
Class,. !3JILlc 
Book Mil 



Gopigtttfl . 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. 









ETHICS 



^ 



OR, 



MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



"WALTER H- "HILL, S.J., 

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IX THE ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY. 

Author of Logic and Ontology, or General Metaphysics. 







BALTIMORE: 

Published by John Murphy & Co, 

182 Baltimore Street. 

London: R. Washbourne, 18 Paternoster Ptow. 

1878. 






Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1878, by 

John Murphy, 
in the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington. 



PREFACE. 



The following work, now respectfully offered to the Public, 
is an elementary treatise on ethics or moral philosophy. It 
contains only those essential and salient principles concerned 
in man's moral action, a clear knowledge of which was .be- 
lieved to be important for students of philosophy. When 
executing this design it was judged best to omit many things 
that would be appropriate in a treatise whose aim was more 
comprehensive; and, for the sake of brevity, even to con- 
dense the matter actually introduced. 

It is the end of philosophy to show truth as coming from 
its first, most absolute, and most universal principles ; and it 
is for ethics to explain the intrinsic and essential constituents 
of moral action in man, as naturally known to human reason. 
Among the subjects pertaining to ethics herein discussed, it 
was deemed expedient, in a work primarily intended for use 
where all citizens have some voice in political affairs, to ex- 
amine the nature, properties, and scope of civil law and au- 
thority, at as great length as the limits of such a book could 
becomingly allow. 

Practical instruction on particular matters of positive duty 
is the special office of the many excellent didactic and doc- 
trinal writings that are composed for general use among the 



IV PREFACE. 

people ; ethics has for its proper aim to furnish demonstrative 
reasons to prove the truth and justice of the chief, funda- 
mental principles from which all the more special rules of 
natural rectitude or morality are deduced. By not sufficiently 
or correctly discriminating between the wholly distinct ends 
of the ethical treatise, and the Christian catechism, one might 
produce a book, and name it philosophy, which, in reality, 
would justly merit the censure of being, "not philosophy, but 
theology not proved." Truth supernaturally taught, and all 
laws and duties based on it, have Divine revelation for the 
foundation of their certainty ; but the arguments of philos- 
ophy are discovered by the natural light of reason. Yet, 
truth that is divinely revealed, and truth proved by natural 
reason, can never be really opposed to each other, both having 
God for their author. Nor, on the other hand, is it anything 
inconsistent that philosophy should be guided and perfected 
by revealed doctrine, at least indirectly, and in matter that is 
of itself obscure to man's unaided natural reason. When the 
human mind is truly logical, it will aways derive the same 
conclusions from the same premises ; still there is not a little 
diversity of opinion concerning some subjects of moral phil- 
osophy, which is apparent especially in questions that regard 
the application of ethical principl _s to certain social and civil 
matters. It can scarcely be doubted that the predilections of 
education, and the peculiar influence of national customs on 
the mind, have some share in causing this difference of thought 
which exists even among the well meaning. 

The criterion of scientific and philosophical truth is not 
authority, but evidence ; namely, the evidence of propositions 
as following necessarily and demonstratively from their cer- 
tain principles ; but, even in scientific and philosophical mat- 



! 



PREFACE. V 

ter, recognized authority is required for some minds, as a 
guaranty of correctness. The well thought sayings of great 
authors, especially of St. Thomas, the master of the schools, 
are often cited on the margin, both as confirmatory of the 
reasoning advanced in the text, and as suggestive of other 
arguments. The fact should not be unknown to the ingen- 
uous student of philosophy, however, that, especially in more 
recent times, the words of St. Thomas, like those of the sacred 
Scriptures, are sometimes quoted in proof of the most contra- 
dictory assertions, and for sustaining the most opposite sys- 
tems : a circumstance which serves, at least, to show the 
weight that his authority still has among the learned. Neverthe- 
less, it is a peculiar excellency of the scholastic language that 
it is neither equivocal nor indefinite. It is, perhaps, not 
saying too much to affirm that the old scholastic metaphys- 
icians are never at fault in their reasoning, when it is a 
question of what must be true in the nature of things, or of 
what can be determined by the canons of strict argumenta- 
tion. Truths that spring necessarily from the very nature of 
man and of human society, never change, though things that 
are extrinsic and accidental to them may change. Those ven- 
erable philosophers of the olden times reached their conclu- 
sions by rigorous logic; and their conclusions were right and 
true, because derived by necessary sequence from matter not 
subject to mutation. St. Thomas and the illustrious authors 
in succeeding centuries that studied his writings and developed 
their meaning, had no opposite opinions concerning the 
natural origin and constitution of civil society. Indeed, there 
is little doubt that nothing is gained by theorists who reject 
the teachings, and the axioms received as certain among 
those sagacious thinkers ; at least, in the truths of social ethics 
1* 



VI PREFACE. 

which are mainly dependent for their proof on speculative or 
abstract reasoning. 

The writer's thanks are hereby tendered to the Public, and 
to the periodical press, for the favor shown his Elements of 
Philosophy, which has met with unlooked-for success. It is 
hoped that this little volume on Ethics, or Moral Philosophy, 
though not a complete and comprehensive work on that branch 
of philosophy, and, doubtless, not free from errors and im- 
perfections that were unobserved in the matter actually con- 
tained, may, despite those defects, still be found of some use 
as a help for the student of philosophy. 

Walter H. Hill, S. J. 

•S*/. Louis University, May 27, 1878. 



INTRODUCTION. 



A purely speculative science has for its object only the con- 
templation of truth; its subjects belong exclusively to the 
intellect, having no direct or immediate reference at all to 
practical things ; yet, such science may be remotely useful, in 
a greater or less degree, to the practical. Ethics is not a 
speculative science, except under some particular respect ; its 
object pertains to the will, and its aim is to perfect the will 
with the good that is true. Though ethics, viewed under a 
certain respect, or as to the mode in which it demonstrates 
a priori some truth, may be called speculative science ; yet, 
that truth is referred by it more or less immediately and di- 
rectly to the practical, or to the objects of the will's deliberate 
action. Moreover, the fundamental principle of this science 
is man's ultimate destination, his sum?num bonum or chief 
good, as an object to which he can freely tend, by using pro- 
portionate means. Hence, ethics is properly styled a practical 
science, since it is concerned about an end to be gained, and 
the. means of attaining to it. 

Ethics, from the Greek word ^°C (Latin, mores, morals, 
whence the name moral philosophy,) is so called, because it 
aims at what ultimately perfects man as a moral being. What 
ultimately perfects man as a moral being, is the acquiring of 
his summum bonum, or of that object, the possession of which 
constitutes for him the state of perfect beatitude or happiness. 
What ultimately perfects man in the present order of his ex- 
istence, is intellectual and moral virtue ; or, from the stand- 



YIII INTRODUCTION 

point of ethics, it is chiefly moral goodness, since in ethics the 
intellectual virtues are regarded as having for their end to 
subserve and perfect the moral virtues. On this account 
ethics is often said to be the fruit of all the sciences, since it 
ultimately perfects man, by ordering those sciences, and all 
things else in respect to an ultimate end that is absolutely 
supreme. 

Since the various objects about which man's knowledge 
and action can be exercised, are related to each other in 
many different manners, we may distinguish several kinds of 
order and connection among things which human science 
regards and proposes; for example, there are many kinds of 
order and real connection in things which reason does not 
devise or found, but which it discovers as facts. The physi- 
cal sciences, whose objects are real things," have for their 
proper matter relations of this kind ; as, that the tides follow 
the moon's movement around the earth; that hydrogen 
burns ; the earth's orbit around the sun is an ellipse, etc. 
There is also an order of connections and relations among 
things which reason devises, and establishes for itself arti- 
ficially, founding it, however, on real things. Of this kind 
are grammar, logic, etc., which are man's work; they propose 
artificial relations among things ; but yet they are not " base- 
less fabrics," though those systems are contrived, and built by 
man's ingenuity. To make " Socrates the nominative case," 
" Europe the minor term," etc., is to conceive Socrates and 
Europe, not as real beings in their real relations ; but as 
placed in an order of artificial relations with which human 
reason invests them, for the purposes intended by the arts of 
grammar and logic. 

There is also an order and relationship among objects of 
the will, and in its acts, which reason makes for itself;* but 

* " Est ordo etiam quam scientia facit in actibus voluntatis, uncle oritur 
nostra ethice. Incle patet ethicam esse de rationabilibus scientiis, non ex 
realibus ; id est earn esse ex iis, quorum objectum pendit a ratione, etsi 
aliter, imo minus, quam Logicae, et Grammaticae objectum ; ideoque magis 
est realis, quam Logica vel Grammatical' Irenseus Carmelit. Eth., cap. 



INTRODUCTION". IX 

which it truly founds, however, on the true and positive rela- 
tions of those things. Nature does not infuse into man's rea- 
son the science of ethics, with its principles and conclusions ; 
or, it is not innate to man ; and, the moral character that is 
in the objects which surround him, is not in those objects as 
a real physical quality. Wherefore, human reason, by its 
natural power, puts an order of relations and connections into 
the will's objects, analogously to the manner in which it 
founds the system of relations and connections among con- 
cepts and judgments that constitutes logic; or the manner in 
which it founds a system ot relations and connections among 
words and phrases in a sentence that makes grammar ; and 
thus ethics has some likeness of nature both with real or phys- 
ical science, and with rational science. 

Finally, there is an order which reason puts into outward 
works and operations ; and this is art, which takes its name ac- 
cording to the objects that the work or operation concerns ; 
as, ait of music, art of grammar, art of agriculture, etc. 

It may be said, then, that ethics is a rational science, which 
is conversant about moral good ; and its principles are de- 
duced by man's reason from the objects that concern the free 
will ; it has for its ulterior end the art by which man may live 
uprightly or conformably to right reason. 

The plan pursued by Aristotle in his Ethics, and Politics, 
was adopted in many subsequent schools ; and in substance 
it is the one followed by most writers on moral philosophy at 
the present time. Aristotle made ethics preliminary to his 
politics. He argued that the end is first and principal among 
causes ; that there is an ultimate objective end, or " summum 
bonum," at which man is ordained by nature to aim; and the 
possession of this chief good constitutes man's last perfection, 

I, § 2. There is also an order which science makes in the acts of the 
will, and from that our ethics arises. It is plain, then, that ethics is a 
rational science, rnd not a real or physical science ; that is, it is of those 
sciences the object of which depends on reason, though in another manner, 
and even less so, than does the object of logic and grammar ; and it is, 
therefore, more a real science than is logic or grammar. 



X INTKODU CTION. 

and his complete beatitude. He explains the nature and the 
principles of morality ; and also of the virtues, which are 
means of fitting man for beatitude ; beatitude itself being pro- 
duced by the contemplation of what is highest and best. Man, 
as alone or solitary, is not sufficient for himself ; he is, there- 
fore, a social being, or is intended by nature to live in society ; 
and he must exist in civil society. After considering man as 
a member of the family, he then discusses, at some length, the 
different forms of civil government, contrasting their various 
advantages and disadvantages. 

The following treatise is similar in its plan and scope to 
numerous modern works of the kind which are modeled on 
the writings of this illustrious Grecian philosopher. Accordingly, 
the first part regards what ultimately perfects man ; or, it 
treats of final beatitude, and the nature and principles of that 
moral goodness necessarily required to be in the means by 
which man attains to ultimate bliss. In the second part 
human action and moral goodness are considered as applied 
to more specific matter; as, man's relation to God, to his fel- 
low man, to the family, and to civil society. 



CONTENTS. 



ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



PART I. GENERAL ETHICS. 

CHAPTER I. 

ULTIMATE END OR DESTINY OF MAN. 

PAGE. 

Article I : All the Voluntary Action of Man, as well as the Natural 
Action of Irrational Things, has an Appointed Ultimate 
End that is duly Proportioned to it 15 

Article 2 : What Constitutes Perfect Human Bliss ; or in what Good, 

Complete Beatitude consists 19 

Article 3 : Whether any Goods of this Present Life can be the Object 
that is Adequate or Proportioned to a State of Perfect 
Bliss for Man 26 

Article 4: Whether the Attainment of Final Beatitude Depends on 
Man's Free Action ; and whether Beatitude is the same 
for all Persons ; whether an Imperfect Bliss is Attain- 
able in this Life, as a Proximate End of Man 34 

CHAPTER II. 

ACTION OF MAN AS A RATIONAL BEING. 

Article I : Human Action ; or of those Actions which Fall Under the 

Empire of Man's Reason 41 

Article 2 : Of Voluntary and Involuntary Actions 45 

Article 3 : Whether Concupiscence Renders Man's Actions Involun- 
tary; whether Fear or Anger takes away Liberty of the 
Will 50 

CHAPTER III. 

PRINCIPLES OF MORAL GOODNESS. 

Article I : Morality of Human Actions 54 

Article 2: The Principles which Proximately Cause Morality 61 



XII CONTENTS. 

PAGE. 

Article 3 : Merit and Demerit of Human Actions 65 

Article 4: Whether any Human Actions are neither Morally Good 

nor Morally Bad 69 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE PASSIONS. 

Article I : General Nature of Passion 73 

Article 2 : Classifica ion of Passions according to their Objects and 

their Acts 77 

Article 3 : Imputability of Passion . . 79 

CHAPTER V. 

THE VIRTUES. 

Article I : General Notion of Virtue 84 

Article 2 : The Moral Virtues 89 

Article 3 : The Cardinal Virtues ; of Prudence and Justice 94 

Article 4: Fortitude and Temperance 97 

CHAPTER VI. 

LAW. 

Article I : The Eternal Law 104 

Article 2: Natural Law 108 

Article 3: Most General Precept of the Natural Law; Immutability 

and Unity of Natural Law 114 

Article 4: Positive Law 124 

CHAPTER VII. 

CIVIL LAW. 

Article I : Necessity of Civil Laws 133 

Article 2 : Human Law does not Extend to all Good nor all Evil ; it is 

not the Natural Law Applied 139 

Article 3 : Law Essentially Just ; it Binds in Conscience 145 

Article 4 : Sanction of Law 154 

CHAPTER VIII. 

CONSCIENCE. 

Article I : What Conscience is. . ^ .. 165 

Article 2 : Rectitude, and Error of Conscience 1 70 



CONTENTS. XIII 

PART II. SPECIAL ETHICS. 

CHAPTER I. 

RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 

PAGE. 

Article I : General Notion of Right and Duty 182 

Article 2: ,Law as Related to Right and Duty 190 

CHAPTER II. 

SPECIAL DUTIES. 

Article I : Man's Duty to God 195 

Article 2 : Duty of Man towards Himself 200 

Article 3: Of Self-Defence 206 

Article 4 : Man's Duties towards his Fellow Man 212 

Article 5 : Veracity or truthfulness; the Lie is Intrinsically Evil 215 

Article 6: Origin of Dominion or Ownership of Property; Commu- 
nism False 222 

CHAPTER III. 

MAX AS A SOCIAL BEING. 

Article I : Man's First Social Relation is to the Family 240 

Article 2 : Unity of the Family 243 

Article 3: Respective Duties of Parents and Children 252 

Article 4: Servile State or Slavery ; Rights and Duties of Masters and 

Slaves 255 

CHAPTER IV. 

CIVIL SOCIETY. 

Article I : Necessity of Civil Society 261 

Article 2 : Necessity of Supreme Authority and Government; Unit of 

Civil Society 268 

Article 3 : Origin of Authority to Govern Civil Society 275 

Article 4: Different Forms of Civil Government ; Right of Suffrage. . 292 
Article 5 : Faculties of Supreme Authority ; its Right Use ; Neces- 
sary Qualities of the Good Ruler 298 

Article 6 : Privation of Law and Government ; or Concerning An- 
archy and Tyranny in the Body Politic 305 

Article 7 : Common Law of Nations ; or, the Jus Gentium ; Inter- 
national Law - : 319 

Conclusion 333 

Alphabetical Index - 335 

2 



ETHICS, OK MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

PAET L-GENEEAL ETHICS. 



CHAPTER I. 

ULTIMATE END, OR DESTINY OF MAN. 
ARTICLE I. 

ALL THE DELIBERATE ACTION OF MAN, AS WELL AS THE 
NATURAL ACTION OF IRRATIONAL THINGS, IS ON ACCOUNT 
OF AN ULTIMATE END. 

The end, according to a general meaning of the term, is 
that for the sake of which an act or an operation is performed;* 
and the ultimate end, in the intention of an intelligent agent, 
is that to which all other ends intended by it are subordinate, 
and to which they all tend, as means. 

The end thus understood is one of the four causes,t as 
explained in works on general metaphysics : it is the first and 
the highest among causes; for, though it influences only 
morally towards the production of the effect wrought by the 
efficient cause, yet it is directive of the other causes, and they 
are subordinate to it. The ultimate end, or the final purpose 
for the accomplishment of which all the means are cobrdi- 

* " Finis est id cujus gratia aliquid fit, in quo quiescit, et satiatur agens ; 
ergo est aptus appeti." The end is that for whose sake any thing is 
done, and in which the agent rests satisfied; it is, therefore, fitted to be 
desired by appetite." 

t " Bonum habet rationem causae finalis." I p., qu, 5, a. 2, ad 1. 
Good has the nature of final cause. "Verum est in anima, sed bonum est 
in rebus." 1 p., qu. 16, a. I, ad 4. The true is in the mind, but the 

good is in things. 

ds) 



16 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

nated, rules all the intermediate actions and intentions:* like 
the first mover that controls the action of many dependent 
agents, which it causes to move in obedience to an impulse 
given by it to the proximate or nearest one, and which is 
then communicated from one to another till the last. Hence 
it is that the ultimate end is often styled " die principle of in- 
tention;" for all other intentions in the rational agent are sub- 
ject to the supreme influence of the object ultimately aimed 
at, and all other action of such agent is related to this ultimate 
end as means; or it reduces to unity all action of the agent, 
causing all movements to tend towards i: as their last term. 
All things in the world exist and act on account of an end. 
The special end for which some things exist is easily discerni- 
ble by us; and one important advantage furnished by physical 
science is the aid which it gives us in discovering and inter- 
preting the plan and order that are in the works of nature. 
We cannot conceive a being created to endure perpetually in 
the condition of tendency to an end, without ever reaching a 
final state, or, at least, without ever fulfilling the purpose of 
its existence. But though all things have some ultimate end, 
which is proportioned to their nature, yet they tend to it in 
different manners, for their action is according to their specific 
nature — " modus agendi sequitur modum essendi." Irrational 
things move towards their ultimate end in obedience to a law 
implanted in them by the author of their being. The brute 
animal can apprehend an end,t as materially such, and tend 
to it by the impulse of sensible appetite; but it cannot know 
an end, formally as an end, which is a rational act. An intel- 
ligent being can apprehend an end, as an end; and it can 
select and arrange the means for its fulfillment. 

*" Primum principium in operatives, quorum est ratio practica, e*t finis 
ultimus." P. 1.2, qu. 90 a. 2, in C. In practical things, which are the object 
of practical reason, the first principle is the ultimate end. The end is 
always first in the intention, and it directs the agent's action; but that end 
is last in the execution of the work. 

t " Finem aoprehendunt, sed non rationem finis." They apprehend 
an end, but not its nature as an end. 



GENERAL ETHIGS. 17 

Not all man's action is performed by him for an end. Here 
we may distinguish four kinds of action in man, answering to 
four grades of essential perfection that are combined in him : 
i. that which he has in common with inanimate natures — v. 
g , minerals ; 2. that which he has in common with veget- 
able natures; 3. the action which he has in common with 
irrational animals — beings whose action is wholly limited to 
these three kinds can tend to an end, as an end, only when 
directed by an intelligent agent that is extrinsic to them and 
superior to them; 4. man can act as a rational being; he can 
apprehend an end precisely and formally as an end, and select 
and use appropriate means for its attainment. He has some 
actions of the first three kinds, and they are really actions of 
man, inasmuch as he is their principle; but they are not 
styled human actions, since by them he does not tend to an 
end differently from inanimate things, nor from the vegetable, 
and the irrational animals, which move towards an end without 
knowing its nature as an end. Man's action is specifically 
and completely human only when it is on account of an end 
intended by him, or when it is rational and deliberate.* 

Man naturally tends to happiness; or, man ultimately aims 
at happiness, in all he does, whether his will acts with delibe- 
rate choice, or naturally, spontaneously, and without deliberar 
tion. The will cannot love evil, as evil ; but, by the physical and 
necessary law of its nature, it embraces what is apprehended 
and offered to it precisely and purely as good. When good 
is understood in this general sense as the undetermined object 
towards which the will necessarily tends in all its particular 
acts, it is sometimes called by authors, man's chief good, 
man's beatitude, or the ultimate end of man's actions, etc. ; and 
there is a respect under which all these forms of expression are 

* "Homo est dominus actuum suorum per rationem et voluntatem; 
unde et liberum ai-bitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis." 1. 2 
p., qu. I, a. I. Man is the master of his actions through his reason and 
will ; on this account, freedom to choose is called a faculty of the will and 
the reason. 

"In omni malo est aliquid boni." I p., qu. 49, a. 3. In every evil 
there is something of good. 

2* 



18 ETHICS, OB MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

true and proper. But further on, we shall see more precisely 
what object and what action of rational nature are required in 
order to constitute perfect human bliss.* 

Reflection on the operations of our own faculties manifests 
the fact to us that in all our voluntary action, we tend to one 
dominant and supreme end ; and that we always either explic- 
itly or implicitly intend that end, in whatever we do as rational 
agents. This end, which is always thus intended by us, is our 
own happiness, our own good; and at this we ever aim, 
whether the means selected by us to accomplish our purpose 
be, in themselves, good or bad. From that end, understood 
in this general sense, we cannot, by any physical possibility, 
avert our wills; for this simple good is the proper object of 
the will, just as color is the connatural and proper object of 
the eye, or sound is that of the hearing; and no faculty can 
turn away from its own specific object to one which is totally 
separated from its whole sphere of action.t It is in accord- 
ance with this truth that the philosophical axiom is to be un- 
derstood, "finis non cadit sub electione ;" the end does not fall 
under our choice, or it is not subject to choice : the end here 
meant is that happiness or good for self which we ultimately 
intend by all that we do. All the other ends which man 
wishes, regard particular things; they are subject to choice 
and they are only means in respect to what is ultimately 
intended by him; to these particular and special ends, which 
may be freely intended by way of means, is applied the axiom, 
•' media cadunt sub electione:" the means fall under election, 
or the means are subject to free choice. 

This ruling principle in man, by which he is irresistibly 

* Observe, then, that the expressions, "man's ultimate end," "man's 
beatitude," "man's chief good," are applied, under different respects, to 
that simple but indeterminate good towards which the will is naturally and 
necessarily inclined, and to which it is conceived to be always tending in its 
acts. But when we conceive God as the real object of happiness, and the 
real chief good, then those expressions are applied accordingly. 

t " Nulla potentia potest ferri extra suam objectum adaequatum." 
Suarez' Metaph. Disp. 30, sec. 1 1, no. 2. No power or faculty can be 
carried beyond its own adequate, commensurate object. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 19 

impelled towards a supreme end or chief good for him, must, in 
the very nature of things, have its ultimate term or object; for 
this natural tendency in man to a term which he never reaches 
in this life, is conclusive proof that he is destined for a future 
state of existence, and that, in respect to it, his present one is 
preparatory and transitional. 



ARTICLE II. 

WHAT CONSTITUTES PERFECT HUMAN BLISS; OR IN WHAT 
GOOD COMPLETE BEATITUDE CONSISTS. 

In order the more clearly to understand the operation of 
man's rational nature, and the object of his action, in a state 
of perfect bliss or complete beatitude, we should distinguish 
between objective beatitude andforma/ beatitude. Objective 
beatitude, is that thing, or object, the possession of which will 
render man perfectly happy; formal beatitude, is that action 
or operation of man's own powers, by which he will really and 
truly possess that thing or object that is to make him happy. 

Since perfect bliss or beatitude should be the ultimate com- 
plement of the rational or intellectual nature's perfection, it 
must include, as esseritial to it, the highest and most noble 
action of that intelligent being. What is the highest and the 
noblest act of an intelligent being ? It cannot be that of rea- 
soning; for all reasoning is progress toward an end, or to what 
is more perfect; or it is a means of attaining to an end, and 
not the act of possessing it. The highest and noblest act of 
an intelligent being, is the vision or contemplation of truth; 
and from this act of the intellect, there result love and fruition 
in the will, which are greater or less, according to the degree 
of beauty and goodness in the object contemplated. Man's 
highest faculty is that one which rules over all his other pow- 
ers, which is first to act; which gives light and offers objects 
of action to all his superior faculties, and which gives him his 
nearest likeness to the divine nature : all this is true only of 



20 ethics, on moral philosophy. 

his intellect; and, by consequence, the intellect is principal 
among the powers of man's rational nature. 

When we consider the objects which the action of the intel- 
lect may concern, its operation in knowing may be distin- 
guished into two kinds; the practical and the speculative. 
The intellect itself as capable of acquiring both practical and 
speculative knowledge, or of knowing both practical and 
speculative things, is also distinguished into the practical in- 
tellect, and the speculative intellect. 

Practical -knowledge regards the feasible, what can be done 
physically, or what ought to be done morally; such knowledge, 
consequently, has for its object concrete, individual things and 
contingent truths. Speculative knowledge principally regards 
necessary things, and therefore its object is that which is abso- 
lute and immutable. It is manifest that an object has greater 
or less perfection in its own species, according to the greater 
or less degree in which the goodness of that object is exempt 
from contingency or mutability. Now, in order for that oper- 
ation of the soul required for perfect bliss or beatitude to be 
the highest and noblest action of the soul's principal faculty, 
it must also have for its object that which is highest, noblest, 
and most necessary. 

It may be affirmed, then, that human beatitude consists, 
principally and essentially, in the most perfect operation of 
man's superior powers, in regard to the highest and noblest 
object. In order for this object to be the highest and noblest, 
it must be absolutely perfect, absolutely good, and absolutely 
ultimate, and thus leave nothing ulterior to be conceived and 
desired which is greater; because the object must fill the capa- 
city of the understanding for truth, and that of the will for 
goodness; otherwise, these faculties could tend towards a 
further term or a greater object. Also, since the intellect can 
not know the essence of all things till it knows the essence of 
their cause, it follows that its ultimate objective end must be 
the first cause that exists a se, or independently of all cause. 
Finally, the intellect and will are not limited for their objects 
to the finite; they can tend to what is greater and greater; 



GENERAL ETHICS. 21 

nor will this movement cease in them till it terminates in the 
infinite. All relative perfection implies dependence, limita- 
tion, mutability ; and, by consequence, cannot be what is most 
desirable. Therefore, the objective end of man which is ab- 
solutely ultimate, is God ; and his beatitude will be the con- 
templation and love of God as infinitely true, beautiful, and 
good. 

The knowledge of God which a disembodied spirit might 
naturally have, would be greatly superior to that which man 
can acquire in this life; but we have no sufficient reason to 
suppose that it would become that of immediate intuitive 
vision, except by a supernatural elevation of the soul's facul- 
ties. Though it is not simply impossible for God to make a 
creature so perfect that intuitive vision of the divine essence 
would be connatural to it ; yet, as a fact, man is not such a 
creature. 

Man's knowledge naturally begins with sensible filings, which 
he perceives through his external organs, and the images of 
their objects formed in the fancy; he ascends to the knowl- 
edge, of higher things by reasoning on those that are sensible. 
In his present state, he also understands supernatural things, 
only by comparing them to things naturally known. The 
ideas or concepts which reason can form for itself of superior 
beings, must always present those objects to him only in an 
abstract manner; for, the conclusion of a syllogism, in the 
very nature of things, expresses what is abstract; at least, in 
as much as it is precisely a logical conclusion; and man can 
form concepts of such beings only by means of reasoning. 
The conclusion of an argument is not derived from the object 
immediately ; but from premises, at least one of which is uni- 
versal, and therefore abstract. 

Our knowledge of God is called abstract knowledge , because 
our ideas or concepts of him are not derived from him as im- 
mediately visible to our understandings ; but they are acquired 
through a medium; or by w r ay of conclusions which present 
him logically to our intellects. This truth explains the fact 
that we have not any one concept with its name, that ade- 



22 

quately expresses to our minds what God is ; but we must 
needs employ a number of names which we apply to Him by 
way of predicates that vary in meaning, according to the spe- 
cies of objects and nature of the reasoning which furnish them 
to us: v. g., i, we give to Him such names as express unity, 
simplicity, absolute being, etc.; 2, negatives in form; as infi- 
nite, immutable, immense, etc.; 3, relative predicates; as Crea- 
tor, Lord, Providence. 

The primary and most connatural object of man's intellect, 
then, is the essence, or the intelligible idea of sensible things ;* 
from the ideas of sensible objects, and by reasoning he rises 
to the knowledge of what has a higher order of existence. If 
we suppose the soul to be separated from the body, it should 
then also, in the very nature of things, have its primary and 
connatural object of knowledge. The object proportioned to 
that state of its existence would be its own essence or sub- 
stance, as that which is next above man's corporeal nature; 
his reason would ascend from the knowledge of his own soul, 
to the knowledge of superior beings and of God ; for man is 
naturally rational, and not purely intelligent, or capable of 
knowing all things intuitively. 

If the foregoing explanations be correct, it follows that 
when the human soul is separated from the body, it could 
naturally know God only in an abstract manner; for, what is 
known by way of logical inference from other truths, is known 
in an abstract manner. 

The concept of God or the idea of his essence, derived 
from, or founded on, man's soul as the intellect's primary or 
beginning object, would be far superior, in every respect, to 
any idea or concept which it is possible for the reason of man 
to form, while it is wholly dependent on the senses and fancy 
for the presentation of its objects. But yet the knowledge of 
God by means of such idea, would not be the intuition of his 
essence ; . He would still be known through the medium of 

* Man' s intellectual ideas of sensible things are formed by help of the 
fancy ; but yet the intellectual ideas have no sensible quality in them ; they 
are spiritual acts, though their objects be material things. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 23 

analogy, and abstractly. To this doctrine the objection may 
occur to the mind : " Man could desire to see God intuitively; 
by what was before said, then, the abstract knowledge of God 
cannot be in ultimate beatitude, which leaves nothing ulterior 
to be desired." The present investigation pertains only to 
natural, not to supernatural beatitude : it does not follow that 
because the soul would know the nature of intuition,* that it 
could desire to see God intuitively; for, it could not posi- 
tively desire what would be unnatural and wholly dispropor- 
tioned to its own species; one cannot, except irrationally, 
desire to be of another and specifically different nature. 

We know from Revelation, however, that the souls of those 
persons who fulfill the positive conditions in this life which 
God has prescribed, will possess supernatural beatitude, in 
which they will see God intuitively, and as He is in Himself; 
for, the lumen glorice, light of glory, which is a supernatural 
medium of intellectual vision, will so elevate the intellect, that 
it will be made able to apprehend the divine essence imme- 
diately. 

Man does not necessarily tend to God as the object of his 
ultimate beatitude; nor can he tend, at the same time, to 
more ultimate objective ends, than one. 

It is true that the human will necessarily loves good, and, 
by consequence, man necessarily tends to what his reason 

* We perceive an object intuitively, only when that object, through its 
own real and immediate evidence, is present to the mind. The term "in- 
tuition," as formerly used by the best English writers, was limited for its 
object to self-evident, necessary first principles and the evident conclu- 
sions that necessarily and proximately follow from them ; no self-evident 
fact or truth in contingent matter was regarded by them as included in the 
proper object of the mind's intuitive perceptions. Many authors of the 
present day employ this term in a less restricted sense, so as to include 
within its matter the direct and immediate perceptions of the senses and 
consciousness ; and this use of the word is conformable to its original mean- 
ing in the Latin language, and also to the sense given to it in most modern 
languages that have adopted it. The advantages of general uniformity in 
philosophical terminology, amply justify this change by which the term in- 
tuition is now made to include within the scope of its objects whatever is 
directly apprehended through its own immediate evidence. 



24 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

apprehends as good, in all his actions. But that good to 
which man thus necessarily tends, is indeterminate; or it is 
simple good in general, but not as actually referred to a 
specific or particular object. The will is by its nature predis- 
posed, or inclined beforehand to whatever is offered to it as 
good; the appreciation or judgment of that good, as an 
object, belongs to the rational faculty or intellect. But since 
the will and the understanding are faculties of the same soul, 
when the intellect apprehends an object as good for us under 
one respect, and evil under another respect, the soul can then 
deliberate, and choose, or refuse to make a choice or act at 
all. But in this case the object of choice is not that simple 
good towards which the will naturally and necessarily tends 
when it is apprehended as such ; it is a mixed good, or good 
that is marred with evil, and it is only a means to that good 
or happiness which is the connatural end of the rational 
appetite. 

Though we speculatively conceive and admit God to be the 
real and only ultimate object of our beatitude, as He was 
above shown to be ; yet, owing to the fact that this truth is 
not immediately evident — God being known to us only by 
means of a logical conclusion — that it is, in itself, more or less 
obscure, and that there are impediments which must be sur- 
mounted in actually tending to Him as our future ultimate 
objective end, we can, as a fact which experience teaches us, 
avert from Him, and seek our bliss in present and mixed 
good, even so as practically to ignore Him. 

That we cannot simultaneously tend to two ultimate objec- 
tive ends that are distinct, or are nowise related to each 
other, is true, in the very nature of things. In the same 
manner that every being is one, " omne ens est unura : " so 
every nature is one; and, therefore, its essential operations 
are reducible to unity of principle.* As the arrow cannot 
move towards the east and the west, at one and the same 
time, similarly, the total operation of a being's nature cannot, 

*"Naturanon rendit nisi ad'unum." P. I. 2, qu. I, a. 5. A nature 
tends to but one principal object. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 25 

at one and the same time, tend to two distinct and separate 
ultimate ends or objects. 

It may be said that in man the intellect and will tend 
towards the same essential end; the intellect to apprehend it 
as the supreme truth, and the will to love or desire it as the 
chief good. But man does not, in every act, explicitly think 
of his ultimate end, even when the whole plan of his life is so 
ordered as to make God the object of his beatitude; just as 
no one thinks, at every step he takes, concerning the town to 
which he is walking. 

We may conclude, then, that man cannot avert from his 
ultimate end or beatitude, understanding by this ultimate end 
the connatural object of his will; but when we consider his 
ultimate end or beatitude as including a determinate object, it 
must be said that the will is free to choose for itself an 
objective end; and, by consequence, even God, who is abso- 
lutely good, does not necessitate the will of man while on 
earth to love Him as the object of his ultimate beatitude or 
perfect future bliss. For man's present knowledge of God, as 
already observed, is more or less obscure and confused, owing 
to his complete dependence on his senses for all he naturally 
knows, even of God; and, besides, man can easily permit 
himself to be enticed by particular good that is immediately 
present to him. 

The perfection of the will does not consist in liberty of 
indifierence alone; for this is perfection only under a respect; 
its perfection is in loving goo i, which is evidently apprehended 
as such; in loving infinite good necessarily, or, while on 
earth, loving the means to it freely. Liberty of indifference in 
respect to good and evil is a mixed perfection; or it is, under 
different respects, both a perfection and an imperfection. 
Man does not love Infinite good necessarily while he is on earth, 
because he apprehends that good but obscurely and imper- 
fectly. If he saw Infinite good evidently and perfectly, his will 
would love it necessarily, and with its highest and most perfect 
act. The exercise of rational liberty in the choice of true 
means to good is man's highest operation in his mortal life. 
3 



26 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



ARTICLE III. 

WHETHER THE GOODS OF THIS WORLD OR THIS LIFE CAN 
BE THE OBJECT THAT IS ADEQUATE OR PROPORTIONED 
TO A STATE OF PERFECT BLISS FOR MAN. 

In order to satisfy the mind more fully as to the object and 
the state required to render man perfectly happy, it is neces- 
sary to consider the question as to whether or not the 
possession of any goods of the present life on earth could 
constitute for him the state of perfect beatitude. This inquiry 
is all the more necessary, from the fact, that since our sensible 
feelings and animal appetites naturally incline to present 
things,* they greatly sway our judgments, and they give an 
occasion of irrational prejudice in the mind against any object 
of happiness that is conceived to be remote from us and 
difficult of attainment. 

No goods of this life can be that object the possession of 
which suffices to constitute bliss proportioned to the capacity 
of man's rational nature First : the objective cause of perfect 
bliss for man cannot be the goods of fortune, or exterior 
goods; as, riches, fame or glory, honor, rank or authority to 
rule. 

That riches cannot be the object of beatitude is easily 
shown: a thing which, by its nature, is only the means to an 
end, cannot be the ultimate objective end of man's beatitude • 
but riches are only a means to an end, since their whole value 
and aim are in this, that they may be used as means of pur- 
chasing or acquiring good things : therefore, they are valuable 
or good, only as means to an end. 

The object of man's beatitude cannot be fame or glory 

* " Operationes sensuum quia sunt principia nostrce cognitionis, sunt 
magis perceptibiles : unde delectationes sensibiles a pluribus appetuntur. " 
P. I. 2, qu. 2, a. 6, ad 2. As the actions of our senses begin our knowl- 
edge of things, they make more impression on us : hence it is that sensible 
pleasures are so desired by many. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 27 

among men. Fame or glory consists in being known and 
praised by many persons, " est clara cum laude notitia." The 
merit or the excellency, on account of which one becomes 
known and praised among men, is either truly and really pos- 
sessed, or it is not thus possessed at all. In the first case, the 
merit or excellency causes the fame or glory among men, and 
it is a superior good to the glory itself, which is its effect, and 
is its light shed abroad. But if the merit or excellency be not 
really possessed, then the fame of it is false: hence, in neither 
supposition, can fame or glory be that ultimate object required 
for perfect human beatitude. Also, what may be lost, cannot 
be the ultimate objective end of man's beatitude, which, if 
perfect, must be stable and inamissible; but the fame among 
men, even of genuine merit and noble deeds, may be lost; or 
it may fail to be acquired. Man's knowledge depends on the 
object which is its cause; he may not rightly apprehend what 
he sees, and he may forget things which he knows ;* but 
God's knowledge precedes the object, and is its cause : hence, 
glory before God brings bliss to man ; glory before men is, at 
the best, not the substance, but the shadow of good. 

Neither can honors be the object of perfect beatitude, as 
similar arguments serve to prove. In the praise which con- 
stitutes fame, testimony of excellency is given only in words 
or equivalent signs ; honors give testimony of excellency or 
merit, both by words and deeds; v. g., genuflexion before 
majesty is honor paid in action to supreme authority; all 
marks showing high esteem or great preference to one that is 
eminent in superior things, give honor to such person. The 
praise that goes with fame, is more proper to relative merit ; 
honor is more proper to absolute merit or excellency m com- 
parison with all other persons in the community. The good on 
account of which one is honored is the cause of that honor, the 
honor itself is an extrinsic effect, and it cannot, therefore, be the 

* " Notitia ssepe fallitur, et prcecipue in singularibus contingentibus, 
cujusmodi sunt actus humani." P. I. 2, qu. 2, a. 3. Our thoughts are 
often mistaken, especially concerning contingent, particular things, such as 
human actions may regard. 



28 ETHICS, OK MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

cause of man's final perfection or the object of his complete 
ultimate beatitude. Honors do not produce that excellency 
to which they are paid, but they presuppose the good or merit 
in him that receives them. Besides, as Aristotle observes,* 
honor is rather in him that exhibits it, than in him that is 
honored ; but beatitude is in him only who is perfectly happy. 
Finally, it is not morally, or even physically possible for all to 
become preeminent in what entitles them to exclusive honors; 
but beatitude should be physically attainable by all persons. 
A like argument shows that the object of the beatitude in 
question cannot be rank or authority to rule over a multitude ; 
for, in the very nature of things, high rank and authority must 
be limited to a few, and the inquiry concerning the object of 
perfect beatitude regards all mankind. Authority in a man to 
rule over a community has not for its principal and proper 
end special happiness for the ruler ; its essential aim is the 
general good of that community,! even if perchance this 
authority should prove an irksome burden to the ruler. The 
object of perfect beatitude must be per se good; and not what 
is good or bad per accide?is : but authority vested in man is 
susceptible of being used either for good or for evil \ There- 
fore, authority, unlike virtue, is not per se good, since it can 
be used for evil. 

Neither can perfect beatitude, which is the ultimate end of 
man, consist in earthly pleasures or enjoyment. 

Pleasure is in appetite when possessing its proper good. 
Desire, as well as every act of appetite, follows the power of 
apprehension which is proportioned and connatural to it ; 
therefore, the action of sensible appetite depends lor its object 
on sensible or organic power of apprehension ; and that of 

* i Eth. ch. v. 

t "Semper finis excellit id quod est ad finem ; et quanto aliquid efficacius 
ordinatur ad finem tanto melius est." P. 2. 2, qu. 152, a. 5. The end 
always excels the means to that end; the more efficacious the means, the 
more perfect it is. 

% " Potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum." P. 1. 2, qu. 2, a. 4. The 
power is capable of good and it is capable of evil. 



GENKRAL ETHICS. 29 

rational appetite, depends for its object on rational or intel- 
lectual apprehension. It may be concluded, then, that man is 
susceptible of two species or kinds of pleasure ; that of the 
body, which is sensible pleasure ; and that of the rational 
appetite or the will, which transcends the sensible. The singu- 
lar.* concrete and corporeal thing, is all that sensible power 
can apprehend ; and consequently, none but material objects 
are proportioned to, and ordained for, sensible appetites. 

But the only proper object of the intellect is the super- 
sensible, as truth, intelligible essence ; consequently, the good 
which is proportioned to rational appetite, must be immaterial 
good. 

Pleasure in the rational appetite, or joy in the will, is surely 
essential to complete beatitude, since the soul must possess its 
object by contemplation and love, whence fruition or pleasure 
will necessarily result in the soul. It was already shown that 
the principal operation of the soul in perfect beatitude is con- 
templation of God: it is disputed in the schools whether the 
operation of the will, which is dependent on that of the intel- 
lect, and follows it, should be termed an essential, primary 
constituent of perfect beatitude, or rather an essential property 
of it.t In either hypothesis, however, complete beatitude 
must necessarily include love and fruition in the will. 

That perfect bliss or beatitude cannot consist in the bodily 
pleasures of this life, is well known among mankind from the 
facts of experience : for, such pleasures are incomplete and 
unsatisfying; they are not lasting, are not exempt from sad- 
ness and misery; and it is not even by them that man is dis- 
tinguished from the brute or irrational animal, to which they 
are likewise common. Indeed, beatitude, which is the uhi- 

* " Singulare non repugnat intelligent^ in quantum est singulare, sed 
in quantum est materiale : quia nihil intelligitur, nisi immaterialiter. Ideo 
si sit aliquid singulare et immateriale, sicut est intellectus, hoc non 
repugnat intelligenti." P. I, qu. 86. a. I ad 3. It is not opposed to the 
nature of the intellect to apprehend the singular as singular ; but it is the 
singular as material that is thus opposed to it. What is singular and im- 
material, as the intellect is, can be intelligible. 

t P. 1. 2, qu. 2, a. 6, et qu. 3. 
3* 



30 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

mate perfection of an intellectual nature, cannot in any- 
rational supposition, consist principally < f bodily pleasure ; 
for, even if we consider man as he will be in a future and 
better state than that of this life ; and if, moreover, we sup- 
pose with Suarez* that the resurrection ot the body can be 
proved as a conclusion from principles known to natural rea- 
son ; yet, the share of the body in beatitude, from what is 
already shown in the preceding Article, could be only an in- 
tegral part of perfect happiness,! or could at the most be only- 
secondary, and accidental to it. The body, having only ma- 
terial action, could not attain to the principal object of beati- 
tude; therefore it could be affected by that object only through 
the medium of the soul's action. But the present question is 
of perfect beatitude, as to its substantial, principal, and essen- 
tial constituents; not as to what may perfect it extrinsically 
and accidentally. 

It may be concluded from the above reasoning that, a fortiori, 
perfect beatitude cannot consist in any gifts or endowments 
of the mortal body: as, long life, beauty, strength, agility, and 
the like. 

* "Status in corpore est magis naturalis animae : licet resurrectio eo 
modo quo nunc fit, et respectu finis ad quem ordinatur, sit absolute super- 
naturalis, attamen etiam inter leges naturae sistendo, naturalis conditio 
hominis videtur postulare ut habeat finem aliquem perpetuum, non solius 
animae, sed totius compositi. " Suarez, De Anima, lib. 6, c. 8, No. 2. 
The state of union with the body is more natural to the soul : although the 
resurrection in the manner it now takes place, and in respect to the end for 
which it is ordained, is absolutely supernatural; yet even arguing from the 
plane of nature's laws, the condition of man seems to postulate that he have 
a perpetual state not only for his soul, but for the whole compound. 

t " In corporali bono non consists beatitudo sicut in objecto beatitudinis ; 
sed corporale bonum potest facere ad aliquem beatitudinis decorem vel per- 
fectionem." P. 1.2, qu. 4, a. 6 ad. I, 2, 3. Beatitude does not consist in 
corporeal good as in the object of beatitude ; but corporeal good can add 
something befitting beatitude and perfective of it. 

Et ibid, in c. " Cum naturale sit animae uniri corpori, non potest esse 
quod perfectio animae naturalem ejus perfectionem excludat " Since it is 
natural for the soul to be united to the body, it cannot be that the soul's 
perfection should exclude its natural perfection: its natural perfection re- 
quires that it be in union with the body. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 3L 

The virtues being only means to an end, cannot consti- 
tute man's ultimate beatitude. Virtues are habits or qualities 
which perfect a rational or intellectual nature for operation ; 
and they are, therefore, ordained to fit man for possessing per- 
fect beatitude, by giving his superior powers greater facility in 
action. The highest powers of such a nature, are intellect and 
will; and they alone are capable of becoming the subject of 
virtue most properly so called. The intellect may be said to 
have for its object two kinds of matter : First, Contingent mat- 
ter, which is mutable, because it depends for its existence on 
a free cause. Two virtues of the intellect regard contingent 
matter; namely, art, which is concerned about what can be 
done physically or mechanically; and prudence, which regards 
what can be done morally, or what ought to be done. 

Secondly: the intellect includes also, as its object, necessary 
matter, which may be divided into three kinds.: i. Self-evident 
axioms, or necessary and immutable first principles which the 
mind sees to be true, intuitively, or without reasoning ; v. g., 
" it is impossible for the same thing to exist and not to exist, 
at one and the same time :" it is for the virtue of intelligence, 
" intellectus seu habitus primorum principiorum," to give 
facility to the understanding in apprehending and assenting 
to these first principles. 2. There are conclusions which follow- 
necessarily and demonstratively from first principles which are 
absolutely true : these conclusions constitute the object of sci- 
entific knowledge, which knowledge being a permanent ef- 
fect, or a habit in the mind, is appropriately styled a virtue. 
Thirdly, the intellect also includes, as a part of its object, 
the highest and most universal causes of all things, or the most 
absolute and essential predicates of all being, together with 
the necessary conclusions derived from them as principles: 
these form the object of the intellectual virtue, wisdom. 

The moral virtues, which are comprised under the four 
cardinal or principal virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude and 
temperance, perfect the will, giving it facility in right action. 
Both of man's highest faculties are enabled, by means of these 



32 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

virtues, to tend more efficaciously to their proper objects, the 
intellec: to the true, and the will to the good. 

It is manifest from the foregoing definitions and description 
of the virtues, that their only end or effect is to perfect their 
subject for operation, in which the chief principle of action is 
not the virtue; but it is the nature which is informed with the 
virtue that is such principle. The virtues may be said also to 
adorn or beautify man's rational nature; but yet, this is only 
a secondary end of virtue; its primary aim or end is to aid 
the power in that action by which it tends to its principal 
object. Hence it may be argued: that cannot be the object 
of perfect beatitude which, by its very nature, is only a means 
of tending with increased facility of action to that object; but 
all the virtues are only means by which the powers of an 
intellectual nature can tend to and attain the object of its 
ultimate beatitude with greater promptness and alacrity • 
therefore, virtue cannot be the ultimate object, in the possession 
and fruition of which perfect beatitude consLts. 

There is, indeed, a species of bliss in virtue — not complete 
or perfect, however, although the stoics taught that " virtue is 
its own reward." But this maxim of stoic philosophy is not 
true of the virtues in general, as Lessius* observes; nevertheless 
it must be conceded that the most perfect bliss attainable in 
this life consists in the intellectual and moral virtues, and prin- 
cipally, as Aristotle sho\vs,t in that contemplation of the highest 
truth, which is the exercise of wisdom. A thing does not act 
merely for the action itselt, but on account of an object, for 
the attaining of which that action is the means; and this 
holds true in all the operations both of nature and art. Just 
as seed is not put into the ground for the sake of that action, 
but for the fruit that is to grow from the seed ; so, the virtues 
are not practiced simply for the beauty and goodness that are 
in them as assistant principles of noble action, but for the 
superior good to which they are ordained as means; i. e., for 
the ultimate object of beatitude, which is apprehended by the 

* Opuscul. De Immort. Aninrae: Ratio 17. 

t Etli. lib. 10, sect. 10 et 11. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 33 

virtuous mind as the supremely beautiful, true, and good that 
may be gained through them. Besides, the exercise of many 
virtues, nay, all of them, is accompanied with not a little pain 
and difficulty ; and even when acquired in the highest degree 
of perfection naturally attainable here on earth, they do not 
leave man at rest. This is true, because, by their nature, the 
virtues are but means of tending further and higher than 
present things : to do this perseveringly requires effort which 
is never exempt from all pain. Hence, virtue has not condign 
reward, either in present objects, or in itself; i. e., in its own 
exercise. 

A created thing, great enough and perfect enough to be 
the adequate object of man's ultimate beatitude, is even 
simply impossible. 

It is manifest that formal beatitude, which is the operation 
or action by which the soul possesses the object of perfect 
beatitude, is something created, since the action of a creature 
is itself a creature ; but the present question is of that good 
or object, the possession of which constitutes man's perfect 
beatitude, or of his summum bonum. The human understand- 
ing is not limited, as to the objects of its cognition, to this or 
that species of being; it knows many genera and species of 
things; nor are these universals that it knows limited in their 
own order, or as to the number ot their inferiors. While the 
intellect of man is not limited either to any definite number or 
species of finite objects, which are all that it is capable of 
knowing; by transcending created things, it rises even to the 
knowledge of absolute and infinite being, or God. It follows, 
by consequence, that the will is likewise unlimited as to the 
objects of its love ; for the will's capacity to love is commen- 
surate with that of the intellect to know; and it can love as 
good even the objects of the intellect as well as the operation 
of contemplating the beautiful and the true. Hence, as there 
is no limit to the objects, whether in number or greatness of 
perfection, which the intellect can know as true; so, there is 
no limit in the power of the will to love the good. 

It may be inferred, then, from the very nature of the soul's 
3 



34 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

faculties, that, in order for the object of its perfect beatitude 
to be such as to leav.e nothing ulterior, and greater to be 
known by the intellect, and no greater good to be desired by 
the will, it must possess the following properties : i. It must 
be per se, or simply good; i. e., it must be necessary, not 
contingent; therefore, not mutable and amissible good. 2. It 
must be per se complete; i. e., it must include, as a necessary 
property of itself, every perfect good that can be known by 
the intellect and desired by the will; and, therefore, there 
should be in it no privation and no deficiency of any simple 
good that is conceivable. Now, since God is the only real 
being whose attributes are simply absolute; that is, necessary, 
independent of all cause, and therefore infinite, it follows that 
God alone is that complete and simple good, which is the 
object of perfect beatitude. 

Every created being has only contingent existence, and, 
therefore, every created being is only a contingent good; 
consequently, it cannot, by any possibility, possess the prop- 
erties which are essential to an object of complete and perfect 
beatitude, that will leave nothing further or greater to be 
known or desired. 



ARTICLE IV. 

WHETHER THE ATTAINMENT OF FINAL BEATITUDE, IN ANY 
MANNER, DEPENDS ON MAN'S FREE ACTION; AND 
WHETHER FORMAL BEATITUDE IS THE SAME FOR ALL. 
THAT THERE IS A RELATIVE THOUGH IMPERFECT BEAT- 
ITUDE ATTAINABLE IN THIS LIFE; AND IT IS THE 
PROXIMATE END OF MAN. 

It is evident that both the ultimate end or destiny of every 
creature, and the appointed means to that end must be pro- 
portioned to the nature of such being; and we find this 
principle actually verified in the action and tendency of the 
created things around us. Inanimate matter, the vegetable 



GENERAL ETHICS. 35 

kingdom, brute animals, are all plainly seen to tend towards, 
and fulfill destined ends, in the movement towards which they 
are impelled and directed by physical laws imposed on them 
naturally, and which they necessarily obey. The Power that 
made them, and fashioned their nature, and appointed for 
them their destiny, or the end to be accomplished by them; 
also prepared and ordered the means by which they infallibly 
execute his purpose. In moving towards the end for which 
they exist, then, they are ruled and guided by assistant 
intelligence, the intelligence of their Maker working through 
second causes. 

With regard to man, the case is different; he can know an 
end, and can intend it by chosen means ; and while he must 
necessarily tend to that good in general which is the connatu- 
ral and specific object of his will, he can choose for himself a 
particular, determinate object,* and freely use the means of 
tending to it as his chief good. The physical law, by which 
the will naturally, spontaneously and necessarily loves what is 
apprehended merely or simply as good, is a help for man in 
tending towards the true object of his beatitude, and it thus 
supplements his tardy and short-sighted reason. While it is 
demonstratively certain that God alone is the ultimate object 
of perfect human beatitude, yet it is within the limits of man's 
powers, as a free being, practically to seek his beatitude in 
other objects, or in created things, as, v. g, in sensible 
pleasure, in honors, etc. It follows, then, that man's ultimate 
destiny is, in some degree, really and truly in his own hands, t 
and that its happy issue must be his own work. This is 
manifest, since nature fits him for tending to his ultimate end 
as a rational and free being; he can intend the right object of 
perfect beatitude, can judge, select and use the means of 

* " Voluntas est quidem secundum naturae ordinem ad unum commune, 
quod est bonum; sed indeterminate se habet respectu particularium bonorum. " 
P. I. 2, qu. 13, a. 3. The will indeed, by the law of nature, tends to one 
general thing, which is good ; but it is not thus determined in regard to any 
particular good. 

t " God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hands of his 
own counsel." Ecclesiasticus, 15, 14. 



36 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

reaching it : these being his distinctive and specific operations 
as an intelligent creature, it is by them that he must attain to 
the fulfillment of his destiny; "modus agendi sequitur modum 
essendi:" the action of a being follows the nature of that 
being, and especially must that action by which it fulfills the 
end for which it exists be connatural and proper to the being. 
In man, therefore, such action must be rational and free. 
Even the agent that is supernaturally elevated in itself si ill 
acts according to its own nature,* which is not intrinsically- 
changed by such exaltation of its state, its powers and action. 

Is ultimate and perfect beatitude the same in all who attain 
to it? 

We must distinguish between that object, the possession of 
which constitutes beatitude on the one hand; this object is 
God, as already proved, and is, therefore, the same for all; 
and, on the other hand, formal beatitude, which is the action 
of possessing and enjoying the object; this, it must be 
admitted, cannot be, under every respect, the same in all. 
Though beatitude will be relatively perfect in all, in as much 
as it will be fully sufficient, according to each one's capability 
of happiness ; yet, since all will not be equally disposed and 
prepared for it by previous exercise of the intellect and will in 
the virtues, so they will not be equally capable of receiving 

* " Intellectus concurrit ad visionem (beatificam) per suam virtutem 
naturalem, ut naturalis est et non solum ut obedientialis est. . . . eget 
auxilio supernatural ad actus supernaturales, non ad naturales." Be- 
canus, p. I, ch. 9, qu. 4, no 4. The intellect concurs in the beatific vis- 
ion, with its own natural virtue, and not merely by its obediential 'virtue. 
It needs supernatural help for supernatural acts, but not for its natural ac- 
tion. Suarez Met. Disp. 30, sec. n, no. 46, says the intellect then acts 
by "obediential virtue;" but his reasoning is less satisfactory. 

By "obediential" virtue or power, is meant that capability which is 
in every creature of being used as an instrument by a superior agent, for 
producing effects which wholly exceed whatever that instrument itself can 
cause as principal agent. But no instrument can be made to do what would 
imply a contradiction; and hence, for a creature to be used as an instru- 
ment to create from nothing; for a mineral instrumentally to elicit intelli- 
gent action, are operations which would wholly exceed the instrumental or 
"obediential" power of those objects. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 37 

their object. For, beatitude will not destroy nature, to which 
it accedes ; but it will perfect nature. 

But difference in formal beatitude may be conceived as 
arising from two causes: i. substantial difference in souls, by 
which one is physically superior to another; 2. difference of 
disposition and acquired perfection in the powers of the soul, 
arising from merit and virtues. The question as to whether 
or not one human soul is superior in substantial entity to 
another, was long and hotly disputed in the mediaeval schools 
of philosophy, and without ever having been definitively 
settled. The difficulty in their controversy turned mainly on 
the question, whether the principle be true, as proposed in 
many contemporary works on metaphysics, and accepted by 
one party as an axiom; namely, different degrees of perfection, 
in substantial forms, found different species in those forms ; or, 
in other words, any spiritual beings which differ in the degree 
of their substantial perfection, differ also in their specie--. 
Hence, it was argued that if one man's soul is substantially 
more perfect than that of another man, these two souls are 
two different species of substance; but it cannot be admitted 
that the souls of men differ in species ; therefore, it cannot be 
that one human soul is ever superior to another human soul, 
in substantial entity. The other party denied that difference 
in substantial perfection, between the souls of men, causes 
difference of species. In this dispute, let the ingenuous 
reader choose his own opinion: " Unusquisque in suo sensu 
abundet."* 

All must agree, however, that there is a manifest difference 
of rational power in men, as they are actually constituted here 
on earth, arising from greater or less perfection in bodily 
organization, especially in the fancy and sensible memory; 
and also from discipline, or education. Moreover, final beati- 
tude will have the nature of a reward; therefore it must bear 
some proportion to man's personal merit acquired by practical 

* " Let every man abound in his own sense;" i. e., let each choose the 
opinion that he judges more reasonable. 
4 



38 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

rectitude of life ; and, at the same time, merit is of various 
degrees ; or, it is greater or less in different men. 

It may be concluded, then, that, as already declared, final 
beatitude will be different in souls, arising from the fact that 
they will be variously disposed to receive the object of beati- 
tude: and moreover, as it is not improbable that one soul 
may be naturally and physically superior to another within 
the same species ; so, it is not improbable that their indivi- 
dual natures may found some difference in their degree of 
subjective or formal 

What, then, is the relation, as regards this subject matter 
ot man's final destiny, in which he is placed to all those things 
of whatever kinds around him here on earth, which he knows, 
and in respect to which he has power of rational and free 
action ? Since no created things can be the object of his 
perfect beatitude, as already proved, it follows that they can 
be no more, at the best, than subordinate ends for him to in- 
tend ; because, as regards him, they can answer no other im- 
portant purpose, and can serve no other real and final use, 
than that of means to his ultimate state; and beyond this, 
they can have, for him, no meaning or genuine value. 

Man has a proximate end which is to be attained by him in 
this life : it is to perfect himself as a rational and free being.* 

Aristotle, and other philosophers of ancient times, taught 
that man's beatitude consists in superior or perfect virtue; and 
their inquiries as to what constitutes the " summum bonum," 
or chief good of man, were limited to those objects of happi- 
ness that are attainable by man during his mortal life. In- 
deed, it is an undeniable truth, proved by reason, and con- 
firmed by the experience of mankind, that a well ordered and 
virtuous life produces the most perfect bliss that is attainable 

* " Tn hominibus secundum statum prcesentis vitse, est ultima perfectio 
secundum operationem qua homo conjungitur I )eo ; sed hrec operatio nee 
continua potest esse, nee per consequens unica; quia operatio intercessione 
multiplicatur." P. I. 2, qu. 3, a. 2, ad 4. There is an ultimate perfection 
of man relatively to his present state, and it is in the action by which he is 
united to God; but this action can neither be continuous nor simply one; 
for, action is multiplied by ceasing and then beginning again. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 39 

in this world,* at the same time that it has the nature of a 
means towards man's ultimate beatitude. 

The perfection, then, which is ultimate in respect to this 
life, or the chief good, " summum bonum," which can be 
reached by man while in this world, is virtue. Virtue is aptly 
styled, " dispositio perfecti ad optimum," the disposition in a 
being that is made perfect, by which it is fitted for what is 
most excellent; because, virtue is a beautiful quality that 
finally perfects man for his ultimate end, by preparing him for 
the highest action in regard to the greatest and noblest object. 
It is true that all persons are not equally capable of the same 
virtue, nor of the same degree in virtue, if judged by an abso- 
lute standard : but all responsible persons can perfect their 
intellects with the knowledge of necessary truth, and their wills 
in the upright love of God, in a degree proportioned to their 
ability, peculiar character, circumstances, and opportunities. 
The pursuit of virtue causes approval of conscience and joy 
in the will ; the acquisition of it gives peace to the soul, and 
firm hope of the perfect bliss to come ; there result modera- 
tion in deportment, and benignity of demeanor towards other 
persons, which diffuse a happy influence on neighbors. When 
genuine virtue is acquired, it is proof against all opposition 
and misfortune, and it can withstand the severest adversities ; 
whence it was judged by Cicero that virtue which can rise 
superior to the worst trials, is something divine. Helped on 
by hope in the future beatitude, and impelled by love for 
superior things, one can coordinate all his aims and actions to 
an overruling ultimate end, and thereby acquire the virtues 
that perfect his intellect with necessary knowledge, and his 
will with the right love of good. The man who can, through 
his virtue, either neutralize or reduce to complete subjection, 
all disturbing passions, thus elevating himself to a certain 
supremacy over the things around him, and over his own pow- 

' * "Si loquamur de beatitudine imperfecta, eadem est ratio de ipsa et vir- 
tute, in cujus actu consistit." P. I. 2, qu. 5, a. 6. As to the question what 
is imperfect beatitude, it is of the same nature as virtue in whose act it 
consists. 



40 

ers and inclinations ; such man thereby acquires happiness 
which is the best that is attainable on this earth. But such 
happiness is not perfect beatitude, for, it is incomplete, unlast- 
ing, and is, by its nature, only a means to the good which is 
perfect, or the "summum bonum" which is to give him un- 
marred and unfailing bliss. Concerning this matter the 
words of Job (xiv. i.) express the well-attested experience 
of mankind : " Man born of a woman, living for a short time, 
is filled with many miseries." There is no virtue which frees 
life on earth from all pain and suffering ; yet, virtue does give 
the exactest likeness of perfect happiness, which can ever pos- 
sibly be found on earth, under God's present providence. 



CHAPTER II. 

ARTICLE I. 

HUMAN ACTIONS; OR OF THOSE ACTIONS WHICH FALL UNDER 
THE EMPIRE OF MAN'S REASON. 

Man has some actions which are specifically the same that 
minerals have; v. g., to gravitate towards the earth's centre, 
to reflect light, etc.; it is evidently not by such actions that 
he differs from the mineral. He has, also, actions which are 
essentially the same in him and the vegetable, v. g., growth by 
intus-susception and assimilation of nutriment; and similarly, 
he has sensible actions which are identical with those of brute 
animals; as to see, hear, suffer bodily pain, etc* Hence, 
none of these actions common to him and the three inferior 
forms of material beings are per se human; for that is not 
human by which he agrees with those different natures; but 
that is human by which man is specifically or essentially supe- 
rior to them, and differs from them. What are the perfections 
by which man is elevated in bis actions above them ? The 
peculiar perfections of man, are his intellect or reason, and 
his will. It follows from these distinctions, then, that only 
those actions are specifically and properly human, which pro- 
ceed from man's rational nature ; that is, from his intellect and 
will. 

The empire of reason does not extend over all things, but 
over a few only; of those things or beings which man knows, 
many both without and within himself are not subject to his 
control; nay, even not all action of his reason and will can 

* " Sub imaginatione non cadit nisi corpus." I p., qu. 5, a. I. Nothing 
except what is corporeal falls under the imagination. The brute has fancy, 
but thcfancy lias only matter for its object; it is a bodily faculty. 

4* (40 



42 ETHICS, OR MORAL P1IILOSOPII Y. 

be controlled by him; v. g, his reason necessarily assents to 
the evident truth,* and his will necessarily loves what is pre- 
sented to it as good in general, or as simply good.t Since this 
kind of action in the reason and will is merely natural, just as 
the action of material substance is also merely physical and 
natural in its species; it is of man physically, but it is action 
comprehended under the general physical law of created na- 
ture, of which he is not master. It is clear, then, that only 
that action is properly and adequately human, which is delib- 
erately willed, and which, therefore, proceeds both from the 
intellect and the will, as having empire over it. Of indelib- 
erate acts in his faculties, man, as a substantial and living na- 
ture, is the principle, to be sure; but as he has not dominion 
over them, they are not properly termed human, since they 
are not completely his actions, as lord over them. It may be 
said, then, that a human action is one which is deliberately 
put or elicited by the will. It is entirely man's act, for, over 
it, he is master. 

The action of the will by which it tends to good in gen- 
ial, and therefore to any particular good, when first offered 
to it precisely as good, is variously termed its necessary action, 
natural action, spontaneous action, according to the respect 
under which it is considered ; but it is indeed the same opera- 
tion of the will which is thus differently named. Such action 
ot the will is also termed voluntary, inasmuch as it is phys- 
ically from the will, or the will is the principle that elicits it, 
although it is not subject to the will, or under its control. 

The will, as capable of freely choosing, is termed in the 

* The intellect assents to the evident truth, with physical necessity; as 
all natural or merely physical agents act with physical necessity, when all 
the conditions required for them to act are fulfilled. 

t " Illse solse actiones vocantur proprie humanpe, quarum homo est domi- 
nus. Si autem alire actiones homini conveniant, possunt dici quidem homi- 
his actiones, sed non proprie humanae, cumnon sint hominis in quantum est 
homo." I. 2, p., qu. I, a. I. Only those actions are properly called hu- 
man, of which man is master. If other actions agree with man, they can, 
to be sure, be called actions of man, but not properly human, since they are 
not of man, precisely as man. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 43 

Latin language, "liberum arbitrium;" for, the power to choose 
was defined to be a "faculty of reason and will;" because this 
elective power in the will, or its power to choose, connotes 
reason also ; or, it implies both intellect and will ; and hence, 
free choice, in the very nature of things, is a deliberate act, 
since it necessarily supposes comparison to have been made. 

When an act is considered as put by a power, or as coming 
intrinsically from the power as the living principle that caused 
it, such power is said to elicit that act, and the act itself is 
termed an elicited act : hence, an "elicited act" is one which 
is immediately put by a living power: non-living things are 
not said to elicit acts. Again : man's members, both his ex- 
ternal and internal senses, and even the intellect itself, are all 
in some manner subject to his will ; and, as every knows by 
experience, they can be made to act, or can be directed in their 
action, by the reason and the will; v. g., when the hand 
reaches for the pen, and then writes down your thoughts ; 
when you call before the imagination the scene which you 
~vish to contemplate or describe; both the hand and the im- 
xgination, in such actions, obey the will, and their acts are 
termed commanded acts, or, with Hale,* they may be appro- 
priately styled " imperate acts." An imperate act, therefore, 
is the act of any member or faculty of man which it puts in 
obedience to his will ; the act is in itself elicited by the power 
which puts it; but it is elicited by command of the will. 

The multiplied distinctions in the acts of the will that are 
made by theologians are useful for a thorough analysis of its 
nature; but ethics or moral philosophy is primarily and di- 
rectly concerned only with those actions of man which are 
deliberate, and therefore free. 

Deliberation, and election or choice, regard the means to 
the ultimate end or beatitude, not that beatitude itself, as al- 
ready observed. Man's most perfect action in this life is that 
by which he freely chooses the means to his future beatitude; 

* "Those imperate acts wherein we see the power of the soul." 



44 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

his most perfect act in his bliss, is that by which he contem- 
plates and loves God. 

To the preceding definitions and explanations it may be 
objected thus : "When man actually possesses beatitude, the 
will must love the object necessarily, not deliberately or freely; 
but only a deliberate act of the will is a human act ; therefore 
the act of the will in loving the chief good in beatitude will 
not be a human act; but this seems not to be admissible." 

Observe that deliberation implies, under different respects, 
both perfection and imperfection, as before explained ; that 
man, while on earth, is concerned only about the means to 
his perfect beatitude, and, by consequence, all deliberate action 
regards an imperfect object, or a perfect object, only as im- 
perfectly understood. Hence, distinguish the minor, "only a 
deliberate act of the will is specifically a human act," when it 
regards the means to beatitude, is true; but not when it is the 
act of possessing the perfect object of beatitude. It will then 
be really a necessary action ; yet it will still be specifically and 
most perfectly human ; because it will be elicited by the in- 
tellect and will, acting according to the complete perfection of 
their nature. Beatitude does not change man's nature, but 
perfects it, enabling it to operate in the most perfect manner; 
i. e., to contemplate and love good that is an absolutely per- 
fect object. 

It may be objected further : " In order for an action to be 
properly styled human, it should, according to the explanation 
given, be put by man as man, and not by man taken accord- 
ing to a part only of his definition; but the acts of the sou[ 
in beatitude are of the soul as separated from the body ; there- 
fore, either those acts will not be acts of man, or else the body 
must rise again, both of which propositions are philosophically 
false." Man is such principally and preeminently by means 
of his soul; and his actions are said to be his, whenever they 
are deliberate, because all action is attributed chiefly to the 
formal principle in a being. Besides, if some proof for the 
resurrection of the body can be founded on the very nature of 



GENERAL ETHICS. 45 

man* as a complete being, this contradicts no genuine conclu- 
sions of philosophy; for, philosophy does not teach that there 
will be no resurrection of the body. 



• ARTICLE II. 

OF VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY ACTIONS. 

Ethics or moral philosophy, as already observed, has for its 
proper object man's deliberate or free actions, and it is not 
concerned about any other operations of his nature or pow- 
ers, except in a secondary manner, and as in some manner 
related to his free will. Mores means manners; and moral ac- 
tion here includes within its extension all man's actions, both 
habitual and particular, which are subject to his reason, and 
which may be regulated by it. For the sake of clearness, 
then, it is necessary to draw with precision the line that sepa- 
rates voluntary and involuntary action. 

That act, and only that act, is voluntary, which is elicited 
by the will; i. e., every act is voluntary which is elicited by 
the will, and no act is voluntary unless it is elicited by the 
will. But since the will cannot elicit any act unless the end 
or good to which that act tends for its term, be previously 

* "Etsi corpus nihil conferat ad illam operationem intellectus, qua Dei 
essentia videtur; tamen posset ab hacimpedire; etideo requiritur perfectio 
corporis, ut non impediat elevationem mentis." "Ad perfectam opera- 
tionem intellectus requiritur quidem abstractio ab hoc corruptibili corpore 
quod aggravat animam ; non autem a spirituali corpore quod erit totaliter 
spiritui subjectum." I. 2, p., qu. 4, a. 6, ad 2, 3. Though the body con- 
tributes nothing towards that operation by which the essence of God is 
seen, yet it can impede that operation ; and therefore the perfection of the 
body is required, in order that it may not impede the elevation of the mind. 
The intellect requires, for its perfect action, freedom from the corruptible 
body, which weighs down the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which 
is wholly subject to the spirit. The body, as made perfect and immortal, is 
here styled a spiritual body. 



46 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

known,* this essential requisite may be included in the defini- 
tion ; whence we may say, " that act is voluntary which is elic- 
ited by the will with previous knowledge of the end."t 

The voluntary act, as thus defined, is either necessary, i. e., 
physically determined by the object of the act, as already ex- 
plained in regard to man's ultimate end; or it is deliberate 
and free, as happens in regard to the means of happiness 
which are subject to the dominion of man's rational nature. 

A voluntary act is either elicited, i. e., is immediately and 
intrinsically from the will; or it is imperate, i. e., a commanded 
act ; in which case it is elicited immediately by the organ or 
power that puts it, but it is put in obedience to the command 
of the will, and it is styled voluntary, from its dependence on 
the will. 

An act is directly voluntary when the will positively puts 
that act, v. g., when you wish to study astronomy to-day, wish 
to take a ride, etc. The will is said indirectly to wish or to 
choose, when it could act but does not act, permitting the ob- 
ject to pass by without making a positive choice. But distin- 
guish between wishing not to act, and not wishing to act; 
the first is a direct act; the second is said to be an indirect 
act. 

An act of the will, considered in itself, may be perfect or 
imperfect. For, since both the intellect and the will must con- 
cur in the putting of a voluntary act, imperfection may result 
from two defects: ist, from ignorance in the understanding; 
2d, from reluctance and incompleteness in the action of the 
will; for it may wish either simply and absolutely, or it may 
wish only under a certain respect. The ?noral perfection and 
goodness of acts, can be explained more advantageously in 
another place. 

*" Ignoti nulla cupido. Nihil volitum nisi prscognitum." There is no 
desire of the unknown. Nothing is wished, unless it be previously known. 

t "Voluntarium est actio ab interno principio procedens cum cognitione 
finis." A voluntary action is one proceeding from an internal principle 
with knowledge of the end; i. e., with knowledge of the end intended by 
that action. According to the most general usage in English, the term volun- 
tary means free. 






GENERAL ETHICS. 47 

Although the will may be necessitated* to elicit an act, as 
already observed, yet, it cannot be forced, by any agent t, to 
elicit an act. It may suffer force which proceeds from an ex- 
trinsic cause ; but its elicited act must be intrinsically from 
itself. Similarly, the members of the body, which are capa- 
ble of putting imperate acts, may suffer force and be com- 
pelled by it to put acts instrumentally and mechanically; but 
their acts, considered precisely as elicited by them, are not 
strictly and formally produced by the extrinsic force, though 
they are necessitated to act, or act involuntarily. 

IMPUTABILITY OF ACTIONS. 

When the term agent, or efficient cause, is understood in the 
most general sense, the effect produced by its action is said 
to be attributed to it or ascribed to it ; but when that agent or 
efficient cause is intelligent and free, and acts as such, we use 
more definite terms, and say that the effects caused by such 
an agent are "to be imputed, to be credited to, put to the 
account of it." Because an intelligent being has dominion 
over its action, it thereby becomes capable of moral proprie- 
torship in the praise or blame justly due to its deliberate acts, 
according as they are seen to be good or bad. Hence, it may 

* "Voluntarium dicitur non solum actus qui est immediate ipsius volun- 
tatis, sed etiam actus a voluntate imperatus. Quantum ad actum qui est 
immediate ipsius voluntatis ; violentia voluntati inferri non potest ; sed quan- 
tum ad actum imperatum voluntas potest pati violentiam ; et quantum ad 
hunc actum, violentia in voluntarium facit." P. I. 2, qu. 6, a. 5, ad I. 
"Quidquid Deus potest facere per causas secundas etiam potest facere per 
se ipsum, nisi effectus debeat esse a principio vitali quod suppleri non po- 
test; atqui lumen gloria; non est a principio vitali; ergo suppleri potest." 
Not only is the act, which is immediately from the will itself, styled volun- 
tary; but the imperate o commanded act is styled voluntary. As to the 
act which is immediately from the will itself, the will cannot receive violence 
or be forced; but the will can suffer violence as regards the imperate or 
commanded act, and such violence makes the act involuntary. 

God can do immediately whatever He can do through second causes, un- 
less the effect must come from a living principle which cannot be replaced; 
the lumen glorise not being a living effect, can be supplied. 

t "Imperatus," i. e., commanded by one having authority. 



48 ETniCS. OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

be said that man's deliberate actions are truly and justly im- 
putable to him as worthy of approval, if good, or of disap- 
proval if bad. The truth of this proposition is so evident that 
all mankind impute to each individual man his deliberate ac- 
tions, and hold him accountable for them, when they are 
such as affect his fellow-men. 

If the foregoing definitions and explanations be understood, 
it will be easy to see the truth of the following propositions : 

Proposition I. — Simple ignorance of a law or a fact is 
not something which is imputable to a person as worthy of 
praise or blame. Simple ignorance of a thing is the absence 
of all knowledge of it; hence, it is a mere negation. 

Proposition II. — Ignorance of a thing which is related to 
the free will, as its direct or indirect cause, is imputable to the 
person. 

Proposition III. — It is not the ignorance, precisely con- 
sidered, which founds imputability; but it is the deliberate 
knowledge to which that ignorance is related that really 
founds its imputability. 

Though ignorance is something negative, yet we give to it 
positive predicates, since we conceive it to influence the action 
of the will; it may be considered a cause, then, which influ- 
ences morally in positive action of the intellect and will, 
though its influence be indirect and negative. 

Proposition IV. — Simple ignorance, whether of the law 
or a fact, prevents an act, put in respect to either, from being 
voluntary; or, simple ignorance renders an act involuntary. 
To understand clearly how ignorance may make an act, under 
different respects, either voluntary or involuntary, distinguish 
between antecedent ignorance, consequent ignorance, and 
concomitant ignorance. In respect to a given act which we 
may suppose man to put, it could happen th?t he had no 
knowledge that it was an unlawful act, before it was put ; this 
would be antecedent ignorance that the act was unlawful. 
Hence, we may define antecedent ignorance to be, the ab- 
sence of all knowledge of some law or fact relating to an 



GENERAL ETHICS. 49 

object of the will's action; v. g., should a well-meaning per- 
son shoot a deer, having beforehand no knowledge whatever 
that the act was prohibited by the game laws, this breaking 
of the law would be involuntary; and this ignorance is also 
termed invincible ignorance. In this case it may be said, 
with some propriety of language, that the ignorance is a con- 
comitant of the will's act when the deer is shot, but yet it is 
not what is technically termed concomitant ignorance; should 
a man, having the will and resolution to kill another man, if 
the opportunity came to him, shoot at an object which he had 
no doubt whatever was a deer, the fact being, however, that 
it proves to be the enemy whom he hated that is killed in- 
stead of a deer, this would be concomitant ignorance : such 
act of manslaughter should rather be said to be non-voluntary, 
than involuntary ; for, what is "involuntary," most properly, 
is something opposed to the inclination or wish of the will; 
"not voluntary" here means merely that the will did not then 
actually wish that homicide. 

" Consequent ignorance " is in some measure wilful,* or, it 
results from the will either directly or indirectly; it may be 
either what is termed " affected ignorance," as where one pur- 
posely avoids knowing the laws, so as to escape the burden 
or the trouble of keeping them or obeying them; or, it may 
be "supine ignorance," as when one is ignorant of the law 
through negligence, indolence, contempt, etc. But neither 
"affected ignorance" nor "supine ignorance" makes diso- 
bedience to the law involuntary. Hence, we may affirm — 

Proposition V. — Non-obedience to any law, caused by 
either antecedent or concomitant ignorance, is not imputable to 
the person; but non-obedience to any just law through con- 
sequent ignorance, whether it be affected or supine ignorance, 
is imputable to the person as blameworthy. 

* "Verba oris ejus iniquitas et dolus; nohiit intelligere ut bene agetet." 
Ps. 35, 4. The words of his mouth are iniquity and guile; he would not 
understand, that he might do well ; i. e , he was unwilling to understand, 
because he wished to avoid the obligation of doing well. 



50 ETHICS, OK MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



ARTI CLE III. 

WHETHER SENSIBLE APPETITE OR CONCUPISCENCE PREVENTS 
VOLUNTARY ACTION BY OVERPOWERING THE WILL; 
WHETHER FEAR OR ANGER RENDERS MAN'S ACTION IN- 
VOLUNTARY. 

Man is susceptible of two species of pleasure ; one species 
which is properly termed joy, and is produced by intelligible 
good, which is an object that transcends the material order, 
since it is in the understanding; the other species of pleasure 
proceeds from sensible good, and it is common to man and 
brute. Concupiscence is capability of pleasure in the sensi- 
ble appetite,* and is a craving for its pleasurable objects, along 
with an impulse towards them. Observe that, as already seen, 
an extrinsic agent cannot, strictly speaking, force a living 
power to elicit an act; but yet, the connatural object of a 
power may necessitate that power to act, and it always does so, 
except in case of the will when acting deliberately. In order 
to answer with precision the question proposed, "whether con- 
cupiscence renders man's action involuntary," we must distin- 
guish between the action of the will as naturally and sponta- 
neously inclined to good, and actually moved towards good 
when presented to it, on the one hand; and on the other 
hand, the deliberate action of the will. When the will is con- 
sidered under the first respect, it is clear that concupiscence, 
or the sensible appetite, both helps and intensifies its action ; 
when the will is considered under the second respect, and as 
opposing concupiscence, its power to resist is more or less 
weakened, in proportion to the greater or less degree of oppo- 
sition which it must overcome. But yet, the action will al- 
ways remain voluntary, unless the empire of reason be lost, 

* " Concupiscentia est appetitus delec'abilis." I. 2, p., qu 30, a. 1. Con- 
cupiscence is pleasurable appetite. 






GENERAL ETHICS. 51 

as happens in insanity.* It is manifest, too, that the concu- 
piscence itself is voluntary, when it is wilfully caused: it is 
then said to be concupiscence which is consequent. 

Does fear render an act involuntary ? Fear concerns, for 
its object, evil that is apprehended either as imminent or as 
approaching. It is clear, then, that the object of fear, being 
apprehended as evil, is opposed to the natural inclination of 
the will ; while, on the contrary, the object of concupiscence, 
which is pleasure, agree with the natural bent of the will, and 
by consequence, fear is more opposed to the natural or spon- 
taneous action of the will than is concupiscence. 

To act with fear is not the same thing as to act from fear; 
a person may act with fear, and yet have such pleasure in the 
act that it would be put, even if the fear were removed. An 
act which is iputfrom fear, would not be put at all, if the fear 
were removed. Now, it is evident that man's action, whether 
it be an elicited action, or an imperate, i. e., commanded ac- 
tion, is voluntary though put with fear. Hence, the difficulty 
in the question regards only the action which comes from 
fear, and of which the fear is a cause. When the robber with 
a deadly weapon ready for immediate use says to the unarmed 
traveler, " Your money or your life ! " and the person delivers 
up his money, in order to escape death ; or, when the seaman, 
in order not to perish in the storm, throws his valuable goods 
overboard : are these actions, which come from fear, and but 
for the fear would not be put at all, truly and properly voluntary? 

They are truly and properly voluntary; and yet, under a 
certain respect, " secundum quid," they are involuntary. 

In each case there is in the intellect the knowledge of an 
end, and it is wished fort along with what is chosen as neces- 

* "Si concupiscentia totaliter cognitionem auferret, sicut contingit in illis 
qui propter concupiscentiam fiunt amentes, sequeretur quod concupiscentia 
voluntarium tolleret." I. 2, p. qu. 6, 7, ad 3. If concupiscence should wholly 
take away knowledge, as happens in those who become demented through 
concupiscence, then ihe concupiscence would take away freedom of the will. 

t " Sunt voluntaria quatenus procedunt a principio intrinseco singula cog- 
noscente." 1. 2, p., qu. 6, a. 6. They are voluntary in as much as they 
proceed intrinsically from a principle knowing singular things. 



52 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

sary means to it. Under this respect, such actions are, in them- 
selves, truly and properly called voluntary. 

On the other hand, these actions are put against the incli- 
nation of the will and with reluctance; and although the per- 
son cannot say, " I will not," he could truly say, " I would I 
could not." Hence, actions which come from fear, are under 
a certain respect, involuntary. 

Similar reasoning may be applied to all the feelings and 
passions of man and their connatural objects, as will readily 
appear when the virtues and passions will have been explained. 
It is a well-known truth that man's feelings and passions do 
not always, nor even generally, await the decision of reason 
in their action; but they anticipate all deliberate choice. 
Man's chief responsibility to himself, to his fellowmen, and to 
his Maker, regards the manner in which he directs and gov- 
erns those principles of action in his nature, especially his 
confining them to their legitimate objects. To move them to 
action, to restrain them, or to indulge them, falls under the 
empire of reason, and is therefore imputable, though their 
action which anticipates choice is plainly not imputable. 

When a person, instead of ruling his natural feelings and 
passions by right reason, puts little or no restraint on them, 
he may ultimately become more or less enslaved to them, and 
thus there will be produced in him the permanent effects 
termed vices, or vicious habits. An act of sudden and violent 
passion, which is put by one who is habitually ruled by his 
feelings and passions, may be imputable; since the vice or 
habit which is a principle that efficiently causes his action, is 
imputable. 

Hence, the disorderly acts of violent passion, the excite- 
ment and perturbation accompanying them, are essentially dif- 
ferent from the similar effects observable in the insane person. 

The specific and distinctive symptom of intellectual insanity 
is a more or less permanent inability, when wide awake, to 
discern the unreality of mere images in the fancy. A person 
in that state is incapable of distinguishing the pictures which 
are produced only by the diseased organ, the fancy, which is 



GENERAL ETHICS. 53 

an organ in the brain, from those images which truly represent 
really existing objects. 

Insanity is, therefore, a diseased state of the brain which 
interrupts all healthy operation of the imagination or fancy ; 
and since the intellect cannot naturally have any normal 
action, except dependency for its objects on the images of the 
fancy, when these images are disordered and false, i. e., not 
founded on reality, the intellect is cut off from all communica- 
tion with the real order of things. Its conclusions in such a 
case, are consequent; but its premises are either wholly or 
partially false, according to the extent of the ailment in the 
organ. 

The affections ot the will, which depend for their objects 
and their direction on the intellect, may become equally ab- 
normal in their action.* 

It is clear that the reason of one who is in such condition 
of bodily health has lost its empire. But passion, though it 
lead to violent and unreasonable action, is not real insanity 
merely on that account; for, such conduct is always imputable 
in its cause, at least in some degree, unless one be in that state 
in which reason has entirely lost its sway. 

* This abnormal state of the will is by some styled "affective insanity." 
'* Insania animae accipitur per hoc quod anima humana recedit a debita 
dispositione humanse speciei. Quod quidem contingit et secundum ratio- 
nem, puta cum aliquis amittit usum rationis ; et quantum ad vim appetiti- 
vam, puta cum aliquis amittit affectum humanum." 2. 2, p., qu. 157, a. 3, 
ad 3. Insanity is taken for this, that the human mind falls away from that 
due condition which man's nature requires ; it is either by losing the use 
of reason ; or it is in the power of appetite, as when one loses human affec- 
tion. Thus Nabuchodonosor seems to have suffered. Dan. 4. 

In some cases of affective insanity, the reason seems to retain its ability 
to judge correctly ; this sometimes happens, for example, in kleptomania, 
nymphomania, etc. 

5* 



CHAPTER III. 

ARTICLE I. 

MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 

Morality pertains, primarily and most properly, to deliberate 
acts of the will; dependency and secondarily it refers likewise 
to all other things necessarily relating to these acts, whether 
they concur positively as causes, or only as indispensable con- 
ditions, to the putting of these acts. As intellectual or logical 
truth is conformity of the intell ct knowing to the object 
known ; so we may define njoral goodness to be conformity 
of the will to the good which is its true object. Hence, it is 
evident that for moral goodness* the act of the will must 
include all the subjective requisites for its perfection; and in 
like manner, the object also must possess all that is essential 
to constitute it the truly good. Therefore morality is: i, 
from the intrinsic order and goodness in things related to 
man ; 2, from his own rational nature as knowing and using 
that order. Hence, we may say of morality, that it is object- 
ively true. The principles which concur to make the morality 
of an act are the end intended, the object, the circumstances; 
the natural or eternal law is for the will the norma of the 
good; but this will be explained to better advantage in a 
succeeding chapter. 

We saw in the first chapter that man's freedom of will is 
limited to the means of tending to his ultimate end or beati- 
tude; and in the second chapter, it was shown that all his 
deliberate action, in respect to these means, is imputable to 
him 

* " Bonitas moralis est ordo conformitatis ad morum principia. " Moral 
goodness is well ordered conformity to the principles of mora' it v. 

(54) 



GENERAL ETIHCS. 55 

It may now be affirmed that all man's deliberate acts are 
either morally good or morally bad, according as they make 
him tend to his ultimate end, or avert him from it. Again, it 
is shown in general metaphysics that all evil consists in the 
privation of good that ought to be, or that is due.* It may 
be said, therefore, that a human action is good when it in- 
cludes all due perfections; and it is bad when deprived of any 
perfection due to it t 

Before examining how it is that a human action is good 
when the end intended, the object, and the circumstances are 
all good, and that the action is morally bad, when any of these 
principles is wanting, observe that what is a means to the ulti- 
mate end, may also be properly termed an end, when con- 
sidered under some particular respect; for all means are sub- 
ordinate ends, when regarded as immediate objects of choice. 
Observe also that rectitude of reason as speculative, or as con- 
cerned about objects which are evident and necessary, consists 
in truth, taken absolutely, as when it enunciates the thing as 
that thing really is : the evil of reason as speculative, would 
be any falsity. The rectitude of the reason as practical, is 
also truth; not truth taken absolutely, however; but truth 
taken conformably to good will, or with rectitude in the reason, 
and rectitude in the will : hence, in selecting means uprightly, 
the reason and the will co-operate. Rectitude in the reason 
as judging of the practical is often styled "loyalty to truth," 
in popular language. 

It will be readily admitted that error in the decision of prac- 
tical reason is imputable, Avhenever it is voluntary, or is attrib- 
utable to the will as a cause. 

Proposition I. — Morality is not founded, in its essence, on 
what is useful for temporal prosperity and happiness as an 
end. 

* " Malum est privatio boni debiti." Evil is the privation of good that 
is due. 

t " Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu." A thing 
is good when its entire principle is good ; it is evil from every defect. The 
enure principle of a human action is made up of the object, the end intended, 
and the circumstances. 



56 ETHICS. OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Temporal prosperity and happiness are of this life alone 
and therefore are not man's ultimate end ; they themselves, 
then, are at the best among the means to his final beatitude. 
If man were to co-ordinate all his actions towards securing 
these goods as an ultimate end, this would be a perversion of 
them and of his own reason, which would be moral evil. 

Utility* is that goodness which is in means to an end; for, 
utility essentially connotes an end, and the usefulness is itself 
perfection in the means to that end. The means depends for 
its dignity and perfection on the end to which it is ordained; 
and the means is good when it is ordained by its nature to a 
good end :t hence, both the end must be good, and the means 
must be good. To suppose that bad means were essential 
for a good end, or that a good end were absolutely dependent 
on evil means; is to suppose evil in the nature of things, 
which would, therefore, be referable to the author of nature ; 
whence the supposition is absurd. God ordains no bad end; 
nor does he ordain any bad means to a good end ; but man 
is capable of perverting some means and ends. 

If utility be understood more absolutely, and be made to 
express that goodness in things by which they are intrinsically 
fitted and ordained as means to be used by man for reaching 
his ultimate end, then the proposition, " morality is utility," 
might be interpreted % so as to exclude error; but, it would 
not be philosophically accurate language, for the end is above 
the means to it, and therefore morality of action should be 
related rather to the end than be related to the means ; hence, 

* The student will easily refute this saying, "The end justifies the 
means," which has a ridiculous history. 

+ " Medium est vel per se necessarium ad finem, vel ad melius esse." 
" In operativis, quando id quod est ad finem, adaequat, ut itadixerim, finem, 
non requiritur quod sit nisi unum tantum." P. I, qu. 47, a. I, ad 3. 
A means may be either per se necessary for the end, or it may be advan- 
tageous. In practical things, when the means, so to say, equals the end, 
then only one means is required. 

% Distinguish between the proper meaning of a term and the meaning 
which it may be made to bear by interpretation, i. e., by attributing to it an 
accommodated signification. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 57 

utility cannot be, even then, an adequate and proper definition 
of morality. 

Proposition II. — The distinction of moral good and evil, or 
the difference between them, is not founded on the opinions 
of men; but it proceeds from the nature of man and the 
nature of the objects over which he has rational empire. 

The intrinsic difference between good and evil is known 
because it exists and is knowable; it does not, on the contrary, 
derive its existence from its being known by man, since it is 
something objectively real. 

That which depends for its existence merely upon the 
opinions of men, as do various customs, fashions, tastes and 
the like, is by its nature mutable, and is often changed or 
entirely discontinued. But that which depends on the very 
essence of man and on the natural rectitude of his faculties, 
cannot change in this manner. All mankind know that there is 
an intrinsic difference between right and wrong, because that 
difference is real and is evident: this fact affords testimony 
to the truth, and is an extrinsic proof of it; yet it does not 
found that distinction, but supposes it. 

Hence to the proverb, " vox populi, vox Dei," we must an- 
swer by a distinction : when the voice of men expresses what 
is both naturally and necessarily done and manifested by 
them, it is true; but when it is the deliberate "voice ofmen," 
we must distinguish ; when it is from right reason, it is in ac- 
cordance with the " voice of God " ; but when it is against 
reason, it is then opposed to the voice of God. Human rea- 
son knows both speculatively and practically the intrinsic dif- 
ference between moral good and moral evil ; not by way of 
an uncertain opinion, but by an evident judgment. As man 
can know an effect by means of its habitude or relationship to 
its cause ; so, there is a habitude, or a fitness in all the objects 
subject to his choice to serve him as a means to good, or the 
contrary ; this character in those objects is evident to him by 
the light of reason ; it determines for him their moral nature, 
and it is intrinsic to those objects as causes or principles of 
moral action, for the object is a principle in all man's moral 



58 ETHICS, 03 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

action * We may therefore conclude that the difference be- 
tween moral good and moral evil does not arise either from 
any positive law ; but it is, on the contrary, presupposed to 
that law, and is founded in the immutable essences of things. 

Proposition III. — The power by which moral good or evil 
is perceived is the intellect, and not a " spiritual sense," or an 
instinct. 

Every judgment is an act of the intellect, and conversely, 
the intellect alone is capable of a judgment; but to know an 
action as morally good or bad is a judgment in which a pred- 
icate is affirmed or denied of its subject; therefore, the know- 
ing of moral good or evil is a rational act. It is a well known 
fact, the induction of which is as complete as it is possible for 
contingent physical truth of the kind to be, that no irrational 
animal can apprehend the morality of an action. Also, the 
object of a sensible power which is per se organic, is only the 
singular or concrete and material object; but moral good or 
evil is in itself wholly immaterial; therefore, it is not a sen- 
sible object, and consequently it cannot be apprehended by 
an organic power. 

Instinct is a perfection which is added to a power, and im- 
pels that power to action; instinct, like appetite, is in itself 
blind, but it requires, in order to cause an action, that its sub- 
ject apprehend, either sensibly or intellectually, the object of 
this instinctive action. Instinct, therefore, is not a power,t 

* "Ex objecto et potentia oritur actio." An act proceeds both from the 
power and the object. 

t The acute thinkers in the old schools of philosophy maintained that 
there is in the animal a special faculty or sense for apprehending the good and 
the noxious characters or properties in objects of their action They named 
and described that faculty as an internal sense: " Potentia sestimativa est 
facultas animse sensitivse intentionum insensatarum apprehensiva." The 
power of sensibly appreciating is a facu'ty of the living compound which 
can apprehend intentions (meanings) not apprehended by the external 
senses. The sheep runs away from the wolf, because by this faculty it ap- 
prehends the wolf as something harmful; the bird gathers straws, because 
it apprehends those straws as good for its nest. " Necessarium est animali 
quod percipit hujusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior. Ad 



GENERAL ETHICS. 59 

but a perfection in the power, moving that power to action. 
It may be concluded, then, that instinct, not being an appre- 
hensive faculty, but only some accidental virtue of a faculty, 
cannot, under any possible supposition, be the principle or 
power which knows moral good and evil. Conscience, which 
is rational action, is sometimes erroneously confounded with 
the sensible feeling, that may accompany it; but neither is it 
by this feeling that the morality of an action comes to be 
known. There seems to be no objection to saying that there 
is an instinctive quality or virtue in man's reason, giving it 
facility in knowing the morality of an action, a readiness or 
aptitude for apprehending the moral character of objects. But 
the quality or virtue which would be thus styled, is more gen- 
erally called by a different name among the philosophers, as 
will appear by the explanation now to be given' of this help 
naturally bestowed on reason, to discern moral good and evil. 
The habit in the intellect called " light of reason," like the 
intellect itself which it perfects, has two objects, the specula- 
tive and the practical. As having speculative matter for its 

apprehendendum autem intentiones, quae per sensum non accipiuntur, ordi- 
natur vis aestimativa. Considerandum est autem quod quantum ad formas 
sensibiles, non est differentia inter hominem et aliaanimalia; similiter enim 
immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. Sed quantum ad intentiones praedic- 
tas differentia est. Nam alia animalia percipiunt hujusmodi intentiones so- 
lum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem per quandam collationem : in 
homine dicitur vis cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam hujusmodi in- 
tentiones adinvenit." S. Th., I. p., qu. 78, a. 4. It is necessary for the 
animal to perceive these intentions (meanings or uses) which the external 
sense does not perceive. For apprehending these intentions or meanings, 
not received through the external sense, this pozuer of estimating is ordained. 
In the acts of the external senses, there is no difference between man and 
other animals; for their external senses are affected by objects in the same 
manner. But as regards the above mentioned intentions or meanings, there 
is a difference. For, other animals perceive those intentions or meanings 
by a certain natural instinct; man uses a sort of comparison. In man, 
this power is styled the cogitative faculty, or the particular reason, which, 
by means of a certain comparison, comes to find out those intentions or 
meanings in things that are learned through the external senses. 

Instinct, from the same root as instigate, seems not to be the correct 
name for this faculty. 



60 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

object, it was termed "intellectus seu habitus primorum prin- 
cipiorum," the faculty of first principles; as having evident 
practical moral principles, or the first principles of morals for 
its object, it was termed, " synteresis." The truth is well 
known that man can know promptly and with facility the evi- 
dent first principles of morality, whether one admit or deny 
that the principles concerned in knowing them are thus rightly 
described and named. The " synteresis "* may be defined, 
then, to be a habit or light put by nature into the intellect, 
by which the intellect is strengthened to give its assent 
promptly and with facility to practical principles that are first 
and universal. The act which the intellect, as thus strength- 
ened, puts, in practical matter, is called conscience; and 
hence conscience is an act of reason ; or, conscience is noth- 
ing else than an actual dictate of reason in regard to some- 
thing that is morally good or morally evil; it is not a feeling. 

To know moral good or evil is, therefore, an act only of 
reason or intellect; and morality, consequently, transcends the 
adequate and entire object of sensible power. 

In popular language, it is said of certain persons tha,. " they 
have a delicate moral sense;" or, of others, that "they have 
lost moral sense;" in these cases, the sensible emotions that 
often accompany acts and affections of the will, and which 
may be considered as caused by action of the will, are attrib- 
uted to that faculty, instead of being referred to their proxi- 
mate principle, which is the body. In like manner, operation 
of the intellect or rational faculty, as well as this faculty itself, 
is frequently called "sense;" in this use of the term, "sense," 

* "Synteresis est habitus a natura inditus, seu lumen naturale quo con- 
fortatus intellectus possibilis praebet assensum primis ac universalissimis 
principiis practicis." Irenseus Carmel. De Anima, page 119. Synteresis 
is a habit given by nature or a natural light by which the intellect is made 
more capable of assenting to first and most universal practical principles. 
" Potentiae rationales se habent ad opposita; synteresis autem non se habet 
ad opposita, sed ad bonum tantum inclinat: ergo synteresis non est poten- 
tia, est ergo habitus." I. p., qu. 79, a. 12. Powers are capable of con- 
trary things ; synteresis is not capable of contrary things, but it inclines 
on'y to good : therefore, synteresis is not a power, but it is a habit. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 61 

or "good sense " is equivalent in meaning to "faculty of first 
principles," i?itellcctusseu habitus primorum principiorum. "Good 
sense" may also mean quickness of perception and accuracy 
of judgment, especially in practical matter. " Common 
sense " may mean either the faculty of first principles, as com- 
mon to all sane men; and also it may be used to signify that 
degree of correctness in judgment, and prudence in action, 
common to the mass of mankind. In all these uses of the 
word " sense," an effect is named in place of its cause ; an 
indispensable condition or an instrument is named, in place 
of what is principal. These forms of expression, which at- 
tribute to the sense action belonging principally to the supe- 
rior powers, will and intellect, are not positively faulty; 
though they are inaccurate negatively ; or, if it be our aim to 
use terms with philosophical strictness. Mankind, in general, 
stop with the knowledge of proximate causes, or with princi- 
ples which are immediately evident to them ; the tracing of 
effects and phenomena to their remote or first causes, is the 
office of science and philosophy. It may be concluded, then, 
that the phrase, " moral sense," as generally understood in 
English, is correct in its meaning; nor is that meaning really 
opposed to the truth that no merely sensible power can appre- 
hend the morality of an action. 



ARTICLE II. 

THE PRINCIPLES WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSE MORALITY. 

There is order which is intrinsic to all tilings, because all 
things are made by an intelligent cause, that shaped them 
with design. Order is equally essential to their relations among 
themselves, to the whole, and to their Author. Man can know 
the order in things, and the relations of those things, so far as 
it is necessary for him to use them as means of tending to- 
6 



62 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

wards his ultimate end. On these things, with their relations 
to him and to his ultimate end, is founded morality, as to its 
objects. 

The morality of an act arises from the object of the act, the 
circumstances, and the end intended by the agent. 

The object here meant is the formal object; that is, tne ob- 
ject precisely as it is apprehended by the intellect, or precisely 
as the intelligible idea expresses it to the intellect ; for it is the 
object only, as thus understood, that proximately influences 
rational and moral action. 

No power can act without an object as the term of its ac- 
tion, and as a cause that must specify that action : this is what 
•the axiom expresses, "actus specificantur ab objectis," acts are 
specified, determined, by their objects; even the will cannot 
elicit an act of free choice which concerns no object at all. 
Hence, the act of an intelligent agent, that concerns no for- 
mal object at all, is inconceivable, i. e., it is nothing. Also, 
an object, though it is good in itself and in respect to the end 
for which it exists, is not good as perverted from this end, 
and when it is coordinated and used for an end that is alien 
nor opposite to the true end of its being. Again, it requires 
no proof for us to admit that many objects may be used by 
man, either rationally or perversely, according to his deliber- 
ate choice. Every real thing is intrinsically good; "orane ens 
est bonum" ; but when it is the term of a rational or deliberate 
act, it becomes relatively good, or bad, according as it is 
thereby made to tend to its own proper and legitimate end, 
or is made to divert from it to another end for which it is not 
intended. 

The term " object " may be understood less strictly, and 
more comprehensively, so as to include under it the relations, 
adjuncts, and all the accidents of the object. Since an ob- 
ject does not exist without its connected accidents, over and 
above what constitutes its substance or essence, it is manifest 
that all its accidents, which are usually called " the circum- 
stances," in this connection, must also concur in moral action, 
and therefore the circumstances enter as an essential principle 



GENERAL ETHICS. 63 

into the morality of a human action. From this it follows 
that the circumstances may affect, and even change, the entire 
moral character of a human action : v. g., suppose the object 
is ten dollars in money; now we may annex to this object a 
variety of circumstances, as, for instance, it belongs to a poor 
person, it is stolen by some one not in need, or it is lost, then 
found, etc. These, and many such circumstances, affect this 
sum of money, regarded as becoming an objective term of 
deliberate action, so that such action would be morally good 
or bad, solely on account of the circumstances connected 
with it. 

As circumstances or adjuncts perfect or deform physical ob- 
jects, according to their nature, v. g., color, stature, integrity 
of members, blindness, etc , so, in the moral order, they per- 
fect acts, or sully them, and even make them positively bad, 
by new malice. 

Therefore, no human action can be good, when either the 
object, or any circumstance joined to it, is bad; since both 
the object and the circumstance are principles that truly con- 
cur in that action. It must be observed, however, that if the 
circumstance be remote, or not sufficiently adjacent, to form 
a part of the total object of the action, it may not influence 
the moral character of the action at all. Circumstances affect 
the moral character of the object in various degrees, according 
to their nature. A circumstance may add another species of 
morality to a good or bad object; v. g., a given injury offered 
to a parent is specifically worse than it is when offered to a 
stranger. Circumstances, then, are of two kinds: ist, those 
that put the object in relation to a new rule of order, which 
the object in itself, ox per se, does not possess; 2d, circum- 
stances which do not thus affect the object: those of the first 
kind may be either good or bad in their effect on the object. 

Among the principles that produce the morality of a hu- 
man act, the one that is chief or superior to the others is the 
end intended, "opus sequitur naturam intentionis ;" a work 
follows the nature of the agent's intention; for, the morality, 
of an act, especially as something which is imputable 



64 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is most directly and immediately from the act of man as 
rational, or from the deliberate will. A human act depends 
principally upon the end, since it is the end that directly influ- 
ences man to act; and hence the end is said to be the first 
and the highest of the causes.* Observe, however, that the 
end intended is properly identical with the formal object, or 
the object towards which the will moves; and, therefore, it 
should not be confounded with the material object which the 
act regards. When it is said by some authors that " the mor- 
ality of a human act proceeds principally from the object," 
the meaning is that it proceeds principally from that formal 
object which is identical with the end intended. t Distinguish, 
therefore, between the end which the agent intends, and the 
end which is intrinsic to the object: "finis operands; finis op- 
eris:" for example, the end wh ch is proper to the virtue or 
habit of temperance, is temperate action, for habit is ordained 
for action ; but the agent may intend, by his temperance, 
health, avarice, etc. An act of kindness, with its circum- 
stances, may be good, while the act intended is theft. Hence, 
the end intended by the agent, and the end proper to the 
object, may differ in their moral species. 

It is plain from what has been said that a human action is 
not morally good, unless the intention, or the end intended, 
be good. Since the human act, in order to be good, requires 
that the object, the circumstances, and the end intended all 
be good, it follows that the action is bad when any one of 
those principles is bad ; or as briefly said in the axiom, 
" bonum ex integra causa; malum ex quocumque defectu :" 
a thing is good when its entire cause is good ; it is bad when 
there is any defect. 

* "Finis est prima et al issima causarum." 

t "Objectum e si sit materia circa quam terminatur actus, habet tamen 
rationem finis secundum quod intentio agentis fertur in ipsum." I. 2, p , 
qu. 73, a. 3, ad I. Though the object be the matter about which the act ter- 
minates, nevenheless it has the nature of an end, in as much as the intention 
of the agent bears on it. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 65 



ARTICLE III. 

MERIT AND DEMERIT OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 

A good or a bad act, considered as benefiting or harm- 
ing another person, deserves some return or retribution 
from that other person, in order that the equality of jus- 
tice be kept. An act, as deserving reward, is termed meritori- 
ous ; if it deserve some sort of punishment, it is a demeritorious 
act. The conditions required for merit may be reduced to 
these: i, it must be a good act that benefits some other per- 
son or persons ; 2, it must be in some manner a free act, i. e., 
not done by special agreement or contract, as for example, to 
repay money that was lent, without retaining any part of it ; 
3, on the other hand, the reward and the merit must agree or 
be equal according to some proportion of justice : gratitude 
and reward of merit are founded on the same principle. 

Observe that a general obligation to do the act, is not op- 
posed to the second condition laid down ; on the contrary, 
to comply with general duties, or obey just general laws, is 
meritorious; also, the deed which is performed by agreement, 
may be made meritorious by adjuncts to it, v. g., to return 
borrowed money, promptly, with cheerfulness, gratitude, etc. 
The peculiar act of justice, is to give to each person his own: 
we may distinguish justice as commutative and distributive; 
commutative justice is that between private persons, according 
to which debts are paid exactly, promises kept, etc. Distri- 
butive justice, is that which rules the public or the community 
in its relations to individuals or private members, rewarding 
them according to service rendered, or degree of merit ac- 
quired in promoting the public welfare. It follows from these 
principles, that a good citizen merits; a virtuous person merits; 
a patriot merits; a benefactor of the poor merits, etc. 

Merit or demerit is a consequence of the imputability of 
acts, or of that moral proprietorship or ownership which a 
6* 



66 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

person has in his own deliberate acts, on account of which 
they may be attributed to him in praise or blame, because he 
is their responsible author; that which is good, is laudable ; 
that which is bad, is not to be approved. 

An act has rectitude, if it is ordered rightly in respect to 
the ultimate end, or to moral good. An act is meritorious, 
which justly deserves reward from another party in respect to 
whom it is a favor or brings an emolument. 

Proposition I. — Man's deliberate actions can be meritori- 
ous or demeritorious in respect both to individual persons, and 
to society. 

Man can perform good acts to which he is not bound by 
special agreement or peculiar obligation, and which redound 
to the advantage of individuals, or to that of the public at 
large; but such actions deserve reward, and they are there- 
fore meritorious. A man who is both a private and public 
benefactor, merits a becoming return for his good deeds from 
those parties that gain by them, and this return is due to him. 
A physician who would, even in performing the duties of his 
calling or profession, expose his own life during an epidemic 
in relieving the suffering, would thereby do a work justly en- 
titling him to some proportionate reward. Justice requires 
some species of equality between good which is given, and 
good which is received; for, it requires equilibrium of good 
among those who naturally have equal rights and duties in 
respect to each other. Order and justice require that 
communication of good should have some corresponding 
return, when that good is a real benefit that is bestowed. 
Similar reasoning, and like proportion, hold in those cases in 
which the actions are of an opposite nature, i. e., are bad; a 
wrong deed which is detrimental to others, thereby destroys 
the equality of justice, and subjects the author to an equitable 
penalty in reparation. 

Proposition II. — Human actions which are good or virtu- 
ous merit well of society, merely because they are good; and 
bad actions are in a corresponding manner demeritorious. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 67 

Besides the general proof arising from the truth that moral 
goodness in man is perse laudable, and deserving of good as a 
fitting reward, human actions merit well of society : i, because 
good actions perfect the agent, and the perfection and civil well- 
being of the members constitute the principal end of society ; 
2, upright or virtuous actions, by perfecting the agent, have a 
beneficial influence on others, and thus contribute to the well- 
being of the whole society, and the increase of that happiness 
which it is designed to promote. It follows, that bad or 
vicious actions are, of their nature, detrimental to individuals, 
and to the whole society, and are, therefore, demeritorious, 
and deserve correction. 

Proposition III. Man considered even naturally, can 
acquire merit or demerit, before God, by his deliberate 
actions. 

It has been said that merit gives a just right to reward that 
is proportioned to it; nevertheless justice cannot be absolutely 
founded in man, for man is not an absolute being, but is a 
relative, and therefore a dependent being; hence, absolute 
justice regards only God. It is manifest, then, that God could 
not become an absolute debtor to any of his creatures, since 
they cannot give to him anything which they have not received 
from him, or which is absolutely their own. 

Yet there is justice, truly such, that is not absolute but 
depends on a condition or hypothesis; the condition being 
fulfilled, the conditionate justly follows. Man knows right 
and wrong, and has empire over his own action in respect to 
them ; the voice of nature itself teaches him that he should 
perfect himself by good action and virtue in order thereby to 
reach the true object of his final beatitude. The condition, 
and the promise, are easily discernible ; and it is no wonder, 
therefore, that this truth is universally known, with greater or 
less distinctness, by all nations of mankind. 

Though man is entirely dependent on God both in existing 
and acting, yet his action is truly his own, and as such is truly 
imputable to him. 

Merit before God, though it depends on divine ordination. 



68 ETnics, on moral philosophy. 

i. e , an order of providence which God freely instituted, may 
nevertheless be founded in justice, since the conclusion fol- 
lows necessarily when its condition is put. God being in 
himself infinitely perfect, cannot receive an addition to his 
perfection ; or as it is more precisely expressed in the techni- 
cal language of the schools, he cannot receive any additional 
perfection ad intra. It must be granted, however, that he 
may receive, and he does receive, an additional perfection, 
ad extra, proceeding especially from the intelligent beings 
created by him, who know him and love him, and thus extrin- 
sically honor him. 

Hence, the argument may be stated thus : in order to found 
the merit of human actions in divine justice, it suffices that 
they render an extrinsic good to God; but human actions 
which have rectitude do render such good to God. We may 
legitimately conclude, then, that man's actions can have the 
nature of true merit in respect to God. Since he can give an 
extrinsic honor to God, and cause others to do so, he thus 
may merit reward. 

It may be objected that, " man can nave no rights before 
God; he can have only duties." We must distinguish; man 
can have no absolute rights in respect to God, is true ; that 
he can have no rights dependently on an hypothesis, or a 
condition which God puts, is not true. Man's capability of 
owing duty to God, and his capability of owning rights before 
God, rest in the last analysis on the same conditions. As 
regards himself, he is able to merit just reward because of his 
rational nature, and his proprietorship in his own acts, and in 
their proper effects : the due effect of good done to another 
is a return of good ; and the due effect of evil done to another 
is that retribution which equalizes justice between them.* 

* " Justitia ordinat hominem in eis quae sunt ad alterum: importat enim 
sequalitatem quandam." ... 2. 2. p., qu. 57, a. I. Justice orders a 
man in those things which relate him to another person ; for, it implies a 
certain equality. 






GENERAL ETHICS. 69 



ARTICLE IV. 

There are human actions which are morally indifferent in 
their species; and yet an individual human act cannot be 
morally indifferent; but it must be either morally good or 
morally bad. 

The meaning of this thesis is that there are human actions, 
which, if considered in the abstract, or in general, and as to 
their species, are neither good nor bad ; and, in order for them 
to become either good or bad, some circumstance, or the in- 
tention of the agent, must accede to them. The moral char- 
acter of such acts frequently depends only on the intention 
with which they are done. To walk, to write, to read, 
etc., are species of action; being conceived as species, they 
are universals, and therefore are abstractions founded on the 
things which they express. Thus understood, it is evident 
that they will, when they become concrete individual acts, be 
either good or bad according to the circumstances connected 
with them, or according to the intention with which they are 
performed ; and it is equally manifest, that, apart from cir- 
cumstances or the intention which determines their moral 
nature, they are in themselves indifferent, i. e., equally capable 
of becoming good or bad. Some human actions are specifi- 
cally bad, v. g., to lie, to blaspheme, to do injustice; others 
are specifically good, v. g., to love God, to honor one's parents, 
honestly to pay just debts, etc. 

In regard to the actions which are indifferent in their 
species, as to walk, to write, to read, when they become 
individual and concrete by being performed: i, they must 
necessarily have their concomitant accidents or circumstances ; 
2, they must be put with some intention by the agent, since 
the question is concerning human actions, i. e., man's deliber- 
ate actions. Now, the circumstances must be either good, or 
bad, or indifferent; it is plain that it may depend on either 
good or bad circumstances to determine the moral species of 



70 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the act, so that if they are good, the act is not bad on their 
account; if they are bad, however, the act is bad. If both be 
indifferent, the act is then not determined in its moral nature 
or species either by the object or the circumstances, but it 
will depend entirely on the intention with which it is put. 

One may write prudently to suitable persons ; or he may 
write useless, frivolous matters to parties with whom corre- 
spondence is not beneficial ; similarly, in order to " walk," to 
"read," some conditions must be added so as to have the 
concrete act, and they will suffice in part to determine the 
action in its moral species; they do not, however, constitute 
the action good in concrete, unless the intention be good 
also. 

It has already been seen that in order to intend with recti- 
tude, all actions should be ordered in respect to the ultimate 
end of man's being ;* God fits the objects of action for this 
purpose, but it is for man to select and use those that are 
made subject to him. Yet he cannot always think explicitly 
of his ultimate end: what, then, is required on the part of his 
intention in order to make actions which are indifferent in 
their species, good when they are really put ? 

Man may be said truly to intend his ultimate end by his 
actions, in three manners ; explicitly, virtually, implicitly : 

i. Explicitly; he intends in this manner, when he actually 
thinks of that end, performing his acts directly on account 
of it. 

2. Virtually; a cause acts only virtually, when that cause is 
not present, but the influence which it gave to objects present 
to it, continues, and is communicated to other objects; hence, 
the mind may habitually or virtually continue to direct its 
intention without at all thinking explicitly of the end first 
intended, v. g., a man often continues his work by the influ- 
ence of the intention with which he began it, but without 
thinking of what he then intended, and yet all his acts have 
relation to the end first intended. 

* Man's present state being a probationary one, all his deliberate action 
evidently must bear on his future and permanent condition. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 71 

3. Implicitly or interpretatively ; one intends the end im- 
plicitly or by interpretation,* when it was not previously 
intended explicitly, and it is not now thought of, but yet he 
intends explicitly or virtually an end which by its nature is 
coordinate to the ultimate end, and which, on that account, 
may be said to include implicitly the ultimate end; v. g., when 
one fulfills his duty, but without thinking of the obligation to 
which he is subject. Actions which in their species are indif- 
ferent, implicitly or interpretatively tend to a good end, when 
they are put with some becoming degree of moderation. When 
one acts merely because he is free to do so, the act is good, be- 
cause liberty of the will is a good which is per se ordained to 
one's ultimate beatitude; and hence, such exercise of liberty 
is not indifferent, but is good. An "idle word" is not im- 
plicitly ordained to good, if we understand by it a word spoken 
without being related to any necessary or useful purpose; for 
it is thus uttered without any rational motive; hence, it is de- 
prived of that goodness which comes from rectitude of reason, 
though the object and its circumstances be otherwise good. 

It may be objected that " man's end on earth is rational 
enjoyment ; or, such as comes from innocent pleasures, from 
the sciences, the fine arts; therefore he acts well, when he 
seeks such pleasure." 

Man's ultimate end or final beatitude pertains to an order 
of existence which will begin for him after his present life shall 
have ended. His proximate end is so to order and direct the 
conduct of his present life that he will thereby tend to his ulti- 
mate beatitude. To the objection given we must answer, then, 
by distinguishing: if by "rational enjoyment, innocent pleas- 
ures, pleasures coming from the sciences, fine arts, etc," be 
meant that enjoyment or pleasure which proceeds from using 
those good things as means which are subordinate to his ulti- 

* Observe that words may sometimes be interpreted by giving to them 
an accommodated meaning, which must not be confounded with the mean- 
ing which they implicitly and really have. It may be legitimate to attribute 
an accommodated sense to a term under certain circumstances ; but, it is 
often done fallaciously, and not legitimately. 



72 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

mate beatitude, and using them, therefore, with rectitude of 
the reason, the assertion is then true; if it be meant that man 
can rightly intend them as an end with which he can stop, 
and without any respect to an ulterior end, it is not true. It 
is with wise design that many acts and works performed by 
man naturally have pleasure annexed to them; for he is thus 
enabled to do with facility and alacrity, what he would other- 
wise either totally omit as an irksome duty, or would execute 
imperfectly ; but it is clear that the pleasures which are de- 
signed to alleviate the pains felt under burdensome duty, 
cannot, without disorder, be sought after for their own sake, 
since this would be to change them from a means to an end. 
For example, it is plainly the duty of some men to study and 
cultivate the arts and sciences ; bnt such occupation is labori- 
ous, requires much effort, and much self-denial; the persevering 
student, however, is encouraged with pleasure of an elevated 
kind, that which comes from the contemplation of the true 
and the beautiful. 



CHAPTER IV. 

ON THE PASSIONS. 
ARTICLE I. 

GENERAL NATURE OF PASSION. 

The passions are natural principles in man, which influ- 
ence his action ; they are, on that account, related to the 
morality of human actions. 

Passion, as applied to the present subject-matter, is used in. 
several distinct senses : ist. The capability of being moved by 
love, hatred, fear, or any such affection, is often termed pas- 
sion; and it takes the name of the affection, as passion of 
love, passion of fear, etc. The subject of any such affection 
is the human compound, i. e., an organ or appetite of the liv- 
ing body, but neither the material body, nor the soul taken 
separately from each other. 2d. Any degree of such feeling, as 
love, sadness, fear, etc., whether the feeling be slight, remiss, or 
intense, is termed passion in popular language. 3d. Cor- 
responding acts in the will, or rational appetite, are less prop- 
erly termed passions; they are more accurately styled affections, 
inclinations, or acts of the will, according to its particular 
operation. 4th. Finally, any immoderate, or violent and excess- 
ive excitement, in sensible appetite, is styled passion, and it 
takes its specific name from the species of objects which pro- 
duce the commotion. This is passion, properly so called; and 
it is, as thus understood, specially pertinent to ethics, since 
it is capable of influencing human action in no small degree. 

Passion is a movement or disturbance in sensible appetite, 
which is vehement and more or less excessive, and which fol- 
lows the imagination of good or evil.* 

* " Passio est motus appetitivre virtutis sensibilis in imaginatione boni aut 
mali; seu, est motus irrationalis animse per susceptionem boni aut mali." 
11 Passiones sunt motus appetitus sensidvi, qui sunt contra naturam vel con- 

7 (73) 



74 

Hence, passion, -which is more or less impulsive excitement 
or emotion, is something sensible, and is not in the will or ra- 
tional appetite as its subject, but it has sensible appetite for its 
subject; it follows the apprehension by the imagination of 
some good or evil ; and it may, therefore, be caused either by 
a real good or evil, or by one that is purely of the imagina- 
tion, as when one is excited to anger by some trivial word or 
act to which he attributes an imaginary and unreal meaning. 
It is denned to follow "the imagination of good or evil," 
because sensible appetite is moved directly by what is in the 
imagination ; and whatever is apprehended, either sensibly or 
intellectually, must necessarily be imaged in the fancy or im- 
agination. 

The passions, as thus described, are frequently called " ani- 
mal passions," because they are common to man and the 
brute, or are proper to all animals. Man, in common with 
the perfect irrational animal,* has two sets of organic princi- 
ples that serve him ; namely, his organic powers of cognition, 
as the five external senses, the internal senses, v. g.,the imagi- 
nation and the sensile memory. Also, he has various sensi- 
ble appetites, or sensible powers of appetition, by which he is 
impelled to action when their objects are apprehended and 
duly presented, v. g., love, sadness, fear, etc. Universal 
experience attests the fact that the seat of these feelings or 
sensible yearnings is either the heart, or it is in the immediate 
vicinity of the heart ; and it is from this circumstance that the 
heart is frequently styled the instrument of the passions. f 

tra rationem." *' Passiones sunt motus qnidam irrationalis appetitus." 
I. 2, p., qu. 124, a. I. Passion is movement of sensible appetite on the 
imagination of good or evil; or, it is movement of the irrational soul, 
through the reception of good or evil. Passions are movements of sensi- 
tive appetites that are against nature or against reason. Passions are cer- 
tain movements of irrational appetite. 

*The perfect animal is one that has five external senses ; it is thus dis- 
tinguished from the imperfect animal, as the oyster, which has fewer senses 
than five. 

t"Cor est instrumentum passionum animae." I. 2, p., qu 48, a. 2. 
The heart is the instrument or organ of the soul's passions. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 75 

The ancient stoics did not distinguish between the intellect 
and the senses ; between the will, which is the rational appe- 
tite, and the sensible appetite, which is organic. They re- 
garded all the passions as a species of insanity, and there- 
fore as in themselves evil; and hence Seneca (liber i, de Ira), 
says that anger, being a kind of insanity, cannot exist in a 
wise man. The peripatetics distinguished between rational and 
sensible action; they maintained that the passions, when re- 
duced to subjection and moderated by reason, are good" and 
not bad; that they are bad only when they are permitted to 
overpower reason and rule man. In this, it is clear that the 
doctrine of the peripatetics was correct in its principle. 

Owing to the poverty of language, we give the same name 
to the passion and the sin or vice to which it tends,* if it in- 
cline to evil; v. g., the passion of anger, the sin or vice of 
anger. If the passion tend rather to good, we give its name 
also to the virtue to which it inclines ; v. g , the passion of 
love, the virtue of love. Although some passions tend to 
good, and others tend to evil, yet, when considered in them- 
selves, or apart from all cooperation of the deliberate will, 
they are neither morally good nor morally bad; but they be- 
come good or bad according to the deliberate action of the 
will in ruling and directing them, or in declining to control 
them. The passions may be reduced to subjection, and ruled 
by reason; but since the power of appetition, of which they 
are the operations or acts, is a proper y of human nature, the 
stoical notion of their total eradication supposes a physical 
impossibility, i. e., that it is possible totally to extirpate an 
essential property of human nature. 

In order to understand precisely the manner in which the 

* "Quaedam vitia innominata sunt, et similiter qusedam virtutes (Aris- 
totle, 4, Eth. ) ; et ideo oportuit in quibusdam passi onibus uti nomine virtu- 
es et vitiorum, etc." 2. 2, p., qu. 127, a. I, ad 3. Certain vices are name- 
less, as likewise are certain virtues ; and therefore, in some passions, we 
use the name of virtue and vice given to these passions. 

Some popular writers now call the passions "emotions;" but, properly 
speaking, emotion is an effect of the passion. 



76 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

operations of any passion become imputable, it will be useful 
to distinguish accurately between the acts of what writers on 
ethics style the inferior will, and those of the superior will : 
not that there are really two wills in man ; but the one will 
has action of two kinds, which are quite distinct. The infe- 
rior will and the superior will are distinguished from each 
other by two kinds of motive to action : when the will is 
moved to desire good or to avert from evil, by objects pre- 
cisely as apprehended or imaged in the imagination, it is then 
styled the inferior will; it is not a rational act, for there is 
neither deliberation nor judgment. When the motive is what 
can be apprehended only by the intellect, as happens in judg- 
ments of composition and division, and in reasoning, then it 
is the superior will that desires the object or averts from it. 
The first indeliberate action of the will is towards what the 
imagination apprehends as good, and away irom what it im- 
ages as an evil; its deliberate action, or that of the superior 
will, may just reverse its natural or spontaneous action, which 
was first; v. g., it may choose what gives pain, and it may 
avert from what gives pleasure. 

Since the passions follow immediately after their objects are 
apprehended by the fancy, and are distinctly presented, their 
action is antecedent to the action of reason or judgment; in 
other words, they anticipate, in such case, all deliberation or 
choice of the will. They can be freely excited, also, by bring- 
ing their objects into the imagination, or deliberately retaining 
them there. Similar feelings, but in a remiss degree, are caused 
by the contemplation of truth and beauty of the intellectual 
order, and especially by affections in the will, even when the 
object is intelligible good. 

Owing to the control which the reason possesses over the 
passions, which it can exercise either directly or indirectly, the 
heart, which is the seat of passionate feeling, is often spoken 
of as the will, or as being the will itself. 

Man is a perfectible being, whether we consider him as an 
individual, or view him specifically; and the work of his moral 



GENERAL ETHICS. 77 

perfection is placed, to a great extent, in his own hands; of 
this work, the ruling and directing of his passions constitutes 
a chief part. 



ARTICLE II. 

CLASSIFICATION OF THE PASSIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR 
PROPER OBJECTS AND THEIR DISTINCTIVE ACTS. 

Writers usually enumerate eleven passions to which all other 
passions may be reduced : love and hate, desire and aversion 
(anxiety to escape), joy and sadness, hope and desperation, 
courage and fear, anger.* 

All the passions proceed radically from love, for all appe- 
tite tends to good under some respect, either as its immediate 
or its ultimate object; but as the modes of moving towards 
the good which is intended by nature are various, according 
to circumstances, means, and the like, hence the classification 
of the passions. The passions are divided into two classes, 
the " concupiscible " and the "irascible:" the first, which are 
love, hate, desire, aversion, joy and sadness, regard good and 
evil as, in some respect, immediate ; the second, or the irasci- 
ble, which are hope, desperation, courage, fear, and anger, 
regard good and evil as accompanied with difficulty, or as 
beset with impediments to be surmounted. Love is the in- 
clination of the appetite towards the good which is appre- 
hended by the imagination; desire impels the agent to seek 
it; joy is the pleasure or fruition that comes from the posses- 
sion of the good. In hatred, there is opposite action in the 
appetite : hatred is an inclination of the appetite against, or 
away from, what is apprehended by the imagination as an 
evil; aversion impels the agent to escape or remove from evil 
which is imminent ; sadness is the sorrow or grief that follows 
the apprehension of evil as present or oppressing. Hope fol- 

* Amor, odium, desiderium, fuga, gaudium, tristilia, spes, desperado, 
audacia, timor, ira. 

7* 



78 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

lows the apprehension in the imagination of good which is 
absent or future, but yet it can be reached or attained to 
with difficulty; it is future, but it is a possible good; despera- 
tion follows the apprehension of good as not attainable, or as 
beset with difficulties which are too great to be overcome ; 
courage emboldens the agent to conquer the opposition and 
difficulty; fear follows the apprehension of evil which is fu- 
ture; anger impels the agent to rise up against evil that is 
present; and hence, sadness and anger both concern present 
evil. These eleven passions may be regarded as simple pas- 
sions; all other passions are either compounded of several 
simple passions, or they are species pertaining to some one of 
the primitive and simple ones. Pity, for example, is caused 
by sadness for another's evil, and lest the like evil may come 
to self, and it includes love ; impudence regards what is unbe- 
coming, and it proceeds from desire and boldness in respect to 
its object; shame is from sadness, and fear of disgrace ; indig- 
nation is caused by anger or sadness, at misplaced good or 
undeserved evil, etc. Also, one passion may sometimes coun- 
teract or neutralize another. Hence, all the passions are dif- 
ferent modes of action in the internal sensible appetite, which 
depend for their species on the objects that are apprehended 
by the fancy. Since the object is presented to the appetite 
and to the intellect simultaneously,* the appetite acts before 
the deliberate will can choose; and hence, the first movement 

* "Motus sensitivi appetitus praevenit rationem, et eo quod eodem mo- 
menta sensus interni objectum exhibeant appetitui et intellectui; unde fit ut 
appetitus in actum prorumpat antequam voluntas quicquam de tali objecto 
acceperit ab intellectu. Qui defectus in innocentia non contigissit, sed gra- 
tia ita ligasset appetitum sensitivum, ut objectum non percepisset, vel per- 
ceptum nee probasset nee reprobasset, nisi ex imperio rationis>." Irenaeus 
Carmelit. In Aristot. Eth. Movement of the sensitive appetite anticipates 
or goes before reason, because the internal senses exhibit their object to 
appetite and to the reason at the same moment ; hence, the appetite hur- 
ries into action before the will is at all affected through the object from the 
intellect. This defect would not have existed in a state of innocence ; but 
grace would have bound the appetite so that it would not perceive the 
object, or, perceiving it, would not have approved or disapproved it with- 
out the command of reason. 



GENEKAL ETHICS. 79 

of appetite is said to precede rational action. The passions 
are in themselves, therefore, blind principles, which it is the 
office of reason to subdue, moderate, and direct. 

They are more adjacent to the will than are the external 
members of man ; * or, they are more intimately connected 
with the will ; therefore, action and reaction of the will and 
passion are more immediate. Hence, since external members 
may be made to put commanded or "imperate" acts, a for- 
tiori, the passions may be moved to action by command of 
the will. Yet, as mere feelings of sense, they may both begin 
and continue, against the choice of the will. 

The passions, when considered as principles of action which 
are natural to man, or in respect to the end for which they 
are naturally intended, are evidently good, since all God's 
works are good as coming from His hands. But, as already 
observed, they are neither morally good nor morally bad in 
relation to man, antecedently to any deliberate action of his 
will. 



ARTICLE III. 

IMPUTABILITY OF PASSION. 

Observe that every action which proceeds from the deliber- 
ate choice of the will, and which is intended or consented to 
in itself or in its cause, is imputable; no other action is impu- 
table. 

* " Propinquior enim e=;t appetitus sensitivus ipsi rationi et voluntati 
quam membra exteriora, quorum tamen motus et actus sunt boni vel mali 
moraliter secundum quod sunt voluntarii, unde multo magis et ipsae pis- 
si ones secundum quod voluntaries dici possunt bonce vel malae moraliter. 
Dicuntur autem voluntarise, vel ex eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex 
eo quod a voluntate non prohibentur." I. 2, p., qu. 24, a. I. The sensi- 
tive appetite is more adjacent to the reason and will than are the exterior 
members, whose movements or acts, however, are good or bad, morally, 
according as they are voluntary; much more, then, are the passions good 
or bid mora-iy when they are voluntary. They are called voluntary either 
because they are commanded, or because they are not restrained by the 
will. 



80 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Proposition I. — Passion which precedes all deliberate ac- 
tion of the will, is not imputable. 

Proposition II. — Passion which is deliberately unresisted, 
and also passion which is deliberately opposed or resisted, are 
imputable. 

Proposition III. — Passion which is deliberately excited, 
is imputable. 

Proposition IV. — Antecedent passion renders man's ac- 
tion, which it helps to cause, less imputable ; but consequent 
passion, i. e., passion deliberately caused, makes the action 
more imputable. 

Proposition V. — Praise or blame, and merit or demerit, 
are due to all human actions which spring from passion that 
is imputable. 

Proposition VI. — Passions, when considered according to 
the intention of nature, are good. 

In practice, it is sometimes difficult even for a candid mind 
to decide whether the will has deliberately consented to an 
emotion of passion or not. This obscurity comes, in general, 
from two causes: ist, the action of the will is, in the nature 
of things, less evident than that of the intellect, and when 
the consent is not fully deliberate, or is not completely given, 
the obscurity is still greater; 2d, when the person is unable 
to distinguish the feeling or inclination which is sensible, and 
the consent of the will, which is a spiritual act, owing to igno- 
rance of their distinct natures. 

Against the foregoing doctrine it might be objected thus : 

Opjection 1. — "The passions are good in themselves; 
therefore they should not be opposed and repressed." 

Answer. — We should distinguish, that passions, when con- 
sidered in their species, or in the abstract, as powers, acts, or 
qualities, are good, it is true; when they are considered in the 
concrete, we must subdistinguish : that they are good in re- 
spect to the end for which God intends them, or as ruled by 
reason, is true ; that they are good when they are deliberately 
left uncontrolled, is not true. The passions are designed to 
perfect man in moral goodness, by affording him the oppor- 






GENERAL ETHICS. 81 

(unity and the objects for virtuous action ; he accomplishes 
this end, when he subjects his passions to the law of reason. 

Objection II. — "Man's actions, which proceed from the 
physical laws of nature, being necessary, are not imputable; 
therefore, murder, theft, etc., are, in general, not imputable." 

Answer — Those actions of man which come wholly from 
the mere physical laws of nature, are not under his control ; 
but merely physical actions may be indirectly subject to him, 
in as much as he can influence their causes. But the conclu- 
sion which is here derived from this principle must be distin- 
guished : that the passions may act necessarily, as regards 
their movement which immediately follows the first apprehen- 
sion of their objects in the fancy, is true; that their continued 
action, and the operations to which they impel, are not sub- 
ject to reason, Ave should subdistinguish; in the irrational 
animal and the insane man, they are not subject to reason; 
in the sane man, they are subject to reason, and are therefore 
imputable to him. 

But it may be further insists ^, that, " a man who acts from 
violent passion, is then insane; therefore his action is not im- 
putable to him as morally good or bad." 

Answer. — That a man when he is under the influence of 
strong passion is insane in the proper sense of the term, is not 
true ; that he may be such when the brain is organically dis- 
eased, is true. We must distinguish violent passion, which is 
imputable in its cause, from that which is not imputable in its 
cause; also, we must distinguish passion which entirely de- 
prives reason of its empire or power to control, and that which 
does not entirely overpower reason. Passion which entirely 
overpowers reason is imputable, if its cause be imputable; but 
not otherwise. This dethronement of reason from violent 
passion, as regards a sane man, is, at the worst, transitory and 
momentary. 

Objection III. — "There can be insane operations in the 
affections of the will, even when the intellect itself is sane; 
therefore the will may act according to disorderly passion or 
6 



b2 ETHICS, OR MORAL PniLOSOPHY. 

appetite, even when the reason is sane, and reprobates the 
evil that is done." 

Answer. — If it be meant that the will can, when the reason 
is sane, deliberately wish what is not, at the same time, free 
and imputable to the person, it is not true; if it be meant that 
the will can wish what is against right reason, this is true ; but 
the supposition is not true, namely, that this constitutes men- 
tal insanity; the deliberate action of the will is always imput- 
able when the reason is sane. Observe, that the imagination 
does not present the object of sensible appetite immediately 
to the will ; this is done by the idea of the object as in the 
intellect: the object as in the fancy is presented directly to 
the inferior appetite, by the fancy. Experience teaches that 
there can be abnormal states of sensible appetite, and that 
insanity may be caused by passion ; but the theory that the 
affections of the will itself can be insane, when the intellect is 
sane, is not tenable : reason and will are intrinsically united 
in one simple nature. Some recent authors who, with the 
ancient stoics, admit no distinction between sensible action 
and intellectual or spiritual action, confound disorderly ope- 
ration in sensible appetite with mental insanity, as Seneca 
did; but this is to err in the simple elements of philosophic 
thought. 

Objection IV. — With John Stuart Mill : " Given the mo- 
tives which are present to an individual's mind, and given 
likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the 
manner in which he will act may be unerringly inferred:" the 
particular motives coming from passion, along with the dispo- 
sition of the person being given, then the action or conduct 
of such person may be unerringly inferred. 

Answer. — The antecedent must be distinguished ; if the given 
motives include simple good or simple evil, that is, either abso- 
lute good, or evil which excludes all good; it is true that "the 
manner in which the individual will act may be unerringly 
inferred." But if the supposed case be one in which the will 
is wholly free to choose, and, at the same time, one in which 
the same person, and all persons, choose differently at differ- 



GENERAL ETHICS. 83 

ent times ; it is not then true that the knowledge of all the con- 
ditions extrinsic to the will's act of that kind enables us to infer 
its action unerringly, since such action would be purely con- 
tingent and it could be absolutely foreknown to God alone. 
Theie are objects, however, really subject to man's free will, 
in regard to which we may foreknow with a high degree of 
moral certainty, how a particular person would act here and 
now, by reasoning from what he and persons in general are 
known to do in such case.* But if " the motives, character 
and disposition of an individual" unerringly determine his 
choice, then it is not the will that freely and intrinsically de- 
termines the choice ; a supposition which destroys the true 
liberty of the will, and makes its action necessary ; or, as it is 
expressed, makes of it in such case, " quid determinatum ad 
unum."t The conclusion derived from Mr. Mill's assertion is 
not true, except it be understood only of the will's indeliberate 
action ; or, as it is also termed, the will's natural action. 
Finally, it is not any disposition of the will that determines its 
choice which is free; it is the will itself that determines its own 
free act. 

* Mr. Mill's supposition assumes the action of the free will to be physi- 
cal or mechanical and not moral. 

t What is determined to one ; that is, what cannot choose between one 
thing, and another thing. 



CHAPTER V. 

ARTICLE I. 

THE VIRTUES. 

Because the natural virtues are permanent effects produced 
by human actions which are good, as will be explained; when 
acquired, they become important principles which essentially 
influence the moral character of all deliberate action put by 
their possessor. It follows, therefore, that an explanation of 
the virtues cannot properly be omitted in an accurate treatise 
on ethics. 

Distinguish between virtue, and the acts which produce it ; 
the virtue itself is a habit which is acquired by repeated acts 
that directly regard the proper or specific object of that virtue ; 
v. g., one who practices justice in ail his words and deeds will, 
after a time, acquire the virtue of justice, the effect of which 
will be to give him facility and promptness in fulfilling all the 
requirements of that virtue. Virtue is a habit, as is also its 
opposite, which is vice. Habit is a permanent effect in man's 
superior powers, the intellect and will, produced by repeated 
acts of the same kind, and in regard to the same objects; it 
renders the putting of those acts more easy, and when it is 
possessed in a high degree, it even makes the acts pleasant. 
The capability of acquiring habits, as thus explained, is pecu- 
liar to rational natures. It is manifest from experience that 
habit is a principle which really and positively influences those 
acts of the intellect or will which concern its objects; for it 
truly co-operates in those acts. 

The virtues regarded as habits* which have good for their 

* " Habitus est in genere qualitatis, cujus est proncere, disponere et 
facilitare. Alice qualitates, v. g , sanitas, pulchritudo, etc., disponunt sub- 
jectum ad bene esse; sed viriutes animi disponunt ad bene operari." 
Gotti. t. 7. Habit is of the genus quality, and it prepares, disposes, 
facilitates; other qualities as health, beauty, etc., dispose the subject to exist 
well ; but the virtues of the mind dispose it to operate well. 

(84) 






GENERAL ETHICS. 

object, are either of the intellect, or of the will; and they are 
conceived to exist in those powers as qualities which- perfect 
them for action, and which are not easily destroyed or re- 
moved ; whence they are appropriately styled, a " second 
nature." The virtues which have the intellect for their sub- 
ject, or which reside in the intellect, give it facility in knowing 
the true; they are termed the intellectual virtues. Those vir- 
tues that reside in the will as their subject, render its various 
acts in loving the good, more easy, and less painful ; and when 
acquired in a perfect degree, they make the will's virtuous acts 
pleasant: they are termed the moral virtues. 

The intellectual virtues are five in number ; they are intelli- 
gence, (intellectus, i. e., habitus primorum principiorum)* sci- 
entific knowledge, wisdom, prudence, and art. Intelligence, 
which by many is said to be a virtue that is naturally infused, 
enables the understanding to perceive self-evident, necessary 
and absolute truths promptly and with ease. These truths are 
first principles which constitute the basis of all demonstrative 
reasoning; and back to them the mind returns when examin- 
ing reflexly its conclusions in order finally to verify them. 
These first principles are known per se, i. e., they are self-evi- 
dent, known in themselves and independently of all other 
truths. 

Scientific knowledge, is rational cognition of truth as com- 
ing necessarily from its first principles; or it is the knowledge 
of a thing as proceeding from its specific and necessary cause 
or causes. As there are different species of knowable things, 
so there are different species of science depending for their 
distinction on the particular and specific classes of those 
knowable things. Scientific knowledge is metaphysical, when 
its object wholly transcends the material order; it is mathe- 
matical when its object transcends the material and sensible, 
but not quantity; it is physical when its object is sensible ; 
but yet it abstracts from the singular, and is the universal, 
although the object be material and sensible. 

Wisdom is also rational knowledge; but its object tran- 

*Intellect, that is, the faculty of first principles. 

8 



86 ETniCS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

scends the particular species of causes which are the object 
of scientific knowledge : it includes the highest and most uni- 
versal causes of all things; its first principles are the absolute 
predicables of all being; i. e., of everything that is, or is pos- 
sible. Its object is the most abstract of all ; and its princi- 
ples are the most necessary and immutable of all principles. 
Wisdom and scientific knowledge agree in this, that both de- 
rive conclusions from their first principles ; but it has this 
peculiar to itself, that it judges all reasoning, and all princi- 
ples; and on that account wisdom, that is, philosophy, is 
styled the queen of the purely rational sciences. Hence, the 
principles of wisdom are absolutely first ; those of scientific 
knowledge are first in their respective species or genera, and 
are therefore only relatively first. 

These three virtues of the intellect are concerned only about 
speculative matter; i. e, matter which is the object of intel- 
lectual vision, and which has no direct or proper relation to 
rational appetite; its principles are not contingent and muta- 
ble, but they are necessary and invariable. 

Prudence is also an intellectual virtue; it gives facility to 
judge rightly concerning matter which constitutes the object 
of human action; i. e., action as deliberate and imputable. 
Prudence enables the understanding to judge with facility 
what ought to be done; " prudentia est recta ratio agibilium," 
uprightness of the reason in respect to things that ought to be 
done. In human action, the ends to be intended are the 
principles from which conclusions are derived, just as self- 
evident and necessary truths are the principles from which 
science and wisdom draw their conclusions. Prudence sup- 
poses rectitude in the rational appetite or the will ; hence, no 
practical conclusion can be deemed prudent which is de- 
prived of any requisite for complete rectitude of reason. It is 
manifest, then, that prudence may be considered under differ- 
ent respects, both an intellectual virtue, and a moral virtue, 
since it is the medium in which the two families of virtue, the 
intellectual and the moral, unite, or become intimately con- 
nected. Prudence is, on this account, often called the ruler 



GENEKAL ETHICS. 87 

of the virtues : " prudentia magistra virtutum " Art is a vir- 
tue in the sense that it gives facility to do what is good as a 
work of reason, "ars est factibilium;"* art has for its object 
that which can be done physically; but it includes no relation 
to rectitude of intention in the will. For this reason it is said 
that one artist may merit more praise for offending against his 
art wilfully, than another does, for offending without wishing 
it; but, on the contrary, the man who is wilfully imprudent is 
always more blamable than is the one who offends against 
prudence without wishing to do so: this is because prudence 
necessarily requires rectitude in the will and art does not. (P. i. 
2, qu. 57, a. 4.) 

As already observed, intelligence as the habit or faculty of 
first principles, scientific knowledge, and wisdom, have neces- 
sary or absolute truth for their object; or, they regard matter 
which is immutable. Prudence and art concern only contin- 
gent matter, or that which is mutable ; and therefore their ob- 
ject is the practical; i. e., what ought to be done, morally 
speaking, and what can be done physically. 

The intellectual and moral virtues agree, in the general 
concept of virtue, in so far as they incline the supreme powers 

* As art requires correctness of reason in ordering means for the effecting 
of an end, it is also called, "recta ratio factibilium," reason as correct in 
devising works that can be done. The old philosophers thus defined and 
named the liberal uid mechanical or useful arts : "Artes illse solse liberales 
dicuntur quse ad sciendum ordinantur. Illse quae ordinantur ad aliquam 
utilitatem per actionem habendam, dicuntur mechanics sive serviles." 
They are named in the following distich : 

" Lingua, tropus, ratio, numerus, tonus, angulus, astra ; (the seven liberal 
or fine arts) ; 
Rus, nemus, arma, rates, vulnera, lana, faber; (the seven mechanical or 
servile arts)." 

" Only those arts are styled liberal which are ordained to improve us in 
superior knowledge. Those which are ordained for something useful to be 
accomplished by labor performed are called the mechanical or servile arts." 
The liberal ai-ts are : Grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, music, geome- 
try, astronomy. The useful or, servile are : Agriculture, the chase, the 
military, navigation, surgery, weaving, architecture. 



88 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

in man, the intellect and will, to what is in itself good, and 
facilitate their action towards it; , but they differ in this, that 
the intellectual virtues, with the exception of prudence, do not 
essentially include moral goodness in their end, and in their 
exercise ; for they can be used for an evil purpose, without 
changing their nature. But the moral virtues essentially re- 
quire, for their normal act, rectitude both of the reason and 
the will; or, as it is expressed, the moral virtues give both 
faculty of action and rectitude in the use made of that faculty ; 
whereas, although the intellectual virtues give the faculty, 
or facility of action also, yet they do not give the right use 
of that perfection. Hence, moral virtue is often defined to 
be, " a good quality of the mind, by which one lives well, and 
which no one uses amiss ;"* it gives not only natural or physical 
goodness of action as do the intellectual virtues; but also the 
moral goodness which proceeds from rectitude in the superior 
powers of the soul, the intellect and will 

Virtue is defined to be " a quality of the mind," because 
virtue, being a "habit," is of the genus or category, quality; 
it is " of the mind," i. e., its subject is the powers of the soul. 
" P.y which one lives well, and which no « ne uses amiss, or 
for evil," are members of the definition which specify the dis- 
tinctive characteristics of moral virtue. 

A sense, being by its nature only an organic power, can- 
not become the subject of a virtue; for, a sensible power 
cannot have either intellectual or voluntary action which 
proceeds from itself; its commanded or "imperate." action 
is always retermined and directed by a principle which is 
superior to itself, i. e., the rational power. The power of 
imagination does not, in its act, attain to the true, as true, so 
that it can distinguish the true from the false, the good from 
the bad; for, the true, and what is morally becoming, trans- 
cend the sensible order, and can be attained to only by pow- 
ers which are proper and intrinsic to rational natures. It is 
true that organic powers may, by exercise, acquire some phys- 
ical effects of habit, by which they become the better dis- 

* " Bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur, et nemo male utitur." S. Aug. 



GENERAL KTlilCS. ©a 

posed to serve as instruments for the higher powers. But 
this is not to acquire virtue, or to be capable of a virtuous 
act; for, the perfection which is in the action of the instru- 
mental cause comes, not from itself, but from the principal 
cause. Sensible appetite cannot desire good as morally befit- 
ting, or as consentaneous to reason; because the moral char- 
acter of an object is beyond the sphere of its action, since it 
pertains only to rational power, or will. 



ARTICLE II. 



THE MORAL VIRTUES, 



The moral virtues have, as already observed, the will for 
their subject, or they are habits which reside in the will. 
They are as numerous as are the species of formal objects 
which moral action concerns : and as these objects are of 
many kinds, so the virtues are of many kinds. For the sake 
of clearness and simplicity, all the moral virtues are usually 
included under the four cardinal virtues, Prudence, Fortitude, 
Justice and Temperance. Some of the moral virtues regard 
the rights of other beings; v. g., justice, religon, piety, grati- 
tude; others moderate passion, as fortitude, temperance, etc.; 
it may be said that all moral virtue is concerned either about 
passion, or about operation, i. e., deliberate action which may 
not directly regard an object of passion or sensible appe- 
tite.^.) 

Proposition I. — The perfection or goodness of moral vir- 
tue proceeds from its being the mean between excess and de- 

(i.) "Justitia et partes ejus proprie sunt circa operationes sicut circa 
propriam materiam." I. 2, p., qu. 60, a. 2. Justice and its parts are con- 
cerned about operations as their proper matter. 

8* 



90 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

feet; or, perfect moral virtue consists in a prudent medium 
between extremes.* 

There are various proverbs in popular use which embody 
the same truth more or less explicitly; v. g., "virtue chooses 
the middle course; "virtue is in the middle;" "avoid ex- 
tremes," etc. 

Just as a work of art is perfect when it can be truly said 
that it has nothing superfluous, and that nothing is wanting 
to it ; so, a moral virtue is perfect when its act or operation 
is free from every excess and every defect : it is evident that 
what is exempt both from excess and defect must be perfect 
in its species. Hence, it may be argued thus : those virtues 
consist in a middle course of action, against which no fault 
can be committed, except by excess or by defect; but there 
can be no offence against moral virtue, except either by ex- 
cess or by defect; therefore, perfect moral virtue consists in 
prudent medium action, which avoids both excess and defect. 

This mediumt in which virtue consists is a rule or measure 
which is determined by reason, but which is founded on the 
objects of moral action. For most of the virtues, this me- 
dium is that of equal ratios in geometric proportion; v. g., as 
virtue is removed from excess, so by equal ratio is it removed 
from defect. ToJ determine this ratio, or the medium of vir- 
tuous action, is the peculiar office of prudence, and hence 
the supremacy of prudence over all the moral virtues; from 

* Bonum virtutis moralis consistit in adaequatione ad mensuram rationis. 
Manifestum autem est quod inter excessum et defectum medium est sequali- 
tas sive uniformitas." I. 2, p., qu. 64, a. I. The good possessed by 
moral virtue consists in its exact agreement with the measure of rerson. 
Now, it is plain that the medium between excess and defect is equality or 
uniformity. 

t "Medium est proprie inter contraria." A medium is, properly speak- 
ing, between contraries. 

t "Est finis uniuscuj usque virtutis moralis attingere medium in propria 
materia quod quidem determinatur secundum rectam rationem prudentiae." 
I. 2, p., qu. 66, a. 3, ad 3. It is the end of every moral virtue to reach 
the medium in its proper matter, which medium is determined by a right 
measure of prudence. 






GENERAL ETHICS. 91 

it comes rectitude of moral action : " prudentia est recta ratio 
agibilium." 

Since the medium, or mean line for perfect virtue, must be 
estimated by reason, according to the nature of the objects, 
according to the circumstances, disposition of individuals, etc, 
it will not be the same for all persons; v. g , a temperate 
meal cannot have the same measure for a delieate person as it 
had for Milo of Crotona, who ate an ox per day; therefore, 
the measure of temperance is not the same for all persons. 
Similarly, the ratio, or the medium for virtuous action in gen- 
eral, depends on a right estimate of all these conditions. 

In commutative justice, by which individuals are required 
to pay their just debts, the object itself precisely determines 
this measure, or the medium for the virtuous action ; hence, 
in this case, there is said to be a "medium rei" a medium in 
the thing itself; v. g , when a man borrows a hundred dollars, 
the payment of this sum in the manner, and at the time speci- 
fied, are objects which commutative justice concerns; the 
sum is one, determinate thing, arithmetically, and it must also 
determine the exact estimate which reason, in such case, 
makes for just action. In this species of matter, the medium 
as regards the object, and the medium for perfect virtue, will 
be one and invariable, with respect to all persons. 

Proposition If. — For perfect rational operation in man, 
there is required virtue ; or, man as a rational being, is per- 
fected only by virtue. 

Man is perfected only by rational action, and rational ac- 
tion is perfected by virtue : action, and the corresponding vir- 
tue, reciprocally perfect each other. 

The perfection of a being is measured by the perfection of 
its action. It is by this measure that we judge and estimate 
the perfection and the goodness of everything around us. 
Man is peculiarly a perfectible being; when he begins life, 
his rational nature is, as it were, a blank. By growth of body, 
and development of mind, he becomes, from a helpless and 
unreasoning infant, far the most powerful being on earth, and 
the ruler of all that is on earth. 



92 etiiics. or. moral philosophy. 

Man's superiority is from the perfection of his rational na- 
ture; and his rational nature is made perfect in its operation 
by the intellectual and moral virtues which give rectitude of 
action to his superior powers. Virtue, as moral, has for its 
essential end to regulate human action by right reason, and 
to moderate the passions : the intellectual virtues are prerequi- 
site to perfect him in the knowledge of truth, for the norma 
of the good is the perfect, which is apprehended as the true.* 
Between the ignorant man, or the vicious man, on the one 
hand, and the wise philosopher, or the man of great moral 
goodness, on the other hand, there are many grades of human 
perfection, the difference proceeding wholly from the unequal 
degrees of intellectual and moral virtues in mankind. Hence, 
every man is more or less perfect as a rational being, accord- 
ing to the degree of intellectual virtue which is in his reason, 
and the moral virtue that is in his will. The virtues are, by 
their very nature, habits or qualities, which complete man's 
superior powers for operation, or perfect their action in re- 
gard to their proper objects, the true and the good. 

Proposition I! I. — The intellectual virtues are absolutely 
more perfect and noble, in their species, than are the moral 
virtues; but the moral virtues are superior, under a certain 
respect, to the intellectual virtues. 

The excellency of a virtue is from the intrinsic superiority 
of its object, and from a greater perfection in the power 
which is the subject of that virtue. The intellect is the su- 
preme power in every intelligent being, as already shown; its 
act precedes that of any other spiritual faculty; and on it all 
the higher powers of the being depend, in acting, for their 
object and for their direction: it is manifest that even the will 

* " Sicut imaginatio formse sine sestimatione convenientis vel nocivi non 
movet appetitum sensitivum, ita nee appreliensio veri (per intellectum) sine 
ratione boni et appetibilis." I. 2, p., qu. 9, a. I, ad 2. As the imagina- 
tion of an object, without any estimate made of it as pleasant or harmful, 
causes no movement in sensitive appetite, so neither does the apprehen- 
sion of the true (by the intellect) without the relation of what ii good and 
desirable. 






GENERAL ETHICS. 93 

can have no act, except dependency on the reason for its ob- 
ject and its direction. 

Again, the object of the intellectual virtues includes abso- 
lute truth, and the highest universals ;* whereas the proper 
and immediate object of the moral virtues is rather that which 
is contingent and particular; this means, and that means, to 
an end. Also, prudence, which is an intellectual virtue, is 
supreme over the moral virtues, since it is the function of pru- 
dence to judge to counsel, to prescribe the choice in all moral 
action. 

It follows, therefore, that the intellectual virtues, both as re- 
gards the power which they perfect, and as regards the objects 
of their action, are simply or absolutely superior to the moral 
virtues.! 

The moral virtues are superior to the intellectual virtues 
under a certain respect. When virtue is considered in rela- 
tion to human action, the moral virtue is more noble ; for it 
perfects the will or rational appetite ; and it is the peculiar 
excellency of the will that it commands the other powers of 
man to act. Any one of the powers which co-operate in cog- 
nition, may be made by the will to put a commanded or " im- 
perate" act ;| hence the will and the virtues that perfect it, 
are, under this respect, the most noble. 

We may regard virtue either simply as a genus of perfec- 
tion ; or we may consider it strictly in its own species as vir- 
tue, according to which it is a means to good or is a good 

* "Notitia quae est minus certa de altioribus et majoribus prsefertur ei 
quse est magis certa de inferioribus rebus." I. 2. p. qu. 66, a. 5, ad 3. 
Knowledge which is less certain concerning higher and greater things, is 
preferable to that which is more certain concerning inferior things. 

t " Secundum eas(virtutes intellectuales) quodammodo inchoatur in nobis 
beatitudo quse consistit in cognitione veritatis." 1. 2, p. qu. 66, a. 3 ad 
I. By means of them (the intellectual virtues) there is begun in us after 
some manner beatitude, which consists in the knowledge of truth. 

% "Voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus; utimur enim 
aliis potentiis cum volumus." I. 2, p. qu. 9, a. I. The will moves the 
other powers of the soul to their acts ; for we use the other powers when 
we wish. 



94 ETHICS, OB MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

quality, as above said : in the order of perfection, intellectual 
virtue is higher. But under the precise respect of virtue, 
such perfection is most properly of the rational appetite, 
whose formal object is good as perfecting man. We do not 
denominate a person good on account of science or wisdom ; 
one is r.iade good by prudence, justice, fortitude, and tem- 
perance. We may conclude, therefore, that the moral excel 
the intellectual virtues in that which strictly and specifically 
constitutes virtue. 

Observe that no rule can be given which assigns the limits 
of the medium between excess and defect in virtuous action, 
with mathematical exactness for all cases ; nor is it practically 
necessary. It is the office of prudence to estimate that medium 
according to the object, the person, and the circumstances 
which concur to make up each particular case; the judgment 
of prudence in such instances is contingent and moral, not 
metaphysical. It is an error which is not always sufficiently 
guarded against, to apply principles of moral prudence, which 
are modified by circumstances, as if they were metaphysical 
principles, which are absolute and immutable. As no eye can 
trace with absolute precision the lines which really divide the 
colors of the rainbow ; so no human power can apply a meta- 
physical gauge to the object of a particular moral action, so 
as to subject it to absolute measurement.* 



ARTICLE III. 

THE CARDINAL VIRTUES. 

The four cardinal or principal virtues, when named in the 
order of their relative dignity or superiority, are prudence, 

* " Quandoque autem medium raiionis non est medium rei, sed accipitur 
per comparationem ad nos, consistit in medio per conformitatem ad rationem 
rectam " i. 2, p. qu. 64, a. 2. When the medium of reason is not the 
medium that is in the thing, but is understood by way of a comparison to 
us, it then consists in a medium of conformity to right reason. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 95 

justice, fortitude, and temperance.* These four virtues are 
cardinal or principal under several respects: i. Every virtue 
participates in the perfections of these four; viz., every virtue 
must be prudent, else it would err by excess or defect ; it must 
be just to God, to neighbor, to self; it must be firm and con- 
stant, despite difficulties; it must be moderated so as to avoid 
any excess or defect. 2. These four virtues are cardinal, be- 
cause they are general principles of moral conduct which direct 
man's entire life. 3. They are cardinal also because each one 
of them possesses its own peculiar perfection or species of rec- 
titude. 4. They are cardinal, finally, because they regard 
distinct matter, under whicn may be included the objects of 
all the moral virtues. 

The relative dignity of these virtues is estimated by the 
degree of perfection in the act of each one, and in the object 
of the act; according to this standard, prudence ranks first, 
and temperance is the last. 

Though prudence is an intellectual virtue, since it is a 
perfection of the intellect ; yet it is also here enumerated 
among the moral virtues; because it supposes uprightness of 
the reason in reference to the objects of action, it is styled 
" recta ratio agibilium," i. e., right reason in matters of duty. 
It is treated as a moral virtue, because rectitude of the reason, 
in respect to what is practical, is inseparable from rectitude in 
the will. It is evident that the mind cannot deliberately and 
practically, judge the medium of virtue, except by the concur- 
rence of the two faculties, reason and will,f since the matter 

* "Virtus moralis versatur circa ea quae sunt ad finem." " Prudentia 
est pro attingendo finem." Moral virtue concerns means to the end. Pru- 
dence is for attaining the end. It is directive of all moral virtue. 

t " Ratio, secundum quod est apprehensiva finis, praecedit appetitum finis ; 
sed appetitus finis praecedit rationem ratiocinantem ad eligenda ea quse sunt 
ad finem, quod periinet ad prudentiam : sicut etiam in speculativis intellectus 
principiorum est principium rationis syllogizantis." 1. 2, p. qu. 58, a. 5, 
ad 1. The act of reason by which it apprehends an end, precedes the act 
of the appetite or will; but the desire of the end precedes the operation 
of reason inferring the means to be chosen for the end, which pertains to 
prudence ; just as in speculative matter intelligence, or the first principles, 
are presupposed to the action of reason as deducing conclusions. 



96 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of moral virtue relates to appetite, and the will therefore must 
be affected towards it when it is practically judged; i. e., 
judged as something to be done freely or not done. It is 
easy to see that prudence, whose function is to consult, to 
judge, to prescribe the choice which is best to be made, is 
supreme among moral virtues. 

Any act which is morally wrong is, at the same time, im- 
prudent; consequently, it supposes some error of the reason,* 
for he that deflects from rectitude thereby really errs. Since 
the intellect does not err pet se, i. e., it does not produce the 
error by its own proper act, we must ascribe the erroneous 
judgment to an impulse or command of the will; therefore, 
error in the reason is primitively from the will. This action 
of the will is either deliberate, or it is indeliberate; in the one 
case, it is imputable; in the other, it is not imputable. t The 
virtue of prudence excludes precipitancy, inconsiderateness, 
inconstancy, and negligence, which are opposed to the virtue 
by defect: cunning or craft, fraud, excessive solicitude, are 
opposed to piuJence by excess. 

JUSTICE AS A CARDINAL VIRTUE. 

Justice is a virtue by which a person gives to every one his 
due. Its subject is the will, which it renders constant or per- 
petual in its purpose of paying every debt, or of giving all 
that is due. Since its proper function is to direct the rational 
appetite, not the intellect in cognitions, we may rightly con- 
clude that its subject is not the intellect, but the will. For, a 

* "Voluntas in suis liberis actionibusnonnecessariodeterminatur a prac- 
tice) judicio intellectus sive quoad exercitium sive quoad speciem actus 

voluntas potest suspendere et non eligere quod intellectus judicat eligen- 
dumesse: hinc Ovidius : Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor." I3e- 
canus de Lib. Arbitrio. The will, in its free actions, is not necessarily de- 
termined by the practical judgment of the intellect, whether as regards 
exercise or as regards the species of choice. The will can remain in sus- 
pense, and not choose what the intellect judges ought to be chosen; hence, 
Ovid says, "I see and approve what is better, and I follow what is worse." 

t "Unusquisque judicat prout affectus est." Every one judges accord- 
ing as he is affected. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 97 

virtue belongs to that power whose acts it is ordained to di- 
rect; and justice directs volition, not the reason, since "the 
giving to another his due" is an operation or a deed which 
is commanded by the will, to which the execution must be 
referred as an act of obedience in the other powers. There- 
fore, the proximate principle of the action is the rational ap- 
petite or will. 

Justice regards another person ; it is concerned about things 
as its matter. It relates also to the public or the common- 
wealth, and likewise to God. Commutative justice directs the 
payment or satisfying of all dues from one individual to an- 
other; it is the office of distributive justice to direct the giving 
of all dues from the public or the government to meritorious 
and to demeritorious individuals. When justice causes a 
person to render due homage to God, it is styled the virtue of 
religion.]: Justice, when it impels children duly to honor their 
parents, is termed piety, which, by figure of speech, is often 
used as synonymous with the virtue of religion. Obedience 
to the command of legitimate authority, and patriotism, are 
also reducible to the virtue of justice; as are also gratitude, 
friendship, veracity. 



ARTICLE IV. 

FORTITUDE. 

Fortitude is a virtue, that gives facility in restraining fear 
and moderating boldness or hardihood: i. e., daringness or 

% " Religio est virtus quae debitum cultum Deo tribuit tamquam primo 
omnium principio." — Gonet. "Sicut objectum justitise non est persona 
sed jus personam, sic objectum religionis non est immediate Deus, sed jus 
Dei. Virtus moralis attingit Deum mediante actu creato non immediate." 
Billuart. Religionis the virtue which renders due homage to God as the 
first principle of all things.— Gonet. Just as the object of justice is not a 
person, but the right of a person; so, die object of religion is not God, 
individually, but God's right. Moral virtue attains to God .through the 
medium of a created act, not immediately. 
9 



98 ETHICS, OK MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

audacity. When boldness is reduced to a rational medium, 
it is usually styled courage. 

The sensible powers of cognition, as the external senses, 
the internal senses, v. g., the fancy, the sensile memory, etc., 
are not susceptible of any quality or improvement by custom 
which makes them better disposed to virtuous action ; or, use 
of them does not give them greater inclination towards virtuous 
or good objects, as such. The reason of this peculiarity in them 
is that their action naturally precedes that of the intellect, 
since the intellect depends on them for its objects; and, on 
the other hand, they have no such dependence. But the sensible 
appetite, within certain limits, is obedient to reason ; it may 
be forced to act, or to cease action, by command of the will; 
v. g., motions of anger may be suppressed, or excited and in- 
creased, on certain occasions, merely by one's own choice.* 
It is a well-known fact of experience, also, that the more abso- 
lutely the sensible appetite is ruled by reason, the more com- 
pletely subject it becomes to control; and although it cannot 
be totally eradicated as a principle of human nature, thereby 
inducing a state of apathy, according to the theory of the 
Stoics; yet, it may be made submissive, in its operation, to the 
government of reason. 

The foregoing explanation being understood, it will be 
readily seen why the internal sensible appetite, as irascible, is 
usually said in philosophy to be the subject of fortitude, which 
is the third cardinal virtue; and why the appetite, as concu- 
piscible, is the subject of temperance. Though the will is 
truly and properly the subject of these virtues, yet, when they 
are developed by exercise into perfect habits, their effect on 
the corresponding sensible appetites is to give them facility 
and promptness in obeying the control of the will or rational 

* "Potential cognoscitiva? sensitive non sunt capaces virtulis, quia sunt 
naturaliter proeviae rationi ; sed potentice appetitivse naturali er sequntur 
rationem quia appetitus inferiori obedit superiori." - D. Tn. DeVirtut. The 
sensible powers of knowing are not capable of virtue, because naturally 
they act before reason ; but the powers of apperition, or the appetites, 
naturally follow reason, for the inferior appetite obeys the superior, or, at 
least, in a certain degree. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 99 

appetite. These permanent effects produced in the sensible 
appetite are conveniently termed fortitude and temperance, 
since these two virtues, as moral principles, regard the same 
objects, respectively, that the appetites concern. 

While justice regards operations or external deeds as its 
proper objects; for, to pay what is due to another, to render 
due return for good received, are operations or works; the 
virtues, fortitude and temperance, regard the passions; that 
is, the acts of the sensible appetite, which is an internal prin- 
ciple. Their function is to moderate the passions, by reducing 
them to the medium which prudence or right reason pre- 
scribes, whereby the acts consequent upon passion will be 
rendered truly conformable to the norma of moral good. 
Passion itself is not virtue,* because it is indifferent to good 
and evil ; or, it is equally disposed to the one and to the 
other; whereas, the object of virtue is only good, and its ac- 
tion is per se good ; since it is of its nature to give, not only 
faculty of good action, but also right use of that faculty. 

Fortitude is a virtue that gives the rational medium between 
the extremes of fear and boldness ; it also confers the facility 
to accept and endure painful things, which it is becoming 
and useful to bear. 

Fortitude includes under it patience, confidence and per- 
severance, in spite of hardships; and magnanimity. 

Patience is a virtue by which a person willingly bears long 
enduring and painful things, when it is becoming or morally 
good to accept and suffer them. Longanimity is a perfection 
of patience by which the soul preserves its equanimity or even- 
ness of temper, when relief which was expected or hoped for is 
further delayed. Confidence and perseverance are produced 
by well ordered courage. 

Magnanimity, i. e., greatness of soul, is a virtue which 
inclines to what is great in every species of virtue. The car- 
dinal virtue to which it is usually referred as its principle, is 

* " Passio non est virtus, sed indifferenter se habet ad bonum et ma- 
lum." — (Philos. passim.) Passion is not virtue, but is indifferent to good 
and evil. 



100 

fortitude ; but it has this perfection special to itself, that its 
object is the great, in every kind of virtuous operation; on 
which account it may be considered as, under some respect, a 
distinct species of virtue. 

Magnanimity is a higher perfection in all virtue, and there- 
fore it may be considered an ornament of all virtue. The 
doing of that which is great in every species of virtue, is gen- 
erally called "heroic virtue;" hence, heroic virtue, and mag- 
nanimous virtue, are really the same thing. Observe, how- 
ever, that heroic virtue does not differ in its specific essence 
from ordinary virtue ; it differs only in degree ; for any virtue 
as ordinary differs from that virtue as magnanimous, only by 
greater or less, i e., only in degree, since their objects differ 
only in this manner.* It follows that a man cannot be truly 
great without magnanimity. A man is styled great, in some 
instances, however, on account of one virtue which is exer- 
cised in a pre-eminent degree; as, Aristides the Just; or for 
excellency in some virtues that are. intellectual, as, Cyrus the 
Great, Alexander the Great, etc.; they were great by their ex- 
cellency in the military art. But for Christian heroism in 
virtue, one must be magnanimous in every virtue which the 
exigencies of his life require him to exercise at all. There are 
three vices opposed to magnanimity by excess ; presumption, 
or excessive confidence in one's strength, proceeding from 
culpable ignorance or inconsiderateness ; ambition, which is an 
inordinate desire of honor as a testimony of excel'ency; and 
vainglory, which regards praise, fame ; and it tends to them 
inordinately, or not by doing well the things that merit praise. 
Pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity by defect; it induces 
the person to conceive all things as exceeding his ability; and 
hence, he shuns all undertakings having any difficulty; imagin- 
ing them to transcend his power. Cowardice, or irrational 
timidity is opposed to fortitude by defect; and rash boldness 
is the opposite extreme. 

* " Gradus non mutat essentiam rei." The degree of more or ress does 
not change the essence of the thing. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 101 



TEMPERANCE. 

Temperance, which is the fourth cardinal virtue, primarily 
regards tangible things which affect sensible appetite with 
pleasure, as its material object; and its formal object is the 
moderating of sensible pleasure by the measure of prudence 
or right reason, especially that pleasure which is produced 
through taste and touch. Aristotle* distinguishes two kinds 
of pleasures, those which are directly caused by material ob- 
jects acting on the external senses ; and those that are pro- 
duced by the mental powers, which, through their control 
over the fancy, can excite pleasurable emotions or feelings by 
its imagery of the beautiful, etc. The proper object of tem- 
perance, however, is limited to the things of taste and touch ; 
and this virtue regards other pleasures which differ in species 
only by accident Yet, meekness and humility are reduced 
to temperance ; not, however, on account of their objects; 
but owing to the manner in which they moderate passion.! 

This virtue moderates those passions which directly incline 
to sensible good or pleasures ; fortitude moderates those pas- 
sions, v. g., fear, rashness, that tend to remove what the fancy 
apprehends as evil; but good is presupposed, however, to the 
action of all appetite, as its object. Sensible pleasures, when 
considered in themselves, are not evil; for they are designed 
as instruments or means of good. But no sensible power can 
apprehend that order which is essential to moral goodness ; 
this is the function only of practical reason : therefore, the use 
of those pleasures, according to the end for which they are in- 
tended, or the good which they are ordained by nature to 
produce, must be the work of moral virtue; and the moral 
virtue which effects this end is temperance. All moral virtue 
derives its goodness or special perfection from the order which 

* Ethics, b. 3. c. 10. 

t D. Th. 2, 2., q. 142, a. I. 
9* 



102 

is put into man's operations by reason; since the beauty of 
virtue is the light of reason that is in it.* 

The medium or rule of temperance is, that real natural ne- 
cessity which there is of sensible pleasures, as means to a good 
end. 

Nature intends certain ends for the good of man, consid- 
ered both individually and specifically, for the perfect accom- 
plishment of which, pleasure is actually a necessary means. 
Within such limits, and for such purpose, pleasure of sense is 
good; because it is a necessary means to a necessary end. It 
is for reason, informed with the virtue of prudence, to assign 
that mean between excess and defect, in which temperance, 
in common with all moral virtue, consists. 

We may conclude, therefore, that the rule or norma which 
is directive of temperance, is some befitting degree or measure 
of necessity for sensible pleasure. 

Temperance, primarily and most properly, concerns indi- 
vidual members of society, since it has for its object to moder- 
ate pleasures which pertain to the man himself; whereas, both 
justice and fortitude are related to others and to the public. 
It is on this account principally, that the virtue of temper- 
ance is considered to be less noble than the virtues, t justice 
and fortitude; since, what concerns the multitude, is more 
exalted than that which regards individuals only 4 The dim- 

* " Pulchrum in rebus humanis attenditur prout aliquid est ordinatum 
secundum rationem." 2. 2, p. qu. 142, a. 2. Beauty in human things 
depends on the works being ordered in accordance with reason. 

'In intemperantia, minus apparet de lumine rationis ex qua est tota 
clantas et pulchritudo virtutis." Ibid, a. 4. In intemperance the light of 
reason appears lessened, and from reason comes the whole glory and 
beauty of virtue. 

t " Maximce virtutes sunt, quae aliis maxime sunt utiles : et propter hoc 
fortes et juntos maxime honoramus. ' 2. 2, p. qu. 141. a. 8, cum Ari>tot. 
The greatest virtues are those that are most especially useful to others ; 
and, on this account, we greatly honor the just and firm. 

t "Bonura multitudinis divinius est quam bonum unius.' 2. 2, p. qu. 
141, a. 8. The good of the whole multitude is something more divine than 
is the good of one person. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 103 

culty of restraining appetite, which tends directly to what is 
apprehended as good, is great ; and also, the medium of this 
virtue is quite variable,* unlike to commutative justice; it has, 
on that account, much dependence on prudence. Sins against 
temperance have less malice than there is in sins against the 
other virtues, because they partake less of rational nature; 
but they are more debasing, because they assimilate man to 
the brute, in as much as they are peculiarly animal opera- 
tions, which are, therefore, specifically common to man and 
brute. 

There are virtues which are referred to temperance, and 
which are more or less intimately related to it; as, abstinence, 
which is moderation in food ; sobriety in drink, chastity, mod- 
esty, or comeliness of exterior conduct; continence, which 
keeps the will firm against opposing concupiscence; meek- 
ness, which restrains anger; humility, which corrects inordi- 
nate self-esteem or pride, etc. 

It is important to bear in mind that moral virtue is only in 
the will as its proper subject, not in sensible appetite : that no 
feeling or organic action which is not from the free will can 
be imputable either as good or bad, morally. Sensible feel- 
ing, and emotion which is merely natural and spontaneous, 
and which is therefore purely physical in its origin and causes, 
must not be confounded with action of the will. Such mis- 
take would cause delusion, and might lead to much perplex- 
ity in minds that mean well and esteem virtue. 

* " Medium rationis est illud quod est divisible variaturque pro loco, 
tempore, et persona, juxta prudentis aestimationem ; et propter hanc oesti- 
mationem, vocatur medium rationis." Des Charmes, de Virtut. The 
rational medium is that which is divisible, and is varied as to place, 
t me and person, according to the estimation of a prudent mind, and it is 
in reference to this estimation that it is called the rational medium, or the 
medium of reason. It is the peculiarity of the extreme mind, to make the 
medium of moral virtue a metaphysical rule, instead of a rule which is 
variable according to circumstances ; this error is the more mischievous 
since it seems to favor virtue, 



CHAPTER VI. 

ARTICLE I. 

THE ETERNAL LAW; THE NATURAL LAW. 

The eternal* law is nothing else than that perfection of the 
Divine wisdom, according to which it is directive of all action 
and movement. An exemplary and eternal idea in the all- 
wise mind of God expresses the essential constituents and per- 
fections of every being that is possible, or that will be created ; 
so, it also defines the absolute measure or rule for every be- 
ing's operation that is in actual existence. This concept of 
every being's essence and proper mode of action is co-eternal 
with God, and it is the primitive exemplary origin or type of 
all law. Therefore, all law is really and truly such, only in 
so far as it is conformable to this eternal law; since it is the 
primitive architype of all rectitude in action, and from it all 

*"Lex seterna nihil aliud est quam ratio divinae sapientise secundum 
quod est directiva omnium actuum et motionum." — P. I. 2, qu. 93, a. 1. 
The eternal law is nothing else than a respect of the Divine wisdom, ac- 
cording to which it is directive of all actions and motions. "Sicut ratio 
rerum creandarum nihil aliud est quam conceptus Divinae mentis, quo con- 
cipit rem, et judicat quomodo ilia facienda, sic ratio rerum gubernanda- 
rum, quam vocamus legem geternam, nihil aliud est quam conceptus divinse 
mentis quo concipit et judicat quomodo unaquseque creatura debeat suas 
functiones obire, adjuncta simul voluntate earn obligindi, vel imprimendam 
inclinationem ad suam regulam servandam." — Becanus De Leg.,c. li, qu. 1. 
As the nature of things to be created is nothing else than a concept of the 
Divine mind, by which it conceives the thing, and judges how it is to be 
made; so, the nature or respect of things as requiring government, which 
we call the eternal law, is nothing else than a concept of the Divine mind, 
by which it conceives and judges how every creature must fulfill its func- 
tions, including the will to oblige it, or else impress on it the inclination to 
obey its law. 

(104) 



GENERAL ETHICS. 105 

other law is a derivation.* The eternal law may be regarded, 
then, as ultimately founded in the Divine essence itself, in 
which we must conceive the Divine intellect to apprehend it, 
and to express it in an idea or mental word. Hence, it may 
be said that law is fundamentally from the nature of things ; 
it originates in the mind of the law-giver by way of a prac- 
tical judgment ;f by means of a volition and command, it is 
actually imposed on its subjects as binding them to comply 
with the duty ordained and declared by the law. Law is in 
the mind of the rational subject only by way of a practical 
judgment that is directive of action, but without necessitating 
that action : it is as a known object that guides the subject in 
what he should do, just as the exemplar is the known object 
that guides the mind of an artist who copies it. 

The question is sometimes disputed, as to whether law per- 
tains principally to the intellect or to the will of the law-giver. 
But law may be considered under different respects; we may 
consider law, ist, precisely as it is in its own essential entity 
as law; 2d, as it is in the law-giver; 3d, as it is in the sub- 
ject. When law is considered precisely as it is in itself, it is 
fundamentally in the nature of things themselves; it first origi- 
nates in the mind of the law giver as a practical judgment; 
and hence St. Thomas, with whom most authors agree, re- 
gards law, when considered precisely in itself, as pertaining 

* "Lex humana in tantum habet rationem legis, in quantum est secun- 
dum ralionem rectam ; et secundum hoc manifestum est quod a lege oeterna 
derivatur; in quantum vero a ratione recedit, sic dicitur lex iniqua." — 1. 
2, p., qu. 93, a. 3, ad 2 Human law truly has the nature of law only in 
so far as it is according to right reason; in this respect, it is manifest that 
it is derived from the eternal law ; but, in so far as law recedes from rea- 
son, it is caded iniquitous law. 

t "Nihil aliud est lex quam dictamen practicce rationis in principe, qui 
gubernat aliquam communitatem perfectam." — 1. 2, p., qu. 91, a. 1. Law 
is nothing else than a dictate of practical reason in the ruler who governs 
any perfect community. 

The "perfect community" is any civil community as distinguished 
from a private family. 



106 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

principally to the intellect:* "lex est aliquid rationis;" i. 2, 
qu 90, a. 1; law is something from reason; though some 
other authorities regard it as being principally from the will. 
It is only as a wise and prudent judgment, however, that law 
is any certain rule of what is just and right in action. 

When law is considered as actually imposed on subjects, it 
necessarily supposes these acts in the mind of the law-giver; 
the judgment that the thing is good and ought to be done; 
the volition, and the command f The first of these acts is 
essential to the very concept of law; the two other acts are 
of authority to govern, and they are indispensably necessary 
for all law as positive, or as actually binding subjects. The 
law is in the subject, as already observed, by way of a prac- 
tical judgment, since its essential office is to direct the sub- 
ject's action in respect to an end. 

It may here be asked, does the eternal law bind God ? The 
eternal law is not anything that is superior to God, or extrinsic 
to Him; nor is it really distinct from His infinite intelligence 
and perfection ; therefore, He is not bound as by something 
superior to Him, or above His own essence. Yet, we may 
rightly conceive God to be guided, in all His works ad extra, 

* "Lex ita est actus rationis, ut per se in suo essentiali conceptu non in- 
cludit actum voluntatis." — Gotti, De Lege Dis. 1, sect. I. 2. "Etiamsi, 
per impossibile, non accederet voluntas divina ad proecepta legis naturalis 
obligans, adhuc lex obligaret." — Billuart. De Lege, Uis. I, Art. I. Law 
is so an act of reason, that strictly in its essential concept it does not in- 
clude an act of the will. — Gotti. Even if, by an impossible supposition, 
the Divine will did not accede to the precepts of the natural law as binding, 
the law would still bind." — Billuart. 

t St. Thomas, in p. 1.2, qu. 17, a. I, after quoting these words of St. 
Greg. Nicen , "appetitus obedit rationi; ergo rationis est imperare;" 
appetite obeys reason, therefore, it is of reason to command ; says: ** Im- 
perare intimando vel denuntiando, est actus rationis proesupposito actu 
voluntatis in cujus virtute ratio movet per imperium ad exercitium actus." 
To command by making known or declaring, is an act of reason to which 
is presupposed an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason moves 
through a command to the putting of the act. 

It is evident, as he noticeselsewhere, that this action of the will pre- 
supposes another act of intellect, judging the thing to be good. 



GENERAL ETHICS 107 

by His infinite wisdom. An indispensable condition for the 
binding force of law is, that it be imposed by one having the 
authority to command; as there is no being that can have juris- 
diction over God, He cannot become the subject of a law. 

Is the eternal law properly styled law ; or, is it truly a law at 
all ? It is manifest that if we define the essence of law so as to 
include in the very concept of law its actual application to sub- 
jects, then the eternal law is not, under all respects, properly 
termed law. But is it of the essence of law that it be actually 
imposed on its subjects, or that it be positive? Is law truly 
such, when it exists only in the mind of the ruler ? God in- 
tended from all eternity to create the universe, and to impose 
His law on all the beings made by Him; we may legitimately 
conceive that there were eternally in the Divine mind the 
judgment and the volition that must be presupposed by us 
to this work, together with the purpose of actually promul- 
gating His law to the universe, in time. These requisites, it 
must be granted, fully comprise all that is necessary for law, 
when considered precisely as it is in itself; for, a law is such, 
not only when it is here and now actually obeyed; but also 
when it is hereafter to be obeyed. For the concept of law, 
its positive application to subjects is not required; its fitness 
or proximate capability of being thus applied suffices. The 
eternal law is, however, not immediately published to creatures, 
but 7nediaiely, or through the medium of natural law, as will 
be explained further on. All other laws are derived from the 
eternal law. The question here is only of those laws that 
are directive of rational or intelligent creatures, and that im- 
pose on them the obligation to obey. Just as all creatures 
are wholly dependent on God for their existence, so are they 
equally dependent on Him for their action ; and therefore 
God is not only their absolute cause, but He is also their su- 
preme ruler, directing the operation and movement of each 
one by a law impressed on its nature. As man's rational 
soul is a likeness of God, so is the practical dictate of right 
reason in him Kke to the eternal law in the Divine mind, from 
which it is derived as an image is derived from its prototype. 



108 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Hence, the practical dictates of right reason, " parents should be 
honored; injustice should not be done," etc., are true, not only 
now that man actually exists ; but these principles are, in 
themselves, eternally true. Therefore, all just law is conform- 
able to the eternal law, and is a derivation from the eternal 
law.* 

As we can infer the idea that was in the mind of the archi- 
tect, from the plan or design in the house built by him; and 
as we can conclude, from the works of God in the visible 
creation around us, to some true notion of His nature and 
attributes ; so, we can form our concept of the eternal law, 
by first knowing the likeness of it which is imprinted on our 
own rational nature ; and then rising to some right concep- 
tion of the eternal prototype which it represents. Hence, as 
just said, we come to a knowledge of the eternal law by rea- 
soning to it from the natural law, just as we reason to the ex- 
istence and attributes of God from His works. 



ARTICLE II. 

NATURAL LAW. 

All created things are subject to the absolute power of God, 
on which they depend both for existence and for action + 
The law of their action is rooted in their nature, or it results 
from the very constitution of their essence; they have no 

*"In temporali lege nihil est justum ac legitimum quod non ex lege 
seterna homines sibi derivaverunt." — St. Aug. I, De Lib. Arbit. ; et D. 
Th., p. I. 2, qu. 93, a. 3. In temporal law, nothing is just and legitimate 
which men do not derive for themselves from the eternal law. 

t " Deus imprimit toti naturae principin propriorum actuum, et icleo per 
hunc modum Deus dicitur praecipere toti naturae . . . . et per banc etiam 
rationem omnes motus et actiones totius naturae legi aeternae subduntur. " 
P. 1. 2, qu. 93, a. 5. God impresses on all nature the principles of its 
proper action, and in this manner, therefore, God is said to rule all na- 
ture. . . . Through this means, likewise, all the movements and actions 
of entire nature are subject to the eternal law. 



GENERAL ETHICS 109 

action, and they can have none, except in accordance with 
this law originally implanted in them, at their creation. We 
may say, then, that they are, by their very nature, subject to 
the eternal law, in conformity to which they were made. This 
law, which is essentially inherent in the very nature of every 
creature, may be styled natural law, agreeably to the most 
general meaning of the terms. 

The expression, " natural law, law of nature," is not used in 
precisely the same sense by all classes of the learned. The 
Roman jurists, included under natural law only those inclina- 
tions and principles of action which are common to man and 
the brute creation, as instincts of animal nature; v. g., to love 
their own kind. In the English language, the expression is 
limited by many writers on popular science to the general 
physical laws that govern the action of material substances or 
bodies; e. g., " by the law of nature, heavy bodies gravitate 
towards the centre of the earth; vapors ascend," etc. Black- 
stone, whose Commentaries* contain the doctrine on such 
matters that is generally upheld by English jurists, defines 
natural law to be " the rule of human action, prescribed by 
the Creator, and discoverable by the light of reason." Theo- 
logians also employ the phrase " natural law" to express what 
is common to mankind by way of a rational instinct, as is the 
practical dictate of reason in regard to what is right or wrong; 
and hence natural law is often defined by them to be the 
natural dictate of right reason f In all that follows in this 
treatise the name, " natural law," will be employed as synony- 
mous with the rule of right reason that is naturally known to 
man. 

The rule of right reason as naturally known to man, may 

* Introduction to Book I, sec. I. 

t "Jus naturale nihil aliud est quam naturale dictamen rect?; rationis." 
Becnnus, De Lege. The natural law is nothing else than the natural dic- 
tate of right reason. 

"Lex naturalis in dictamine rationis naturalis consistit." Suarez, De 
Legibus. The natural law consists in the dictate of natural reason. 

10 



110 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

be still more philosophically defined, thus :* Natural law is 
nothing else than a participation of the eternal law in a 
rational creature; or, natural law is the light of natural rea- 
son, by which we distinguish what is right and what is wrong. 
Ethics is specially concerned about natural law as the norma 
of right moral action. This norma is appropriately styled 
" natural law," because it is an inborn virtue and light, help- 
ing and directing the right exercise of man's rational nature. 
This law may be regarded as an essential perfection or prop- 
erty of man's intellect, since it is a principle that is per se 
necessary for the operation of right reason; and hence, its 
names, the natural dictate of reason; the natural light of rea- 
son, etc. 

In what sense of the term can natural law be legitimately 
styled a " participation of the eternal law ?" A being is said, 
in the technical language of the schools, to possess by partici- 
paiioti existence, this perfection or that perfection, when such 
existence or perfection in that being is derived from a superior 
cause, which possesses the same thing essentially, and in a pre- 
eminent manner :f thus, creatures are said to possess exist- 
ence, goodness, beauty, intelligence, etc., by participation ; 
because those realities are in creatures as effects that are de- 
rived from a cause in which they are absolutely essential, and 
are, therefore, as simple perfections. The natural law, then, 
is styled " a participation of the eternal law," because it is 
derived from the eternal law, whose perfection it imitates, as 
every created effect imitates, in its own degree and species, 
the first cause, from which it receives its being. Through the 

* " Lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis re tern re in rational! 
creatura .... lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum 
et quid sit malum." P. I. 2, qu. 91, a. 2. The natural law is nothing 
else than a participation of the eternal law in the rational creature .... 
it is the light of natural reason by which we discern what is good from 
what is evil. 

t " Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse est 
quod causeiur in ipso ab eo cui essentiahter convenit." P. I, qu. 44, a. I, 
in c. If anything is found in one by participation, it must necessarily be 
that it was caused in him by one to whom that thing belongs necessarily. 



GENERAL ETHICS. Ill 

natural law, which is in man as a dictate of right reason, he 
resembles God by what is highest in the grade of perfect 
action, the intellectual ; for, it is especially by his rational 
nature that man is made according to the likeness of God. 
Hence, it is only the natural law as it is in a rational creature, 
that is most properly a participation of the eternal law. The 
eternal law is in man, only according to the sense in which a 
divine perfection is communicable to the creature. All knowl- 
edge of truth may be regarded as some participation of the 
eternal law :* the natural law is its light shed upon the created 
intellect, by which this absolute norma of the true and the 
good is promulgated to the rational soul, enabling it to discern 
good and evil. 

While no person possessing the use of sane reason can 
doubt, or be ignorant of those self-evident conclusions from 
the natural law which are principles of right action that are 
common to mankind, or which apply to all persons in every 
condition of life;f yet, there may easily be doubt or ignorance 
in regard to remote conclusions from the natural law. To 
see such deductions as* logically true or consequent, requires 
power of reasoning in a degree of which all are not equally 
capable. 

The question is disputed as to what precisely and formally 
is the natural law in itself; or what principle it is as denned 
in itself. Many answers are proposed, their very number and 
diversity showing that the subject is obscure; v. g., it is vari- 
ously defined as in some obscure manner identical with the 
eternal law, or with the divine will, with human reason, with 
a dictate of reason, etc. It is certain that the natural law 
essentially supposes uprightness or rectitude of reason, and that 
the dictate of right reason is that law, even when the judg- 

* " Omnis cognitio veritatis est quredam irradiatio et participatio legis 
seternse." P. i. 2, qu. 93, a. 2. All knowledge of truth is a certain radia- 
tion and a participation of the eternal law. 

t "Veritatem ornnes aliqualiter cognoscunt, ad minus quantum ad prin- 
cipia communia legis naturalis." P. 1. 2, qu. 93 a. 2. All know truth at 
least as to the cemmon principles of the natural lav/. 



112 ETIIICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ment is per accidens erroneous in its matter.* Absolutely and 
perfectly, the natural law is a dictate of right reason, truly 
founded in the nature of things as related to God, to fellow- 
creatures and to self; whence results its exact agreement with 
the eternal law, and its obligation also. Reason cannot be 
the sole principle of the natural law, since the act of reason 
requires an object; reason does not make the norma of recti- 
tude in action, but it knows that norma, just as reason knows, 
but it does not make the truth that the " shortest distance be- 
tween two given points is a straight line." Hence, the auton- 
omy of practical reason, propounded by Kant, is not tenable 
as true. 

When this principle, natural law, is styled " the light of 
natural reason," it is then conceived by way of a real and posi- 
tive perfection given to reason, that proximately fits it for 
actually discerning right and wrong in conduct or deeds to be 
done. It was styled natural light of reason by the acute 
metaphysicians of former times ;f they argued that the Author 
of nature must give to the creature, not only existence and 
power; but He must also give first operation to the power: 
this is accomplished, for the intellect, by means of a natural 
habit, without which that faculty would be indifferent to truth 

*"Billuart Dis. II. a. II. De Lege, thus proposes the question: 
" Quid sit istud ens participatum quod in subjecto regulato dicitur lex 
natural is ?" What can be that participated entity which in a regulated sub- 
ject is called the natural law? He thinks it not to be a mere act, as is the 
dictate of reason, for the natural law is in the idiot and infant ; it is pub- 
lished by discourse of reason, and they are incapable of reasoning. 

t" M hi sane videtur quiestio de mxlo loquendi et non dubito quin in 
actuali judicii mentis propriissime existit lex naturalis. Addo vero, etiam 
lumen naturale intellects expeditum de se ad dictandum de agendis posse 
vocari legem naturalem : quia quamvis homines nihil cogitent, aut judicent, 
naturalem legem retinent in cordibus suis." Suarez De Leg. lib. 2, c. 5. 
To me it really seems to be a question about a manner of talking, and I do 
not doubt but that the natural law is, most properly, in an actual judgment 
of the mind. I add, however, that also the natural light of the intellect 
proximately prepared to dictate what ought to be done, can be called the 
natural law; for, even when men are not thinking or judging of anything, 
they retain the natural law in their hearts. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 113 

and to falsity ; " potential se habent ad opposita." This natural 
habit proximately fits it for assenting to evident truth promptly. 
The will, however, requires no natural habit for its first opera- 
tion ; since its nature is determined to its proper object, through 
a connatural inclination by which it follows the intellect. Hence, 
natural law may be legitimately conceived as including some 
virtue, over and above that which is required merely to con- 
stitute the bare physical being of reason, and which really, by 
way of an intellectual light, helps reason to discern moral 
right and wrong in action ; for this law directly regards, not 
the existence of reason, but the operation of reason.* 

The precepts of the natural law remain habitually or per- 
manently in the mind, in the same manner as other judgments 
of reason continue habitually in the mind : hence, although 
natural law is in the reason most properly as an act, yet, it 
may also, under an another respect, be considered as sharing 
in the nature of a habit.f 

* " Verius videtur legem naturalem nihil aliud esse quam lumen natu- 
rale ut impressum et participatum a ratione asterna seii lege geterna." Bil- 
luart, De Lege, Dis. II. a. II. " Est lex aeterna ut participata in subjecto 
regulato." Ibid. It seems more true to say that the natural law is nothing 
else than natural light impressed on the intellect and communicated by the 
eternal reason or the eternal law ; it is the eternal law, as shared by a regu- 
lated subject. 

tP. 1.2, qu. 94, a. I. "Potest dici habitus id quod habitu tenetur: 
hoc modo quia praecepta legis naturalis quandoque considerantur in actu a 
ratione, quandoque autem sunt in ea habitualiter tantum : secundum hunc 
modum potest dici quod lex naturalis sit habitus." That can be called 
habit which is kept by means of habit ; on this account because the pre- 
cepts of the natural law are sometimes considered as actual in the reason, 
and sometimes as in reason only habitually : under this respect it can be 
said that the natural law is a habit. 
10* 



114 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



ARTICLE III. 

MOST GENERAL PRECEPT OF THE NATURAL LAW; IMMUT- 
ABILITY OF THE NATURAL LAW ; ITS UNITY. 

The question, is there one most universal precept of the 
natural law, from which all its other precepts are logically 
deducible ? is not identical with the question concerning the 
formal constituent principle of the natural law. This intrinsic 
principle that may be conceived as informing the dictate of 
right reason, is presupposed to the practical habits or precepts 
of natural law, which concern actual conduct ; and it founds and 
gives to those precepts their obligation. The present inquiry is 
as to whether there is some one general rule of conduct, pre- 
scribed by right reason, which in its extension applies to all 
objects and all action, and which consequently comprehends 
under it all rules of rational conduct. There is such precept 
of the natural law, and it is, " Do good and avoid evil." Just 
as the first and most universal object of intellectual apprehen- 
sion or knowledge, is ens, being ; so, the first and most uni- 
versal object of the will's action, is good. Whatever is per- 
ceived by the intellect, has this property or nature, " ens," 
being, intrinsic to it ; and similarly, whatever is loved or in- 
tended by the will, must be apprehended as good.* The 

* " Sicut ens est primum quod cadit in apprehensione simpliciter, ita 
bonum est primum quod cadit in apprehensione practicse rationis quae ordi- 
natur ad opus. Omne enim agens agit propter finem, qui habet rationem 
boni: et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur 
supra rationem boni, quae est, bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Hoc est 
ergo primum principium legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequen- 
dum, et malum vitandum." P. 1.2, qu. 94, a. 2. "Just as 'being' is 
what first falls under intellectual apprehension simply, so good is what first 
falls under the apprehension of practical reason which is ordained to prac- 
tical work. Every agent acts for an end having the character of good : 
and therefore the first principle for practical reason is founded on the nature 
of good, which is what all things desire. This, therefore, is the first prin- 
ciple of the law ; good is to be done and sought after, and evil is to be 
avoided." 



GENERAL ETHICS. 115 

principle of judging speculatively and of knowing conclusions 
as right and true, which is metaphysically and absolutely first 
and the most universal, is the principle of contradiction as ap- 
plied to " ens," being; namely, " quodlibet est vel non est," 
anything either is, or it is not; "it is impossible for the very 
same thing to be, and not to be, at one and the same time." 
This is the first and most universal of all logical rules or prin- 
ciples, and by it we may ultimately judge the correctness of all 
reasoning and all rules of demonstration ; for, all forms of 
argument are derivable from it, and are reducible back to it, 
as to their first principle or origin. 

It follows by like reasoning that, since the primary and most 
universal object of the will, as the rational appetite, is good, 
" bonum est quod omnia appetunt," good is what all things 
tend to ; the first and most universal rule which practical rea- 
son affirms and prescribes to the will, must regard that object 
of the will which also is first and most universal ; and that 
object is good. Hence, the precept of the natural law which 
is the first and most general of all, must regard the will's first 
and most general object: "do good; avoid evil;" or, "do 
good, tend to good, and avoid evil." That tendency towards 
good which is from a spontaneous or natural and necessary 
inclination of the will, is caused by the physical law of nature. 
But the general command, " do good, and avoid evil," pre- 
scribes for man that he tend to the true object of beatitude 
by the appointed means ; and it therefore ordains what is sub- 
ject to the empire of his reason. From this most general pre- 
cept, all other precepts of the natural law are deducible; v. g. s 
that "it is good to honor parents; it is good to be just, kind; 
to pay supreme homage to God ; it is evil to injure others; to 
murder; to blaspheme," etc. 

There are usually said to be many first principles of natural 
law ; v. g., the decalogue, or the ten commandments, are often 
spoken of as first precepts of the natural law ; though some 
of them are for us really conclusions from natural law ; * this 

* Suarez, De Legibus, lib. 2 ch. 7. 



116 ETHICS, OPw MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

fact, however, is not really adverse to the truth of what is 
above affirmed, namely, that there is one most general of all 
natural precepts from which all the others spring, or in which 
they have their immediate origin.* The other common or 
general precepts of natural law are so proximate to this first 
one, " do good, and avoid evil ;" they are so evident, and so 
necessary in their matter, that all minds see and assent to them 
as to self-evident truths : they may, therefore, be appropriately 
styled first principles, though they are, in themselves, imme- 
diate deductions from a precept that is, in strictness, logically 
prior to them.t 

Some have held that this first and most universal precept 
of the natural law is, " follow order, or keep order." But order 
is not the first object of the will's action ; good is that object, 
and order in things founds the norma of moral rectitude in 
the use of means to it ; hence, " observe order," is one of 
many general precepts of natural law; yet it is not that pre- 
cept which is primary, and to which all others are directly 
reducible. The first precept of the natural law, " do good 
and avoid evil," regards the object of the will which is first; 
the precept, " keep order," pertains to the manner of using 
all the means; and it is therefore not the first precept, but is 
a consequence from the first one. 

Many conflicting answers are given, by different philoso- 
phers, to the question, " what is the first and most universal 
precept of the natural law ?" On this matter, some opinions 
have been expressed which are so erratic as naturally to ex- 
cite surprise; v. g., that of Fichte, who inculcates, as the 
first duty, " complete independence, together with love of self 
above all things, and love of other persons on account of 

* " Omnia ista praecepta legis naturae in quantum referuntur ad unum 
primum praeceptum habent rationem unius legis naturalis." P. I. 2, qu. 
94, a. 2, ad I. All those precepts of the natural law, in as much as they 
are referred to one first precept, have the nature of one natural law. 

t " Sunt multa prcecepta legis naturae in se ipsis, quae tamen communi- 
cant in una radice." I. 2. p., qu. 94, a. 2, ad I. There are many precepts of 
the natural law in themselves, but yet they communicate in the one radix. 



GENERAL ETIIICS. 117 

self" The following are adduced as instances of more plausi- 
ble solutions to the problem under consideration : ist. Bent- 
ham says, "tend to the useful;" 2d. Thomasius says, "seek 
long and happy life;" 3d. Grotius makes this first duty, "so- 
cial good, or perfect sociality;" 4th. Cousin answers, "be free, 
or act with liberty;" 5th. Others of the French schools say, 
"evolve all the faculties of your nature;" 6th. Epicurus, and 
other ancient philosophers, said, "follow nature: sequi natu- 
raw, summum bonum est/ 1 7th. the stoics laid down, as the 
first and greatest precept, "seek for virtue; eradicate passion 
and sentiment, or feeling." 

It readily appears that, ist, "seek what is useful," cannot 
be the first precept of natural law, even when the useful is 
referred to man's ultimate end, if we reflect that the "useful"* 
includes in its comprehension only means ; therefore, the pre- 
cept which also prescribes the end for those means, namely, 
" do good, tend to the true object of good, and avoid evil," 
is principal, and it regards what must be prior in the inten- 
tion. 2d. " Long and happy life," cannot be more than an 
intermediate end for man's rational intention and action, since 
our present life is something transitory, at the best; besides, it 
is an object that is not directly subject to human choice, and it 
is, therefore, an uncertain good. To the 3d, it must be said that 
the good of society may be, under some respect, first or princi- 
pal in the intention of the law- giver; but, for the private indi- 
vidual, the first duty is proximate to himself, and it binds him 
not only in regard to a special good to be intended, as is 
the social good; but he is bound by the natural law to aim 
at every species of good for him, duly befitting his rational 

* The useful, or the expedient, may be understood as simply and abso- 
lutely such; i. e., as useful or expedient in respect to man's ultimate end: 
or, these terms may be understood in a relative sense; 1. e., as expressing 
what is referred to some merely temporary end to be gained. Utility or 
expediency in this second meaning may be good or bad, according as the 
end, object and circumstances are perfect or imperfect. Bentham intends 
"utility" for whatever serves as means to present pleasure of this life. 
Principles of Morals and Legislation; by Jeremy Bentham: Oxford, 1876; 
chaps, i, ii. 



118 ETHICS, OR, MORAL PIIILOSOPIIY. 

nature; and of this more general good, that of society is but 
a part. In answer to the 4th, "be free," it must be observed 
that liberty, as capable of choosing either good or evil, is, 
under different respects, both a perfection and an imperfec- 
tion ; its right use as a perfection is prescribed in the general 
precept, "do good, and avoid evil;" it would be absurd to 
affirm either that a precept of natural law prescribes the free 
choice of evil, or that such choice is good because it is free : 
on the contrary, it is bad because free. The precept 5th, 
"evolve, or develop the powers of nature," prescribes only 
one particular work or object, and that work regards the fac- 
ulties of man's nature; namely, that they be enlarged by ex- 
ercise, or be expanded; but the faculties of man's nature may 
be "evolved" so as to acquire either good or bad habits, 
virtues or vices; hence, this precept does not determinately 
command good ; or, even if favorably interpreted, it prescribes 
only a part of what is good for man, or a part of what is 
comprised in his whole duty. To the principle laid down by 
Epicurus, and other ancient philosophers (6th), "to follow 
nature is the chief good : sequi naturam, summum bonum 
est;" it maybe answered, man's nature is inclined both to 
what is good and what is evil for him as a rational or moral 
being; it follows, then, that, contrary to the doctrine of Epi- 
curus, man's natural inclinations are not the true guide of his 
reason in what pertains to his chief good ; but it is his reason 
that must direct and control the inclinations of his nature. If 
we interpret this saying of the pagan philosophers so as to 
make it mean, "follow the natural dictates of right reason," 
the precept will then have for its matter the natural law itself; 
or, it will command the natural law to be followed. But the 
natural law is presupposed by us to be subjectively in the 
human reason ; and the present question is, what precept of 
natural law constitutes its most general application to its own 
matter ?t The answer, as often declared already, is, "do 

t " Prseceptum importat applicationem legis ad ea quae a lege regulantur." 
P. I. 2, qu. 90. a. 2, ad I. Precept imports an application of law to those 
things regulated by the law. 

Hence, precept is law, considered as proximately or immediately regu- 
lating moral action. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 119 

good; avoid evil;" for, good is the first, principal, and most 
universal object which the practical dictate of right reason 
concerns. 

To the stoic principle (7th), "acquire virtue; eradicate pas- 
sion and feeling;" it may be replied, that since virtue has for 
its end to perfect the powers of the soul for good action, 
virtue is only a means to good; and, consequently, the natu- 
ral precept making it a duty of man to acquire virtue, is not 
concerned immediately about that good which is the object of 
the first and most universal precept of natural law, but it has 
for its end a means to that good. It is not physically possi- 
ble for .man in this life to eradicate all passion and feeling 
from his nature; and even if it could be accomplished, the 
destruction of these natural qualities would be injurious, both 
in its moral and physical effects upon him. It is a natural 
duty of man, however, to subject passion and feeling to the 
government of his reason. 

Finally, it maybe objected that "the saying, 'do good, and 
avoid evil,' seems rather to declare man's natural inclination 
to good, which is not free, but spontaneous and necessary; 
whereas, the precept in question is one which he should obey 
freely." To this it may be answered : it is not good, as it is 
the object of the will's natural and spontaneous action, which 
this precept, "do good, avoid evil," directly regards at all; 
but what the precept concerns, as its matter, is the true object 
of man's chief good, and the means of attaining to that ob- 
ject. As shown in Chapter I., man can freely choose this 
object; and he can freely use or not use the means of reach- 
ing it: now, as said, the precept, "do good and avoid evil," 
regards this object of his beatitude, and the means to it. 

THE NATURAL LAW IS, IN ITSELF, IMMUTABLE. 

The obligation of the natural law proceeds intrinsically 
and necessarily from the very nature of things; but the na- 
tures of things are immutable ; therefore, the obligation of 
natural law, which necessarily arises from them, is also immu- 



120 

table. Natural law, as already shown, is nothing else than 
the natural dictate of right reason ; but right reason is, in its 
essence, immutable; therefore, natural law, which is the ne- 
cessary dictate of right reason, is also immutable. 

In order for the natural law to be changed in itself, that 
which by its very nature is according to right reason, and that 
which by its very nature is against right reason, must, while 
all else remains the same, be positively reversed, so that one 
becomes the other; the right being converted into the wrong; 
and the wrong being in itself changed into the right. But 
this would be a contradiction; therefore, it is simply impossi- 
ble for the natural law to be in itself changed. What is con- 
formable to right reason, is conformable to natural law; and, 
conversely, Avhat is conformable to natural law, is also con- 
formable to right reason, and it is, at the same time, intrinsic- 
ally good. Now, the essential goodness in things is immuta- 
ble ; so, therefore, is the natural law, which is founded on that 
goodness in things immutable. 

The foregoing arguments also prove that there can be no 
dispensation or abolishment of the natural law, considered as 
the practical dictate of right reason. For, simply to dispense 
in a law, is nothing else than to allow any one to act contrary 
to that law, while it is in force and obliges ; or, to act con- 
trary to the law, while all the circumstances which give force 
to that law, and make it binding, remain unchanged : this 
cannot be done without changing the law; but the natural 
law is immutable; therefore, the natural law is not suscepti- 
ble of dispensation. 

Against the doctrine above advanced, the objections will 
occur to the mind: ist, that God commanded Abraham to 
immolate his own son, Isaac, as a holocaust; but, to kill an 
innocent child is against the natural law. 2d. The Israelites 
were allowed, by dispensation of natural law, stealthily to 
carry off with them the goods of the Egyptians, as, gold, gems, 
and other precious objects. Therefore, according to fact, 
God can dispense with the natural law. 

In answer to the first objection, observe that it is in accord- 



GENERAL ETHICS. 121 

ance with the actual law of man's nature for him to die ; the 
mode of death, and its immediate physical causes, are di- 
rected and ruled by the general providence of God, who 
gives to all created nature its law: God may cause a partic- 
ular person to die, either in accordance with His general 
providence, or in obedience to a special providence ; for, in 
Him is the perfect dominion of life and death. The com- 
mand imposed on Abraham to sacrifice the life of his son 
Isaac, was by a special providence, which made no change 
in the natural law as the rule of right reason; it was a change 
only in that which, by its very nature, is mutable, and may 
be variously regulated by positive divine precept. As regards 
the goods taken from the Egyptians with Divine approval : 
man's dominion over his temporal possessions here in the 
world is not absolute; he owns merely a passing and depend- 
ent use of them; the absolute dominion in them belongs only 
to God, who can change the temporary and dependent own- 
ership of them at will. The right and title to perfect domin- 
ion over the goods taken from the Egyptians was not injured; 
it was only the transfer from one to another of a relative or 
conditional right to the temporary use of those objects. 

The natural law is one ; and it is in itself identical for all 
nations of mankind. Natural law is one, when we regard 
it: i st, as natural rectitude of practical reason; 2d, when we 
view it in respect to its most general precepts, or those which 
are common to all men ; 3d, when we consider the knowledge 
of these precepts as possessed by the different races of man- 
kind, both civilized and uncivilized. 

The unity of the natural law, considered as a likeness of 
the eternal law impressed on human reason, seems plain, in 
the very nature of things; for, it has one end,* and it perfects 
a nature which is one; whence it must be one in its essence. 

There are first principles, both in speculative and in prac- 
tical matter, which are seen as true, and are recognized as 

* "Primum principium . in operativis, quorum est ratio practica, est finis 
ultimus." — P. 1. 2, qu. 90, a. 2, in c. The first principle in works to be 
performed, which belong to practical reason, is the ultimate end. 
11 



122 ETHICS, OK MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

such, by all nations and races of mankind. But the conclu- 
sions from these first principles may be more or less perfectly 
known to different minds; and many minds may even not see 
them at all as consequent from their principles: v. g., though 
every person of sane reason is capable of knowing, in some 
manner, what a triangle or three-sided figure is; yet, all men 
do not understand the demonstrated truth, that the sum of its 
angles is equal to two right angles. Evident and certain con- 
clusions, in necessary matter, are seen alike by all persons 
that truly know them as conclusions; and this suffices to make 
their knowledge of such truths identical, or one and the 
same in its kind. It is a fact, that all minds likewise know 
the most general principles of right and wrong, and that 
they understand them substantially in the same manner. But 
all people do not see with equal clearness the conclusions 
which follow from these first principles so universally known 
by mankind. When the first principles of natural law are 
actually applied to the particular objects and actions of hu- 
man life, this is done by way of conclusions; this particular 
matter which these conclusions concern is something contin- 
gent and mutable. Hence, when deductions from natural 
law that regulate practical things are remote from their first 
principles, even superior human intellects can, in many cases, 
know only with probability what are right and true conclu- 
sions,* for this or that matter. Results analogous to these 
take place in respect to principles even of the purely specu- 
lative order : when the absolute truths of mathematics are 
actually applied by man to material physical objects, the 
work which he does ill practice can only approximate meta- 
physical exactness. For example, the most perfect wheel 
which man can construct of wood or metal can never be 
* " Ratio practica negotiatur circa contingentia, in quibus sunt operationes 
humanse; et ideo si in communibus sit abqua necessitas, quanto magis ad 
propria descenditur, tanto magis invenitur defectus." — P. I. 2, qu. 94, a. 4. 
Practical reason is concerned about contingent things in respect to which 
there are actions ; and hence, although there is some necessity in the com- 
mon or universal law, the more there is a descent to what is proper or par- 
ticular, the more is defect found. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 123 

made by him absolutely and certainly to conform, in all its 
parts, to what the circle is strictly and abstractly defined in 
geometry to be. We may conclude, then, that man is phys- 
ically unable to measure, with absolute strictness, particular 
and practical things by metaphysical rules, though he can 
attain to a precision that is sufficiently perfect in practice. 

Suarez* appropriately distinguishes the general principles 
and precepts of natural law into three classes : ist, those 
which contain the most general principles, or such as are evi- 
dently common to every species of moral goodness in human 
action; v. g., "do good; avoid evil; do as you would be 
done by," etc.; 2d, precepts which regard more determinate 
or particular matter, and which are therefore conceived to be 
more special, less general;! v. g., "be just; live temperately; 
worship God; honor parents," etc. These principles are all 
self-evident to any mind that understands the terms in which 
they are expressed. 3d. Those precepts that follow by neces- 
sary and evident illation from natural principles, or by means 
of reasoning; of these precepts, some are more easily seen as 
following from their principles, and are known as consequent 
by most minds ; v. g., " theft is evil ; adultery is evil," etc. ; 
others, though in themselves certain precepts of the natural 
law, are less easily seen to be such; v. g., "lying is always 
evil; fornication is always evil," etc. 

While it is not possible totally to erase from the mind of 
man the general or common principles of the natural law ; 
yet, depravity of manners can, as experience testifies, obscure 

* De Legibus, lib. 2, cap. 7. 

t "Si propria loquamur, magis exercetur lex naturalis in his principiis, 
vel conclusionibus proximis, quam in illis principiis universalibus, quia lex 
est proxima regnla operationis ; ilia autem communia principia non sunt 
regulae nisi quatenus per particularia determinantur ad singulas species ac- 
tuum, seu virtutum."— Suarez, De Legg.,lib. 2, c. 7, no. 7. Strictly speak- 
ing, natural law really acts more in those principles or proximate conclu- 
sions than in the more universal principles, because law is a proximate rule 
of action ; even those common principles ore not rules, except in as much 
as they are determined by particular things to concrete kinds of action or 
virtue. 



124 

and pervert the reason, as regards the application of obvious 
deductions from them to the conduct of life. Thus authors 
explain the fact mentioned by Caesar (De Bello Gallico, lib. 6), 
that the ancient Germans believed robbery to be a good work ; 
we may in like manner account for the vicious reasoning which 
led many ancient nations, and among them the Carthaginians, 
to offer human victims on the altar, a practice which the 
Greeks compelled the Carthaginian people to discontinue. 
Their argument in proof that human victims should be immo- 
lated to their gods was this : the best objects on earth are the 
most befitting offerings to the divinity; but human beings are 
the best objects on earth; therefore human beings are the 
most fit objects that can be offered to the divinity. Yet, it is 
evident to natural reason that murder is unjust; and it is a 
conclusion which is proximate to first principles, that an act 
of great injustice to man cannot be any acceptable homage 
to God. 



ARTICLE IV. 

POSITIVE LAW. 

Positive law is not innate to man, as is the natural law ; but 
it is law which is laid down by supreme authority, command- 
ing expressly and explicitly what is left undetermined by 
nature, or what is only implicitly contained in the natural 
law. Hence, positive law* has for its special matter those 

* " Lex est ordinatio rationis, ad bonum commune ab eo, qui curam com- 
munitatis habet, promulgata." P. I. 2, qu. 90. Law is an ordinance of 
reason, for the common good, and promulgated by him who has care of the 
community. 

"Lex est commune prseceptum justum ac stabile sufficienter promul- 
gatum." Suarez, De Leg. lib. I, c. 12. Law is a common precept that is 
just, stable, and is dnly promulgated. 

" Ilia lex vocatur positiva quae non est innata cum natura, sed ultra illam 
•ab aliquo principio extrinseco habente potestatem posita est ; inde enim 
positiva dicta est, quasi addita naturali legi, non ex ilia necessario manans." 



GENERAL ETHICS. 125 

rights and duties pertaining to the common good which are 
not expressly and evidently dictated by nature to all minds as 
are the universal first principles of natural law, or the first self- 
evident judgments of right reason. Things that are not deter- 
minately prescribed by natural law, therefore, are defined by 
positive law; or, positive law regards only that matter which 
is left undetermined by the natural law. 

Law is divided into the eternal law, natural law, and posi- 
tive law. The positive law is subdivided into the divine posi- 
tive law, and the human positive law. The explanation of 
divine positive law, with whatever pertains to its scope and 
matter, is the office of theology; human positive law, which is 
necessary for man as naturally social, and as a member of 
political society, belongs to the proper subject matter of 
ethics. 

The nature and properties of law as a positive and proxi- 
mate rule of action for man living in organized society, are 
specified in the following definition: Law is an ordinance of 
reason, for the common good, promulgated by him who has 
charge of the whole community. 

Law is a rule by which the action of intelligent subjects is 
directed to an end intended by the lawgiver; but it is for the 
reason, which is the first principle or radix of human action, 
to measure and order means to an end ; law is therefore the 
work of reason. Command is a locution, or it is the speaking 
of something, for it is a mental word ; and therefore it is true 

Suarez, De Leg. lib I, c. 3. That law is called positive which is not inborn 
with nature, but is afterwards laid down by extrinsic principle having the 
power; for it is called positive law because it is, as it were, added to the 
natural law, not flowing from it necessarily. 

"Cum totus populus. consentit quod aliquid habeatur quasi adsequatum 
et commensuratum alteri, vel cum ordinat princeps qui curam populi habet 
et ejus personam gerit, hoc est jus positivum." S. Thomas. P. 2. 2, qu. 
57, a. 2, ad I. When all the people agree that one thing shall be considered 
adequate and commensurate in respect to another, or -when the prince so 
ordains who has care of the people and bears their person, represents 
them, this is positive right. 
11* 



126 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and just, only when it is conformable to right reason.* It is 
of reason to enunciate the true, and to measure the just and 
right: hence, speech is usually named as a specific note of 
rational nature; while it is the office of reason to constitute 
and prescribe the rule or measure of action that is accord- 
ing to order, or is designed for an end; yet, an action of the 
will is presupposed as moving the reason to this operation. 
Hence, to ordain a law is the work of reason ;f but law presup- 
poses, at least as positively imposed, an act of the will. 

When it is said that law is made binding by the will of the 
ruler, " quod placuit principi, legis habet vigorem," what 
pleases the prince, has the force of law; this can be true only 
when the will of the ruler is regulated and directed by reason; 
for, law which is not devised and prescribed by reason, is 
iniquitous, and it cannot impose a true or just obligation. To 
the merely arbitrary law, is frequently applied the well-known 

* " Intimare seu annuntiare, est manifestare etloqui, quod etiam pertinet 
ad inte.lectum." Billuart, L'e Act. Hum. Dis. III., a. 7, sec. 2 To inti- 
mate or announce, is to manifest and speak, which also pertains to the 
reason. 

t '* Regula autem et mensura humanorum actuum est ratio quae est prin- 
cipium primum actuum humanorum. Kationis est ordinare ad finem qui 
est primum principium in agendis." P. I. 2, qu. 90, a. I, in c et 66, a. 
I. The rule and measure of human actions is reason, which is the first 
principle of human acts. It is of reason to ordain for an end, which end is 
the first principle in moral action. 

"Causa et radix humani boni est ratio." The cause and radix of 
human good, i. e., good which man produces, is reason. 

"Imperare autem est quidem essentialiter actus ralionis . . . ordinare 
per modum intimationis cujusdam est rationis. . . . Radix libertatis est 
voluntas sicut subjectum ; sed sicut causa, est ratio : ex hoc enim voluntas 
potest libere ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conception es 
boni." P. 1. 2, qu. 17, a. 1, ad 2. To command is indeed of its essence 
an act of reason ... to ordain, by way of a certain declaration, is of rea- 
son. The radix of liberty, as to the subject in which it resides, is the will ; 
but as to the cause, it is the reason ; (the sul ject of liberty is the will ; the 
cause is the reason) ; for, therefore can the will be carried to different 
things, because the reason can have different conceptions of good. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 127 

line: " Hoc volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas;"* I wish 
this; I thus-command; my will must be the reason for it. 

It must be concluded, then, that to frame and pronounce a 
law is the work of reason ; for law, which is not a judgment 
of reason, is not a rule of rational action ; and command is 
not an arbitrary act, but it is essentially a work of reason. 

Law must have for its end, the common good. Law, as an 
ordinance of reason, has for its necessary and only legitimate 
end, that order which is a means to the common good of 
society or the community: it follows, then, that law is by its 
nature ordained to the general welfare of the community, or 
that it can prescribe only what is for the common weal.t The 
public or supreme authority has for its end, the welfare of the 
whole community : it may be concluded, then, that the laws 
by which the supreme power ordains and rules all things with 
the intention of promoting the common good, must have the 
same end. Hence, no law is just which has only a private 
end, or which benefits, only a particular person or part of the 
community; for, the public or common welfare is the essential 
end of just law; in the same manner that the supreme 
authority in the community cannot have for its principal and 
essential end, only the particular good of one individual, or 
one class of that community; because the only principal and 
essential end for which human authority exists, and to which 
all its particular ends are subordinate, is the good Of the 
whole community. 

* Juvenal, Satyr. VI, line 223. "Voluntas de his quae imperantur, ad 
hoc quod legis rationem habeat, oportet quod sit ahqua ratione regulata : et 
hoc modo intelligitur quod voluntas principishabet vigorem legis : alioquin 
voluntas principis magis esset iniquiias quam lex." P. 1. 2, qu. 90, ?. 1, 
ad 3. In order for a will concerning things which are commanded to have 
the nature of law, it is necessary for it to be regulated by some reason ; in 
this manner is understood the saying, " The will of the prince has the 
force of law ;" in any different sense, the will of the prince would rather be 
iniquity than law. 

t " Est de ratione legis humanae quod ordinetur ad bonum commune 
civitatis." P. 1. 2, qu. 95, a. 4. It is of the essence of human law that 
it be ordained for the common or general good of the nation. 



128 ETHICS, 07. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

We should here distinguish different kinds of " community'' 
which may exist among human beings; v. g., we* may regard 
all mankind as making up a community, because they agree 
in the same specific, rational nature: the natural law pertains 
to this community; for, its common, self evident precepts 
bind all races, nations and tribes of men. There is also the 
political community which is kept in union by a moral bond; 
as, the State, the Republic, the Kingdom, etc. A political 
body of this sort among mankind, which is not subject to the 
authority of any superior nation, is styled a " perfect com- 
munity"; hence, a perfect community is a political union 
among mankind which posses-es within itself supreme power 
of legislation and jurisdiction. A household of persons, or 
the family constitutes what is termed an " imperfect commu- 
nity," the ordinary ruler of which is the father of the family, 
who is differently related, however, to its members, the wife 
children, and servants. The father of the family can govern 
by private precepts, by which he may even principally intend 
his own interest; but his precepts cannot bind any except 
inmates of his own house; he has not equal authority over all 
members of the family, and his power to coerce obedience, is 
limited. The ruler of the " perfect community " has supreme 
authority, with all its essential prerogatives, as will be more 
fully explained in another place; but his laws must have for 
their end the well-being of the whole community, nor can 
they intend as principal either his own good, or what is good 
in respect only to a part of the community. 

We may conclude, therefore, that none but a " perfect 
community" is susceptible of law; and that the common 
good, or good of the whole community, is the essential end of 
all law.* The privilege is not really an exception to this 
truth. 

A privilege is a private or particular and special law, con- 

* "Omnislex ad bonum commune ordinatur." P. 1.2, qu. 90, a. 2. 
Ail law is ordained for the common good. 

Salus populi suprema est lex. The welfare of the people is the supreme 
law. 



GENERAL ETHICS. .129 

ferring some benefit, right or immunity on a person or on some 
persons,* which is not enjoyed by all in the community. 
What a privilege directly concedes, is always something 
favorable; but it may be indirectly odious, in as much as it 
may be offensive to other particular persons. Law is of this 
same species which prescribes what is necessary for the 
common good, but is harmful to a few. But no privilege is a 
just law unless it have for its principal end, the common good 
or general welfare of the community; it may have for its 
proximate end a private good; but law that is just can intend 
private good only as ordained to the public or common good. 
In this case, though the privilege is a private law, under one 
respect, or in as much as it grants a favor to particular 
persons; yet, its principal end is still the public good, which 
can never be rightfully postponed to merely private good.f 
Besides, public authority, as already said, has for its only just 
and proper end the good of the community ; therefore, its 
laws, which are means, have the same end: " Finis autem 
humanas legis, est utilitas hominum." (P. i. 2, qu. 95, a. 3.) 
It is disputed as to whether or not it is strictly of the essence 
of law that it have the good of a community for its principal 
end; some affirming that law may be complete in what is es- 
sential to it, and yet be imposed on but one person, having 
the good of that one person as its only principal end. But 
our present question is of positive law imposed by public au- 
thority on men living in society, or living as social beings. It 
is true that there may be private precepts which are binding 
on individuals without imposing any obligation on the rest of 

* " Qusedam sunt communia quantum ad aliquid, et singularia quantum 
ad aliquid: hujusmodi dicuntur privilegia quasi leges privatse, quia res- 
piciunt singulares personas ; attamen potestas eorum extenditur ad multa 
negotia." P. I. 2, qu. 96, a. I, ad I. Some things are common under 
one respect, and particular under another; such are called privileges, 
or a sort of private laws, because they regard individuals; yet, their effect 
extends to many things. 

t "Bonum totius gentis divinius est quam bonum unius hominis." 
D. Th. in 1 Eth. Arist. The good of the whole race is something more 
divine than is the good of one man. 

9 



130 KTIIIC3, Oil MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the community; but, notwithstanding this, the public author- 
ity cannot place the burden of law on a private member of 
the community, in matter which is not at all related to the 
general good of the community. Hence, in the language of 
jurisprudence, no command or precept has the nature of law, 
or is so styled, unless it regard what is related to the public 
welfare of a " perfect community." To argue whether or not 
an individual man, having no real connection with any soci- 
ety or multitude of human beings, be capable of law, is merely 
a question concerning the use of a term, as Suarez indicates.* 
As a fact, only common precepts, or such as have for their 
matter what is related to a perfect community, are styled 
laws; whatever may be conceived as abstractly or metaphys- 
ically possible concerning the existence of only one intelligent 
creature as subject to authority. All law is general or uni- 
versal, in virtue of its matter, and as declaring what is rightt 
in action. 

* " Usee controversia potest multum pendcre ex usu voci.s. Nihilominus 
simpliciter dicendum est, de ratione legis, ut hoc nomine significatur, esse, 
ut sit prseceptum commune, id est, communilati, seu multitudini hominum 
impositum." — Suarez, De Leg., lib. I, c. 6. This controversy may depend 
on the use of a term. Yet, simply it must be said thai it is of the essence 
of law, according to what the word signifies, that it be a common prece^ t ; 
that is, it must be imposed on a community, or a multitude of men. 

t " Lex est regula et mensura operationis, quasi ex parte materiae, et me- 
dii virtutis : nam hoc moclo dicitur regula 'justorum et injustorum.' Lst 
ergo lex quasi regula constituens, velostendens in sua materia, sen opera- 
tione, circa quam versatur, medium scrvandum ad recte conveniente:que 
operandum. Usee autem regula de se universalis est, ad omnes cum pro- 
porlione periinens ; ergo lex de se est generalis : ut ergo aliqua sit propria 
et perfecta lex, hanc condiiionem habere debet." — Suarez, De-Leg., lib. i, 
c. 6.. no. 12. Law is the rule and measure of action, as it were, on the pa<t 
of the matter, and the medium of virtue ; for, it is in this manner that it 
is called "the rule of things just and things unjust." Law is, therefore, 
as it were, the rule constituting and showing in the matter, or the action 
concerning it, the medium to be kept in order to operate rightly and in a 
becoming manner. But this rule is of itself universal, pertaining, in due 
proportion, to all, and therefore law is ot itself general ; hence, for law to 
be properly and perfectly such, it must have this condition, or be a gen- 
eral, common precept. 



GENEKAL ETHICS. 131 

The law must be decreed and duly promulgated, by the 
supreme authority in the community, whether this supreme 
authority remains in the multitude, or is transferred to a per- 
son or body of persons, thereby empowered to provide for 
the common good.* 

It is plain, from the very nature of things, that it is for the 
supreme power having charge of the whole community to 
prescribe the laws that must direct and govern all its mem- 
bers. Since law has for its proper or special end to secure 
that order which is necessary for the welfare of the whole 
people, it pertains either to the people themselves as a body, 
or to some public person representing the people, to frame and 
execute necessary laws. It is impossible that each private 
citizen should be a law for himself, in matter which pertains 
to the public good; nor can legislation be the work of any 
particular party in the community that does not include within 
its aim and scope the good of the whole community. Law 
must, therefore, come from that authority which is supreme 
over all, and whose office it is to promote the good of all, 
with justice and impartiality. Hence, the objection may 
occur; " the multitude is not superior to itself ; therefore the 
authority to make laws cannot reside in the multitude." The 
multitude, acting collectively, can prescribe laws that distribut- 
ively bind its members; hence, the multitude, as a collection 
or organized body, may be superior to its members as indi- 
viduals. 

The promulgation of the law is necessary in order that the 
existence of the law may become known to the people for 
whose benefit it is made. The promulgation is an indispens- 
able requisite for applying the law to those for whom it is a 

* " Ordinare autem aliquid in bonum commune est vel totius multitudi- 
nis, vel alicujus gerentis vicem totius multitudinis ; et ideo condere legem 
vel pertinet ad totam multitudinem, vel pertinet ad personam publicam 
quae totius multitudinis curam habet." P. 1.2, qu. 90, a. 3. But to ordain 
anything for the common good, belongs either to the whole multitude or to 
some one acting in place of the -whole multitude: and therefore to enact 
law either pertains to the whole multitude, or to some public person that 
has care of the whole multitude. 



132 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

rule of action. Hence, the promulgation does not pertain to 
the intrinsic essence of law itself; but it is necessary by way 
ot condition, in order for the law actually to bind its subjects. 
The manner of publishing or promulgating law is regulated 
by the special laws or customs of different nations ; but the 
necessary end of promulgating laws is accomplished, or they 
are in force, when their existence is known or it morally can 
be known by the people. We may consider the natural law 
to be promulgated to all men, through its self-evidence to them, 
as the practical dictate of right reason. 



CHAPTER VII. 

NATURE AND PROPERTIES OF CIVIL LAW. 
ARTICLE I. 

General laws f ;r the government ot the civil community- 
are necessary; government solely by the arbitration of judges, 
who are directed in their decisions by no established or fixed 
laws and customs, would not be expedient for the public 
good. 

It is a sufficiently obvious corollary from what is thus far 
said, that laws are necessary means to the good of the whole 
community. It is now to be shown that laws are necessary 
on account of reasons furnished by the nature itself of man,* 
when he is regarded as an individual member of the nation ; 
and that by reason of this truth also there should be general 
laws, for the government of all the people. 

When man is considered as he now actually is in himself, 
the wants and imperfections that render positive law neces- 
sary for his guidance and maintenance in good, may be re- 
ferred mainly to deficiencies in the superior powers of his soul, 
the understanding and will. Owing to imbecility of intellect 
in apprehending, and feebleness of reason in following out 
principles to their legitimate consequences, many persons are 
unable to apply the general precepts of natural law with truth 
and certainty, even in much practical matter that necessarily 
concerns both their own good and that of the public, or the 

* " Necessitas legum ex ipsa natura hominum oritur : cum enim natura 
humana sit ex se defectibilis et a vero fine deficere possit, necesse est ut per 
leges ad suum finem dirigatur." Billuart, De Leg. Disp. L, a. I. The 
necessity of laws arises from the very nature of man ; for, since human 
nature is of itself liable to fail in duty, and can fall away from its true end, 
it is necessary that it be directed to its end by laws. 
12 ( T 33) 



134 ETHICS, OH MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

commonwealth. Such individual members of the state would 
err in duty to themselves and to others, through ignorance; still 
more impossible would it be for them to prescribe for them- 
selves safe or just rules of conduct in matter concerning which 
even the most prudent need counsel and direction. There- 
fore, man needs laws as rules for the direction of his life, owing 
to ignorance and weakness in his reason. 

There is necessity for positive law arising also from the 
disorderly inclinations, passions and vices which many persons 
permit to control their wills. Being ruled by selfish feeling, 
and devoid of moral rectitude in action, the conduct of many 
persons would be injurious both to themselves, and to the com- 
munity : hence, positive law is needed, not only to declare 
what is good and right; but to restrain evil,* and compel 
obedience to necessary duty towards the public. 

The government of the community solely by the arbitration 
of judges, who both make the law and decide the fact, would 
not, in practice, be for the public good. 

It is more easy, as Aristotle contends, to discover a few 
wise men who can devise prudent general laws, than it is to 
find many able and upright judges who can legislate with 
justice and impartiality on all particular cases that will come 
before them. They who make general laws for the nation, 
can take time to reflect, and judge deliberately what is best 
for all the people; whereas, the judge must decide both the 
fact and the rule of justice that is applicable to it, with the 
least delay possible. The one judges of what is general and 
abstract, in which reason is less exposed to error; the other 
must deal with concrete and particular things, in relation to 
which, feeling and passion are easily excited so as to warp the 
judgment. In order, therefore, to secure the good of all the 
people in the community with prudence and certainty, some 
general laws are necessary. It must be granted, however, 
that such judges are very competent to determine whether or 

* " Knowing this that the law is not made for the just man, but for the 
unjust and disobedient.." I Tim. ch. i., v. 9. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 135 

not a particular fact is here and now proved.* In England 
and in the United States, the jury is a body of twelve men 
whose special office it is to decide concerning the sufficiency 
of testimony adduced before a court in proof of facts that are 
litigated, or that regard persons at law. In the very nature 
of things, the testimony of witnesses regarding particular facts 
that are contested at law, should be estimated by some 
impartial person or persons, who will decide equitably as to 
its sufficiency for founding certainty; for, thus alone can the 
abstract law be duly or efficiently applied to its concrete 
matter of the kind.f 

The fact that it is the civil courts in England and the 
United States which govern the people in nearly all the 
affairs of their social life, as citizens, and that the courts 
themselves are, in many things, not guided by a written law, 
is no real exception to the preceding theses. The law that 
mainly directs and controls all proceedings of those courts, is 
the Common Law of England, or, as it is also styled, the lex 
?i07i scripta, the law not written ; so called, because it did not 
originate as a written law, or statute enacted in form and pro- 
mulgated by the legislative power; but it originatedby way of 
a custom. The common law, then, derives its authority from 
immemorial usage and universal reception ; and it is preserved 
in the traditions of the courts and written reports of judicial 
decisions. It may be truly said that the common law is written 
in the hearts of the people, "jus non scrip turn tacito et illiter- 

* " Quaedam tamen singularia, quae non possunt lege comprehendi, 
necesse est committere judicious : v. g., utrum tale factum sit an non, et 
alia hiijusmodi." P. I. 2, qu. 95, a. I. It is necessary to commit to 
judges certain particulars that cannot be comprehended under law; for 
example, whether such be the fact or not, and the like. 

t Although the jury, in ordinary language, are said to be judges of the 
fact only, yet a general verdict in a civil or criminal case ordinarily decides 
both the facts, and whether the law, as stated by the judge, is immediately 
applicable to uVse facts: v. g., the verdict "guilty," on a charge of mur- 
der, implies both that the act was committed, and that it included what 
amounts to murder. In some parts of the United States, the jury also 
assess the penalty of criminal offences. — Brande. 



136 1TIIIC3, OR. MO HAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ato hominum consensu et moribus expressum "* — an unwritten 
law expressed by the tacit and unlettered consent and by the 
customs of the people : this law retains its power to rule the 
affairs of civil life, even when political disturbance or revolu- 
tion prevails, as the facts e f history attest During past 
centuries, when the people felt aggrieved at some new and 
oppressive statute, they besought their rulers to restore the 
'•laws of Alfred and good King Edward": and thus it 
happened that not even the Norman Kings could suppress the 
common law of England. 

The common law, therefore, has the force and value of an 
established custom which dates back, as expressed in the 
quaint phraseology of olden writers, "to a time whereof the 
memory of man runneth not to the contrary." Some of its 
rules and precepts may have originated in statute law ; it 
was modified and perfected by learned Christian jurists who 
had studied the Justinian Code or Roman Law. It is for 
the judges to know the rules and principles of the common 
law, and to decide exactly according to them; for, the judge 
can declare, but he cannot make the law. If, by exception, a 
judge decides contrary to common law, his decision will be 
reversed in another court, where it will be shown, by refer- 
ence to tradition and to former decisions, what the law is for 
that case, and that it has always been the custom to observe 
it. Since former decisions f are the best testimony as to what 
the law is for particular matter, it is laid down, as a general 
rule, that "the decisions of courts of justice are evidence (re- 
liable or credible testimony) of what is common law." These 
decisions, faithfully reported and printed, are preserved ; and 
they form the principal part of the lawyer's library. 

The common law is at the basis of most statute lawf that 

* Aulus Gellius: see Fortescue, " De Laudibus Legum Anglise," chapt. 
17; Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1874. 

t See Kent's Commentaries, Vol. I, Lecture XXL 

+ Statute law, which is enacted and promulgated with due formality by 
the legislative power, is, in the language of Roman jurists, variou.-.ly 
styled "constitution, edict, law, precept," according as it is the work of 



GENE HAL ET1U 137 

final ils or permanently ? urvives ■ for, sta: :hat 

contravenes the common law is likely to be evaded by the 
courts; and, in many is even practically annulled by 

the cou: 

This law still retains much of its pristine, universal authority 
over the people, throughout the English-speaking nations : I . 
it follows the race, and it is embodied in their language. 

lile genuine law does not per se depend for its validity or 
binding force on its acceptance by the community, except 
when so provided in the c:::s::tution of the government; yet, 
the peculiar efficacy and permanency of the common law are, 
without any doubt, greatly due to the universal love for it in 
the hearts of the people, as a wise and safe rule of what is 
right and just among citizens.* 

The body of law published by the emperor Justinian, usually 
styled the Justinian code, was slightly modified and improved 
by succeeding emperors ; the emended and complete collec- 
tion, together with some comments of learned Christian jur; 
was subsequently published under the title, " Corpus Juris 
.is" ; constituting what is generally styled, " Roman Law," 
or ; * the civil law."f This body of civil law, which Blackstone 

the emperor, a king, an inferior or subordinate ruler; and a command to 
one person is a " mandate." In English, statute law is distinguished from 
common lazv as being a written law; it is distinguished also from constitu- 
tional laiv, which is a fundamental law determining the form of govern- 
ment, or defining the powers and duties of its legislative, executive, or ju- 
diciary departments. 

* For a clear and sufficiently comprehensive account of the common law, 
or the lex n.m scnpta, see Blackstone's Commentaries, Introductory Es- 
say, especially Section III; or, Sir Francis Palgrave, "Essay upon the 
Original Authority of the King's T:.:ncil: Printed by command of His 
Majesty King William IV., 1S34." He says, p. 10: "The common law 
jurisdiction may be considered as emanating from the people. Not that 
institutions were democratic; but the Folk-moots (the c"» ts of the 
hundred, and the borough and the shire, and those institutio s on which 
trial was grounded,) had descended lrom that distant age when the 
name and office of king were alike unknown to the rough German." 

- Sec Kent's Comme- I, Lecture XXIII; or, "The Insti- 

tutes of Justinian, by Thomas Cooper." 

12* 



138 ETHICS, OH MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

praises as " a collection of written reason," was studied in all 
the universities both in England and on the continent of 
Europe, until the rise of the present political order that pre- 
vails in nations; and it was accepted and quoted as authority, 
in questions of civil right, even by the theologians, who 
studied it along with common law. This venerable system of 
written jurisprudence is frequently referred to by our English 
law-writers under the title of " the civil law." It consists 
partly *of laws that were copied from different foreign national 
codes, some merely transcribed, some altered and accommo- 
dated to the manners of the Romans; partly of new provisions, 
and partly of the laws and usages that had come down from 
their ancient Kings. It is, perhaps, not too much commen- 
dation of the Roman Law, to say that it is the masterpiece 
among the collections of written civil law. In such esteem 
was it held during the existence of the Roman Empire, or 
till after the reign of Charles V r rather till the peace of 
Westphalia, in 1648,* that it was often styled "Jus commune," 
or the general civil law of nations; and many were of opinion 
that it possessed binding force in any nation that was, by 
some cause, actually bereft of its own special or peculiar laws 
and customs;! so that a community, without any law of its 
own, was, from that very fact, under the " civil law," in virtue 
of the general authority possessed by that " civil law." While 
those laws, compiled by Justinian, no longer retain their 
pristine authority over nations, yet they have lost none of 
their value as embodying the sound reasoning and prudent 
judgments of many wise minds, concerning the practical affairs 

* The title of Roman Emperor was not finally abolished till the time 
of Napoleon I. 

t Billuart reflects this opinion, when he says, De Legibus, Dis. IIT, a. I : 
"Jus civile (Jus Romanum) habet auctoritatem apud eas nationes et pro- 
vincias quae illud adoptarunt, nee moribus contrariis reguntur: apud eas 
etiam quae usibus contrariis reguntur ubi usus deficit jus commune allega- 
tur." The civil law has authority over those nations and provinces which 
have adopted it, and are not ruled by different customs : over those like- 
wise which are governed by contrary customs; when their customs cease, 
this common right succeeds them. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 139 

of social and civil life; and their study may advantageously 
accompany that of Blackstone, Littleton, Fortescue, Kent, 
Story, Grotius, Vattell, etc. 



ARTICLE II. 

HUMAN POSITIVE LAW DOES NOT INCLUDE WITHIN THE SCOPE 
OF ITS MATTER EITHER ALL GOOD, OR ALL EVIL \ NOR 
IS IT MERELY THE NATURAL LAW APPLIED. 

Since human positive law has for its only peculiar specific 
end, the public good or the common weal; it can neither for- 
bid all things that are evil, in respect to individuals, nor can 
it command all things that are good. 

The natural law, which is the eternal law as impressed on 
man's reason, and is known by him as the rule of natural rec- 
titude, forbids everything that is morally evil : this prohi- 
bition, then, is universal; it admits no exception; or, before 
the natural law, evil is in itself never licit. But human law 
cannot prohibit all that is forbidden by the natural law, nor is 
it capable of reaching what is merely internal action of a per- 
son. Positive human law is for the whole community, and its 
observance must, therefore, be possible to all the citizens; 
but all men have not equal moral strength to abstain from 
every vice ; yet, all can avoid those evils which, besides being 
grievous in themselves, are clearly and more or less seriously 
detrimental to the community. In practice, such law can 
efficaciously restrain only those disturbances of moral order, 
which are external or public, and which are injurious to the 
general welfare of the community. . We may conclude, there- 
fore, that human positive law is, by its nature, competent to 
prohibit only those defections from rectitude of action or be- 
havior, which it is in the power of the less virtuous to avoid, 



140 ETHICS, OPw MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

which are not entirely private, and which are injurious to the 
community.* 

The positive law cannot command all things that are good, 
or all virtuous works : since such law has for its special and 
proper object only the general public good, it can legitimately 
require only what is judged to be positively and certainly re- 
lated to that general public good, as means. It is manifest, 
however, that there are many actions, both good and bad, of 
individual persons, which have no positive connection what- 
ever with the general interests of the community ; and there 
are many good deeds which exceed the strength of all but a 
few persons. It follows, then, that to require by positive law, 
from the whole multitude or .nation, the exercise of all the 
virtues, would be to prescribe what is not morally or physi- 
cally possible in practice ; and such requirement is, therefore, 
beyond the true office and sphere of human law. 

Even the positive or affirmative precept of the natural law 
does not bind, as it is expressed, seuiper et pro semper : i. e., 
at every successive moment ; or, a positive precept, as, " pay 
due homage to God, honor parents," etc., does not require the 
acts which it commands, to be performed without any inter- 
mission or cessation. Indeed this would be physically impos- 
sible for man, since it is not in his power to be always, or at 
every instant, actually performing the positive works that are 
prescribed by an affirmative precept. But a negative or pro- 
hibitory precept, on the contrary, does bind semper et pro 
semper, or alwa\ s, and for every moment of time. It is never 

* " Lex humana deficit a lege seterna : unde omnia non potest prohibere 
quae prohibet lex naturae, sed tantummodo quae sunt in nocumentum ali- 
orum, sine quorum prohibitione societas humana conservari non posset . . . 
alioquin imperfecti hujusmodi prsecepta ferre non valentes, in mala dete- 
riora prorumpunt." P. I. 2, qu. 96, a. 2. Human law falls below the eter- 
nal law; hence it cannot forbid all that is forbidden by the law of nature, 
but only those things that are injurious to others, and without the forbidding 
of which human society could not be conserved . . . otherwise the imper- 
fect not being able to bear such precepts, Mould rush into worse evi's. 

He quotes Prov. xxx. 33, and Matt. ix. 17, in which the evil of over- 
doing, in such things, is reproved. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 141 

legitimate to do an action that is simply or absolute 1 y forbid- 
den by a precept of the natural law; and such prohibition is 
always binding, or its obligation never ceases so as to allow 
the contrary, even for a moment. The positive law cannot 
reach and regulate all the details and particulars of the indi- 
vidual's practical conduct ; or, it is not the office of civil 
authority to govern either the individual or the family in all 
things. 

Although there is no concrete individual or particular 
human action which is morally indifferent; that is, which is 
neither good nor bad morally ; yet, the natural law leaves 
r.uich matter so subject to the empire of each man's reason, 
that he can either choose or reject, and at the same time do 
thereby what is morally good ; as shown in a preceding chap- 
ter. There are many objects about which the private conduct of 
individual persons and that of families is concerned, which 
are not within the sphere of human laws : by this arrange- 
ment of God'i; general providence the individual is left, in 
some things, to the guidance of his own prudence, or to the 
counsel of wise preceptors:* hence, the perfecting of each 
particular person does not belong wholly to the province of 
human positive law. 

Human positive law is not always merely the natural law 
applied. 

The natural law has for its peculiar object what is good or 
bad in the very nature of things, or what is necessarily and 
evidently good or bad. What is dictated or prescribed by 
the natural law, may be known to us either by way of first 
principle, as " good should be done, evil should be avoided " ; 
or, it may be known by way of evident, necessary, and imme- 
diate inference ; as, " to blaspheme is evil ; it should therefore 
be avoided." Such conclusion is merely an application of the 

* " Nullo privato commodo, sed pro communi utilitate civium lex debet 

esse conscripta Ad singulares enim actus dirigendos, dantur sin- 

gularia prsecepta prudentium." P. I. 2, qu. 96, a. 1, ad 2. Law should 
not be made for any private advantage, but for the common welfare of the 
citizens. For the direction of particular actions, there are particular pre- 
cepts of prudent persons. 



142 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

natural law. The old writers on ethics regarded what they 
styled the "Jus gentium," or the common law of nations* as, 
under some respect, the natural law applied by means of 
demonstrated conclusions from it to the practical direction of 
civil communities : the " law of nations," will be further ex- 
plained in a succeeding chapter of this treatise. But all pos- 
itive law is not, in the same sense, a mere application of the 
natural law to the social direction of communities. 

Much matter, about which human positive law is concerned, 
is more or less remote from what the first principles of natural 
law, with their first conclusions, directly and immediately re- 
gard. But positive laws are derived from the natural law in 
two manners ; first, by way of demonstrated conclusions, as 
the laws comprised in the " Jus gentium " were considered to 
be; such demonstrated conclusions derived from the first dic- 
tates of right reason may, for the present, be regarded as the 
natural law; though some of them are mutable, because of 
their matter being mutable. 

Secondly, a conclusion may be derived from the law of 
nature, by way of a determination, as it is styled, t The word 
" determination " expresses, in its general meaning, a decision 
and definition of limits ; when it is applied to logical, and 
therefore, abstract matter, it most properly expresses that limi- 
tation which is made by adding the specific difference to the 
genus, or applying the universal to the particular. When it is 
said of some positive law, that it is "a determination of natu- 
ral law," it is meant that what is a general, abstract or univer- 
sal principle of the natural law, by being applied to particular 
matter, thereby founds for such matter, a specific, determinate 
rule or law. It was already observed that man cannot apply 

* "Quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, iclque apud om- 
nes gentes custoditur: vocaturque jus gen ium." — P. 2. 2, qu. 57, a. 3, 
in c. What natural reason establishes among all men, and is observed 
among all races : that is called jus gentium, or the common law of nations. 

t "Omnis lex humanitus posita in tantum habet de ratione legis, in 
quantum a lege naturae derivatur." — P. I. 2, qu. 95, a. 2. Any law laid 
down by man has the true nature of law, only so far forth as it is derived 
from the law of nature. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 143 

abstract, or metaphysical truths and definitions to contingent 
and particular things with absolute strictness and precision; 
v. g., he could not produce a marble or metallic sphere that will 
absolutely agree with the geometrical definition of the sphere; 
so, in the particular matters of political economy, civil con- 
duct of individuals, etc., he can apply common or general 
truths only with approximate, not with absolute accuracy. It 
is not difficult to see that the following general truths are 
legitimate conclusions from the natural law; "theft should be 
punished; the murder of an innocent person in the commun- 
ity deserves condign punishment ; " to decide and define the 
particular penalty, as, "imprisonment, hard labor for life, 
death inflicted in this or that manner," etc., is a " determina- 
tion " of these general principles, " theft and murder should 
be punished," which constitutes human positive law for such 
matter. 

The natural law does not dictate the particular penalty; 
this is determined by a human judgment, and that judgment 
itself is, in such matters, mutable or variable ; for, these par- 
ticular things are differently decided in different nations; and 
differently decided at different times, in the same nation. 

Hence, positive law is not always a necessary or demon- 
strated conclusion from the principles of natural law ; it is, in 
many cases, only probable that such law declares what is for 
the public good ; oftentimes it may have only that value pos- 
sessed by a prudent opinion in practical, but doubtful matter.* 
The determination made by the lawgiver as to what shall be 
the action of the citizens in particular cases, by which positive 
law is constituted, is directed and authorized by an absolute 
principle; for instance, in the example adduced, "the mali- 

* "Appositely to this subject, St. Th. says, p. I. 2, qu. 96, a. I, ad 3: 
" Non est eadem certitudo quserencfa in omnibus; unde, in rebus contin- 
gentibus, sicut sunt naturalia et res humanse, sumcit talis certitudo, ut ali- 
quid sit verum ut in pluribus, licet interdum deficiat in paucioribus." See, 
also, qu. 91, a. 3, ad 3. We must not seek for the same certainty in all 
things ; hence, in contingent things, as are natural objects and human af- 
fairs, the certainty suffices when anything is true in nearly all cases, even if 
it do not hold in a few instances. 



144 ETHICS, OS MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

cious murder of an innocent citizen should be punished," is a 
necessary conclusion from natural law, which is in itself, ab- 
solutely certain and immutable; and it is directive of the law- 
giver, as the absolute premise of his reasoning, in determining 
a just penalty for the crime of murder. 

It may be concluded, then, that the human positive law, 
as just described and explained, is, under one respect, an ap- 
plication of natural law ; under another respect, it is the work 
of human reason, and thus it derives something from natural 
law, and something from man. Hence, human positive law 
is not merely an application of natural law ; for, what is merely 
the natural law applied, is natural law itself, and not human 
law. Human law is mutable, natural law is immutable. In 
stating this truth, the Roman law makes the following dis- 
tinction : " The laws of nature, which are observed much 
alike in all nations, being constituted by divine providence, 
always remain fixed and immutable. But the laws which every 
state has enacted for itself, suffer frtquent changes, either by 
tacit consent of the people, or by some subsequent law."* 

As man's reason is perfectible in speculative knowledge, so 
is it also perfectible in the knowledge of practical things, espe- 
cially by means of experience :t as the earlier attempts of wise 
men in exact science are improved on by those who come 
after them and enjoy the benefit of their speculations and dis- 
coveries, so, in legislation, jurists and lawgivers are improved 
by the experience of mankind that preceded them. As a 
nation advances in genuine civilization, so is there a corre- 
sponding progress in the perfection of its laws. It is observed 
that, in many cases, laws increase both in number and in 

*Instit, lib. i, Tit. ii, § xi: "Seel naturalia quidem jura, qua? apud 
omnes gentes pera?que observantur, divina quadam providentia constituta, 
semper firma atque immutabilia permanent. La vero, qua? ipsa sibi qua?- 
que civitas constituit, saepe mutari solent, vel tacito consensu populi, vel 
alia postea lege lata." 

t " Humana? rationi naturale videtur, ut gradatim ab imperfecto ad per- 
fectum perveniat : in speculativis, in operabilibus." — P. I. 2, qu. 97, a. I. 
It seems natural to human reason, that it should progress gradually from the 
imperfect to the perfect ; in speculative matter, and in the practical. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 145 

harshness, when a community is declining in civilization, or 
tending to an inferior state of morality.* But the multiplica- 
tion of laws in such instances is, perhaps, more a symptom of 
degeneracy in manners, than it is the cause of such evil ; though 
it cannot be doubted that a nation may often be injured by 
bad laws, as well as it can be improved by wise and good 
laws. 



ARTICLE III. 

JUSTICE IS INTRINSICALLY ESSENTIAL TO LAW; THEREFORE 
AN UNJUST LAW IS REALLY NO LAW AT ALL. HUMAN 

LAWS THAT ARE JUST, BIND THE CONSCIENCE OF ALL 
ON WHOM THEY ARE LEGITIMATELY IMPOSED, IN VIR- 
TUE OF THE NATURAL LAW FROM WHICH THEY ARE 
DERIVED. IN THE SAME MANNER, SUCH LAWS ALSO 
BIND THE LAWGIVER WHO ORDAINS AND PROMULGATES 
THEM. 

It was seen in the preceding chapter that all law governing 
created things originates in the eternal law. All human law 
is said to be derived from the natural law, because it is through 
the natural law that it is conceived to originate from the eter- 
nal law. 

Only that law is just.f then, which is derived from the nat- 
ural law; and, conversely, any law is just which is truly and 
really derived from the natural law.| But no law can be a 

* " Et corruptissima republica, plurimse leges." — Tacitus, Annals., lib. 
% no. 27. It is in the most corrupt republic, that laws are most numer- 
ous. 

t -''Augustinus dicit in I de Lib. Arbit, 'non videtur lex quae justa non 
merit' : unde in quantum habet de justitia, in tantum habet de virtute le- 
g; s ." — p. 1. 2, qu. 95, a. 2. Augustine, De Lib. Arbit., says, that does 
not seem to be law which is unjust : wherefore, it is law only in so far as 
it is just law. 

% Hence, Suarez makes it of the definition of law that it be just : "Lex 
est commune praeceptum, justum ac stabile, sufficienter promulgatum. n -~* 
Suarez, Le Leg., lib. I, c. 12. Law is a common precept, just, stable, and 
duly promulgated. 
13 



146 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

derivation from natural law, unless it be conformable to right 
reason ; it may be concluded, therefore, that no human law 
can be just, if it disagree with right reason, the rule of which 
is the natural law. It may be affirmed, also, that in order for 
any law to be just, it must be conformable to right reason, and 
thus be derived from the natural law. 

A law must be just, first, as regards its essential end, which 
is the common or general good of the community ;* secondly, 
in regard to the authority of the lawgiver, as when the law 
does not exceed the power committed to him ; thirdly, in re- 
spect to its form, as when it distributes burdens equitably, and 
proportions them according to what is required for the pub- 
lic welfare; finally, law is just as to its matter, when it dees 
not command what is against the laws of God, or the precepts 
of natural law. No government has the authority or moral 
power to make any but just laws; and unjust laws, which are 
iniquitous and mere violence, can found no obligation in con- 
science; but, on account of extrinsic reasons, as when obe- 
dience to them is a less evil, it may become a duty to obey 
laws even when they are unjust. 

Just law being a derivation from the natural law, is binding 
in conscience,! by virtue of the natural law. Conscience is 
nothing else than an act of right reason by which it applies 
the absolute rule of rectitude, here and now, to some particu- 

* " Injustse sunt leges vel ex fine, sicut cum aliquis pr?esidens leges im- 
ponit onerosas subditis, non pertinentes ad utilitatem communem, sed 
magis ad propriam cupiditatem vel gloriam. Vel etiam ex auctore, sicut 
cum aliquis leges fert ultra sibi commissam potestatem ; vel etiam ex forma, 
puta cum insequaliter onera multitudini dispensantur.. eiiam si ordinenttir 
ad bonum commune : et hujusmodi magis sunt violentias quam leges." — P. 
I. 2, qu. 96, a. 4. Laws may be unjust on the part of their end, as when 
a ruler imposes on the subjects onerous laws that do not pertain to the 
public good, but rather to his cupidity or ambition. Also, on the part of 
the law-giver, as when one makes laws that exceed the power committed 
to him. Also, on the part of their form, as when burdens are dispensed 
to the mul'itude unequally, even if they are otherwise ordained for the 
common good : such laws are violence more than laws. 

t "Obedientia est virtus moralis, cum sit pars justitise." — P. 2. 2, qu. 
104, a. 2, ad 2. Obedience is a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice. 



GENEKAL ETHICS. 147 

lar and real matter included under that rule. Since a just law 
prescribes only that which is required for the public good, its 
obligation on each citizen is founded in truth and justice, 
whether we consider the well being of that citizen as an indi- 
vidual, his connection with the whole community and his duty 
towards it, or his obligation before God to obey the dictates of 
his own right reason ; under all these respects there is reason 
why he ought to obey the laws rightfully imposed on him. 
That duty binds in conscience, which one owes as a matter 
of justice; but obedience to just law is a duty arising from 
justice; and, therefore, obedience to just law is a duty that 
binds in conscience. Also, right reason dictates that duty of 
obedience to just law, as all agree; but a dictate of right 
reason in practical matter is morally binding. 

Such laws are necessary; therefore it is also necessary that 
they be obeyed ; or, in other words, they impose a moral obli- 
gation, for, without that obligation, they would be practically 
inefficacious and useless. When we consider man as he is 
now actually constituted, human positive law is necessary for 
him in the very nature of things; for, natural law does not 
determine in particular all his duties to himself and to society ; 
but it leaves much to be determined by human positive law : in 
like manner, man's consequent moral duty or obligation in 
conscience to obey just positive law, arises also from the nature 
of things, and with equal necessity. Now, that duty which 
arises from the very nature of things, springs from the natural 
law; it follows, then, that just human laws bind in conscience 
by virtue of that natural law from which they are derived. 
We may say that the obligation of a positive human law is 
proximately from the law itself; but nevertheless, such law has 
no virtue or moral power to bind, except what it derives from 
the natural law.* 

* Billuart, De Leg., Dis. ii, a. iii, thus reasons in proof that all obliga- 
tion is at least a remote effect of natural law : " Ideo lex positiva obligat, 
quia lex naturalis dictat et prsescribit esse obtemperandum legitime prsecipi- 
enti; et ideo docent Theologi neminem averti a Deo ut auctore supernatu- 
rali, quin simul avertatur ab eo ut Auctore naturali, quod verificari non 



148 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

A difficulty may here arise in the mind of the inquisitive 
reader : " In order for human law to be just, it must be derived 
from the natural law; but the natural law is immutable; so 
therefore must the laws logically deduced from it be immut- 
able." In answer, it must be conceded that rules of human 
action which are demonstrated conclusions from natural law, 
share the necessary truth of the principle from which they 
come; and hence, such conclusions, like the natural law, are 
immutable. 

Natural law is the practical dictate of right reason; and 
human law is not otherwise derived from it than as a prudent 
judgment in some particular practical matter, not necessarily 
possessing any greater logical value in the order of certainty, 
however, than what belongs to the discreet yet fallible deci- 
sions of human reason when it judges concerning contingent 
and practical things.* Human law changes, one while be- 

potest, nisi quia transgrediendo legem supernaturalem, simul transgredi- 
tur legem naturalem." Positive law, therefore, binds, because the natu- 
ral law dictates and prescribes obedience to one legitimately commanding; 
and hence, theologians teach that no one is averted from God as supernat- 
ural Author, without at the same time being averted from Him as the Au- 
thor of Nature, which cannot be verified, unless it be that, by transgress- 
ing the supernatural law, one at the same* time transgresses the natural law. 

This can apply, however, only to actual, not to original sin ; for, we 
should rather hold, with Becanus (De Auxil. Gratia, qu. 5, a. 5, Obje- 
ctio 5,) and other safe guides, that man is not averted from God, as the 
Author of Nature, by original sin; in order for man to become averted 
from God, as the author of his nature, actual sin is required ; by original 
sin, man is averted from God as his supernatural end; but he is not 
averted from God, as his natural end, by original sin. 

* "Ratio practica est circa operabilia, quae sunt singularia et contingen- 
tia, non autem circa necessana, sicut ratio speculativa; ideo leges humanse 
non possunt illam infallibilitatem habere, quam habent conclusiones demon- 
strative scientiarum. Nee oportet quod omnis mensura sit omnino infalli- 
bilis et certa, sed secundum quod est possibile in genere suo." — P. 1. 2, 
qu. 91, a. 3, ad 3. Practical reason is concerned about works to be done, 
which are singular and contingent, but not about necessary matter, as spec- 
ulative reasons ; therefore, humnn laws cannot have that infallibility which 
the demonstrated conclusions of sciences have. Nor is it required that 
every measure or rule be wholly infallible and ce.tain, but only that it be 
what is possible in its kind. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 14** 

cause its matter is changed ; another while, because the legis- 
lator discovers some truth not before known by him; but such 
law is a just rule of action, at least, so long as no positive and 
solid reasons cust doubt on its validity; and in virtue of its 
justice as a prudent dictate of reason, positive law is derived 
from the natural law. 

The lawgiver is bound in conscience to obey the laws im- 
posed by him on the community. 

We may distinguish between the laws which, by their nature, 
more or less directly and immediately regard the whole com- 
munity ; and those special regulations which proximately con- 
cern the supreme ruler alone, as, what pertains to his legal 
titles, insignia of office, the court ceremony, etc. The pre- 
sent question is only of those laws which positively bind the 
whole nation. 

Law as a rule of action for the whole community, may be 
considered as capable of both directive and coercive action ; 
or, law may be considered either as a rule which is directive 
of human action, or as including in itself the power to compel 
obedience by means of some extrinsic force moved by it. 

The essence of law consists in its being a just rule of human 
action; and for this object its principal virtue is in this, that 
it is directive of such action. Compulsion to obedience by 
means of force or punishment, is not per se intended by law; 
nor is any coercion, therefore, per se necessary in order for 
law to induce uprightness of conduct; because, force or punish- 
ment is necessary only secondarily and hypothetically. 

The laws, when regarded as directive of human action and 
as obliging the whole community, bind the supreme ruler in 
conscience, no less than they bind the citizen on whom he 
imposes them ; but the laws as being coercive, are not appli- 
cable to the supreme ruler, owing to extrinsic reasons and cir- 
cumstances. This obligation on the legislator to obey the 
laws of the community, even those promulgated by himself, 
arises, as Suarez shows,* from the nature of law itself, which 

*"Princeps obligatur ad servandam suam legem proxime ab ipsamet 
lege, et ex virtute, et efficacia ejus. . . Lex positiva habet efucaciam coils 
13* 



150 ETHICS, OB MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is a rule of rectitude for the whole community, without except- 
ing any one that is capable of moral duty. In this case Aris- 
totle's axiom was always explained, < : lex in republica debet 
dominari:"* law should have full sway over the common- - 
wealth. The general law is, by its nature, an ordinance of 
reason, for the common good; and it determines and consti- 
tutes a norma and rule of right action for all persons in the 
nation, of every rank and condition. It is but just also that 
the lawgiver should bear the burden with which he loads 
others; especially as his power of legislation and jurisdiction 
is intrusted to him not for his own sake, nor to exempt him 
from the restraints of just law ; t but the power to govern is 
committed to him as to a minister and vicegerent of the com- 
munity : " ordinare aliquid in bonum commune est vel totius 
multitudinis, vel alicujus gerentis vicem totius multitudinis ; 
(i. 2. p., qu. 90, a. 3); to ordain anything, belongs either 
to the whole multitude, or to some one holding the place of 
the multitude. The ruler is for the community ; the 
community is not for the ruler ; or, the welfare of the com- 
monwealth is the end, in respect to which its ruler is to serve 
as means. Hence, laws that burden the people with an onus 
which the ruler has no part in bearing, are unjust ; and in 
their way and degree, such laws are really tyrannical, since 

stituendi materiam suam in tali specie virtutis et praescribendi medium ne- 
cessarium ad honestatem talis virtutis. Postquam illud medium constitu- 
lum est, absolute in illo consistit virtus. . . . Quia vis directiva ordinatur 
ad bonos mores; et ideo comprehendit etiam ipsum legislatorem." — Sua- 
rez, De Leg., lib. iii, c. 35, no. 8, n, 17. The prince is obliged to obey 
his own law proximately from the very law itself, and from its virtue and 
efficacy. . . Positive law has the power of constituting its matter into a 
special kind of virtue, and of prescribing the medium for what is becoming 
in that virtue. . . . After that medium is constituted, the virtue absolutely 
consists in it. Law, as directive, is ordained for good works; it, therefore, 
comprehends the law- giver himself. 

*3 Polit, c. 7. 

t It is in this meaning that the well-known rebuke to the Pharisees is 
generally understood: "They bind heavy and insupportable burdens, and 
lay them on men's shoulders ; but, with a finger of their own, they will 
not move them." — Math, xxiii, 4. St. Th., p. 1. 2, qu. 96, a. 5. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 151 

their principal end is not simply the common good, but also, 
and mainly, the special private good » f the ruler.* 

It may be concluded, therefore, that since just law com- 
mands what is right in action, then by its own virtue as a rule 
of rectitude, it is binding in conscience on the whole commu- 
nity ; and this obligation extends with no less force to the law- 
giver himself. But this truth, which is universally conceded, 
that the lawgiver is bound in conscience to obey his own laws, 
is not founded on extrinsic reasons; the obligation arises, as 
said, from the law itself. The arguments in proof of this ob- 
ligation which are drawn from what is becoming or decorous 
in him who is observed by all the people, and from his conse- 
quent duty to set an example of order and rectitude in action, 
are only extrinsic reasons which do not found a strict obliga- 
tion in conscience always, in public and in private, to obey 
the laws, though these reasons corroborate the truth of that 
duty; he is, therefore, bound by the law itself, whose virtue 
and efficacy extend to the whole community, including its su- 
preme legislator. 

When law is considered as coercive, or as including power 
of compelling obedience by means of punishment, it is not ap- 
plicable to the supreme ruler; not that disobedience to just 
law is less imputable to him than it is to the private citizen, 
for it may actually happen to be more so ; but it is only be- 
cause he himself is the highest tribunal, and, therefore, there 
is no authority above him in the community either to enforce 
obedience, or to inflict punishment on his disobedience to the 
laws. Yet, the essence of law is in this that it is a just rule of 
right human action, which, therefore, binds the subject of it 
in conscience; law does not directly and necessarily intend 
punishment, since punishment is required only conditionally 
and per accidens for rectitude of action. t It follows, then, that 

* "Regimen tyrannicum non est justum; quia non ordinatur ad bonum 
commune, sed ad bonum privatum regentis." — 2. 2, p., qu. 42, a. 2, ad 3. 
Tyrannical government is not just; because it is not ordained for the com- 
mon public good, but for the private good of the ruler. 

t "Pcena non est per se intenta, neque per se necessaria ad honestatem 
morum ; et ideo obligatio ad illam, eiiamsi in conscientia oritur respectu 



152 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 






while law as directive has universal application to the commu- 
nity; law as coercive, has not universal application to the 
community; for, good citizens obey the law without coercion, 
because it is just, and it is an ordinance of reason that founds 
duty ; it does not apply as compulsory to the lawgiver, owing 
to his supremacy over its administration. But his disorderly 
action will be censured by public opinion; and there is no 
man so strong or great, nor sunk so low, as not to fear con- 
demnation before the moral tribunal of wise and just men; 
and before that bar the highest earthly potentate that rules 
amiss must submit to be tried and judged. 

It will be advantageous to notice, in this place, that Justin- 
ian begins his Institutes, which comprise the more important 
part of the civil or Roman law, by defining justice as the basis 
of all law: "justice is the constant and perpetual will of giv- 
ing to every one what is rightfully his."* He defines jurispru- 
dence, or the science of law, to be "the knowledge of things 
divine and human; the science of what is just and unjust." 

Three cardinal precepts of the natural law are then assigned, 
from which we may conceive all laws to be derived, and under 
which they may all be classified; these principal precepts 
which furnish the ground of all positive human law, are : " to 
lead a becoming life, to harm no one, to give to every one his 
due."t These three principles state the just and valid proxi- 

aliorum, non est tarn universalis, sicut obligatio ad materiam per se inttn- 
tam in lege." — Suarez, De Lege, lib. iii, c. 35, no. 19. Punishment is not 
in itself intended, nor is it necessarily required, for correctness of morals ; 
and, therefore, obligation to it, even if it arise for some in conscience, is 
not universal, as is the obligation in respect to the matter which of itself is 
intended by the law. 

* " Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi. 
Jurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, jusli atque 
injusti scientia." The necessity of knowing "Divine things" is here spe- 
cially mentioned, because of the close union between Church and State in 
the Roman Empire of that period: on this account, the learned jurist of 
that day was versed both m canon law and civil law, where Roman law 
was in force. 

t "Juris praecepta sunt : honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cin- 
que tribuere." — Lib. L, Tit. I. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 1T)3 

mate reason for all law that commands either what is neces- 
sary or useful to the general good of the commonwealth. 

The following are the necessary qualities of genuine human 
law, as they are usually given by writers on ethics; i, it must 
require only what is morally correct; 2, it must be just, or 
conformable to reason ;* 3, it must prescribe only what is nat- 
urally possible : i. e., it must not command what makes too 
heavy a burden, or what is exceedingly difficult without great 
necessity; and the laws must not be too numerous, or be 
needlessly multiplied; " prselati abstinere debent a multitudine 
praeceptorum : " p. 2. 2, qu. 105, a. 1. ad 3; rulers should 
avoid a multitude of laws. 4, The law must command noth- 
ing opposed to the reasonable and general customs of the 
nation, lest obedience to it prove too difficult, and it thereby 
become " a dead letter " or inefficacious; 5, the law must be 
clear and free from ambiguity, so that its meaning is plain or 
easily understood; 6, it must ordain what has the common 
good of the nation for its end, and what it commands must be 
either necessary or really useful in respect to that specific or 
essential end. To these requisites for genuine human law, 
Roman jurists usually added that the law must be written; 
but this is not always necessary for law, as is clear from the 
explanation hitherto given of the English common law, or 
lex non scripta. See Art. \, of this chapter. 

The act of law, is to command, to forbid, to permit, to 
punish : f it commands what is good for the commonwealth ; 
it forbids what is contrary to the public good; it permits what 
is indifferent, or what does not concern the public at all, 
whether it be done or not; it determines and appoints the 
punishment to be inflicted contingently on disobedience, thus 
supplementing its virtue as directive, with the force coming 

* " Lex est dictamen rectse rationis in prsesidente, quo subjecti g'lber- 
nantur.'' — P. 1. 2, qu. 92, a. 2. Law is the dictate of right reason in a 
ruler, by which his subjects are governed. 

t " Legis actus est imperare, vetare, permittere et punire." — P. 1. 2, 
qu. 92, a. 2. 



154 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

from fear of punishment, in order morally to compel the refrac- 
tory and self-willed to be dutiful and orderly citizens. 

The effdd of the law* which is proper to it, is to render its 
subjects good or virtuous citizens, and thus be- fitted to enjoy 
that happiness which it is the end of law to secure for the 
whole community : it is the essential end of law to produce 
good. 



ARTICLE IV. 

SANCTION OF LAW. 

When reward and punishment are regarded as confirming 
law by adding extrinsic means for persuading or enforcing 
obedience, they constitute what is styled the sanction of law. 
Mankind could not be impelled to obedience by a precept 
which offered neither the hope of good, nor the fear of evil as 
a motive for action. This double motive, which law as both 
directive and coercive proposes, constitutes the sanction of 
law, thereby giving it the ability actually to effect that good 
which is the essential end of all law. 

Some recent authors seem to make the sanction of law con- 
sist principally in punishment, not in reward. It is not easy to 
assign any good reasons for this opinion, since the contrary 
doctrine appears to be evidently true, from the very nature of 
law whose essential end and effect must be good, as above 
shown. Law per se intends the good; it intends punishment 
contingently, or per accidens ; and hence the definition of law 
declares that it is, " an ordinance of reason, for the common 
good." It is true that human law specifies no particular re- 

* "Cum virtus sit quae facit bonum habentem, sequitur quod proprius 
effectus legis sit bonos facere eos quibus datur." — P. I. 2, qu. 92, a. I. 
Since it is virtue that makes its possessor good, it follows that the proper 
effect of law is to make those good for whom it is given. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 155 

ward for obedience* to it; because obedience to the law is 
sufficiently rewarded by the good which it does for the whole 
community, and for every one in the community ; nor is it 
possible for human government otherwise to reward obedience 
to its laws. It is, perhaps, from this circumstance that some 
authors are led to conceive that the whole sanction of law 
consists in punishment. It is true also that the law appoints 
and inflicts a penalty for disobedience, if by exception some 
refuse to comply with the requirements of the law; but the 
punishment is ordained to secure that good which is the prin- 
cipal end of the law. Moreover, it is a debatable question, 
whether the reward, or the fear of punishment, be generally 
the stronger, or, at least, the more efficacious, incentive 
to compliance with duty. But it is a misconception both 
of law, and of duty to obey it, to suppose that what is "prin- 
cipal in the sanction of law, is punishment. That which 
is the principal end of law, is, at the same time, its prin- 
cipal sanction ; but good or reward is the principal and 
direct end of law, or the end which law per se intends; there- 
fore, reward is the principal sanction of law, and punishment 
is part of the sanction, only secondarily and contingently, or 
per accidens. Owing to the character or disposition of par- 
ticular persons, or multitudes of people, the fear of punish- 
ment may prove for them a more effectual inducement to 
orderly conduct, than does the hope of reward or the direct 
desire of any good intended by the law ; but this proves only 
that both reward and punishment are necessary for the com- 
plete sanction of law. Without punishment as part of the 
legal sanction, the ill-disposed could defy all legitimate au- 
thority. 

In order for law to regulate the action of its rational sub- 

* Blackstone (Introductory Essay, Sect. II.,) says that the law does not 
specify any reward for obedience to it, "because the quiet enjoyment and 
protection of all our civil rights and liberties, which are the sure and gen- 
eral consequence of obedience to the municipal law, are, in themselves, the 
best and most valuable of all rewards ; nor could the State confer any 
other." He is quite inaccurate, however, when he says of punishments: 
" Herein is to be found the principal obligation of human law." 



156 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

jects, or to impose on them a moral obligation to do what is 
commanded, it must necessarily include some fit sanction. 
What the law proposes as its sanction, is, in reality, utimately 
identical with the essential end of law as affecting each person. 

Hence, since there cannot be a law without some just end 
which it proposes as a motive for obedient action, and the 
sanction of the law is only that end considered under another 
respect, it follows that there cannot be a law which has no 
sanction. 

The reasoning in proof that the sanction of law consists 
principally in good or reward, and only secondarily in punish- 
ment, is made still more clear and conclusive by tlie kindred 
truth, that no human law can be purely vindicatory ; in other 
words, no law can intend punishment as its principal end, 
since such law would spring from ill-ordered hatred, or evil, 
as its principle. Punishment, like every other act of law, must 
have good as its only principal end.* 

The natural law must also have its perfect sanction ; in 
other words, there is reward due to him who keeps the natural 
law, which is proportioned to the merit thereby acquired; and 

* " Vinclicatio fit per aliquod pcenale malum inflictum peccanti. Si vindi- 
cantis intentio feratur principals er in malum illius, de quo vindictam sumit, 
et ibi quiescat, est omnino illicitum : quia delectari in malo alterius pertinet 
ad odium. ... Si vero intentio vindicantis feratur principaliier ad aliquod 
bonum, puta ad emendationem peccantis, quietem aliorum, justitise conser- 
vationem, etc. potest esse vindicatio licita, aliis debitis circumstantiis serva- 
tis. — P. 2. 2, qu. 108, a. I, ad I : "Si autem prreter ordinationem di- 
vinae institutions, aliquis vindictam exerceat, usurpat sibi quod Dei est, et 
ideo peccat." Vindicative punishment is by means of some penal evil in- 
flicted on the offender. If the intention of the one who punishes aim prin- 
cipally at the pain itself of him who is punished, and there terminate, that 
would be entirely unlawful ; for, to take pleasure in the pain of another 
belongs to hatred. But if the intention of the one punishing aim princi- 
pally at something good: for examp^, the correction of the offender, the 
peace of others, the defence of justice, etc. ; the vindicative justice can 
then be licit, other due circumstances being included. If, against the order 
divinely instituted, any one exercises vindicative justice, he usurps to him- 
self what belongs to God, and therefore sins. 

"Revenge is mine, and I will repay them in due time." — Deuteronomy, 
ch. xxxii, v. 35. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 157 

punishment proportioned to demerit is due him who disobeys 
the natural law; and thus, moreover, reward and punishment 
as the sanction of the law will be actually apportioned. The 
arguments already adduced, and which were drawn from the 
very end and essence of law itself, prove that the natural law 
has a fit sanction. The natural law, primarily and principally 
intends the direction of man in the right use of means for 
reaching his ultimate end, or final beatitude. This law ope- 
rates morally, not physically; and hence, the reaching of beati- 
tude under its direction, is a work which, speaking in the light 
of pure reason, man can do with his own natural resources, or 
which he can wholly or partially omit. 

The sanction of the natural law, like that of all law, con- 
sists principally in reward ; it consists secondarily and condi- 
tionally, in punishment. This is true in the nature of things;* 
for, to intend punishment principally, or for its own sake, 
would be malevolent, or to love evil; whereas, to intend 
reward for its own sake or principally, is to love and prefer good. 

The reward which is the principal sanction of the natural 
law, is the perfect bliss or happiness which constitutes the ulti- 
mate end of man : the ultimate end of man, or his final perfect 
final beatitude was explained in Chapter I. 

We know what is to be the punishment of the kicked in the 
present actual providence of God; it is to be thatf which was 

*"Est autem concedendum quod pcen^e inferentur a Deo, non propter se, 
quasi in ip-is Deus delectetur ; sed propter aliud : scilicet, propter ordi- 
nem imponendum creaturis, in quo bonum universi consistit." — Contra 
Gentes, lib. 3, c. 144. But ic must be conceded that God will inflict pun- 
ishments, not for their own sake, as if God could take pleasme in them; 
but on account of something else : for the order that must be imposed on 
creatures, in which the good of the universe consists. 

t Matt. xxv. 41: Observe our Lord's words : "Depart from me, you 
cursed, into everlasting fire which ic-as prepared for the devil and his 
angels y The commentators notice that this punishment was prepared 
principally for the fallen angels: " Hinc patet ignem inferni primo et per 
se paratum fuisse a Deo daemonibus." Hence it is plain that God prepared 
the fire of hell in the first p^ce and of itself for the demons. 

See the striking words of Socrates, Plato's Phredo, Nos 143 145. He, 
perhaps, speaks tradition coming down from primeval days. 
11 



158 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

prepared for the everlasting punishment " of the devil and his 
angels." But what the punishment of a wicked' life would be, 
under the supposition that man had none but a purely natural 
destiny, cannot be precisely and certainly determined by mere 
reason, though reason is competent to demonstrate that pun- 
ishment is necessary for the sanction of natural law. We can- 
not by reasoning ascertain what, as a fact, would be the 
particular species and exact measure of that punishment ; 
because that is a question regarding contingent matter, which 
God could dispose and determine in more ways than one, or 
variously. 

That the natural law has a sanction, or that there is a future 
state of rewards and punishment, is shown to be true, not 
only by the preceding arguments a priori, and from the 
nature of law itself; but it may be proved also by induction 
from facts and by moral reasons. Assuming, as we have a 
right to do, that the time of man's probation, and consequent- 
ly the time of merit and demerit, terminates for him with this 
life, and that it is to be succeeded by a permanent state; then 
it would be against truth and justice to suppose that one who 
has lived a good and meritorious life to the end, will have the 
same final condition, as one whose entire life was bad. 

The immortality of the human soul is here supposed, as a 
preliminary truth; for, its proof is the proper office of psy- 
chology. It is there shown that the soul being a simple sub- 
stance, cannot naturally die or perish ; then, from its rational 
and substantial nature, from the attributes of God, and his 
providence as manifested in his works, the positive truth is 
logically deduced, that the human soul has an immortal des- 
tiny, or that it will not be annihilated. 

It is clear to reason that, as a fact, man's life on earth, 
which is transient, is a probationary one ; or, that it is a state 
in which his main duty is to perfect himself with a view to an 
order of existence that is future, and that will be unending, 
by educating himself duly in virtue both intellectual and moral. 
Thus all races of mankind understand and explain the obvious 
facts that merit is not always duly rewarded in this life, and 



GENEEAL ETHICS. 159 

that crime does not always receive here its condign punish- 
ment. Oftentimes the most virtuous suffer wrongs and inju- 
ries which are not redressed, or they languish in poverty and 
sickness; while, on the other hand, it happens equally often 
that the wicked prosper; that their injustice results in gain 
and temporal plenty; that they deny themselves nothing 
which is grateful to passion, regardless of moral rectitude in 
action. These facts are manifest, and they are generally ob- 
served and admitted by mankind as proving the same conclu- 
sion. For, they argue, justice must be done; but justice is 
not done in this life ; therefore, it must be done in the future 
life; or, merit will be duly rewarded, and demerit condignly 
punished only in a future state of existence. This conclusion 
is also proved by the fact, equally well known, that man can 
not attain to any object of happiness, in this life, which is at 
all proportioned either to the dignity of his nature, or the 
greatness of his capacity: for this end, no object is adequate, 
but one that is perfect and unfailing. 

It cannot be proved demonstratively from unassisted 
natural reason, either that punishment in the future state is 
actually eternal, or that it is not eternal; nor could we natu- 
rally come to the certain knowledge of the fact that man's 
probationary state, or the time of merit and demerit for his 
soul, ceases immediately with the present life in this world. 
The truth of these statements is all the more evident and cer- 
tain from the fact generally conceded, that God could, if he 
had chosen so to do, have saved every human being:* but 
while inquiry concerning these matters would here be out of 
place and useless, it is appropriate to examine whether or not 
unending punishment of the wicked is repugnant to reason. 

Although, as conceded, it cannot be proved from natural 
reason that the punishments of the future state are to be actu- 
ally eternal or unending; yet, it is riot contradictory to reason 
that there should be such punishment ; or, that loss of beati- 

* Some have denied the possibility of demonstrating that God could not 
justly, and in virtue of his absolute dominion over his creatures, annihilate 
the wicked, though it be strictly provable that the good will be immortal. 



160 ETHICS. OK MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

fied life through demerit, should constitute a state of existence 
that will be permanent. 

It may be argued thus: as the reward for keeping the natu- 
ral law is proportioned in justice to the merit thereof; so is 
the punishment of not keeping the natural law proportioned 
in justice to the demerit acquired thereby ; but the due reward 
of such merit is the state of beatitude, or an immortal life in 
happiness; therefore, by parity of ratio, the demerit incurred 
by refusing to be governed by the natural law, can be a cor- 
responding loss or privation of beatitude that is irreparable. 
Hence, just as beatitude will be a permanent state; so the pri- 
vation of beatitude can, by like reasoning, be a permanent state. 

This argument seems to be perfectly conclusive, as regards 
the simple, abstract principle of justice. Hence, merely 
reasoning a priori, it may be said : that principle is not repug- 
nant to reason, which is founded in the very nature of things; 
but that there can be unending or unrepaired privation of beat- 
itude, in punishment of a life that is morally evil, is true from 
the very nature of things. When, from some defect or priva- 
tion in man, life leaves his body; there is not either in his 
soul or body a power capable of restoring the principle of life 
to the body; this can be done, in the nature of things, only 
by a power that is superior to both soul and body, it can be 
done only by divine power. Hence, it may be said generally, 
that whenever a principle is totally destroyed, the defect is 
not naturally reparable ; v. g., when the organ of vision is 
radically and totally destroyed, there is no virtue natural to 
creatures which is able to remedy this evil; for, if there be 
power in such being or in any creature to restore the lost 
faculty, it cannot then be said to have been under all respects, 
radically and totally destroyed. Restoration of life here on 
earth is not naturally, or merely from the nature of things, due 
to the dead; nor is power' of seeing, here due to the eye that 
is totally destroyed as an organ. Similarly, no conclusive 
reason can be given to prove that the soul will not exist per- 
manently in a state corresponding to its merits or demerits 
after death. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 161 

The principle of the soul's life, which is essential in order 
for it to live in beatitude, is that virtue or moral good quality, 
with which it is informed and perfected by the actual fulfilling 
of the natural law. If there be a defect or privation which 
totally ami radically destroys this essential principle of the 
soul's beatified life, such evil is irreparable, it is manifest, 
through any principle or power that is intrinsic to man, or 
even to any other creature ; the evil can be repaired only by 
a special exercise of divine power, but which is not, in itself, 
something due from God. Moreover, since the loss of beati- 
tude is imputable to man as coming by his own deliberate 
choice of the known cause, he cannot claim reparation of the 
evil by any title of justice or merit. It follows, then, that in 
the nature of things, forfeited beatitude cannot be redeemed 
or regained through any virtue or principle in man, for the 
principle in his soul that is essential in order to make it capable 
of living in beatitude, is wholly destroyed. By analogy, when 
civil government punishes murder of the innocent citizen, with 
the murderer's death, such penalty constitutes unending pun- 
ishment; for, the state of death is in itself permanent; it is 
not naturally mutable or reparable, since the principle of life 
in the body is totally gone from it. 

It may be concluded, then, that when one loses his claim to 
final happiness by his own deliberate great fault, he cannot, in 
the nature of things, rise by his own power from his fallen con- 
dition; nor can he claim as his right the restoration of this 
lost blessing. Therefore, it is not repugnant to natural reason 
that there should be punishment of evil, or privation of beati- 
tude, that is, in the nature of things, unending,* or is a perma- 
nent state of existing. Yet, this reasoning does not demon- 
strate the fact that any future punishment will actually be eter- 
nal; for the proof of this, other arguments are required: it is 
made certain by revelation. 

Can it be correctly said that the malice or guilt of moral 

* In popular language, unending punishment is usually styled "eter- 
nal punishment;" but, strictly speaking, nothing except God can be eter- 
nal. The phrase is herein used according to this popular sense. 
14* 



162 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 






evil is infinite ; or, in more general terms, can the infinite be 
a real and true predicate of any moral act or quality that is 
imputable to man ? 

In order to avoid an equivocal use of the term, we must 
distinguish the different meanings which are attributed to the 
word " infinite." In its most proper sense, according to which 
it can be correctly applied only to God, " infinite " expresses 
absolute perfection \ that is, perfection which both excludes 
all imperfection, and includes all simple or unmixed perfec- 
tion. Also, that which has unlimited succession of parts 
added to parts, or which is a perpetually increasing series, and 
which may be expressed by number constantly added to num- 
ber, is often termed infinite ; though it is, perhaps, more ap- 
propriately styled, under different respects, the " potential 
infinite," the " negative infinite," the " indefinite," etc. Again ; 
that which is vaguely and indeterminately great or small, is, 
in popular language, often termed " infinitely great, infinitely 
small." Finally, when a rational action has God for its direct 
object; as, to perceive intellectually, or to love; such action, 
when considered only in respect to its object, which is God, 
is sometimes called "infinite;" or, what is more accurate lan- 
guage, " objectively infinite." The term " infinite," in these 
last three meanings, agrees only by a species of remote anal- 
ogy with "infinite," as predicated of God; and hence, it is 
illogical to apply the term indiscriminately to God, and to 
what is not God, as if it were univocal in its meaning. This 
error, with its false consequences, will be avoided by attending 
to the rule laid down by logicians for right reasoning or legiti- 
mate argumentation concerning this matter : " ab infinito syn- 
categorematice, ad infinitum categorematice,non valet illatio;"* 
i. e., we cannot validly conclude from what is not strictly and 
really infinite, to the real absolute infinite. God alone is really 
infinite; and whatever is really not God, is really finite. 

The question, " is the malice or guilt of moral evil infinite? '" 
can now be answered both briefly and clearly : the malice of 

* From what is not specifically infinite, to what is specifically infinite, 
illation is not valid. 



GENERAL ETIIICS. . 163 

evil, or sin, is, in itself, necessarily finite. Both the malice of 
sin, and the goodness of a genuine religious act, may be styled 
" objectively infinite," since they regard an infinite object, 
which is God; but in themselves, they can be only finite, for 
God alone is really infinite. 

A common fallacy against the foregoing explanation 
should here be refuted : "A given offence is greater or less, 
according as the dignity of the person oftended is greater 
or less; but the dignity of God is infinite; therefore, an offence 
against God is an infinite offence." 

This syllogism is fallacious, since it really has four terms ; 
hence, the conclusion does not follow from the premises.* 
The terms in the major premise express onlv what is finite, or 
what can be greater or less within the same species or series, 
all the words used in the comparison having only a univocal 
meaning; in the minor premise and conclusion, a transition is 
made to another species or order of being, the simple, abso- 
lute infinite ; whence the middle term as in the minor premise, 
does not occur at all in the major premise : therefore, the syl- 
logism is not in form, or it is not a valid argument. If the 
minor premise be so given as not to introduce a second mid- 
dle term, as, for example, " but the dignity of God is the 
greatest dignity ;" then the conclusion, " therefore an offence 
against God is the greatest in the species or series of offences," 

* This apparent argument misleads some minds ; it is thus disposed of 
by Becanus (De Peccat, c. 2, qu. 6): " Iste modus argumentandi non 
valet quando fit transitus ad res diversi ordinis et speciei. Non enim sequi- 
tur, eo perfectior est amor, quo versatur circa perfectius objectum ; sed 
amor noster, quo amamus Deum, versatur circa objectum infinite perfectum : 
ergo amor noster est infinite perfectus. In antecedente agitur de amore rei 
creatse, in qua datur magis et minus ; at in consequents de amore rei incre- 
atae, in qua non datur magis et minus." That manner of arguing by tran- 
sition to a different order and species of things is not valid. It does not 
follow that, because love is the more perfect in proportion as its object is 
more perfect; but our love for God has an object that is infinitely perfect; 
therefore, our love for God is infinitely perfect: in the antecedent, the 
question regards love of a created thing, in which there is more or less ; 
but in the consequent, the question is changed to love for an uncreated 
object, which is not susceptible of more and less. 



164 ETHICS, Oil MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

follows legitimately. From the infinity of God it can be in- 
ferred only that the offence is objectively infinite, as is any other 
act that has God for its direct object ; but the offence, in itself 
as an entity, is finite. 

When it is said that the loss of beatitude, or punishment, is 
"eternal," the word "eternal" is to be understood as express- 
ing - a duration by successive moments, which is unending. 
Duration which is conceived to increase by perpetual or con- 
stant succession of moments, can be termed infinite duration, 
only according to the second meaning of the word as above 
distinguished; or, it is ?iegatively vifinite; since, while in itself 
it must be ever actually finite, yet there is no limit or end to 
what it will receive by successive addition or increment of 
moments. 

Punishment consisting in the state of lost beatitude, priva- 
tion of beatitude, is not something merely negative ; or, it is 
not only the absence of perfect happiness, but it must also in- 
clude positive pain, from the very nature of such a state. To 
lose the condition of the blessed must cause pain ; for, it sup- 
poses that all man's powers or faculties will be degraded to 
inferior objects, instead of being exercised on that which en- 
nobles and gives bliss, but which he forfeited by preferring 
other things to the true object of beatitud 

It may be concluded, then — i. that positive law and natu- 
ral law essentially require a sanction ; 2. that this sanction 
consists principally in reward, secondarily and conditionally in 
punishment; 3. that this sanction proposes, as the principal 
motive of obedience, that good which constitutes the essential 
and proper effect of law. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

ARTICLE I. 

APPLICATION OF NATURAL LAW BY THE INDIVIDUAL REASON 
TO PARTICULAR OBJECTS OF ACTION; CONSCIENCE. 

In order to understand clearly what conscience is, it is 
necessary to ascertain precisely what it is psychologically ; or, 
what it is when considered as a principle whose subject is the 
soul; and also, its special function in human action must be 
distinctly known. Accurate knowledge of this subject is im- 
portant, both for ethical science, and for rightly estimating 
human action in the concerns of man's life. 

The matter to be examined, in order to determine what 
conscience is in itself, is proposed with distinctness in the fol- 
lowing questions : Is conscience a special power of the soul ? 
Is conscience either an acquired or an innate habit ? Or, 
finally, is conscience an act ? 

Conscience is not a special and distinct power of the soul : 
we conclude the truth of this assertion both from the nature 
of a power, or faculty to act; and from that action which we 
attribute to conscience. The distinctive peculiarity of a 
power is that, by its nature, it is capable of action towards op- 
posite objects;* for example, the will, which is a power, can 
choose either good or bad objects: the intellect may be made 
either to err, or to judge truly. But a habit has only one specific 
object, which is either good or bad; and with that good or bad 
object as its cause, the species of the habit is either good or 
bad. While the will can elicit either a good action or an evil 
action, in respect to the same object; a virtuous habit cannot 

* " Po'.entise se habent ad opposita; habitus autem non se habent ad op- 
posita, sed ad unum tantum." — Powers are capable of acting towards con- 
trary objects; but habits are not thus capable of contraries : they are for 
only one object. 

(165) 



166 

become the principle of an evil action, any more than a vicious 
habit can be the principle of a good action. Now, "he con- 
science, as such, or as the proximate rule of upright action, 
has but one proper object, and it cannot have a contrary or 
opposite object to that one; as a little reflection suffices to 
render clear. Conscience tends per se only to moral good, 
and most properly, to the moral good of the person that is its 
subject; for, conscience, though it is fallible, and its dictate 
may even be disobeyed,* is naturally ordained for what is 
morally good and right in the objects of choice. This will 
become still more clear, when we shall have considered the 
obligation of following the real dictate of conscience. 

It may be concluded, therefore, that the conscience is not a 
distinct power or faculty of the soul. Is it a habit, then, or is 
it an act ? Conscience is really an act of the reason ; it may be 
said, however, that a habit in the reason is presupposed, as a 
concurrent principle t of that act which conscience is affirmed 
to be : what that habit is, will be made clear by the reasoning 
which is to follow. It is true that uprightness of the con- 
science supposes rectitude also in the will ; but yet conscience 
is of the reason, since its chief office is to judge % \\ practical 
matter, and to testify ; both of which are acts of the reason. 

The conscience is sometimes called " actus synteresis," an 
act of synteresis ; by which it is meant that conscience is an 
act of reason as informed with this natural, innate habit called 
the " synteresis"; and by some, the conscience itself is iden- 

* " Sed contra, Conscientia deponi potest, non autem potentia; ergo con- 
scientia non est potentia." — P. I. qu. 79, a. 13. Conscience can be put 
aside, but not a power; therefore, conscience is not a power. 

t "Quia habitus est principium actus, quandoque nomen conscientice 
attribuitur primo habitui naturali scilicet synteresi." — D. Th., p. 1, qu. 
79, a. 13, in c. Because habit is a principle of action, the name of con 
science is sometimes given to the natural habit, called synteresis. 

t "Conscientia recta coincidit cum actu prudentise qui dicitur judicium; 
sunt eniin tres actus prudentise, scilicet, consultare judicare et imperare." 
Billuart. De Act. Hum. Dis. V. Upright conscience coincides with the 
act of prudence which is called judgment; for, there are three acts of pru- 
dence, namely, to consult, to judge, to command. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 167 

tified with this habit. It will be advantageous briefly to 
repeat in this connection an explanation already given in a 
preceding chapter. The intellect has for its proper object, 
truth ; as the will has for its proper object, good. But in order 
for the intellect to become proximately and completely able to 
attain with promptness and facility to its proper object, it re- 
quires an infused or superadded virtue, which, as philosophers 
teach, both gives it the ability thus to act, and, at the same 
time, serves it as a medium of action : hence, this naturally 
infused habit of virtue is often styled " the natural light of 
reason," " lumen naturale rationis." This first habit, which is 
naturally infused, has for its object evident and immutable or 
absolute first principles ; and, for this reason, it is also called 
"habitus primorum principiorum" — faculty of first principles. 
It is the only habit that is naturally infused. 

This primitive habit or virtue given by nature to reason, is 
well said in English, by the expressions, " natural intelligence," 
or " gift of natural intelligence ; " and as including also prac- 
tical first principles, it is termed, " common sense," * in the 
English language. Again, truth and its first principles may 
be divided, according to the distinct species of their objects, 
into two kinds : namely, speculative or necessary first princi- 
ples, and practical first principles. When the faculty of first 
principles has practical matter or truth for its object, it is 
more generally styled the " synteresis; " and by some, it is 
less correctly called the " natural conscience." It is not 
really the conscience ; for, conscience being directive of moral 
action, we must include in the true concept of it an act of 
rational knowledge ; whereas, the habit or virtue in question, 
which we also called " the natural light of reason," is not an 
act of knowledge ; but it is a means or help to that act. It 
is not amiss, however, to term conscience an act of this virtue 
or habit, " conscientia est actus synteresis ; " for, since the . 

* " Common sense," as in the English language, must not be confounded 
with the " sensus communis" of the philosophers, which is the bond of 
all the senses, or a sense that gives to the other senses a unity; it is called 
by some "sense-consciousness." 



168 ETHICS, OK MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

habit is truly a helping or concurrent principle in the produc- 
tion of the act; the act is justly attributable to it, under this 
respect. 

We must conclude, then, that conscience is, in itself, truly 
and properly a practical dictate of right reason ; for, it is 
neither a distinct faculty, nor is it habit or virtue that perfects 
a faculty for action, since it is essentially an act of knowledge. 
But, as conscience is affirmed to be a practical dictate of right 
reason, is it, then, identical with the natural law ? For, the nat- 
ural law is defined to be the practical dictate of right reason. A 
general distinction between them is indicated, when the natural 
law is defined to be the practical dictate of right reason, and 
conscience is defined to be a practical dictate of right reason; 
for, they differ somewhat as that which is specific or general 
differs from a particular individual that is included under it. 

Conscience more precisely defined is, the act by which the 
individual reason applies the natural law or some certain gen- 
eral principle of rectitude, to a particular object or matter, as 
here and now related to the person, by means of a judgment 
that the action should be done or omitted. Or, more briefly, 
the conscience is that act or practical dictate of right reason, 
by which it applies a general principle of rectitude to particu- 
lar matter, here and now. 

It is manifest that the natural law, or any general rule of 
right action, can be actually applied, only by a dictate of the 
individual right reason, which regards some particular object, 
here and now; it is only through these conditions that law can 
actually bind, or that there can be a human action that is reg- 
ulated by law. . 

The conscience, or practical reason by its acts, performs the 
function of applying knowledge or of applying the natural 
law, thus: i, in respect to a thing that is past, it testifies, or 
bears witness; 2, it blames, giving remorse, or it approves, 
causing joy; 3, it instigates to action, here and now, or it 
restrains from action ; all of which it does, through particular 
judgments or dictates of practical reason. When conscience 
dictates something to be done or omitted, here and now, this 



GENERAL ETHICS. 169 

is a practical judgment ; but when conscience is an act of 
reason which regards a past fact, to which it testifies, the judg- 
ment is a speculative one * 

It may be said that conscience is the practical and particu- 
lar conclusion of syllogism, whose premises are practical 
truths ; for example, " evil must .be avoided ; fraud is evil ; 
therefore, I must not now practice this fraud, on this person;" 
the illation or conclusion here expresses that particular dictate 
of practical reason, which is conscience. 

Conscience is called the proximate rule* of human action, 
" conscientia est proxima regula raorum ; " because it is only 
through that particular dictate of reason, which is conscience, 
that any law can immediately and actually bind man ; for, it 
is only through this same dictate of particular reason that the 
law is promulgated to the individual soul ; or, it is only through 
this act of knowledge that the law can become known as pos- 
tively binding. It is manifest that the law can be neither more 
nor less, here and now, than right reason sees it to be. 

The following general definition may, perhaps, be now 
appropriately given: conscience is a practical judgment, re- 
garding a universal principle of morality as actually applied 
to particular matter comprehended under it ; by which one 
decides that an individual action ought here and now to be 
done or omitted by him ; or, it testifies to a like fact of him 
in the past, which it either blames or approves. 

It will be noticed by the observant reader that conscience 
is often spoken of herein, just as if it were a faculty, rather 
than merely the act of a faculty ; it is plain that, in such 
cases, the word " conscience " is used for the right reason 
itself as actually dictating or judging practically. This man- 
ner of conceiving and speaking of conscience, is not object- 

* "Synteresis est regula morum infallibilis sedremota, quia legem tantum 
generaliter et in communi proponit : conscientia autem est regula fallibilis, 
sed proxima, quatenus explicat et applicat legem ad actus particulares. " 
Billuart, De Act Human. Dis. V. Synteresis is an infallible rule of mor- 
als, but it is a remote one, because it proposes the law only in general or 
in common : conscience, however, is a fallible rule, but it is a proximate 
one, since it explains and applies the law to particular acts. 

15 



170 fcTHlCS, OK MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ionable; for, since the act which we define conscience to be, 
has no existence apart from the reason, it is not incorrect thus 
to transfer the name of the act to the faculty as eliciting the 
act; the mind thereby makes the idea of conscience less ab- 
stract j for, then its idea represents that act which conscience 
is explained to be as concrete in the reason. 



ARTICLE II. 

CAN PERFECT RECTITUDE, AND ERROR, CO-EXIST IN THAT 
PRACTICAL JUDGMENT WHICH IS CONSCIENCE ? 

There is perfect rectitude of conscience whenever it is a 
practical judgment that is upright, sincere, and certain ; or, 
when such practical judgment is formed in perfectly good 
faith. But we may consider any judgment of reason, under a 
twofold respect ; namely, as it is in the mind, and also as it is 
when compared to its matter. It is a plain fact of general 
experience, that a judgment may be right as compared to the 
reason alone, and at the same time be erroneous or untrue, as 
regards its real matter; or, as it is also expressed, a judgment 
of the reason may be formally right, and materially erroneous. 
In forming this upright ultimate dictate, conscience is both 
the judge and the witness. A judgment, when considered in 
respect to the matter, which is its extrinsic term, may be 
formed erroneously in two manners; first, by mistaking either 
the law, or the fact ; that is, either by falsely supposing that 
there is or is not a law, or else by falsely supposing that the 
fact does or does not come under the law. Secondly, a judg- 
ment may'also be erroneous by illogical reasoning, or because 
it is an inconsequent conclusion. It is only ignorance that is 
invincible, and, therefore, not imputable, that can give rise to 
such unintended errors of judgment : hence, the conscience is 
said, in such cases, to be invincibly erroneous. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 171 

There are two fundamental and universal principles which, 
when understood and duly attended to, simplify all questions 
and difficulties that rise in regard to the right direction of con- 
science in practice. The first one of these principles is by its 
nature so evidently true, that it requires neither proof nor ex- 
planation ; it is this, the will is bound to avert from evil pro- 
posed to it. This is part of the first, most general, and best 
known precept of the natural law; consequently, it is self- 
evident. 

The other one of these two general principles is this : The 
judgment of the intellect is the proximate rule of the will:* 
or, conscience is the proximate rule which the will is bound 
always to follow. This truth comes as a direct and necessary 
conclusion from the very nature of the human mind ; for, the 
will is absolutely dependent for its object, which is the good, 
on the understanding ; its object is apprehended, determined, 
and proposed to it, by the intellect, " bonum intellectum est 
objectum voluntatis"; good as apprehended by the intellect 
is the object of the will. Hence, the moral goodness of the will 
itself depends on its being subject or obedient to the dictate 
of reason, t A defection of the will from the judgment of the 
intellect, is a defection from its rule of right action ; therefore, 
when the will goes against the dictate of conscience, it becomes, 
by necessary consequence, deficient in moral rectitude. 

Is the will bound to obey the conscience when it is invinci- 
bly erroneous? Is it thus bound even when that is judged to 
be good which is, in itself, intrinsically evil ? 

The principles explained above, provide for the answer to 

. * "Judicium intellectus est proxima regula voluntatis." " Bonum prius 
pertinet ad rationem sub ratione veri, quam ad voluntatem sub ratione ap- 
petibilis." — P. i. 2, qu. 19, a. 3, ad 1. The judgment of the intellect is 
the proximate rule of the will. Good, under the aspect of the true, per- 
tains to the intellect before it pertains to the will under the respect of some- 
thing desirable. 

t "Bonitas voluntatis dependet ex hoc quod sit subjecta rationi." — P. I. 
2. qu. 19, a. 3. The goodness of the will depends on this, that it be sub- 
ject to the reason. 



172 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

these questions. The dictate of conscience which is invincibly- 
erroneous, must be obeyed, under all possible suppositions ; 
even if it judge that to be good which is, in itself, intrinsically 
evil. For, the will can never choose that which is known cer- 
tainly to be evil, without a defection from rectitude ; but the 
will wishes evil whenever it wishes that which is opposed to 
an upright dictate of conscience, as is that practical judgment 
which is formally true and certain, though erroneous mater- 
ially, or as regards the object. It follows, then, that the will 
cannot legitimately wish that which is opposed to an upright 
dictate of conscience. To wish that which the conscience as 
certain prohibits, or to refuse what it then commands, is surely 
to wish evil; and to wish what is apprehended by the reason 
as certainly evil, is a direct and explicit aversion of the will, 
from its guide to moral good ; for, the will, which is not a 
power capable of judging, is bound to follow the conscience 
as its rule of action. 

When we consider moral things as they are really in them- 
selves, or as they are in their objective truth, it is manifest that 
the mind may be variously related to these things; or, it may 
be in very different states in respect to them, if we compare its 
degree of knowledge, and its want of knowledge, to the ob- 
jects themselves. For example : i, the mind may know some 
object of moral action, clearly and certainly as it is in itself; 
2, it might be totally ignorant of the object's moral character 
or its relation to the rule of rectitude; 3, it might be partially 
ignorant of the object, or ignorant of it only under a certain 
respect; 4, the mind's ignorance maybe either vincible, in 
which case it is imputable; or invincible, in which case it is 
not imputable. It is easy to see that the practical judgments 
which the mind forms, are greatly influenced by these states 
just enumerated. Dependency on these causes, the conscience 
may be, as regards a given object of moral action, in any one 
of the following states : it may be certain, doubtful, perplexed, 
irrationally fearful or scrupulous. 

The conscience is said to be certaifi, when the matter which 
is judged is presented as being so evident to the mind, that all 



GENERAL ETHICS. 173 

doubt, and all prudent fear of error, are excluded. Prudence 
may happen to be speculatively and metaphysically erroneous, 
in its judgment; or, in other words, prudence maybe defect- 
ive, when compared to an absolute and abstract standard, and 
yet be, at the same time, relatively perfect, or be perfect rela- 
tively to the knowledge and ability of the individual human 
mind. For the rectitude of human actions, judgments that 
are formally certain, suffice; even, when such judgments 
of reason happen to be materially erroneous ; for, the rule ot 
right human action, is a moral, not a metaphysical one. In 
contingent and practical matter, absolute certainty is not re- 
quired for perfect action: " Intellectus non potest infallibiliter 
conformari rebus, in contingentibus, sed solum innecessariis;"* 
the intellect cannot be conformed to contingent things with 
infallible accuracy or exactness ; it can thus know only neces- 
sary things. A dictate of conscience may be right, prudent, 
and certain, then ; and, at the same time, be untrue or erro- 
neous in its matter. 

The conscience is said to be doubtful, when the mind sees 
probable reasons, both for and against, some practical judg- 
ment of the intellect ; so that- the reason weavers, or is sus- 
pended between two opposing judgments, with some fear of 

* "Verum intellectus practici aliter accipitur, quam verum intellectus 
specu 1 ativi; nam verum intellectus speculativi accipitur per conformitatem 
intellectus ad rem. . . . verum autem intellectus practici accipitur per con- 
formitatem ad appetitum rectum, quae quidem conformitas, in necessariis 
locum non habet quae (necessaria) voluntate humana non fiunt, sed solum 
in contingentibus, qua? possunt a nobis fieri." — P. I. 2, qu. 57, a. 5, ad 3. 
Truth, in the practical intellect, is taken otherwise than truth in the specu- 
lative intellect ; because truth in the speculative intellect is taken for con- 
formity of the intellect to the thing ; but truth of the practical intellect is 
taken for conformity to right appetite or good will, which conformity has 
no place in necessary things that are not subject to the human will, but it 
has place only in contingent things which can be done by us. 

Observe how differently the mind is conformed to its objects in such judg- 
ments as the following : " The sum of the three angles in any rectilinear tri- 
angle is equal to two right angles. This tree at which I am now looking 
is a maple. This letter of advice which I have written will be good for 
James." 

15* 



174 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

mistake if it decide, either affirmatively, or negatively. It is 
not morally right to follow a doubtful conscience, or con- 
science doubting whether the thing be commanded or forbid- 
den ; for, he that follows a doubtful decision of conscience, 
consents to evil, at least implicitly ; virtually making his choice 
thus : " I doubt whether this action be right or wrong; but 
whether right or wrong, I will do this action." This manner 
of reasoning is necessarily implied, whenever a doubting con- 
science is either obeyed, or forced to decide practically. 

The conscience is said to be perplexed, when it is between 
two evils, and sees no escape from doing wrong; if the action 
be put, the evil will be committed ; and, on the other hand, 
there will be evil, in the estimation of the mind, if the action be 
omitted; thus the conscience is embarrassed since it is in a 
dilemma between two evils, both of which cannot be avoided, 
though one of them can. Both the doubtful conscience, and 
the perplexed conscience may decide with certainty concern- 
ing the matter that puzzles rational choice, by recurring to 
some reflex principle, or extrinsic rule for such case, as will be 
explained further on. 

The conscience is scrupulous, when the person, on account 
of slight or groundless reasons, imputes serious guilt to him- 
self; or, when there being no rational cause for it, he is fear- 
ful and anxious about things which neither require nor even 
deserve attention, imputing them to himself as if they were 
grave and culpable. . This condition of the mind oftentimes 
proceeds from a certain degree of imbecility, of which it may 
be justly considered the real symptom. The surest remedy 
for such ailment of the conscience, is for the person to follow 
strictly the decisions and direction of a prudent adviser; 
and to keep himself cheerfully and usefully employed. 

It is manifest that all doubt, and all error imply a greater 
or less degree of ignorance ; for, the intellect cannot assent 
to what is false, except when the object is only apparently or 
imperfectly evident to it; and it is always impelled by the will 
when it elicits assent in doubt Since ignorance is either vincible 
or invincible, it may be affirmed that, when the matter of action 



GENERAL ETIIIC3. 175 

is practical, every person is bound in conscience to relieve 
his mind of that doubt or ignorance which, besides being 
vincible, is an obstacle to the right performance of his moral 
duty. 

Reason can rightly and certainly direct human action, only 
when it is duly informed with the necessary knowledge of the 
end to be attained, and of the legitimate means to that end. 
To assert that man is bound to act rationally, is merely to 
affirm in different words that he is bound to obey the natural 
law ; and it evidently follows from this general obligation to 
act rationally, that he is bound by the additional obligation of 
acquiring the knowledge necessary to fulfill all that duty. 
Vincible ignorance can be considered a cause of evil, only in 
a negative sense, as all moral evil, which is a privation of good 
that is due, is a cause. The evil which results from wilful or 
vincible ignorance, is foreseen in its cause, and it is imputable 
to the person. Hence, the obligation to avoid such evil, falls 
most directly on the negative or indirect cause of such evil ; 
that is, on the vincible or wilful ignorance. 

In case such partial ignorance or doubt cannot be relieved 
with evident or certain knowledge of the matter to be acted 
on, then the mind must recur to some true and appropriate 
reflex principles, which indirectly, but yet rationally and deter- 
minately, solve its difficulties, by enabling it to derive its prac- 
tical conclusion from what is both evident and true. The 
manner in which a certain dictate of conscience is derivable 
from a reflex principle that is legitimately applied to doubtful 
matter, can be made clear by an example of such argumenta- 
tion : when the testimony in a criminal suit before the civil 
court, affords only doubtful proof that the accused is guilty, 
the jury are instructed that, " one accused, is entitled to the 
benefit of doubt; and if there be solid doubt of this man's 
guilt, the verdict should be not guilty /" a verdict of acquittal, 
let us suppose, is rendered by the jury. The jury reason 
thus, in making up their verdict : " He is innocent before the 
law, whose guilt is not certainly proved ; the guilt of the 
accused is not certainly, but only doubtfully, proved ; there- 



176 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

fore, the accused is not guilty." Here the conclusion is deduced 
from premises that are certain ; not from the doubtful testi- 
mony that was given. In a great deal of analogous matter, 
the conscience which, as already declared, is for the individual 
soul both witness and judge, may rightfully reason in a similar 
manner. To most of the cases which can arise, under the 
supposition here made, the following well known axipms will 
apply : " a doubtful law, is no law ; lex dubia, lex nulla ;" 
" choose the less of two evils ; minus malum praeferendum 
est." These truths, known evidently and certainly, constitute 
the reason, or the principle, which gives certainty to the prac- 
tical conclusion or dictate of conscience, when the conscience 
must recur to an extrinsic rule in order to decide, here and 
now, what is right and good to be done. 

When the invincible doubt or uncertainty regards the exist- 
ence of the law, then the law is not duly promulgated to such 
mind; but, as shown in a preceding chapter, the promulga- 
tion of the law is indispensably necessary, in order to give it 
obligation or binding force; since the law must be in the sub- 
ject, in order to bind that subject. Only that law is actually 
and positively such, which is a known rule of action ; but a 
doubtful law is not a known rule of action, since the knowl- 
edge of a thing excludes both ignorance and doubt concern- 
ing the existence of that thing. Therefore, when the existence 
of the law remains positively doubtful, the conscience is not 
bound by that law. The conscience is often styled the forum 
internum, as distinguished from the forum externum, which is 
the human tribunal having authority to administer the law 
over such person. Since human judges can know only what 
is manifested externally, a decision before the public tribunal, 
and that before the secret court of conscience, may not ad- 
judge a particular fact related to law in the same manner; 
for, though public authority presumes the law to be known 
which was promulgated in due form ; yet, as a fact, the exist- 
ence of the law, by accident, may actually be unknown to 
some individual conscience. Just rulers do not punish an act 
against law, which they know to be innocent or guiltless. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 177 

Should the doubt in one's mind regard the existence of a 
law commanding something that is necessary, " de necessitate 
medii," for reaching ultimate beatitude ; the axiom of pru- 
dence then to be applied is, "choose what is safer : tutior 
pars sequenda est; " or, the doubtful law must then be cer- 
tainly obeyed. A means is said to be necessary " de necessi- 
tate medii," only when it is so indispensable, both as a means, 
and a " conditio sine qua non," that the end is not attainable 
without it, even should failure to use such means be not at all 
imputable. What another law commands, may be necessary 
only so far as actually commanded; nor is it thereby made 
necessary for one to whom the existence of the law cannot 
become known. But a means that is required " de necessitate 
nudii" for reaching ultimate beatitude, is unconditionally 
necessary, even for a person that is entirely ignorant of such 
means, or of the law prescribing it. Means that are necessary 
in tli is manner, pertain, in the very nature of things, only to 
an end, or a good to be gained, not naturally due; or, which 
is "bonum indebitum naturae humanae." It does not seem 
possible for means to be made necessary " de necessitate medii," 
in respect to an end naturally due, or to purely natural beati- 
tude, since such means would not be duly proportioned; for, 
it does not appear that a person would truly and really forfeit 
the befitting natural end for which he was created, merely by 
failing through invincible ignorance, and therefore blamelessly, 
to obey a law that is not promulgated to him. 

It may be concluded, then, that whenever the doubt of con- 
science relates to the existence of a law prescribing means to 
our ultimate beatitude which is necessary " de necessitate 
medii," the safer course should be followed, and, therefore, 
that doubtful law should be obeyed, owing to the special 
nature of such means. But a law prescribing any other spe- 
cies of means, does not oblige the conscience, unless certainly 
promulgated to it. An obligation to obey may arise, however, 
from some extrinsic or accidental reason ; v. g., when the obe- 
dience is necessary in order to avoid greater evil. 

When the conscience is perplexed between two evil alterna- 

12 



178 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

rives, one of which must be chosen, and the mind is unable to 
relieve its embarrassment by obtaining further knowledge of 
the matter to be decided ; then the good sense of man- 
kind inculcates the prudent and just axiom, " choose the less* 
evil." But if it cannot be determined as to which is the less 
evil, in such case, another reflex principle evidently holds true : 
" In dubiis, libertas: " in doubt between two evils of the kind, 
the person is of right free to choose either side. This is a 
certain rule; for, first, he must, as is supposed, necessarily 
choose one side or the other ; secondly, it is absurd to say 
that a person can ever be under the simple necessity of doing 
what is morally wrong, or of making a choice that is morally 
evil; therefore, to choose either side in virtue of the principle, 
" in dubiis libertas/' when the conscience is in such perplexi- 
ty, is an action that is lawful and morally good. Jurists and 
moralists lay down a rule tor determining the scope and equi- 
table application of law, which is pertinent to this matter; 
namely, " law must be interpreted strictly ; " that is, the obli- 
gation must be restricted to what the law distinctly and cer- 
tainly requires, when it imposes a burden, in order that its onus 
may not be unnecessarily augmented; but when the law con- 
fers favors, its scope and limits, they teach, are not to be 
narrowed with equal rigor. In this meaning, the maxim is 
often repeated that affirms, " favores ampliandi sunt ; odiosa 
restringenda sunt." 

WHAT LIBERTY OR FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE REGARDS. 

The conscience being an act of reason, is not, as such, free 
at all ; for, freedom or liberty is of the will, not of the intellect. 
It is true that the will can either follow or reject the dictate of 
conscience; but when this practical judgment of reason is evi- 
dently true or certain for the mind, it is a necessary act of the 
intellect ; not a free, or imperate act. Yet, when evidence of 
the truth, or the sufficiency of its motive for assent, does not 

* "Minus malum est aliquodbonum." The less evil is some good; it is, 
therefore, worthy of choice. 



GENERAL ETHICS. 179 

necessitate the judgment of the intellect, in such case, the 
will can so control the reason, as to compel it either to affirm 
or deny ; decide, or not decide. 

While the will can either follow or reject any dictate of con- 
science, in virtue of that liberty of indifference which is natu- 
ral to it ; yet, the will is not free, however, to choose either 
good or evil, in the sense of having the moral right to choose 
arbitrarily and indiscriminately either the one or the other ; 
this would suppose moral good and evil to be indifferent in 
their species, which is absurd. The legal or public liberty of 
conscience which regards action affecting others, may be justly 
determined and limited by positive law, according to what is 
necessary and useful for the common good, and for the pro- 
tection of mutual rights and duties among citizens. The 
conscience, as to its purely internal acts, is regulated by the 
natural law and all known principles of rectitude ; but every 
one is also bound in conscience to conform his external con- 
duct to the just public laws promulgated by authority for the 
direction of the community. Liberty of conscience in the 
sense of license to do every outward action withont legal 
restraint, would be lawlessness of conduct fully authorized. 

Since laws regulating human action must operate as moral 
principles, not with physical or metaphysical necessity and 
mathematical universality, men will often, from the very nature 
of such things, reason differently concerning the medium be- 
tween right and wrong in matters of conscience. It will be 
useful here briefly to contrast the two extremes which are 
to be avoided, and between which the rational medium is 
always to be sought ; namely, laxism and rigorism. 

The laxist, for reasons that are really of little or no value, 
rejects the law as not binding; and by the misuse of a word, 
he styles his principles liberality. The rigorist exacts the most 
strict obedience to the law unless it be demonstratively proved 
that the law does not actually exist ; or, he permits no degree 
of counter probability, or mere uncertainty of the law's exist- 
ence, to invalidate nor even weaken the actual obligation of 
law ; a doctrine which is all the more mischievous, because, 



180 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

with the pharisee of old, he stickles for the law, thereby assum- 
ing the guise of stern virtue, which accredits his false teaching 
with the simple. While the laxist tends to throw off all re- 
straint on conscience, the rigorist tyrannizes over the con- 
science, by loading it with unjust burdens. The principles of 
the one, directly and openly destroy the rights of others, by 
practically annulling the laws that protect them ; the princi- 
ples of the other, accomplish the same result indirectly, by 
inflicting wrongs concealed under the semblance of duty, and 
love for the law. The laxist and the rigorist agree in this, 
then, both are by their false theories enemies of the common 
good ; but they employ very opposite means. 

It will be noticed by the attentive observer that, in refer- 
ence to this matter, men whose intellects are unduly influenced 
by passion, or by affection in the will, as also men of feeble 
judgment, are apt, when arguing, or especially when opposing 
each other in opinion, to affirm universal contraries. When 
their subject of dispute is some moral virtue, their universal 
contrary propositions, which declare or define the medium of 
that virtue, will, in general, both be false. This is evident, 
since moral virtue, by its very nature, consists in the medium 
between opposite extremes ; " virtus est in medio." In pro- 
portion as moral action recedes from this golden medium, in 
a corresponding degree will it be disorderly and deficient in 
genuine moral perfection. For example, should one extreme 
mind contend that the unrestricted use of intoxicating drinks 
is never evil, and another extreme mind were to oppose this 
error by affirming that any use at all of alcoholic drink is evil 
for all persons : both of these contrary propositions assert 
that which is against the nature of temperance as a moral vir- 
tue; but the second extreme, by denying the very action to 
be lawful, in the moderating of which the virtue consists, 
really annihilates the essence of temper? nee as a specific 
moral virtue, at least as regards that part of its matter. It is 
true that total abstinence is, for some persons, a necessary 
means for avoiding insobriety; but this truth is not adverse to 
what is here affirmed concerning the virtue of temperance. 



GENEKAL ETHICS. 181 

Yet,* since some excess, in the use of strong drink, seems 
more opposed to temperance than would be a corresponding 
degree of abstinence, or lessening of the moderate or medium 
quantity, it is easy to comprehend the fact that well-meaning 
but simple minds are deceived by the extreme austerity or 
rigorism that would prevent the evil by preventing, in a given 
case, even the action in which the moral virtue consists. 
Hence, the extreme, called rigorism, is generally more harm- 
ful in practice ; for, besides tending to bring about even the 
opposite evil, it really deceives simple minds, since it is less 
obviously opposed to virtue, and is more restrictive of action. 
But such errors are not always opposed to each other by way 
of utmost opposite extremes ; they may differ only as too much 
and too little, that are less removed from the medium ; yet, 
their falsity is always in this, that both of them practically deny 
the medium in which genuine moral virtue consists. 

In whatever pertains to casuistry, or the deciding in matters 
of conscience, true and ingenuous minds, especially when 
judging for other persons, will always strive so to shun each 
extreme as, in imitation of our Lord, to make goodness ex- 
ceed justice; and rather to be generous, than severely ex- 
acting. 

* "Virtus majorem convenientiam videtur habere cum uno oppositorum 
vitiorum, qnam cum alio : sicut temperantia cum insensibilitate ; et forti- 
tude- cum audacia." — P. 2. "2, qu. 21, a. 3 in c, cum Aristot. in 2, Eth. 
Virtue appears to have more agreement with one of two opposite vices 
than with the other ; as temperance with insensibility of appetite, and forti- 
tude with boldness. 

16 



End of General Ethics 



PAET II. 

Special Ethics, or Ethics Applied. 



It is the object of special ethics to explain rights and duties 
as applied to man. Natural law is the absolute rule or 
measure of those rights and duties, and it is treated in gen- 
eral ethics. 

The revealed law is not herein considered, it being legiti- 
mate subject matter only of theological science. 

Man, as a moral being, is now to be viewed in his relation 
to God, to the human family, to civil society, and also as con- 
ceived to have some relation to himself. It is only by means 
of these relations in which he is placed that the natural law, 
with its precepts, has actual application to man as directive 
of his moral action. It is the office of ethics to demonstrate 
first and most general principles of human action considered 
under these respects. Particular matters of positive duty and 
law, are beside the scope of philosophy; they are appropriate 
to special treatises that have for their peculiar aim the giving 
of prudent counsel on minute details of man's practical con- 
duct. 



CHAPTER I. 

ARTICLE I. 

GENERAL NOTION OF RIGHT AND DUTY. 

The term " right " is used in several distinct senses : v. g., 
right is often synonymous with law ; it may also mean the 
just, equitable thing that founds the law. Since law is based 

(183) 



18 i ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

on what is just and right; and when it has the complete re- 
quisites of law, it must be declaratory and directive of what is 
equitable, good, right; the name of that right which it defines 
and ordains, is given to the law which is based on it. 
Hence, what is in itself really law, is often termed right: thus 
natural right, positive right, civil right, general national right, 
"jus gentium," international right, etc., are all expressions that 
are frequently used in the sense of law.* 

Right, as related to duty, is the moral faculty to have and 
to keep what is one's own, because really one's own. This 
moral faculty may have for its object the acquiring of an end 
by its just means. This right, as to its object is really iden- 
tical with the just, equitable, or good, truly and rightfully 
possessed. In what follows, the term "right "will be em- 
ployed according to this second meaning attributed to it ; 
i. e., the moral faculty to have and to hold what is justly one's 
own, because one's own. 

Duty is the moral obligation always to act with right reason; 
to do good and avoid evil; to render due service and equita- 
ble return for good received to God, and to all rational creat- 
ures with whom we are anywise connected as objects of our 
deliberate action. 

Since a subject is well understood, only when it is known in 
its first principles, it is necessary for accomplishing that pur- 
pose to consider carefully and answer precisely the fundamen- 
tal question : 's all right prior to its correlated duty; or, on the 
contrary, is the duty prior to the right ? Does right primarily 
and originally found duty; or, vice versa, does duty thus 
found right ? 

One who has studied a few learned and elaborate treatises 
on the subject of " Rights and Duties," will scarcely deny 

* Law is styled " right" or "just," not because it creates or primitively 
founds the right ; but because it defines, declares, and enforces the right : 
"Jus primo impositum est ad significandum ipsam rem justam ; postmo- 
dum autem derivatum est ad artem qu.i cognoscitur quid sit justum." — P. 
2. 2, qu. 57, a. I. Right, in the first place, is used to signify the just thing 
itself; but afterwards, by derivation, it is for the art by which the just 
thins; is known. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 185 

that the remark of Leibnitz has some justification in fact: 
" The doctrine of right, which is included by nature within 
certain limits, is, by the ingenuity of man, spread out into the 
immense."* Hence, it is all the more necessary to ascertain 
with certainty the true basis of all right and duty. 

Right may be considered either as absolute, or as relative 
and dependent. Right, as simply absolute, does not connote 
duty to another: God alone, in His own absolute independ- 
ence, is capable of right as thus understood. If we choose 
to conceive simply absolute duty, it could be affirmed only 
of that duty which God may be conceived to owe Himself; 
for, in a creature, neither right nor duty can be simply ab- 
solute. 

Dependent right necessarily supposes, and it founds some 
duty, at least from the receiver to the giver of that right; and, 
it is manifest that all created rights are originally from God, 
and they are, in themselves, purely gratuitous gifts. 

It was already explained, when speaking of merit and 
demerit, that perfect equation of justice from man to God is 
impossible ; t since God is infinite and absolute Being, and man 
is only a dependent being, and is God's creature, but yet, it 
was there said, when God puts the condition, and makes man 
capable of rational action which is his own, though that action 

* "Juris doctrina, certis a natura inclusa limitibus, humano ingenio in 
imrnensum diffusa est." 

Some extreme minds conceive man as having no rights, but only duties ; 
others, that man has rights, but not duties. 

t "Debitum attendi potest dupliciter in operatione divina; aut secundum 
quod aliquid debetur Deo; aut secundum quod aliquid debetur creaturae, et 
utroque modo Deus debitum reddit. . . . Sed hoc (secundum debitum) 
pendet ex primo, et licet hoc modo debitum alicui ^creaturae) det, non ta- 
men ipse est debitor; quia ipse ad alia non ordinatur; sed potius alia in 
ipsum."— I p., qu. 21, a. I, ad 3. Duty, as regards divine operation, 
may be considered under two respects : either under the respect of some- 
thing due to God, or of something due to the creature, and in each manner 
God gives what is due. . . . But the second depends on the first ; and 
though He gives this due to a creature, yet He is not a debtor, for He is 
not ordained for other things, but rather other- things are ordained for 
Him. 

1G* 



186 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is put in absolute dependence upon his Creator, yet he may 
thereby acquire merit before God, the reward of which will be- 
come justly due. 

In answer to the question, " Is all right founded on duty ; 
or, on the contrary, is all duty founded on right ? " it is now 
to be shown that, 

Absolutely, or in the nature of things, right is simply first, 
and duty is consequent upon it ; but, under a certain respect, 
duty may precede and cause right; i. e., in the order of effi- 
cient causes, or in the order of execution by use of the means, 
the duty of employing the means precedes the actual posses- 
sion of the related right. The meaning, scope and truth of 
this thesis will be made clear by what is to follow. 

Man, through his creation, became, by the gratuitous gift of 
God, a complete rational or personal being, with the right to 
be himself, " sui juris,"* and to put action which is really his 
own ; or, as it is expressed in the schools, he was made a 
"substantia rationalis, undique completa, sui juris, et alteri 
incommunicabilis ;" a rational substance, with proprietorship 
of self, and incommunicable to another. Therefore man's 
rational being is a purely gratuitous gift from God ; but be- 
cause it is truly a gift, it becomes man's right, to possess and 
to use, but dependently on God, of course. This right in his 
personal being is man's first right, which founds all his duties, 
and which has no duty presupposed to it, or anterior to it. 

Man's duty to God follows immediately and necessarily 
from the gift of personal nature; logically, therefore, the gift 
or right, as in him, was first ; the duty was second and conse- 
quent upon it. This first duty is that of supreme homage to 
God, thanks, and service. As there can be no right in man 
which is prior to that of personal existence, so there can be no 
duty which is prior to that which is first consequent upon his 
possessing by his creation a personal nature with action which 
is really his own. This, then, is the first origin or basis of all 

* " Corpora obnoxia sunt et adscripta dominis ; mens quidem est sui 
juris." The body is subject and bound to its master; but the mind is its 
own master. (Seneca, de benef., lib. 3, c. 30.) 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 187 

rights and duties which are in man as relating him to God, to 
self, and to all his fellow-beings so far as really connected with 
him. For, what duty in man can precede this first right ? and 
what duty can he owe antecedently to the duty consequent 
upon this first right ? 

Hence, to conceive of duty which is in no sense founded 
on right, is to conceive of that which cannot have being ; 
namely, a relation which has neither basis nor term. As 
there can be no reward due, unless the merit or benefit pre- 
cede it; no debt, without value received, or to be received; 
no accountability, without a trust to answer for : so, there can 
be no duty where there is simply and absolutely no right 
which founds it; in other words, duty without co-related 
right is impossible, is nonentity. Since a gift includes, in its 
essential concept, the bestowal of the right to some owner- 
ship in the thing given, we may legitimately and truly call the 
gift of personal existence a right under God, and, as said, it 
is man's first right. God's right is both antecedent and ab- 
solute; but the present inquiry is only of dependent and 
human rights. 

When we consider men as related to other men, it will be 
found that right and duty are always referable to each other, 
radically and a priori, in the order of cause and effect: i. e., 
the right is logically and by its nature first; and the duty 
which derives its being from it, is second and consequent 
upon it. For, a duty which is, in no sense, dependent on 
and founded by a right, is impossible, since such duty would 
not be founded in justice. The gift to each man of personal 
existence with proprietorship in his own deliberate action, 
founds in him the first actual created object of justice; * or it 
is the "jus," from "justum," or the "res justa," which is first. 
The equation of right and duty is an equation of justice; and 

* "Isidorus dicit quod 'jus' dictum est quia est justum; sed justum est 
quod est objectum justitiae. . . . Jus primo impositum est ad significan- 
dum ipsam rem justam." — 2. 2, p., qu. 57, a. 1. Isidore says that right 
is so named because it is the just; but the just is that which is the object 
of justice. Right is first employed to signify the thing itself which is just. 



188 ETHICS, OU MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

as right necessarily connotes some respect of justice, so also 
does duty; and the thing owned as a rightful good, " bonum 
rectum," is the object of the virtue justice, as well as it is the 
objective basis of right and its co-related duties. Hence, the 
good, is logically presupposed to the just. 

We may now answer the questions, (i.) Can man have any 
rights before God ? Man can have no absolute right before 
God; but he may have conditional rights; i. e., if God gives 
them to him, he possesses and owns them so far as they are 
given. Neither can man, who is a dependent being, have any 
absolute duty, for his duty is commensurate with his right, and 
they are both, in themselves, something finite and dependent, 
as in man. (2 ) Can a right in one man found a duty in 
another man ? or can one man's right originate another man's 
duty ? The question is pertinent, since it is an essential prop- 
erty of right to be inviolable. 

It may be said that the right in one man proximately founds 
duty in another man ; but all man's duties to other men 
originate, primarily and absolutely, in his first duty ; which is 
that owed by him to God through the gift of personal existence. 
Hence, duty cannot be originally and adequately founded 
in what belongs to another man, or in another man's right. 

It was said above that while right is simply prior to its co- 
related duty, yet duty may precede and found right under a 
certain respect ; i. e., relatively to the order of means or effi- 
cient causes. 

Right, considered as God's first gift to man, may be con- 
sidered as twofold : first, the gift by creation of a rational or 
personal nature, which, as already explained, founds in man 
his first duty of paying to God supreme homage, thanks, and 
love, and this right and this duty are necessarily the first right 
and duty in man. Secondly, God proposes to man, as the 
complement of his existence, the state of future beatitude by 
way of a good or right for him to acquire, through the means 
which God ordains, and which man can freely use. It is 
manifest that this act of God's bounty to man founds for him 
two principal duties towards God : one of which is supreme 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 189 

homage, thanks, anH love, as for the gift of his being; and 
the other is that of obedience to God by tending 10 this ulti- 
mate state through the means which God prescribes to his 
reason. In this second case, the good is proposed as a right 
to be acquired by man's own cooperation ; and it is, there- 
fore, made dependent on man's free action. Observe, how- 
ever, that this gift, with the duty on which it depends as a 
necessary condition, has presupposed to it man's personal 
existence with rational empire over self. 

The right in man to possess and own the gifts of God to 
him, is, as already defined, a moral faculty in him; and as a 
moral faculty, it originates in God's intention, as we may truly 
conceive it, and must conceive it. Now, it is the final cause 
which is the first principle of right, and which first gives it 
being ; for the final cause is the first and chief among causes, 
and to it every effect is principally to be attributed ; in respect 
to the final cause, the other causes belong to the order of 
means, and they have only instrumental and secondary virtue. 
It is for this reason that the end is styled the cause of causes 
" Finis est causa causarum." Hence, the moral faculty which 
we term right, comes primarily and principally from the inten- 
tion of God, who gives it ; and, therefore, right must be pre- 
supposed as conditionally to be given, in the order of intention, 
or in the order of final cause, before we can have any basis on 
which to found the duty of tending to that gift through the 
means prescribed; how could man tend to it, unless it were, 
at least in this sense, made his ? But, since the full acquisition 
and possession of the proposed gift, depend on his using the 
means, and thus fulfilling the condition ; and also, since the 
means precede the end as a work that depends on them, 
under this respect, the end is last; for, the end is always last 
in the execution : " Finis est primum in intentione, ultimum in 
txecutione." 

We may conclude, then, that when the future right to be 
acquired, is considered in the order of final cause, which is the 
first principle of this moral faculty, it precedes and first founds 
all duty related to it; but when right is considered in the order 



190 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of execution, or as a work dependent on the order of interme- 
diate efficient causes, the duty of using the means to it pre- 
cedes the right as a work to be effected by them. Therefore, 
right cannot originate simply and absolutely from duty ; but 
yet, right may proximately, and under a certain respect, have 
its origin in duty ; besides the duty of tending to the future 
state of beatitude presupposes man to have personal existence 
with rational self-movement ; and on this right, which is first, 
all that is subsequent depends. This may be regarded as a 
reason a priori, why the future state proportioned to human 
nature, is often styled, among philosophers, the " debitum 
naturae humanae," something due to human nature: it is due, 
whether we consider man's nature as it is in itself a priori, or 
consider it related to the attributes of God as its creator. 
Hence, right is simply first; but duty may be first under a 
certain respect. 



ARTICLE II. 

HOW LAW IS RELATED TO RIGHT AND DUTY; WHETHER LAW 
CAN CREATE OR PRIMARILY ORIGINATE RIGHT AND DUTY; 
IN WHAT SENSE OF THE TERMS LAW CAN BE SAID TO 
FOUND RIGHT AND DUTY. 

It is sometimes convenient, and it is also sufficiently accu- 
rate in much practical matter, to attribute an effect to only 
one of its proximate causes, although that cause is not the 
complete nor the chief principle from which the effect pro- 
ceeds : thus, we frequently assign any one of the four causes, 
the efficient, the final, the formal, or the material, as sufficiently 
accounting for the origin of some effect, without specifying the 
others; and, in many cases, this mode of explaining things is 
just and rational, as well as satisfactory. In like manner 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 191 

rights and duties may often be legitimately ascribed to a proxi- 
mate principle really pertaining to the order of means, though 
they are most properly and duly referable to the final cause, 
which is first and supreme among causes. Hence, law is cor- 
rectly said to cause rights; though law is, in fact, subordinated 
to that good which is its end, as every means is subordinate to 
the end served by it ; for, it is the rule by which rights and 
duties are made known, and are practically enforced. 

The natural law, which was defined to be a participation of 
the eternal law in a rational creature, and which is promul- 
gated in the dictate of right reason, cannot properly and truly 
be said to constitute that rectitude which is in the nature or 
essence of things as in the eternal concepts of Divine wis- 
dom : it is the means by which that rectitude which is its 
proper object, is determined and made known. Therefore, 
we might say, in other words, that the natural law is the law 
of right reason whose object is that rectitude which is in the 
intrinsic nature of the things that are made subject to rational 
empire or government. Hence, the natural law does not 
create that object of justice which is termed right, but sup- 
poses it, and makes it known : for, as seen in another chapter, 
moral goodness or morality, does not arise from the will or 
law of God ; but it depends intrinsically on the eternal essen- 
ces of things, which are immutable. 

It may be affirmed, then, that, a fortiori, no human law, 
which of its essence must be a derivation from the natural 
law, can create a right, or can primarily and completely 
originate a right or duty. But human law is competent to 
define and declare a right; and thus it can be said, in some 
sense, to produce that right. Since the positive law must be 
a derivation from the natural law or from the natural rule of 
rectitude, it may be said to produce the right, somewhat as 
the premises of the argument are said by logicians to produce 
the conclusion. Although not every positive human law is a 
necessary conclusion from the natural law; yet, it must be 
prudently judged by the legislator to agree with the natural 
law as its essential norma ; and, unless the contrary is evident, 



192 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

in practice it is wisely accepted as just, or as following from 
the natural law. 

Human law may proximately and really found right and 
duty. Let us here distinguish again the object of human pos- 
itive law from matter not included within it. Those first con- 
clusions from the natural law which impose a common obliga- 
tion on all mankind, as, v. g., the precepts of the decalogue, 
do not, as such, fall under human legislation, since it would 
be preposterous, and therefore absurd, for a human lawgiver 
to reaffirm them. Yet, in virtue of a still further conclusion 
from the natural law, human law may prescribe and inflict 
penalties on those violations of these first conclusions derived 
from natural law, when such punishments are necessary to 
maintain or preserve the common good. As already noticed, 
there are some laws, regarding matter thus proximate to the 
natural law of rectitude, in the substance of which all nations 
of mankind agree; and they constitute what is styled the "jus 
gentium." It may be said that such laws are human laws 
only under a certain respect or in a limited degree. 

There are other laws which, by their nature, are more 
purely positive and human; hence, they are not the same in 
all nations, but they are various according to the character of 
the people, their form of government, etc. In regard to laws 
of the first kind, which were always generally accepted among 
the nations of mankind, they may be truly considered as the 
natural law practically applied with certainty to what is more 
or less immediately its proper object. In respect to laws of 
the second kind, their matter, in itself, may be indifferent as 
to its species, or have no determinate relation to rectitude. It 
is in this species of matter that positive laws can most prop- 
erly be said to make the right and the duty — the good or the 
evil — by commanding or forbidding : in this case, some things 
will become good because commanded; other things become 
evil, because forbidden ; " bona, quia mandata ; mala, quia 
prohibita.' Yet, the positive law is not, in such instance, the 
adequate and total principle from which the right and the 
duty, the good and the evil, proceed. Since law cannot be 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 193 

truly and correctly called law at all, except in so far as it is 
just, or i:i so far as its formal object is a just thing,* it is evident 
that while such law makes that to be good which was indifferent 
before, and that to be binding which was not binding before — 
yet the chief act of the law is to declare and direct, and thus 
make that a definite, explicit and bounden duty, which was 
otherwise undetermined. Therefore the right or duty must 
be conceived as preexisting, at least in its principles, namely, 
the just things that the law is concerned about; somewhat as 
an effect is precontained in its cause, or as a form is conceived 
as precontained in the subject matter from which it is educed. 
We may conclude, therefore, that law does not create right 
and duty ; nor, by consequence, is law the intrinsic formal prin- 
ciple that absolutely originates and constitutes right and duty. 

By similar reasoning it follows that human law cannot an- 
nihilate right and duty ; though it is competent to abrogate 
them for a sufficient and equitable reason, where their matter 
is included in the legitimate object of such positive law. 
There are rights which are by their nature inalienable ; there 
are rights of this kind pertaining to the multitude, some to the 
family, and others to the individual man. Hence arises a 
special necessity for the lawgiver to know the object, the 
nature and the limits of the power which is vested in him as 
a means to the common good ; t and to use it as a faithful 
minister, only with a view to the essential end of all just law 
and government, according to the ordination of the Supreme 
Ruler, to whom all right and duty must be ultimately referred 
for their principal and essential value. 

To the foregoing explanation of right and duty, the objec- 
tion may be raised, " A being which depends absolutely upon 
God, owes absolute duty to God ; man absolutely depends on 
God, and he therefore owes absolute duty to God." 

* "Lex, in quantum habet de justitia, in tantum habet de ratione legis." 
I, 2, p., qu. 95, a. 2; also, 2, 2, p., qu. 57, a. 2, ad 2. So far forth as a 
law has justice, that far has it the real nature of law. 

_ t "Lex est aliquid rationis." — I, 2, p., qu. 90, a. 1. Law is essen- 
tially an act or work of reason : and, therefore, a law that is purely arbi- 
trary, is no law at all. 

17 



194 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

A similar instance of false reasoning, by which a predicate 
or attribute is transferred from God to the creature, was al- 
ready adduced in a former chapter, when answering the ques- 
tion, " Is the malice of moral evil infinite ?" Absolute, as ap- 
plied to God, expresses His positive, independent and all 
perfect existence ; the phrase, " absolute dependence of man " 
is privative, and it excludes from man all sufficient reason of 
his own existence; "absolute duty," as well as '-absolute 
right," says nothing that is really predicable of a creature; 
hence the term "absolute" has two meanings in the premises. 
The objection is refuted in unequivocal terms, thus : a being 
that has not absolute existence, cannot owe absolute duty, man 
has not absolute existence, and he therefore cannot owe abso- 
lute duty. 

Observe, however, that duty is not proximately and directly 
founded by dependence; for then all irrational creatures would 
owe duty; which cannot properly be said of them. Man's 
first duty is founded on the gift of rational or personal exist- 
ence, which ultimately reduces, however, to his relation of 
total dependence on God; all creatures are equally depend- 
ent; but only intelligent creatures owe duty. 

From what is thus far said it may be legitimately inferred that 
neither any rights nor duties, as in men, can be absolute; nor 
can they be complete w T ithin their species, if they be not founded 
in man's relation to the Author of his being, which is ultimately 
that of total dependence for all he possesses and all that he is. 

Rights are simply inviolable, only in as much as they are 
divinely given; and duty simply binds the rational creature, 
only so far as it is truly derived from that creature's duty to 
the first Author of right and duty. Positive justice may be 
said to have for its primary object under God that right, "jus, 
justum," which is comprised in the gratuitous gift of creation 
with its prerogatives and conditions. From this all other 
rules or precepts of justice proceed, as from their real source. 
It is a dependent and hypothetical right before God ; it is a 
complete and inalienable right -in respect to creatures, or as 
against creatures. 



CHAPTER II. 

OF SPECIAL DUTIES. 
ARTICLE I. 

man's duty to god. 

God's dominion over man is absolute. 

The truth of this proposition is evident; for, creation from 
nothing, and conservation of the creature in being, found abso- 
lute dominion and ownership; but man is totally dependent on 
God both for the beginning and for the continuance of his exist- 
ence. That which a being makes or produces, in the very- 
nature of things, belongs by first right to that being. The 
title to ownership of the thing made, will be more or less com- 
plete, according as the thing is more or less completely pro- 
duced by the agent or maker of the thing. Man may make 
a watch out of his own materials, i. e., of gold, steel, glass, 
etc , which he owns; he may make a watch for another per- 
son out of materials belonging to that person. In both cases 
he has some right in the work of his hands, but the right is 
not the same in each ; and it is not absolute in either. For, 
man not being a purely efficient cause, cannot totally produce 
any object; nor can it, therefore, become totally his own prop- 
erty ; it is his only under a certain respect — i. e., to be used 
by him. God creates man's soul totally from nothing; his 
body, too, is primitively from God in the same manner : there- 
fore, man absolutely belongs to God, in the very nature of 
things. God chose to create man, for His own all-wise de- 
si^s. and He did this work, not compelled by necessity, but 
fredy. He gave to man personal being, which, by its very 
nature, is, as to its spiritual and formal principle, immortal ; 
and this gift was, under all repects, purely gratuitous. Man 
is wholly a dependent being. 

(>95) 



196 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Man's dominion over himself is limited, under every respect. 

This truth follows necessarily and evidently from his total 
and absolute dependence for existence. But his rational 
nature is made able, within a certain sphere of objects, to rule 
its own action, and t > choose the objects of that action : its 
responsibility is limited to this sphere of its operation. 

Man owes to God supreme homage. 

The proof of this proposition is from God's supreme domin- 
ion over man and from man's empire over his own rational 
action. 

Homage is strictly supreme only when it is both directed to 
the Supreme Being, and is such as, by its very nature, can be 
rendered only to the Supreme Being: v. g., when God is ac- 
knowledged and reverenced as the Author of our being, of our 
life, and death ; this is to put an act of supreme adoration or 
homage; for it is manifest that God alone can truly and just- 
ly be the object of such an act. This species of worship is 
usually styled latria ; it is offered to God alone. Dulia ex- 
presses an inferior homage that may be offered to creatures. 

Man owes God supreme homage by the first and highest 
claim of justice. God's right to it is absolute, for the gift to 
man of his rational being was purely gratuitous; and man has 
nothing except what is a gift of God; a proportioned return 
for this gift is due to God from the very nature of justice itself. 
But the return from man which is proportioned, is the highest 
service which man can bestow: the highest service which man 
can pay to God, is that of supreme homage. This return does 
not equal God's absolute right, but it is proportioned to man, 
who can do nothing greater. The virtue or good habit which 
is produced in man by repeated acts of honoring God as su- 
preme, is called the virtue of religion. This virtue of religion, 
from the argument above given, is generally regarded as per- 
taining to the cardinal virtue, justice. None but intelligent 
creatures can owe supreme homage to God, since none but 
intelligent beings are able to put an act of justice; they alone, 
therefore, can be bound by justice. Irrational beings manifest 
God's perfections; they thus become means which God's in- 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 197 

telligent creatures may use for knowing and honoring God ; 
they themselves honor God instrumentally. It is evident, 
then, that God should be actually preferred to all creatures : 
this is the love of God above all things. 

Man's life on earth should be so ordered as to become a 
homage to God. The reasons which prove that man owes to 
God supreme worship, at the same time show this proposition 
to be true; since man's return of service to God is not all 
man can do morally, and ought to do, unless the plan and main 
purpose of his life be directed to that end. An additional 
reason which is conclusive, and most powerful, comes from 
the doctrine of the future state, or man's ultimate destiny, 
for which the present life is a preparation. This was suffi- 
ciently explained in Chapter I of General Ethics. 

Man owes to God both internal and external homage. 

Man, as a person, owes supreme homage to God; but man 
is a personal being,* only as consisting of both soul and 
body. Therefore, since it is man as a personal being that 
owes service to God, both his soul and body should share in 
paying supreme homage to God : this is fitly done, only by 
the union of interior and exterior acts. Both the soul and 
body are gifts from God; for this reason both should con- 
tribute to the homage which is justly due to God. 

It is true that an internal act of adoration includes an act 
of the human compound, or the body; for, the imagination, 
which is an organic power, must cooperate in all of man's 
rational thought, by presenting its objects in its images, since 
man does not think without the fancy ; but yet, such act is 
merely internal, and, therefore, it is, in itself, a secret operation. 
Our homage should be manifested in external acts and signs, in 
order that it may be a public tribute to God. Though the 
external act does not per se add to the merit or the demerit of 
a moral act, nevertheless it does so per accidens, in as much 
as it gives an occasion for intensifying or repeating the inter- 
nal act. 

* A personal being is one that is intelligent, and is a complete sub- 
stance. 

IT* 



198 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

It is according to the nature of man that he should express 
outwardly the highest acts of his superior powers : this is evi- 
dently included in the end for which the power of speech was 
bestowed upon him. When friendship, love, wisdom, valua- 
ble knowledge, adorn his heart and intellect, these excellent 
acquirements are productive of but partial good, if they be 
not communicated for the improvement and happiness of 
others. There is fitness, then, in the public worship of God. 
Although homage to God should consist principally in the in- 
ternal acts of adoration, obedience, etc , yet it will not be 
complete or fully sincere, unless it be, on suitable occasions, 
outwardly testified. Besides, visible example is necessary for 
the instruction of the young and the simple ; it serves to sus- 
tain the virtuous in duty, and it impels the imperfect to seek 
for better things : "Exempla trahunt." 

The two principles, then, from which man's duty to God fol- 
lows as a necessary conclusion, are : first, God's absolute domin- 
ion over man, founded on creation from nothing and conserva- 
tion in being; secondly, the future great good, or perfect beati- 
tude, the attainment of which is made dependent on man's 
leading a life of moral rectitude, by duly exercising the virtue 
of religion. Obedience to this law of rectitude, as was suffi- 
ciently evinced heretofore, is an indispensable condition for 
meriting beatitude, as regards every person who has the use 
of reason. It should here be added, however, as a conclu- 
sion clearly deduced from God's attributes and his visible 
providence, that he deals benignly with the frailties and im- 
perfections of men who strive with good will, and according 
to the best lights of their reason, duly to honor God. 

There are no exterior ceremonies, except that of sacrifice, 
which, of their nature, have God alone for their object. The 
signs and ceremonies by which external homage is paid to 
God, are either conventional,* or are of positive institution. 
To repudiate duly approved practices of external worship, or 

* It is alleged that the word adoration is from ad os, "to the mouth," 
from the circurnst.mce that the putting of the hand to the mouth once 
meant an act of homage to God. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 199 

to reject them when they are legitimate, merely because they 
are conventional and arbitrary, would be eccentric, just as it 
would be an oddity to condemn, or refuse obedience to the 
becoming rules of social life. 

It does not fall within the scope of a work on natural 
ethics to treat the subject of supernatural revelation ; in it, 
man is taught the true history of his origin ; supernatural 
beatitude is proposed to him, with duly proportioned means 
for reaching it. The proof and explanation of revealed 
religion constitute the proper subject matter of theological 
science, for the accurate and thorough understanding of which, 
however, he alone is well prepared who has mastered natural 
ethics. To.the theologians the student is remitted for ques- 
tions the discussion and answer of which are proper to 
theology. Yet, it is not alien to the present topic here to 
affirm that : 

Supposing God to reveal a law, man is evidently, and in 
the very nature of things, bound to accept and obey it. 
This proposition requires no proof. The question may be 
asked, Was supernatural revelation necessary for mankind ? 

In answer to the question, we must distinguish between an 
ultimate end or destiny, which is proportioned to man's 
nature, as a rational being; and an ultimate end which is 
supernatural, or is by its essence above what is proper or due 
to man's nature. What is necessary for man in order that he 
may be really capable of reaching his ultimate end as a 
rational or moral being, is natural, and not something super- 
natural. For a supernatural end, supernatural means are 
proper; on the simple principle, that man cannot formally 
tend, in his rational action, to a supernatural end, unless he 
know that end, and be provided with means proportioned to 
it. Hence, the authors who prove by arguments from reason 
the necessity of a special revelation to man, in order that he 
may be enabled to render becoming homage to God, are to 
be understood as assuming for men, what is true in fact, a 
supernatural destiny; and in this supposition, such revelation 
is truly and simply necessary, for the reason already given. 



200 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

It is manifest, then, that the religious homage which is due 
from man as limited to a natural state and a natural destiny, 
differs from the religious homage which is due from man as 
elevated to a supernatural state and destiny, just in the same 
proportion as those two orders differ from each other. To 
the question, then, "Was supernatural revelation necessary 
for mankind ? " we answer : Supposing man to have a super- 
natural destiny, it was necessary; but if man had been left to 
a merely natural destiny, then only natural means were re- 
quired for him to reach it; and what is necessary naturally, is 
itself natural. 



ARTICLE II. 

DUTY OF MAN TOWARDS HIMSELF. 

Man's first duty, under that to God, is to himself. 

This follows from the truth, which is an evident fact of uni- 
versal experience, that man has direct control over his own 
moral action, and he has no direct empire over any other per- 
son's moral action ; therefore, it is only his own moral action 
that is directly imputable to him. The action of another per- 
son is imputable to a man, only through his own action as a 
cause of the other's act ; hence he is directly responsible or 
accountable, only as master of his own action. 

Jt was observed already that duty always includes some re- 
spect of justice; and it is also an admitted principle that jus- 
tice properly regards another as distinct from self. The 
question arises, then, how can man owe duty to himself? 

In answer it must be said that commutative justice and dis- 
tributive justice always regard another person, as is evident 
from the definition and explanation of justice given in the 
article on the cardinal virtue, justice. Nevertheless, justice as 
commutative, and justice as distributive, are not the whole of 
justice, but they are justice only under those respects. Justice 
includes much more, and it enters as a principle into all moral 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 201 

rectitude of action. Man can be just to himself — and the 
duty of being just to self is inculcated even in the proverbs of 
the people — because such duty is easily known, and is import- 
ant. The will can freely choose some things that are injurious 
to the person or subject, and this is an act of injustice to 
self; and similarly, the will can choose some things that are 
right and necessary to self, and to do this is just and virtuous 
action. Also, the rational principle in man rules over him, 
or governs his personal and substantial nature ; therefore, the 
reason in him can operate for the good or the evil of the man. 
Hence, Ave may say that his rational power can put action 
which pertains to justice; his superior powers can be just or 
unjust to him, at least under a particular though real respect 
of justice. 

As ail moral duty is reduced to the one general precept, 
" Do good, and avoid evil; " so, we may enunciate man's spe- 
cial duty to himself, by the same principle as applied to him, 
''Do good to self, and avoid what is evil to self." It seems 
preferable, however, and is, perhaps, more determinate, to ex- 
press his whole duty to self by the rule of " well ordered love 
of self." Man loves himself naturally and necessarily; and he 
is physically unable to love that which is evil to himself, pre- 
cisely as evil. Yet, he has many actions, and there are many 
objects related to him, over which he can exercise free con- 
trol; and they constitute the matter out of which he can 
choose that which is good for him, or that which is good for 
him under one respect, and evil for him under another respect. 
He must choose only that which is rationally and morally 
good for him. 

Man's duty to himself may be considered more particularly, 
as regards the cultivation of his understanding, that of his 
will, and the due care of his person, or the health and life of 
his body. 

The understanding is perfected by knowledge, and the will 
is perfected by the moral virtues; or, man's rational nature is 
perfected by the intellectual and the moral virtues. Since 
powers are perfected by their proper action, it may be said, 



202 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

then, that the intellect and will are perfected and adorned 
with their distinctive virtues by prudent exercise ; for, the vir- 
tues are habits, and are habits that may be acquired by those 
acts which they regard, and for the putting of which they give, 
when acquired, increased facility. 

Aristotle gives directions for acquiring the moral virtues,* 
which are generally accepted by subsequent philosophers as 
both true, complete and adequate, at least in respect to the 
natural virtues which are acquired by repeated acts of those 
virtues. Besides using the prudence required to attain to that 
medium between excess and defect, which is essential for the 
act of moral virtue, the good acts which are to produce the 
virtue, (i.) must be put knowingly, not ignorantly or by 
chance; (2.) the agent must operate by choice, not from pas- 
sion, necessity, and the like; (3.) he must act on account of 
the virtue, not on account of pecuniary gain, vainglory, praise, 
or any other f reign motive : (4.) he must act firmly and 
steadily : this fourth condition pertains rather to the habit as 
already acquired. These are general conditions which must 
be observed, in order to have physical and moral perfection 
in an act of virtue. 

It may be affirmed that all persons should strive to acquire 
virtues, especially such as are proper to their state in life. 
All persons cannot reach the same degree of virtue; yet all 
should acquire the knowledge of their duties, and of the means 
which are necessary for the performance of those duties. But 
few can acquire the intellectual virtues in a high degree, since 
scientific knowledge, philosophy, and the liberal arts require 
much labor, and a long time, as also a natural aptitude for 
superior things. But all are capable of acting with right rea- 
son ; and hence, while the moral virtues are more necessary 
for all persons, so all persons are capable of acquiring them in 
some befitting degree, and according to the exigencies of their 

* "Vide S. Th. in 2 Eth., seet. 4, lit. c. : "Si operatur sciens ; deinde 
si eligens, et eligens haec; tertium autem si firme et immobiliter," etc. 
One acts virtuously, if he operates knowingly; if he chooses, and chooses 
this good, firmly and immovably. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 203 

condition in life. Virtue is therefore necessary for all persons 
who are capable of rational operation; and it is the chief 
means of perfecting man. Virtue as an acquired habit is pro- 
duced by repeated good acts of the species which it is the 
proper object of the virtue to render easy and pleasant, as was 
already explained. 

The soul must rule the body according to the law of right 
reason; for man has dominion over much action which is of the 
body. Man has despotic authority over the members of his 
body, as it is usually expressed ;* but over its appetites and 
passions, he can exercise only political control. 

A ruler governs despotically, when his authority and power 
are such that his subjects are compelled to obey without ever 
resisting, because they have no means nor capability of resist- 
ing. A ruler governs politically or regally, who controls sub- 
jects that are free, and have the ability to refuse obedience to 
his behests; nor can they always be compelled against their 
choice to submit simply because commanded. 

Now, it is manifest that the members of the body, as the 
hands, the feet, etc., obey the commands of the will, without 
hesitancy, without any resistance, or with complete servility. 
]t is not thus, however, with bodily appetite and passion; 
they have action of their own, and they do not always directly 
obey commands of the reason. In order for them to obey, a 
prudent use must be made of means which are various, ac- 
cording to many circumstances ; v. g., averting or removing 
from their objects, directing the apprehensive powers to other 
things, sometimes to things contrary, then to things totally 
distinct from the objects of the appetite or passion. Hence, 
bodily appetite and passion are not controlled despotically by 
the reason ; but they must be ruled prudentially or politically, 

* "Anima quidem corpori dominatur despotico principatu; intellectus 
appetitui, politico et regali." — I. p., qu. 81, a. 3, ad 2. The soul rules 
over the body with despotic supremacy; but the intellect rules appetite 
with prudential and regal superiority. The despot rales with power that 
cannot be resisted by his subjects ; the king governs by law those who 
are free and can disobey. 



204 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

because they are capable of disobeying, or of action which is 
not directly subordinate to reason. 

When the action of bodily appetite or passion is opposed 
to right reason, though its movements or action be not directly 
subject to the command of reason, yet the will is competent to 
deny the possession and enjoyment of its illicit object, and 
this is a duty in such case. 

Man has not dominion over the life of his body; and, 
/ therefore, suicide, or willful self-murder, is a grave evil. 

Distinguish between that which is intrinsically and abso- 
lutely evil, and that which is evil from extrinsic and positive 
reason. What is intrinsically evil, is said also to be per se 
evil, that is, of its nature evil; it could not become lawful un- 
der any condition that is possible ; v. g , to hate God, to 
blaspheme. That which is evil on account of external and 
positive reasons, may cease to be evil by a change of circum- 
stances ; of this kind are all those things that are forbidden by 
the positive laws. As God has actually constituted man, He 
has not left to man any direct dominion over his own life ; 
though it is not something impossible, in the nature of things, 
for God to confer such power on man ; but it is a plain truth that 
he has not done so ; for, in fact, God has done the contrary. 

This truth is naturally manifest ; first, because man never 
knows when the assigned task of his life is finished ; for who 
can know, before the moment of his natural death has come, 
that no further good, or no other act of virtue is left for him 
to do ? Secondly ; a provision is made to terminate each 
man's life according to the physical laws of nature ; therefore, 
the ending of his life is not made dependent on man's own 
choice, but upon a law of nature. Thirdly; every animal has 
an instinctive fear of death; and though man may conquer 
this fear of death, yet the principle itself cannot be eradicated. 
This fact, that nature abhors death, is proof that nature intends 
every animal to avert promptly and with all its strength from 
death, which it is made to apprehend as the greatest of physi- 
cal evils. Therefore, suicide or self-murder, is plainly against 
the positive teaching of nature. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 205 

It can be verified as a historical fact that mankind, in all 
ages, the records of which have descended to us, expressed a 
horror for suicide as a crime against nature. This crime is 
so abhorrent to the better feelings of man's nature, that many 
persons are unable to conceive suicide to be the deed of a 
sane mind, though it is evident that not all self- destroyers are 
insane. Self-destruction is an act of moral cowardice which 
is exceedingly pusillanimous; hence this ignoble deed is justly 
infamous among all the wise and good of mankind. 

The Stoics, who did not teach that moral virtue consists 
the middle or the medium operation between too much and 
too little, authorized suicide in one who is miserable and hope- 
less. Their theory of moral goodness in action, included two ex- 
tremes, both of which are false ; i. e., man must destroy all 
passion or feeling which is adverse to virtue; but this is impos- 
sible. If man cannot eradicate his natural feelings at all, he 
may destroy himself; and through this deed of self-murder, 
they helped themselves to stifle natural feelings with vanity, 
by affecting to meet death fearlessly and even cheerfully. 

Life is given only for a good end ; and it follows from the 
preceding arguments that no case can arise under the natural 
law in which man is authorized directly to terminate his own 
life; consequently man never can intend his own death as an 
end directly to be sought by him. 

In a case of due necessity for the public good, or even for 
private good, a person may expose or risk his life. The neces- 
sity which justifies one in thus indirectly causing his own 
death, exists when such risk of life is the only means of pre- 
venting great public or private evil, or also when it is a neces- 
sary means of promoting some great interest. Hence, soldiers, 
they who attend the sick in time of plague to cure and com- 
fort them, they who venture upon dangerous voyages in order 
to make useful discoveries, are justly honored by mankind as 
deserving public gratitude. Also, they who in the practice of 
laborious and difficult virtues, or who by austerity of life in 
order to conquer the appetites and passions of the body, or 
the inferior principle in man, thereby impair their health, may 
IS 



206 



ETHICS, OR MORAL PIULOSOPIIY. 



be worthy of commendation, provided the injury to health be 
not the end which is directly intended. 

It is a duty incumbent on every person to take at least 
moderate and reasonable care of his bodily health. This duty 
is complied with most perfectly, when the care taken of health 
is a prudent medium between excess, which causes anxiety; 
and defect, which leads to rashness or stolid indifference. It 
requires no proof that health and strength of body constitute 
a great natural good ; the soul depends greatly for the normal 
and equable operation of its superior powers, upon the general 
health of the body. This is manifest from the fact that the 
reason cannot naturally operate at all, unless served for its 
objects by the imagination, which is an organic power in the 
brain, and by other senses; and therefore disturbance in the 
object, caused by ill- health, leads to corresponding disturb- 
ance in the action of the intellect. Besides, all man's duties 
in life are subserved by physical health and vigor ; while feeble- 
ness and disease unfit him for the regular occupations of life. 
Therefore, every person is bound to employ reasonable means 
for preserving health of body. 



ARTICLE III. 



OF SELF-DEFENCE 



A person may employ any legitimate means which is neces- 
sary to preserve his own life. The right of self defence 
includes in its object not only one's own life, but the members 
of his body, the goods or property necessary to sustain life, 
and good name or reputation. 

The means of self-defence must be legitimate in their 
species, and they must be duly proportioned to the end 
intended. Hence, that which is per se evil, i. e., essentially 
and absolutely evil, cannot be used as a means of self-defence; 
the means must be such as is authorized by natural law for the 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 207 

purpose, " cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae," according to 
the measure of blameless defence. 

In case of necessity a person may defend his own life by 
killing an unjust aggressor. Reason : a man may rightfully 
prefer his own life to that of an unjust assailant who is cer- 
tainly and actually intending his death, and when as a fact the 
one or the other must die or will be killed. 

What is technically styled " moderamen inculpatae tutelae," 
measure of faultless defence, requires the following conditions 
to be verified for the justification of manslaughter or other 
violence used in self-defence; i, that the person attacked em- 
ploy no more force than is necessary to defend himself against 
the danger; 2, the danger of injury or death must be certain, 
and the defence must be made in the danger, not really be- 
fore it exists, nor after it is past; 3, that there be no other 
means of escaping from the danger, as flight, help, etc. ; 4, 
that the person defending himself do not directly and princi- 
pally intend the death of the aggressor, but the preservation 
of his own life.* It is manifest that when two effects come 
from the same action, one of those effects may be intended, 
and the other one be beside the intention ; v. g., the surgeon 
does not directly intend the pain Avhich comes from lancing 
the ulcer, but the relief which will follow. In this case the 
moral nature or species of the action comes from the effect 
which is intended, not from the one which is beside the inten- 
tion. Observe, however, that an action can never be legiti- 
mate when one effect of it is per se evil; i. e., of its essence 
evil, even should the other effects of it be good. 

It is the office of public authority to defend the life of a pri- 

* "Nihil prohibet unius actus esse duos effectus, quorum alter solum 
sit in intentione, alius vero, prseter intentionem. Morales autem actus 
recipiunt speciem secundum id quod intenditur. Potest tamen aliquis actus 
ex bona intentione proveniens illicitus reddi, si non sit proportionatus fini." 
2. 2, p., qu. 64, a. 7. There is no reason why two effects may not come 
from one act, one of which is in the intention, and the other beside the in- 
tention. But moral acts receive their species from what is intended ; yet, 
an act coming from a good intention may become illicit by not being pro- 
portioned to the end. 



208 



ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



vate citizen against the unjust aggressor; but when the duly- 
constituted authority is physically unable to perform this duty, 
the right of defending his life reverts to the person unjustly 
attacked. Besides, if this right of self-defence be denied, we 
must admit the obligation in the person whose life is attacked, 
of preferring the life of his assailant to his own; but this is 
opposed to the principle of well ordered love for self. 

One should not defend himself in the spirit either of hatred 
or revenge. One is not bound in all cases to defend his own 
life against the murderer ; he may, for laudable reasons, under 
certain circumstances, freely forego his right; v. g , being pre- 
pared to die, he may generously spare his enemy, in order that 
he may repent of his crime afterwards. 

Since the right to one's own life manifestly includes the 
right also to the necessary and legitimate means of preserving 
life, it follows by the same arguments that one can defend the 
members of his body, and his property which is necessary for 
sustaining life, in like manner against the unjust aggressor. 
In this case it must be supposed that the injury intended is 
very great, and that all the conditions before assigned tor jus- 
tifying the use of violence in self-defence, are observed. To 
be seriously maimed, or to have one's goods which are neces- 
sary for his sustenance unjustly destroyed, are great injuries, 
which a person may avert from himself as he would avert 
death from himself. It is clear, however, that when the injury 
of this kind is not grievous, then great violence to the aggressor 
would be disproportioned to his injustice. 

THE DUEL. 



A duel, according to the general meaning of the term, is a 
battle with deadly weapons between two persons, the condi- 
tions of the fight being deliberately agreed to by both parties, 
and each intending to kill the other. 

Duels may be distinguished into those that take place 
by private agreement between the parties and their friends; 
and those which are either permitted or required by the public 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 209 

authority. The duel which has the approval of public 
authority is either that which is usually styled by historians 
the " single combat," the end of which was to spare blood- 
shed by placing the decision of the general battle which was 
to be fought, on the issue of the battle between two men ; or 
else it is that deadly contest between two which is designed 
to afford gratification to the populace, as were the ancient 
fights of the gladiators. 

With regard to the single combat which was intended to 
avoid the evils and disasters of a general battle, such duel 
was evidently in accordance with natural right, at least as 
regards the army that was engaged in a just war, and feared 
its ability to cope with the enemy. For, if nations can right- 
fully wage war, in which the choice of their youth may fall 
in battle; a fortiori, they can legitimately lessen the evil by 
exposing one life to certain risk of death instead of many 
lives. 

As to other duels authorized by public authority, v. g., the 
gladiatorial contests ; they are against the natural law, and 
are morally evil. The public authority has no dominion over 
the lives of the people, except so far as the power to levy just 
war, to punish certain crimes with death, may imply some 
respect of imperfect dominion. That which is opposed to jus- 
tice and right reason, is at the same time, opposed to the 
natural law, as is evident from the definition and properties of 
natural law; but to sacrifice the lives even of slaves for the 
amusement of the multitude, is unjust and against right rea- 
son. No government has the natural right proximately to 
expose the life of a citizen, except it be necessary for the com- 
mon good; and these contests, authorized for such an end, 
are not ordained to good, but their proper effect is evil. 

In this connection the question is sometimes proposed; 
when two criminals are justly sentenced to die, and the public 
authority offers them liberty of fighting a duel, with the condi- 
tion that the survivor in the combat shall escape the legal 
death penalty, or have his life spared: is such duel morally 
evil ? In answering, we must distinguish the matter as it is 
18* 



210 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

related, first, to the civil authority proposing such mortal con- 
test; and secondly, as it is related to the two criminals. It is 
difficult to assign a principle on which to justify such an act 
of authority, since that, as a mode of exercising clemency, 
would be capricious and unreasonable; hence, this form of 
showing mercy, being irrational, is morally wrong. Therefore 
it would be more consonant with reason for the criminals to 
refuse the profTered condition and not fight the duel. If they 
accept the condition, the animal instinct of self-preservation 
may be such as to excuse the choice ; but a refusal would 
better accord with right reason. If such doom between per- 
sons must be decided by a merely contingent fact, it is more 
correct in principle that it be done by lot, otherwise it would 
not differ essentially from the gladiatorial contests. 

Since publicly authorized duels are no longer practiced at 
all, in any civilized nation, at least; while the private duel is 
still of frequent occurrence; it is a more important and inter- 
esting question to ask, can the private duel become legitimate, 
in any case ? 

The duel fought by private agreement is evil in all cases. 

For man to expose his own-life to the certain risk of death, 
without a just cause, is evil ; also for a man to kill, or intend 
to kill, his fellowman without a just and legitimate reason, is 
evil; but in a private duel each party exposes his own person 
to certain risk of death without legitimate reason, and at the 
same time he endeavors to kill his fellowman without a just 
and legitimate reason ; therefore, the duel is morally wrong 
on account of two reasons, each of which is a conclusive 
proof. The duel is neither the proper nor the proportioned 
means to any end which can be intended by it. Also, man 
has no such dominion either over his own life or over that of 
his fellow man. If the motive of the duel be hatred or 
revenge, the act proceeds from mere ungoverned passion; if 
it be to defend one's honor, it is not a means to that end, and 
all the motives of the private duel can be reduced to the 
ones named; therefore, the private duel cannot be the legiti- 
mate means to any good end. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 211 

At the present day, the duel is generally regarded by those 
who approve it, only as a means of defending " honor; " and 
the rules that govern the duellist are styled, " the code of 
honor." The argument given to justify the duel, is this : a 
gentleman will defend his honor at the risk of his life, since 
he must prefer his honor to his life ; but the duel, which is a 
deadly combat, is sometimes the only means of defending 
one's honor; therefore the duel is sometimes legitimate. In 
reply, it must be conceded that every person has a natural 
right to defend his good name and credit with his friends by 
all just and legitimate means ; it may also be granted, that 
when considered in themselves, death is sometimes preferable 
to dishonor. But the argument is erroneous, because the 
minor is false in matter. The duel is never a means to that 
end ; the issue of the fight depends only on the perfection of 
the weapons and the skill with which they are used, or else 
on the want of these requisites ; or, in other words, the result 
of the fight as regards the persons of the combatants, depends 
only on events that are purely contingent and physical, hav- 
ing no connection whatever with the honor which is defended 
or avenged. 

If the injurer always fell in the combat, and the aggrieved 
party always escaped, there would then be a natural connec- 
tion between the termination of a duel, and the defence of 
one's honor, but, as a fact, the one seeking redress for wrongs 
in the duel, may be the person that is killed, and the injurer 
may escape unhurt. Who accepts the death of one combatant 
as any proof that the other one was in the right ? 

It is evident, then, that the duel is not a means at all either 
of defending or retrieving honor. This truth being so clear in 
itself, the real and sufficient motive of the duellist is to be 
sought for in other matter. 

An erroneous public opinion, which is a remaining vestige 
of barbaric times ; false friends, by their mischievous inter- 
meddling; and vicious newspapers ; have, in many instances, 
no doubt, the chief moral guilt of the duel; for the purpose 
of bringing about a duel, they use the natural pride, and the 



212 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

passion of revenge, in the persons at variance. The duellist, 
thus stimulated to take the step, meets his adversary reluct- 
antly, and against his conscientious judgment of what is 
morally right. It cannot be denied, then, that the conduct of 
the duellist, in such case, is, in reality, moral cowardice. One 
is guilty of cowardice, who yields to unreasonable and ignoble 
fear, and is thereby prevented from doing some action that is 
either laudable, or is a matter of duty. Such fear is usually 
styled moral cowardice, when the cause which excites it, is 
false public opinion, the erroneous reasoning, the ridicule, or 
persuasion used by others, impelling one to do what is morally 
wrong; and he yields to this influence against the dictate of 
his conscience, from fear of censure or of giving offence. 
This is moral cowardice; and that it is, as a principle of 
human action, base and unmanly, requires no proof; for, 
there can be no true honor in a deed which is devoid of 
moral rectitude ; and it is base, because it is proper only to 
brute animals to be ruled by fear. 

That the duel, as a work of revenge, is wrong, follows from 
the truth that to inflict punishment by death to the culprit, 
belongs only to public authority. Therefore, the duel is a 
wrong to self, a wrong to the adversary, a wrong to society, 
and, consequently, it is a grievous offence against the natural 
law, and against God. 



ARTICLE IV. 

man's duties towards his fellow man. 

All man's duties, to God, to himself, and to his fellow man, 
can be reduced to well-ordered love. In this mode of con- 
ceiving duty, all the virtues and all the rules of rectitude must 
be understood as means of rightly ordering and perfecting 
love. This is a generalization which is both legitimately and 
conveniently made. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 213 

As man's action must start from himself, he best understands 
what pertains to others by comparison with what he perceives 
in himself; hence, his duty towards his feliow-beings is fitly 
enunciated in rules which include a comparison to himself; 
" love thy neighbor as thyself; d ) unto others as thou wouldst 
have others do unto thee." 

These are clear and simple principles, the meaning and the 
plain limits of which, all persons having any ability to judge, 
can easily understand. It is manifest that the affirmation of 
a duty or a rule, is an implied prohibition of what is contrary 
to it, since what is contrary destroys the good intended; v. g., 
the command to love his neighbor implies the prohibition of 
man's hating his neighbor: "do not to another that which 
thou wouldst not have another do unto thee ; do no harm or 
injury to thy fellow man." 

Love as a passion was already explained ; it was then seen 
that nature intends good by all the passions ; for, nature can 
never directly intend evil. But love has this peculiar to itself, 
which distinguishes it from all other principles of action ; 
namely, that it directly intends good as its proper object. # 
But good cannot be loved unless as apprehended ; t and since 
there is both a sensible power of apprehending, and also an 
intellectual power of apprehension, so, both 'sensible and 
intellectual objects of love may be apprehended. To love, 
as an act, is to tend to the good which is apprehended. { 

* "Illud est proprie causa amoris, quod est amoris objectum; amoris 
autem proprium objectum e-t bonum." — I. 2, p., qu. 27, a. I. That is 
properly the cause of love, which is the object of love; but the proper ob- 
ject of love is good. 

t "Bonum non est objectum appetitus, nisiprout est apprehensum." — 1. 2, 
p., qu. 27. a. 2. Good is not an object of appetite, except in so far as it is 
apprehended. 

X " Sicut cognitio naturalis semper est vera, ita dilectio naturalis semper 
est recta, cum amor naturalis nihil aliud sit. quam inclinatio naturae indita 
ab auctore naturae. Dicere ergo, quod inclinatio naturae non sit recta, est 
derogare auctori naturae." — 1. p., qu. 60, a. I. As natural knowledge is 
always true, so is natural love always right; since natural love is nothing 
else than an inclination given to nature by the Author of nature. To say, 
therefore, that the inclination of nature is not right, is to derogate from the 
Author of nature. It is f . r man to direct and control this inclination in 
him with right reason. 



214 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

It is clear that love, as operative, always tends to unity, as 
a term ; or, it tends to union of the object or good which is 
loved, and the subject loving ; hence the axioms which are 
often repeated by philosophers, " unio est opus amoris ; " 
(Dionysius) " amor est virtus unitiva;" (Aristotle). 

Man's love starts with himself, and is stronger for himself 
than it is for his fellow man j first, because he is one substance 
with himself, and is, therefore, nearest to himself;* and sec- 
ondly, because his fellow-man is only like to him in specific 
nature. Man naturally loves himself in a greater degree than 
he is able to love a likeness of himself. Indeed, all animals 
naturally love their own species, and tend, therefore, to union 
with them ; because they love that which is like to themselves. 
This truth is generally known, and is recognized in popular 
proverbs; v. g., ''birds of a feather flock together." But 
irrational animals are determined to one mode of action, for 
they are not free in any operation. Man,t being a rational 
animal, can choose, or he can make elective judgments. 
Hence, man, in loving his own species, is required to govern 
and direct the principles of action which are natural to him, 
by reason. Man may love the good that is in himself, or in 
another ; or, if a good be wanting to either, he may desire 
that it be acquired and securely possessed ; in the first case, 
the love is styled the love of benevolence or friendship ; in the 
other case, it is called the love of concupiscence. 

It may be said, then, that to love a person is to wish good 
to him; f that the good be enjoyed, if it is already possessed ; 

* " Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium; quia sibi unus 
est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine alicujus formoe." — I. 2. p., qu. 
27, a. 3. One loves himself more than another, because he is one with 
himself in substance; but he is one with another by likeness of nature or 
quality. 

t "Solum illud quod habet intellectum potest agere judicio libero, in 
quantum cognoscit universalem rationem boni, qua potest judicare hoc vel 
illud esse bonum." — 1. p., qu. 59, a. 1. Only that being which has an in- 
tellect can act with free choice coming from judgment of comparison ; 
knowing the general nature of good, by which such being is able to judge 
either this or that thing to be good. 

t " Amare est velle alicui bonum." — 1. 2, p., qu. 26, a. 4. To love, is 
to wish good to some one. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 215 

or, if it is wanting, that it may be gained. Observe, however, 
that man can rationally wish for himself or another, only that 
which is good under all respects; for, a thing that is wished, 
is completely good, only when all the principles that enter 
into it are good; it is vitiated by any important defect : " bonum 
ex integra causa ; malum a quocunque defectu." 

It follows, therefore, that the duties of men towards others 
which arise from commutative and distributive justice, though 
they are the most necessary for the well-being of society, are 
not by any means all man's duties ; nor are they man's noblest 
operations which regard his fellow-men. Well ordered love 
to others, is the highest norma of moral action which relates 
to one's fellow-men. But it may be objected: "this seems to 
be true when the persons with whom we treat are good; but 
how can we love evil or vicious persons ?" 

In answer, we must distinguish between the evil that is in a 
person by way of accident or quality, or rather the privation 
of good quality, and the person himself as a substantial and 
rational being. Now, the evil that is in a vicious person, as 
a privation of good, cannot be loved ; for all evil is the 
privation of good, and it is the proper object of hatred. 
But the substantial and rational nature of which man consists 
is specifically identical with our own nature, and in its degree 
it is a likeness of its Creator; under this respect a man is 
intrinsically and essentially good, and is therefore worthy of 
love. Hence, every man should be loved, in as much as he 
is good. Also, we should sometimes prudently do that office 
of love which may improve or correct the evils of our neigh- 
bors, especially when this is surely feasible. 



ARTICLE V. 

EVERY PERSON IS BOUND TO VERACITY OR TRUTHFULNESS; 
A LIE IS, OF ITS OWN NATURE, EVIL. 

The agreement between the words or other ngns by which 
a person intends to manifest what is in his mind, and that 



216 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

which is actually in his mind, is what is meant, in general, by 
moral truth, or veracity. The words or signs are false, at 
least under a respect, when they do not express what is in the 
mind. When the disagreement between the outward signs, 
and the thought in the mind, is by mistake, there is then only 
material falsity in the signs; when voluntary, such falsity is 
formal. This distinction can be made more strictly a little 
later. 

The faculty of speech, or the power of manifesting one's 
thoughts in outward signs, is intended by nature and ordained 
only for truth ; it is the means of making that known to other 
persons which ought to be known, and which cannot other- 
wise become known, at least naturally and directly. 

The thoughts of the intellect, as they are in the faculty 
itself, or as they are in its immanent acts; also, the affections 
and wishes of the will, which are not manifested by means of 
some extrinsic sign or operation, cannot naturally be known 
by any creature; not even by the highest angel; they are 
known only to God. It is not difficult to see that these opera- 
tions of the soul must be known to God, or that God must see 
them just as they are intrinsically and immediately from the 
faculties, for those powers absolutely depend on God, both in 
existing and in acting. Hence, since no creature can act 
without God's concurrence as first cause, it is subject to him, 
dependent on him, and intimately present to him, in its most 
hidden essence, and is therefore wholly seen by him under all 
conditions.* The angel may know what is in the fancy ; and 
the human intellect has no normal action naturally, except 
dependency on the fancy as a mirror which furnishes it with 
the images of all the objects of its intelligent ideas. But no 

* "Solus Deus cogitationes cordium et afFectiones voluntatum cognos- 
cere potest ; quia voluntas rationalis creaturce soli Deo subjacet et ipse so- 
lus in earn operari potest, qui est principale ejus objectum ut ultimas finis."' 
S. Th. I. p., qu. 57, a. 4. God alone can know the secret thoughts of 
hearts, and affections of wills ;. because the will of a rational creature is 
subject to God alone, and He alone can act on it, who is its principal ob- 
ject as ultimate end. 






SPECIAL ETIIICS. 217 

creature can know the action of the fancy or of any other 
member, precisely as it is related to the intellect and will; for, 
the reason can intend variously, by the same imperate or com- 
manded acts. Therefore, in order for the thoughts that are 
inmost in the soul, or immediate to it, to become known to our 
fellow creatures, they must be truthfully manifested by means 
of words or other signs. Certain things may be manifested 
involuntarily by the countenance, or through different physio- 
logical facts and symptoms, to experienced and sagacious men. 
But yet, the knowledge is by way of inference, and is often- 
times merely conjectural; it is imperfect, and partial; it does 
not directly reach what is in the soul, and, on account of dif- 
ferent contingencies, it is liable to error. We are dependent, 
then, for our knowledge of what is in the minds of others, 
upon their truthfulness or veracity in manifesting their secret 
thoughts. 

Now, the existence of human society would not be possi- 
ble, if there was in its members no reverence for the sacred- 
ness of truth, or if veracity were not generally and practically 
recognized as a virtue. Where there is no truth, there can be 
no justice: and the observance of justice is essential to the 
existence of society. Also, where there is no truth, there is, 
in like proportion, no rectitude ; and rectitude of action is the 
distinctive or the specific constituent of practical morality. 
The man who is devoid of veracity or truthfulness is thereby 
destitute of moral rectitude, since there can be no moral rec- 
titude of action in which truth is wanting. Hence,.truthfulness 
or veracity, is generally referred to the cardinal virtue, justice. 

Man cannot be bound to manifest at all times, and to all 
persons, the thoughts that are in his mind ; nor is this required 
for veracity. Veracity is not opposed to just and prudent 
secrecy, but it is opposed to mendacity or to lying. Although 
lying is, by its own nature, evil, since it is a privation of moral 
goodness or rectitude ; yet, not all truth is always to be man- 
ifested, for silence is sometimes of strict duty, and, by conse- 
quence, the manifestation of some truth may itself be an act 
of injustice. 
19 



218 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Evil is the privation of good that is due or ought to be. 
This definition is metaphysically precise; for, it includes all 
evil, and it excludes everything that is not evil. Any particular 
or specific evil is the privation of that specific good which is 
its opposite. In accordance with this sense of the terms, a 
lie may be defined to be the privation of truth that is due or 
ought to be; " mendacium est privatio veri debiti;" or, in 
other words, since the lie is a species of evil, it must be the 
privation of that special due good to which it is opposed ; 
but the species of good that is due, to which the lie is opposed, 
is truth that is due. Hence, admitting these definitions to be 
precise, it follows that the privation or absence of good which 
is not due, is some limitation of good, but it cannot be pro- 
perly styled evil ; * so the privation or absence of truth that 
is not due, is, under some respect, a limitation of the true, but 
it cannot be properly styled a lie. For, the lie is evil, and 
there cannot be evil, properly and strictly so called, where 
there is no privation of that which is due or ought to be. 
Truth may be directly due to God ; it may be due proximately 
to society, to legitimate authority, to our neighbor, or in 
respect to ourselves ; and all such trnth, it is a duty to mani- 
fest. Before God there can be no secrecy ; but some privi- 
leged knowledge is not due to man, and it is sometimes a 
sacred duty to conceal what is known in the mind. 

The preceding principle by which evil is denned and ex- 
plained by metaphysicians, cannot be legitimately denied. 
Yet, in applying this definition, and every other definition of 
the lie, a peculiar difficulty exists in some cases, arising from 
the fact that the privation of truth that is not due may be 
brought about not only by silence, but by a positive denial of 
that which is really in the mind. Then, wilfully to utter 
words that deny the thought which is actually in the mind 
with the intention of deceiving, appears to be a good defini- 
tion of the lie. Hence, it would seem to follow that even the 
privation of truth which is not due, may also become a lie; 
namely by the positive denial of that truth. 

* Malum est omnis et sola privatio boni debiti; mendacium est malum, 
i. e., omnis et sola privatio veri debiti. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 219 

It is worthy of being observed in this matter, that the end 
intended by a denial of what is in the mind, or of speaking 
contrary to one's knewledge, is, in many cases, rather the 
concealment of an objective truth, than the deception caused 
by it ; or the intention to deceive is secondary, and is ordained 
by the person as a means to what is principally intended by 
his denial, which is secrecy. 

That the refusal to manifest truth which is not due by con- 
cealing it in silence, is not a lie, no one doubts; for it is evi- 
dent that merely to be silent, in regard to matter that ought 
not to be communicated, is not opposed to veracity. 

But is the positive denial of what is in the mind, to be 
accounted a lie, even when it is either a duty or a right to 
conceal what we know ? It is generally agreed that a 
lie is intrinsically evil ; it is manifest, then, that if to deny 
what is in the mind bzfierse, or of its nature, a lie, it never 
can be lawful to do so. It is also right to say that a lie is /' 
intrinsically evil; for the privation of any moral good that is '• 
due is essentially evil; and the lie, as seen, is a privation of 
moral truth that is due. 

Two facts will prepare the way for a conclusive answer to 
the question proposed; namely, "is the positive denial of 
what one knows, always a lie, even when the concealment of 
the truth known is, in itself, a right or a duty ?" First : through- 
out that part of the civilized world, in which the English lan- 
guage is spoken, and English principles regulating personal 
rights and duties, are accepted and enforced in practice, it is 
admitted that no one can be bound even by oath and in a 
public court of justice, to criminate himself. Hence, when a 
criminal is interrogated as to his guilt, and he answers, " not 
guilty :" though his answer be contrary to what he knows to 
be the fact, it is not regarded, in a legal sense, as being a lie. 
It is also settled by the courts of the United States that knowl- 
edge acquired officially by the priest, the physician, or the law- 
yer, is " privileged knowledge;" i. e., its manifestation cannot 
be legally exacted, even in court. Secondly ; all who believe 
sacramental confession to be of divine institution, also believe 



220 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

that the seal of secrecy binding the priest to whom confession 
is made, is likewise a divine ordinance. Now, it is universally 
admitted to be the consequent duty of such priest, though put 
upon his solemn oath in court, as a witness for or against one 
arraigned as a criminal, to answer, should it be necessary to 
do so, that he knows nothing of the matter asked about, even 
if the accused has actually manifested his guilt to him by con- 
fession, and, in his own mind, therefore, the priest knows him 
to be really guilty. In other words, the knowledge of crime 
committed, which is acquired by sacramental confession, is 
simply incommunicable. 

Also, if the lie is intrinsically evil, and such it surely is ; 
then it is immediately against the natural law, since that alone 
is intrinsically evil, which is evil in the very nature of things, 
and, conversely, what is evil in the very nature of things, is 
against the natural law. But the natural law is absolutely im- 
mutable; therefore, what is immediately against the natural 
law, or, in other words, that which is intrinsically or per se 
evil, cannot be made legitimate, even by Divine ordination. 
Yet, the priest, in the case supposed, must, of bounden duty, 
answer by positively denying that which is actually in his 
mind; and he does this, replying to the question, as proposed, 
and with the intention of concealing that truth * 

These two facts which are adduced, show that both human 
and Divine legislation authorize the concealment of some 
known truth by a positive denial that the thing in question is 
known, or by speaking contrary to what is in the mind. 

The conclusion may be legitimately drawn, then, that the 
positive concealment of truth in the mind, when the manifest- 
ation of it is neither a right, nor a duty, and the truth ought 
to be concealed, is noi: a lie ; for that alone is properly and 
really a lie which is a privation of truth that is due, or, which 

* "As oaths are designed for the security of the imposer, it is manifest 
they must be performed and interpreted in the sense in which the imposer 
intends them, otherwise they afford no security for him. And this is the 
meaning and reason of the rule, 'jurare in animum imponentis.'" — Paly's 
Philos., ch. xvi. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 221 

is a positive concealment of a truth that ought to be mani- 
fested. Every one has, or he may have, truth in his own mind, 
which concerns himself alone, and which no one else can justly 
require him to manifest; but he cannot rationally suppose 
that he is thereby exempted from any duty of truthfulness or 
candor towards other persons. For truthfulness, or veracity, is 
a sacred duty prescribed by the natural law; and a lie is in- 
trinsically evil. 

They who prefer the definition of a lie, which affirms it to 
be "something said against what is in the mind of the speaker, 
with the intention of deceiving, " do not deny that what is in 
the mind may be concealed, in the cases above specified, and 
in the manner described. But some of them, with Paley,* 
prefer to say, in order to explain the exceptional matter, 
that a lie, or a falsehood, is lawful in certain cases ; others 
explain the exceptions to that definition by a theory of u men- 
tal reservation," in which the words uttered, after all, declare 
the contrary of what is known in the mind of the speaker. 
But that which is intrinsically evil, and such the lie is admitted 
to be, cannot become lawful by any exception or dispensation. 
For these reasons, it seems to be both more simple and more 
consistent, in the judgment of many persons, to give a defini- 
tion of the lie which is metaphysical and absolute, and which 
is, therefore, not entangled with exceptional matter: "malum 
est privatio boni debiti ; mendacium est privatio veri debiti." 
Evil is the privation of good that is due ; the lie, which is a 
particular evil, is the privation of the true that ought to be 
manifested ; and the truth which is due is the particular good 
opposed to the lie. Consequently, when one possessing privi- 
leged or incommunicable knowledge, is asked to manifest 
what must be kept hidden under the sacred seal of secrecy, 
and when necessary he answers that he does not know any 
thing of such matter, his answer is not opposed to moral truth 
or veracity ; or, he does not tell a lie, and such an answer 
contravenes no right and no duty. If one prefer to say that 
the incommunicable matter is concealed, in such case, " by 
* Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, ch. xv. 
19* 



222 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

legitimate mental reservation," i. e., by uttering one thing 
with the tongue, and at the same time meaning a contrary 
thing in the mind, it is then for him to reconcile this language 
with the definition : " The lie is saying the contrary of what 
is in the mind of the speaker, with the intention of deceiving." 



ARTIC L E VI. 

HOW EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY FIRST ORIGINATED 
AMONG MEN; OR, THE FIRST ORIGIN OF DOMINION IN 
PARTICULAR PERSONS OVER THE MATERIAL OR COR- 
POREAL GOODS OF THIS LIFE ; ACTUAL DIVISION OF THESE 
EARTHLY GOODS WAS BY HUMAN LAW. THE COMMUNIST 
THEORY IS FALSE. 

The dominion, or exclusive ownership of property, which 
is now to be explained, is the right to have, to hold, and to 
dispose at liberty of a corporeal thing, unless it be prohibited 
by law. * 

Dominion, as the word implies, gives a lordship or master- 
ship over the object owned, as, for example, a house or home; 
and this empowers the possessor rightfully to do with it what- 
ever he may choose, rationally; or if he do not trouble the 
right of another person thereby, it makes him civilly free to 
use it or dispose of it, even irrationally. 

We may distinguish two classes of corporeal goods over 
which man can acquire dominion or ownership ; the one, 
those that can be used, or fully appropriated at once, to serve 
his actual wants, as food and raiment; the other class may 
comprise such as he can preserve, claim, or hold for future 

* " Dominium est jus perfecte disponendi de re corporali, ni-i lege prohi- 
beatur." Bartohis. This is the definition generally given by writers on this 
matter; it directly applies, however, to that ownership of prope-ty which 
is in organized society, and which has its immediate origin under the laws 
of that society. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 223 

use. Again, all such objects may be considered first as phy- 
sical natures depending for their existence and action on the 
Creator. When viewed under this aspect, God alone can 
exercise and hold dominion over these things, since He alone 
can change, rule, or own them as existing and acting natures 
that, as such, are wholly subject. Secondly, such objects may 
be considered in respect to the use which man can make of 
them; man has no physical power to use the things around 
him except as means or instruments for the accomplishment 
of an end. It is only under this second aspect that man has, 
or is capable of acquiring, any ownership or dominion over 
the material goods that are made subject to him. Hence 
man can control and dispose of the use, not the nature itself, 
of things which he owns; or, in other words, his dominion 
over the material goods of life is not that of absolute owner- 
ship or lordship, but is by its very nature limited wholly to 
some particular and special use of those things. 

Naturally and originally, the material or corporeal goods 
of this life belong to men in common; the rightful division of 
these exterior goods came about by human law, or it was 
made conventionally. * 

With regard to those necessary objects belonging to no one 
in particular, which are required for the relief of present 

* " Dominium et prselatio introducta sunt ex jure humano." — Div. Th., 
p. 2 2, qu. io, a. io, et qu. 12, a. 2. Particular dominion over exteri al 
goods, and superiorship in authority of any one person, or body of per- 
sons, over a multitude of persons, were introduced by human positive law. 

" Communitas rerum attribuitur juri naturali, non quia jus naturale dic- 
tat omnia esse possidenda communiter, et nihil esse quasi proprium possi- 
dendum; sed quia secundum jus naturale non est distinctio possessionum 
sed magis secundum humanum condictum, quod pertinet ad jus positivum. 
Unde proprietas possessionum non est contra jus naturale ; sed juri natu- 
rali superadditur per adinventionem rationis humanae." — P. 2. 2, qu 66, a. 
2. ad I. Community of goods is attributed to the natural law, not that the 
natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common, and 
that nothing is to be owned by an individual ; but because, according to 
the natural law, there are not distinct possessions ; this comes rather by 
human agreement, which pertains to positive law. Hence, exclusive own- 
ership of possessions is not against natural law, but it is superadded to the 
natural law through an invention of human reason. 



224 ethics, on moral philosophy. 

actual wants, as food, clothing, etc., it is manifest that one 
coming into possession of them can justly consume them or 
directly apply them to his own use; for the actual want of 
what is necessary to sustain life would justify his using them 
even if they were owned by another person. Hence, extreme 
present need of the means to support life even abrogates con- 
ventional dominion or ownership of property. The right of 
one who is in such want depends on possession or occupancy, 
however, only by way of necessary condition ; it depends for 
its origin and validity on his extreme need, and on the truth 
that before the law of nature the goods of the earth are for 
the use of mankind. * 

Mere occupancy, as occupancy, cannot per se, or of its own 
nature, and apart from all law or other superadded cause, 
found real ownership or dominion in landed or immovable 
property. For occupancy, as such, is only an extrinsic acci- 
dent or circumstance, which can as truly and really exist when 
such property is not owned as when it is owned ; and, on the 
other hand, one can as truly own land which he does not 
occupy at all, as land which he actually does occupy. There- 
fore, mere occupancy of such property is an accident which 
is too purely contingent and indeterminate to found that 
dominion which constitutes real ownership of landed pro- 
perty. It follows, then, that when occupancy is said by jurists 
to give a title, or to found dominion in property, though they 
attribute the effect nominally and proximately to occupancy, 
yet it is by means of the causes annexed to mere occupancy 
that such dominion is really and legally founded. One who 

* Therefore, Cajetan observes, p. 2. 2, qu. 66, a. 2, ad I, that while do- 
minion over the goods of the earth was originally common, negatively, 
they were also positively common in case of extreme necessity. But, apart 
from special cases of the kind, the dominion is only negatively common : 
"Hinc disce quod hujusmodi propositiones, scilicet, secundum jus natu- 
ral? omnia sunt communia, exponuntur negative, non affirmative." — Vide 
p. I, qu. 14, a. 3, ad I. Sammoe D. Thomae, 

Goods are said to be negatively common when, though owned by all, 
yet it does not belong to the individual to determine his own share for 
himself. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 225 

should enter and settle in an uninhabited and unclaimed dis- 
trict of country might bi said to acquire, concomitantly with 
actual occupancy, a negative dominion over the territory ; * 
if we add, as another cause founding just right, that he culti- 
vates a spot of land and builds a house, the fruit of his indus- 
try will surely belong to him, so far as it is something which 
he is capable of appropriating and possessing, but not farther. 
The common right of mankind to share the goods of the 
earth is not positively abrogated, either in respect to that 
whole district of country or the spot of land itself which he has 
cultivated, unless it be so determined conventionally or by law. 
For if we suppose this territory, with its solitary inhabitant 
occupying his tract of cultivated land, now to be rightfully 
acquired, for example, by the United States government, 
there appears no valid reason, coming merely from the nature 
of things, why this person should not become subject to all 
just laws, like every citizen, even inclu ling the law which im- 
poses conditions for acquiring " the pre-emption right." Man 
as a member of society can acquire ownership to a particular 
spot of land only in the manner prescribed by the public law. 
Where, in fact, is there a member of civil society who now 
owns land independently of all positive law, and the absolute 
title to which he acquired merely by first occupancy ? 

Since there is no reason in the nature of things, or a priori, 
why one man should own a particular piece of land rather 
than another man, and also since men must live in society as 
rational beings, it follows that because the apportionment of 
land is not made by nature, it must be done, when division 
becomes expedient or necessary, by a positive convention or 
agreement, i e., by equitable general laws. 

If it be determined as in Roman law that occupancy under 
certain conditions shall found a right of ownership in such 

* It is negative dominion, in as much as there is no other occupant of 
the land. Cowper makes the lonely Alexander Selkirk thus declare the 
true nature of his dominion over all the island of Juan Fernandez : 

"I am monarch of all I survey; 

My right there is none to dispute" 



226 



ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



property,* then the community will define what shall be those 
special conditions that must accede to mere occupancy, in 
order for it to establish a legal title; and it will be deter- 
mined by the same authority as to what extent or quantity of 
land may in this manner be "legitimately acquired by one per- 
son, f In practice, occupancy could not otherwise, than as 
defined and regulated by positive law, be an equitable and 
peaceful mode of establishing for individual persons exclusive 
ownership of landed property. In the United States all un- 
occupied landed property within the territory of the nation is 
assumed to be public domain ; and such land was thus re- 
garded from the beginning of the Union. Occupancy of land 
in the undivided or unconveyed public domain establishes for 
the first actual settler or occupant, there dwelling and cultivat- 
ing or improving the land, " a pre-emption right," or the first 
right to purchase the quarter of that section \ which includes 
the settler's domicil. 

The " right of eminent domain," dominium allurn,^ which is 



* " Sicut divisio rerum est de jure gentium, ita de jure gentium est ut 
quse adhuc nullius sunt, fiant de primo oecupante." — Becanus, De jure, c. 
5, q. 3. Ita etiam Cardin. Toleti in 2. 2, q. 66, a. 2, et alii communiter. 
Just as division of goods is from human law, (the common law of nations,) 
so it is by human law that things, which as yet belong to no one, become 
the property of the first occupant. 

t For what pertains to the manner in which a nation acquires dominion 
over vacant territory, and what concerns the right of discovery, as actually 
settled by international law, see Wheaton, " Elements of International 
Law," ch. iv; or, Vattel, "Law of Nations," book I, chap, xvii- or, other 
approved authorities. 

X A section is one mile square, or 640 acres. 

§ Judge Dillon, of the United States Circuit Court, in his treatise, "Mu- 
nicipal Corporations," ch. xvi, defines and explains this right, and the 
laws for applying it. He says: "The maxim, salus populi supremo, 
lex, has an important meaning in "its application to private rights, and in 
limiting the absoluteness of any possible ownership of private property 
. . . This (supreme power to maintain the general welfare) is a right inhe- 
rent in every government. One branch of this governmental prerogative 
is known by the name ©f taxation, and the other arm of this transcendent 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 227 

held to be inherent, remains in the State, or supreme public 
authority; and, therefore, when really necessary for the com- 
mon good, the government can, in virtue of that original and 
natural right existing in the community, and exercised by the 
government as representing the community, condemn private 
property for public use, by making equitable compensation 
for it, in order that an undue burden be not imposed on a 
particular person or part of the community; also, property 
left without an heir-at-law reverts to the common wea'th; and 
all immovable property is liable to forfeiture for just taxes. 
This paramount right or authority over all real estate or landed 
property belonging to the individual citizen, being necessary 
for the government in the very nature of things, is therefore 
originally derived by the community directly and immediately 
from the natural law itself. 

But while the goods of the earth are given by nature to all 
mankind, the division itself of those goods is left to the rational, 
just, and prudent determination of mankind; and what thus 
pertains to mankind for its decision, does not belong to the 
individual to decide for himself independently of the commu- 
nity ; it is always the office of public authority to determine 
in such matter what is best for the common good, since in no 
other manner can justice, and, consequently, social peace, be 
maintained. There is no precept of the natural law prescrib- 
ing a division of property as, per se, necessary for every com- 
munity of mankind. Such division is not thus necessary under 
every hypothesis ; in a state of innocence, or of integral nature, 
a division of property would not become necessary, nor per- 
haps even useful.* In a small community, common proprietor- 

and underlying authority is now familiarly known as the power of eminent 
domain. The Constitution of the United States provides that private prop- 
erty shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. " — P. 438. 
To impose a special burden on the property of a private party for the ben- 
efit of the public, would not be just; if no compensation were made, it 
would be an unfair exaction. 

* " Tn statu nnturce integrae et eo perseverante probabilius permansisset 
bonorum communitas. Quia in illo felici statu, summaque hominum inter se 
concordia, nulla fuisset causa seu necessitas dividendi qualis est post lap- 



228 ETHICS, OE MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ship might even now happen to be advantageous under cer- 
tain conditions. 

The principle that particular dominion or exclusive owner- 
ship of property is by human convention, "" dominium et prae- 
latio introducta sunt ex jure humano," was generally taught 
as certain in the old universities. The opinion of the best 
English and American jurists concerning this matter will be 
found briefly and clearly enunciated in the two citations which 
are here subjoined; their theory, it will be noticed, agrees in 
substance with what was held by St. Thomas and the scho- 
lastics.* 

sum : imo decens erat et ad dignitatem atque magnificentiam generis hu- 
mani pertinens ut hujusmodi bona communiter donata communiter posside- 
rentur." — Billuart, de dominio; with theologians more generally, in Div. 
Th., p. 2. 2, q. 66, a. 2, ad I. In this state of integral nature, and it con- 
tinuing, it is more probable that community of goods would be permanent. 
For, in that happy state and perfect concord of mankind among themselves, 
there would be no reason or necessity for a division such as there is since 
the fall : nay, it would become the dignity, and belong to the generous 
spirit of mankind, to possess the goods of the earth in common, as they 
were given in common. 

* Billuart, "De modis acquirendi Dominium," thus states the doctrine 
of the Scholastics concerning this matter: "Divisio rerum facta est non 
jure naturae, quia jus naturae neque earn prsecipit neque ad earn inclinat ut 
ad quid simpliciter necessarium sed ut ad quid magis conveniens tantum ; 
non jure divino positivo, cum neque in Scriptura neque in Traditione ulhim 
de ea extat praeceptum; sed jure gentium, quatenus homines, dum attenta 
corruptione naturae, quae est sui anians, alieni negligens, cupiditati et ambi- 
tioni serviens, viderent gravia et plura incommoda sequi occasionaliter ex 
communitate bonorum, divisionem, non dico praeceperunt, alioquin pecca- 
rent monachi, sed ut vitae sociali et bonorum administrationi magis conve- 
nientem commutii consensu formali vel tacito introduxerunt. Unde L. I. 
Digestorum dicitur; ex hoc jure gentium discretas esse gentes, regna con- 
dita, dominia distincta, agris terminos positos." The division of things is 
not made by the law of nature, for the law of nature neither commands it 
nor persuades it as something simply necessary, but only as something 
more suitable or expedient ; it is not from divine law, since there is no pre- 
cept concerning it, either in the Scripture or from tradition ; but it is by 
human law, in as much as men, considering the corruption of nature which 
inclines man to be selfish, unmindful of others, following cupidity and am- 
bition, saw the grave and numerous inconveniences occasioned by commu- 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 229 

Timothy Walker, LL.D., Introduction to American Laic, 
fourth edition, p. 282, thus states and explains this matter : 
" We know, as a matter of history, that in the beginning God 
gave to man a general dominion over the earth, and all things 
appertaining thereto ; but this would only make the first in- 
habitants owners in common of the world, and not exclusive 
owners of any specific part. The historical inference, there- 
fore, is that exclusive ownership did not commence until some 
subsequent period, when a division of the common property 
was made,* either by compulsion or voluntary agreement. In 
other words, the right of exclusive ownership is conventional, 
and not divine or natural ; and the same inference results from 
our theory of the social compact. An island or continent, for 
example, which no man had ever seen, would be the property 
of no one ; but if a number of persons should be cast upon it, 
and take possession of it, they would own it in common until 
some agreement would be made concerning it, after which the 
nature of their ownership, whether exclusive or common, 
would depend upon their agreement. In either view, there- 
fore, it would seem that the exclusive ownership of property 
is a social, and not a natural right." 

James Kent, Comme?itaries o?i American Law, vol. hi, p. 501, 
§ 378, twelfth edition, shows how the government, which repre- 
sents the nation, is the source of particular ownership in prop- 
erty. " It is a fundamental principle in the English law, de- 

nity of goods. I do not say mankind prescribed it as being of natural 
law, for then the monastic orders would be doing wrong ; but they intro- 
duced division of goods by common consent, either formally or tacitly given, 
as better suited for social life, and for the right management of its goods. 
Whence it is said in the Digests, L. I., from this common law of nations 
distinct civil communities come, kingdoms are founded, ownership of prop- 
erty begins, and farms have their limits determined. 

* The following texts of Scripture are usually cited as bearing on this 
matter: '-And to Heber were born two sons; the name of the one was 
Phaleg. because in his days the earth was divided." — 1 Paralipomenon, i. 
79. " By these (the descendants of Noe) were divided the islands of the 
Gentiles in their land, every one according to his tongue and their families 
in the nations." — Genesis x. 5. 
2J 



230 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

rived from the maxims of its feudal tenures, that the king was 
the original proprietor or lord paramount of all the land in the 
kingdom, and the true and only source of title. In this 
country we have adopted the same principle, and applied it to 
our republican governments; and it is a settled and funda- 
mental doctrine with us that all valid individual title to land 
within the United States is derived either from the grant of 
our own local governments, or from that of the United States, 
or from the crown, or royal chartered governments established 
here prior to the Revolution. This was the doctrine declared 
in New York in the case of Jackson v. Ingraham, and it was 
held to be a settled rule that the courts could not take notice 
of any title to land not derived from our own State or colonial 
government, and duly verified by patent. This was also a 
fundamental princple in colonial jurisprudence. The title to 
land passed to individuals from the crown through the colo- 
nial corporations, and the colonial or proprietary authorities." 

Particular dominion or exclusive ownership of property is 
from the natural law only according to the sense in which all 
just human law is derived from the natural law.* 

When people became numerous on earth and the means of 
living were thereby made relatively less abundant, division of 
property was rendered morally necessary, f Many men are 

* " Est de ratione legis humanae, quod sit derivata a lege naturae. Et 
secundum hoc dividitur jus positivum in jus gentium et jus civile; secun- 
dum duos modos ; sicut conclusiones ex principiis, et alio modo sicut deter- 
minationes quaedam aliquorum communium." — P. I. 2, q. 2, a. 4, et a. 5. 
It is of the essence of human law that it be derived from the law of na- 
ture. And under this respect positive law is divided into the common law 
of nations, and the civil law according to two manners of deriving posi- 
tive law from the natural law, namely, as conclusions from first principles, 
and as certain particular determinations (or applications) of some common 
or general principles. 

t "Distinctio possessionum et servitus non sunt inductae a natura, sed 
hominum ratione ad utilitatem humanae vitae." — P. I. 2, qu. 9, a. 5, ad 3. 
Distinct possession of material goods, and slavery, were not introduced 
by nature, but through the reason of man for the advantage of human life. 
S. Thonns. '"In statu naturae lapsae nedum licita, sed conveniens fuit re- 
rum et dominiorum divisio." — Billuart, with scholastic writers generally. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 231 

either slothful or selfish, and, therefore, considering the pres- 
ent actual state and character of the human race, together 
with the disorderly inclinations that are so often dominant 
over mankind, it is, in practice, more favorable to the general 
good that each one be left to provide for himself what is ne- 
cessary, and that he become the owner of what he legitimately 
acquires; then, every one's rights and duties being maintained 
justly by public authority, there will exist fewer causes of con- 
tention or quarrelling, and consequently there will be greater 
peace and security. Men will labor with more alacrity, and 
preserve with more care the fruit of their industry, when they 
work for themselves or their own particular advantage, than 
they would if all things belonged only to the community; for, 
in the latter case, each would leave this task to be performed 
by another, and hence there would result confusion in em- 
ployments, insufficiency in necessary things, discontent, and 
many other evils.* But, in the present actual state of man's 
nature, a fair and orderly division of property would not be 
possible, in practice, except as regulated by just law; and 
hence from this truth a valid argument is derived also to prove 
the necessity of supreme authority in human society. Con- 
sequently upon the fact of a legitimate agreement to make the 
division, each person in the community has the right to some 
determinate and equitable share of the property first given in 
common by nature ; but that right, if considered in itself a 
priori, can positively be determined and defined as to its par- 
ticular and actual object, not by the individual for himself, for 
thus he would take law into his own hands, which would lead 
to confusion ; but only by that authority which is duly em- 
powered to provide for, and protect the general good, t 

In the state of fallen nature, the division of goods or exclusive ow nership 
of property is not only permitted by the law of nature, but it is also some- 
thing expedient. 

*Aristot!e uses similar reasoning in his " Politics," book ii, ch. 5, against 
the theory of communism proposed by Plato, in his " Republic." 

t "Nota quod propositio, communitas rerum est de jure nature? quoad 
usum, potest dupliciter intelligi, scilicet positive et negative. Et si intelli- 



233 



ETHICS, On MORAL PIULOSOPriY. 



It may be concluded, therefore, that man's natural reason 
dictated the division of property according to which each one 
has his own, and is defended in the possession and enjoyment 
of it, as a moral necessity for the common good, at least for 
large communities; and hence, although the actual division 
of property is from human legislation, yet it is founded on the 
natural law. Against this assertion the objection may here 
arise in the mind of the inquisitive reader : " What right rea- 
son dictates to be done, as something necessary for the com- 
mon good, should rather be called the natural law itself than 
human law; but, as just alleged, the division of property was 
originally made, reason dictating its necessity, 'dictante lumine 
naturalis rationis,' in order to avoid the inconveniences and 
evils arising from common ownership of goods; therefore, 
' the division of property is made by the natural law.' " Since 
the natural law or right reason does not dictate the division of 
property to be simply and under all conditions necessary, the 
argument objected proves only that this division was made in 
accordance with the natural law, and that the necessity or 
expediency of it was a just conclusion from the natural law, 
agreeably to the sense in which all laws comprised in the 
"jus gentium," "common law of nations," are conclusions 

gatur positive, sensus est quod jus natural e dictat quod omnia sunt cora- 
munia; si vero inte'ligatur negative, est sensus quod jus naturale non ins'i- 
tuir proprietates rerum, et in utroque sensu propositio est vera, si sane in- 
telligatur. In primo quidem, scilicet, positive, veriftcatur in casu scilicet 
extremse necessitatis ; quando enim aliquis est in extrema necessitate, potest, 
undecumque sibi occurrit, sibi vel alteri hujusmodi subvenire, quia sua tunc 
naturae jure re usus est. In secundo, scilicet negative, verificatur abso- 
lute; nam, extracasus loquendo, jus naturae non fecit aliquid esse proprium 
alicui, et aliud alteri." — Cajetan, in p. 2. 2, qu. 66, a. 2, ad I. Cardinal 
Toleto speaks similarly in commenting on that same passage. "Observe 
that the proposition, bv natural law, goods are in common as to the 7ise of 
them, may be taken either positively or negatively, and in both senses it is 
true, if rightly understo >d ; it is verified positively when one in extreire 
necessity helps himself with the re'ief which is within his reach, or when 
he does this for another in like want; in that case, he uses what is his by 
the law of nature. The proposition is verified negatively, in that, apart 
from the case mentioned, the law of nature does not make one thing the 
property of one person, and another thing the property of another person." 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 233 

from the natural law. Such laws are not simply immutable, 
since their matter is not simply immutable; whereas the natu- 
ral law and the strictly demonstrated conclusions derived from 
it are simply immutable.* 

The reaasons above given in proof that the goods of the 
. earth should be divided, show its expediency and necessity as 
a means to secure the greater good of society : it now only 
remains to adduce the arguments which demonstrate the fal- 
sity of modern communism, or the theory proposing a return 
to common ownership of property as a measure that is ex- 
pedient and even necessary for the common good of nations. 

In order for the communists to advance any valid argument 
in proof that their theory proposes what is true or legitimate 
in practice, either they must show that nature dictates com- 
munity of goods as necessary, or else they must prove that it 
is expedient and good for nations now to establish common 
ownership of property. These are the only arguments bearing 
upon the subject that can be devised or offered by them; no 
other assignable reasons would be pertinent. 

Now, neither does nature dictate common ownership of prop- 
erty to be necesssary, as was already explained, nor is a return 
to primitive community of goods possible in practice for any 
nation; and hence it is justly charged that this wild scheme 
has nothing in it which can seriously commend it to any but 
indolent, improvident, and vicious members of civil society, f 

* Some of the older philosophers and jurists put "jus positivum" in 
contradistinction to "jus gentium;" but they did not intend by this tech- 
nical use of the terms to imply that the "jus gentium" was not a human 
positive law, or that it is simply the natural law. The general truth which 
nature teaches, and in which all nations concur, not by express agreement, 
but because they judge the same matter in the same manner, namely, the 
goods of the earth should be divided by us, is of the '-jus gentium ;" the 
special laws, or rules by which that division is actually made, and main- 
tained in force, are civil laws, or positive laws, as opposed to the common 
laws of nations, '"jura gentium." But this "jus gentium " must not be 
confounded with the code of positive law now styled " international law." 

tit is a notorious fact that when the communists got control of Paris 
temporarily, in 1871, they sought, not a community of goods, but to enrich 
themselves individually. 
20* 



234 ethics, or moral philosophy. 

That is neither rational nor legitimate which cannot be done 
without destroying peace, order, and justice in civil society; 
but a return to common ownership of property cannot be 
effected in any nation without causing the evils named, and 
others along with them, which would lead to social anarchy; 
therefore the theory of communism is false and impracticable, 
and it was always repudiated by the natural good sense of 
mankind, no nation ever having actually attempted in practice 
so unreasonable a system.* 

The communist argues that " what comes by human con- 
vention can be undone by human convention; but division of 
property is something merely conventional, and therefore it 
can be undone by convention." It is not true that all things 
done by convention or general agreement can be arbitrarily 
changed by human authority; only those things can be thus 
changed or undone which are not thereby converted into 
what is evil, or which, in other words, are, by their own 
nature, susceptible of change, provided there are due and legiti- 
mate reasons for it. There can arise no reasons to justify the 
reestablishment of common dominion in property, nor is it 
perhaps possible as a fact that any nation of mankind will 
ever agree to do so. The reasons originally making the divi- 
sion of property necessary or expedient now militate with still 
greater strength for adhering to separate or exclusive owner- 
ship of property ; or if community of goods was not for the 
general welfare in the beginning of nations, still less can it 
now be good for nations to institute that state of things. 

To answer the communist's reasoning above given, how- 
ever, by asserting that individuals acquire, and actually hold, 
their right to particular property immediately from the law of 
nature, appears to be the denying of one error merely by 
affirming another one, but without really meeting the point of 

* Although the agrarian movement under the Roman commonwealth 
continued, during several centuries, occasionally to excite popular commo- 
tions, and some just concessions were made to the plebeians, yet there 
never was a return to common ownership of property, nor were all the 
goods possessed by the people ever redivided. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 235 

the difficulty raised. Nor will it do to affirm that community 
of goods or common ownership of property was, in itself, im- 
possible from the beginning, since this would be to prove too 
much. In the case of monastic orders, the property of their 
members is actually converted into common property, no one 
retaining exclusive ownership of anything whatever.* It is to 
be observed, however, in answer to any inferences that may 
be drawn therefrom by the communist for the right and fea- 
sibility of reinstating primitive community of goods in nations 
of mankind, that there is no parity between a monastic body 
and a nation. Such a community does not, like a nation, 
include a large number of entirely different persons collected 
together, as it were miscellaneously; nor is it a body politic; 
but it is a peculiar private association that is governed by a 
special system of rules ; it has none but adult members, who 
attach themselves to it voluntarily, and its members still owe 
duty to the civil government of the nation in which they dwell. 
For such a society which, owing to its peculiar aim, is actually 
adapted only to a small number of persons, the common 
ownership of property is indispensable, and in such a com- 
munity it works harmoniously in practice, a result, however, 
which would not be morally possible in a large civil com- 
munity. It follows, then, that the theory of communism is 
false, not because all common ownership of property is evil or 
impossible, and not because a community of goods is, under 
all suppositions, wrong or impracticable, but for this, that divi- 
sion of property having been made by the nations of mankind, 
because they found it expedient and even necessary for the 
common good, a return to common dominion in property 
would now, for still greater reasons, be utterly impracticable ; 
and even if it could be actually effected, a thing that is per- 
haps utterly impossible, the change would be productive of 

*The first Christians also made their goods common property. While 
common ownership of property would now scarcely be possible in a large 
civil community, yet in small ones it may easily obtain, as was the case in 
the French colony of upper Louisiana or Missouri, before that territory 
was purchased by the United States government. 



236 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the greatest evils and no real good. It a widespread and 
numerous nation of mankind could not, in practice, continue 
to prosper or even subsist, without instituting separate or indi- 
vidual ownership of property, how, then, would it be possible 
to establish a community of goods in a nation which never 
adopted such system, because never expedient or even practi- 
cable for it to do so ? 

Let us here recapitulate: God gave the goods of earth in 
common to mankind. Determinate and exclusive ownership 
of property was introduced by human convention or agree- 
ment.* The natural law does not dictate that the goods of 
the earth should be held in common by mankind; nor does it 
dictate that division of them is simply necessary. Right rea- 
son teaches that it is expedient, and in practice it is also 
necessary for the good of large communities or nations of 
mankind, that there should be made an equitable division of 
the goods given in common by nature. After the division of 
those goods is once actually made, because found by a com- 
munity to be necessary for the common good, then a fortiori 
will it be necessary for the general welfare of such community 
that this condition of things be permanently maintained; by 
consequence, the theory of communism as teaching that com- 
mon dominion or ownership of property should be re-estab- 
lished, is false, and in actual practice it would surely prove to 
be disastrous. 

The doctrine of the communists concerning the rights of 

* In order to be further assured that this is the doctrine commonly 
taught in the schools, see Cajetan and Cardin. Toletus, in Sum. D. Th., p. 
2, 2. qu. 66. a. 2; also Billuart, Becanus, or other scholastic authors on 
the same article. Suarez, De Legibus, lib. II. c. 18, No 4, simply accounts 
it to be received as the doctrine in the schools : " Item divi»io agrorum, seu 
terrarumac sedium etterminorum in communi dicitur esse de jure gentium, 
quse manifeste supponit institutionem humanarum societatum, et ilia suppo- 
sita, ex vi solius rationis naturalis omnia ilia licent, licet simpliciter nece- 
ssaria non sint." Also the division of fields or lands, as well as homes, and 
boundaries in general is said to be of human right, which manifestly pre- 
supposes the institution of human, societies, which being supposed, by 
force of natural reason, all these things are lawful, though not simply 
necessary. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 237 

property is herein refuted; but some of their leaders advocate 
other principles still more iniquitous, which have served to 
bring much discredit on them and their extravagant theory in 
all enlightened communities of mankind. As for those among 
them who actually attempt to destroy marriage and the family, 
the legitimate answer to them is not by appeal to the canons 
of logic; such matter pertains rather to the authoritative deci- 
sions of criminal jurisprudence, to the bar of civil justice, 
where convicted culprits that violate the essential and well- 
known laws of social life are arraigned, to have passed on 
them the sentence merited by their misdeeds. 

Finally, some less extreme minds object that "a portion of 
the abundance possessed by the rich, who have more than 
they need, should in natural justice be taken from them and 
given to the poor, who have less than they need, for nature 
intends that all shall have a living from the goods which 
nature provides for all." 

This objection is a mixture of truth and error, and it pre- 
sents a difficulty which it is not expedient to slur over, and 
which at the same time it is not easy to answer in very precise 
terms, for the obvious reason that it belongs to legislative 
power to define the specific means of meeting that emergency 
under its particular and actual circumstances. The general 
reply is, that it is the duty of public authority, and not the 
office of private parties, to provide for the necessary well-being 
of the whole community, and therefore to provide the means 
necessary to save a deserving and innocent portion of the 
people from starvation in a time of such adversity. It is true 
that "nature intends all to have a living from the goods which 
nature intends for all," but nature intends this, as so regulated 
and measured, that the rights of all may be duly defended. 
Nature does not intend to confer a private communistic 
authority or right on individuals of appropriating to themselves 
exclusively goods in which others also have a right. Hence 
a particular part of the community can have only that right 
which is consistent with the rights of others, and which, there- 
fore, must be regulated by general laws of the community. 



238 



ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



This is another one of those difficulties in human affairs, on 
account of which public authority, whose office it is to main- 
tain the general good, is indispensably necessary for every 
civil community. On the hypothesis, however, that individ- 
uals derive their right to exclusive ownership of property im- 
mediately from the law of nature, and not through the positive 
law of society, there would, in this case, be no certain means 
of averting the desperate multitude from violence and anar- 
chy; for, in such theory, it does not appear how even the 
government could rightfully provide for the emergency. 

In considering the matter proposed by the above objection, 
it will help towards clearness of thought to distinguish differ- 
ent classes of poor people. Under the first may be included 
all industrious laboring or working people who, we shall sup- 
pose, wish to live only by upright and legitimate means, but 
who, here and now, cannot obtain wages that suffice for their 
support. It is, without any doubt, the solemn duty of public 
authority to protect them in their natural right to the neces- 
sary means of living. 

Secondly, there is a class of the helpless and afflicted poor, 
comprising such, for example, as are reduced to want by sick- 
ness, or by any of the various misfortunes and disasters that 
may befall even the most virtuous and worthy persons. There 
surely never was an enlightened nation in which all the good 
and generous among the people did not look on it as a duty, 
even of private benevolence, to befriend the suffering poor 
and relieve their wants, though oftentimes this can be done 
only at the risk of being imposed on by the false stories of 
undeserving vagabonds. For this class of the poor public 
authority provides hospitals, homes, asylums, etc., in which, 
according to the particular form of their miseries, they may 
find shelter and comfort in their wretchedness. 

A third class may comprise all those more or less indigent 
people who are idle and vicious, as thieves and lazy vagrants, 
the improvident and sensual drones of society that collect in 
the large cities, where they haunt the dens of low pleasure 
and amusement, who would live above their social condition, 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 239 

and seek the means of maintaining themselves in their ex- 
cebsive habits by various dishonest arts and tricks of fraud. 
It is not work, even for high wages, that such people desire; 
their wish is to lead a reckless and self-indulgent life in idle- 
ness and debauchery. They shun the duties of life, leaving 
toil and the employments of industry to other hands, though 
they would have a full share in the fruits of that industry, 
despite the Scriptural behest, " If any man will not work, 
neither let him eat." * Even if they should come into the 
possession of wealth and abundance, with their dissolute and 
extravagant habits, and their heedlessness of the future, it 
would be quickly squandered in the excesses of maudlin, low- 
bred pleasure. All they require for turbulent action or out- 
breaks is, that they be headed by the bold, dangerous spirits 
which rise up in troubled and evil times from the dark, low 
depths to the surface, to plan and execute desperate deeds of 
violence. They are practical communists; the system of 
communism favors them ; they have nothing to lose, no home, 
no goods providently laid up ; and any change is for them an 
improvement. It can scarcely be doubted, therefore, that it 
is chiefly on this unruly and mischievous element of society 
that the communists, whose leaders are either wild theorists or 
else men of desperate fortune, must depend for enlisting num- 
bers into their ranks. Could any redress of social troubles 
possibly arise from a violent and revolutionary return to 
primitive community of goods brought about by this class of 
mankind, and that, too, with all the calamities and wrongs to 
persons which would be necessarily caused by such a change 
in the very constitution of society ? 

Well-administered government and wise law T s are the means 
intended by nature for protecting and securing all classes of 
citizens in their genuine civil rights. But the principles of 
communism can remedy no evil, and remove no social griev- 
ance. Nay, to reduce that execrable theory to practice would 
be to substitute for occasional troubles that can be quieted by 
authority of just law, manifold evils that could not be endured 
in any but a savage nation. 

*2Thessal., chap, iii., v. io. 



CHAPTER III. 

MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING; THE FAMILY. 
ARTICLE I. 

THE FAMILY IS THE FIRST SOCIETY; OR, MAN'S F[RST SOCIAL 
RELATION, IS TO THE FAMILY. 

Man's first relation to other human beings is that which he 
has to the family. This is manifest; for he has his origin in 
the family, in the sense, that, by the law of nature, he is born 
and reared in the family.* Therefore, man is naturally or 
according to his genetic origin as a rational animal, a member 
of human society. But, because the family in which he is 
born is presupposed to him, the series of preceding families 
goes back till it reaches the first family; which must have 
been created, since a series actually infinite, is absolutely im- 
possible. Hence, man's social relation that was simply first, 
was that of man and woman ; and this is the first basis of 
all social relations. Man is a social being, then, by his 
natural origin ; and society is necessary for his perpetuation 
as a species. 

Man being physically unable to provide for himself in his 
infancy and childhood, indeed, among all the animals, he is, 
at his birth, the least capable of helping himself; it follows, 
then, that man is also dependent on others for the preserva- 
tion of his life. Nay, it is only under peculiar and exceptional 
conditions that a man, even of mature age and vigorous 
strength, could subsist for a great length of time, entirely with- 
out aid or comfort from other persons. Whence it follows 
that as man is born in society, so he is naturally ordained to 

* " Homo est naturaliter animal sociale, eo quod sibi non sufficit ad 
vitam." p. 2. 2, qu. 129, a. 6, ad 1. " Man is naturally a social animal, 
because he has not of himself alone what suffices for life : " and this is 
true, whether we consider the origin, or the continuance of his life. 

(240) 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 241 

live in society, though he should choose to live solitary for a 
part of his life, on account of special and unusual reasons. 

Since the components are logically prior to the compound 
which results from their union, it is evident that the family is 
presupposed to civil society, or is logically prior to it ; for, 
civil society is a multitude of families, ordinarily inhabiting the 
same territory, and reduced to unity by government and laws 
that are common to them. 

It is man and wife that principally and most properly con- 
stitute the family, the essential end of their union, intended 
by nature, being the preservation of the human species ; as 
thus united and forming the family, man and woman consti- 
tute, under a particular respect, but one person civilly.* As 
will be explained in a succeeding article, the family is, under 
a certain regard the unit of civil society; yet, since civil 
authority and government have for their essential end the 
good of the whole community, the unit of civil society is ulti- 
mately and simply the individual, not the family. 

Man is naturally the head of the family ; or, the woman is 
naturally subject to her husband; but she is not his servant, 
however. Observe that there are two distinct manners in 
which a person may rule as superior over others; f first, he 
may govern others so as principally to intend merely his own 
advantage; and, in this case, the condition of his inferiors is 
that of servility or slavery. The woman is not the servant of 
her husband, nor is she at all subject to him in this manner. J 
Secondly ; there is a superiority of one person over others 
arising from greater natural power or more of special gifts 
from nature, as prudence and fortitude, by which he is fitted 
to direct the action of others for their own advantage : it is 

* "And they shall be two in one flesh." Genesis ii. 

t I p., qu. 92, a. 1, ad 2. 

% " Servus in hocdiffert a libero : liber tst causa siti ; servus autem ordi- 
natur ad alium." I p., qu. 96, a. 4 in C. The free man is the cause or 
master of his own action ; the slave is ordained to another ; i. e., he acts 
not for himself, but for another person. 

21 



242 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

only in this second sense that man is superior to his wife, or 
that she is naturally subordinate to him ; for, as regards other 
things, they are equal.* But that man is naturally principal 
or head in the family, may be shown by way of inducti <n 
from well known facts; for, just as we learn from the powers 
and perfections of any created thing, as manifested in its 
action, the end for which it is naturally designed, so, the 
respective duties for which man and woman as constituting 
the family are intended by nature, are made evident by their 
distinct virtues and qualities. Each one of them is endowed 
by nature with special and characteristic qualities, both of 
body and mind, as Aristotle and Xenophon point out. Man 
has intrepidity of soul, and strength of body ; the first enables 
him to conquer the fear of danger; the second empowers him 
to endure the hardships of toil and exposure to the weather; 
his inclination is to be abroad, and engaged rather in outdoor 
employments. The woman is more timorous of spirit, and 
more weak and delicate of body ; and she is inclined to the 
shelter and retirement of home. The virtue of fortitude in 
man, verges farther towards extreme boldness; that in woman, 
naturally inclines more to patience, and it more easily yields 
to fear, f It may be said, then, that the medium or mean 
for the virtue of fortitude, in them, is not precisely identical. 
It is for a purpose that nature gives to man and woman these 
opposite qualities: they are thus fitted for different duties 

* It is worthy of notice, that the word family, is from the Oscan word, 
famel; which signifies a slave, as does the Latin word familia mean a 
collection of slaves. The wife and her children were slaves, till Chris- 
tianity restored the family to its primitive unity and dignity. Previously, 
the penalty of man's primal fall was especially heavy on woman, as De 
Maistre observes. (Du Pape, liv. 3, c. 2.) 

t" Quod una virtus magis declinat ad unum extremum quam ad aliud, 
contingit ex hoc quod virtutis medium est propinquius uni extremo quam 
alteri; sicut fortiudo est propinquior audaciae quam timiditati." P. 2. 2, qu. 
109, a. 4. That a virtue leans rather towards one extreme than towards 
another, happens from this that the medium of that virtue is nearer to 
one of the extremes than to the other; for example, fortitude approaches 
nearer to rash boldness than it does to cowardice. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 243 

which contribute, by different means, to the good of the 
whole family. What is a perfection in the one, may thus be 
an imperfection, if it exist in the other; and for this reason, 
an " effeminate man." or a " masculine woman," are expres- 
sions which, in popular language, have an opprobrious mean- 
ing. It is beside the intention of nature for a person of one 
sex, to assume duties which are proper only to one of the 
opposite sex. 

It is plain, then, from the nature of things, that man is 
principal in the family ; and that he is its chief ruler and 
guardian. 



ARTICLE II 

UNITY OF THE FAMILY. 

Unity is necessary for the family, since it is a community. 

Every community must be one, both as regards the princi- 
pal end which is intended for it ; and also as regards the 
special or proper means to that end. The end intended by 
nature for the family is its good, which is the welfare of all its 
members. The good of the family or welfare of all its mem- 
bers, is gained only by those means that perfect the whole 
family as a community ; or, what preserves its integrity and 
unity. 

Unity is opposed to division. But a thing may be contrary 
to the unity of the family, in very different degrees of opposi- 
tion ; for, first, it may be wholly destructive of that unity; 
secondly, it may be destructive only of what is integral to it ; or, 
finally, it may be detrimental merely to its accidental perfec- 
tion. It is manifest that although a family may continue to 
subsist, even when in an imperfect state, yet, what destroys 
its essential unity, at the same time causes its dissolution, or 
destroys its existence. 

The internal bond of family unity, is well ordered love ; so 
long as love that is pure and strong rules the family, it is in- 



244 ETHICS, OR MORAL piiilosophy. 

destructible, except by extrinsic physical violence which forci- 
bly separates its members from their happy union. 

Both polygamy and divorce are opposed, not only to the 
perfect unity of the family, but to the purity of that love which 
is the bond of union among its members. Are polygamy and 
divorce prohibited, then, by the natural law ? 

Before answering this question, it will be necessary to dis- 
tinguish and explain two different manners or degrees in 
which any action or work done by man, may be opposed to 
natural law, or be contrary to what is intended by nature. 

Nature, either through certain instincts that are inborn, or 
through the light of human reason, dictates somethings which 
concern man merely as an animal being ; and nature also dic- 
tates some other things which concern him according to his 
specific nature as a rational animal. In other words, some 
things are natural to man, on account of his genus, which is 
animal; v. g., to eat, to sleep, to reproduce his species, and 
the like, are of this kind. Other things are natural to man, 
on account of his species or specific nature, as a rational ani- 
mal; of this kind are reasoning, willing, loving rationally, vir- 
tue, peace of mind, etc. A thing is said to be opposed to the 
first principles or precepts of the natural law, when it is against 
the first and principal end intended by nature for that thing. 
A thing is opposed to the secondary principles of the natural 
law, when it is against a secondary end intended by nature 
for that thing. For example, the principal end of eating food 
as intended by nature, is to sustain life ; the secondary end is 
to work well, to study, to be agile, etc.: the first is necessary 
in order for man to live at all ; those second ends are neces- 
sary for the perfection of his life.* 

The first or principal end of marriage, is the perpetuation 
of the human species ; and this is natural to man, or it is 
intended by nature for man, as an animal being. The second- 
ary end of the marriage state is mutual happiness of man and 

* "Aliqua necessaria sunt ad esse rei ; alia, ad melius esse." Some 
things are necessary for the existence of a being ; other things are neces- 
sary for its better existence. 






SPECIAL ETHICS. 245 

woman, contentment, the blessings of peace, means of virtue, 
etc.; and such good belongs to man, or is proper to him, only 
as having a rational nature. 

Polygamy is opposed to the secondary ends intended by 
nature for the conjugal state; but it is not directly or imme- 
diately against the primary end of marriage.* 

That polygamy is opposed to the secondary ends intended 
by nature for the conjugal state, appears to be certain and un- 
deniable ; for, first, the rational love and the attention which 
are naturally due from the man to his family would, if he were 
a polygamist, be divided; and, on that account, his duty as 
head of the family, would be complied with only in part, t 
Secondly; the woman would be degraded to personal inequal- 
ity with her husband ; while, in justice, she should be his con- 
sort and equal, not his servant or merely an abject instrument. 
Thirdly ; it would render peace and happiness in the family 
morally impossible, since it would afford undue occasion and 
incentive to envy, jealousy, hatred, and all the vices and 
violent passions whose effect is to destroy domestic content- 
ment and union. Also, it is a truth confirmatory of this reas- 
oning that the superior races of mankind, as the Aryan or 
Japhetic families, never publicly or generally authorized polyg- 
amy ; among them, the practice was always regarded as 
vicious and debasing. Finally, the intention of nature as 
regards the family seems to be indicated in a manner and a 

* Vide D. Th., 4 Sent., 29 et sequ., or also his doctrine as stated for him 
in Suppl., qu. 65, a. I and a. 2: "Pluralitas uxorum non est contra prima 
prsecepta naturae ; sed est contra praecepta secundaria " Plurality of wives 
is not against the first precepts of nature, but it is against the secondary 
precepts. 

t " S. Thomas, p. 2. 2, qu. 154, a. 2, notices the fact in natural history, 
that all those animals whose young require the attention of both the male 
and female parent, unite in pairs and remain together; as is done by many 
species of birds. It is not thus, however, with the grosser kinds of brutes, 
as the dog, the cow, the hog, etc. Since the child in the human family 
needs the help of both parents in order to be rightly reared and educated, 
an argument is thus furnished by the analogies in nature against polyg- 
amy: it is an argument, likewise, against divorce, though less cogent, 
21* 



246 



ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



sense even still more comprehensive than asserted in the 
thesis, by the significant fact that the numerical proportion of 
the sexes to each other among mankind, is always that of 
equality ; except when there is a transient disturbance of that 
equilibrium, arising from accidental causes, as war and emi- 
gration.* 

It may be concluded, then, that the secondary end 
is necessary to the family \ and, by consequence, polygamy is 
forbidden by dictates of right reason or principles of the nat- 
ural law, possessing corresponding necessity. 

Polygamy is not intrinsically and absolutely against the 
natural law ; because what is thus opposed to the natural law 
is intrinsically evil; for the natural law absolutely forbids 
only what is intrinsically evil; and that which is intrinsically 
evil, cannot be made lawful by any dispensation, since both 
the natural law and the necessary conclusions from it are 
simply immutable, as was already seen. On the other hand, 
polygamy was divinely authorized under the old law; though, 
in the new dispensation, it is forbidden by Divine positive law. 

While polygamy is not prohibited by the first precepts or 
proximate cone usions from the natural law; yet, it is forbid- 
den by other principles or conclusions from the natural law 
that are more remote, and which follow from their premises 
with less strict necessity: such conclusions teach man what is 
conformable to right reason and what should, therefore, be 
observed by him.f It was by such rule of conduct that the 

* The original institution of marriage as recorded in Gen. i ; , is thus de- 
clared: " Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave 
to his wife ; and they shall be two in one flesh." 

t " Secundaria proecepta juris naturae non habeut vim coactivam, nisi 
specialiier a Deo vel ab aliquo p incipe sanciantur; sed solum obligant 
quatenus recta r rio docet ita esse faciendum. ' Becanus v. Matrim, c. 46, 
qu. 2, No. 7. The secondary precepts of natural law have not coercive 
power, unl-ss God, or else some earthly ruler specially command them ; 
but they bind only in so far as right reason teaches that what they prescribe 
should be d me. 

As already said, the universal or common precepts of the natural law 
which are primary conclusions from it applying to every person that can 
judge rationally, as those of the Decalogue, are ordained to secure the first 
or principal end which nature intends in any good work. The secondary 
precepts of natural law, which are derived lrom the first, regard the second- 
ary ends intended by nature in good works. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 247 

superior races of mankind always rejected polygamy as op- 
posed to reason ; that they even prohibited it by law, in some 
instances. These remoter deductions from the natural law as 
applied to the affairs of human life, are more or less strict and 
unchangeable, according to the nature of their matter; but 
because that matter is less necessary or more contingent, the 
precepts regulating it may permit dispensation, at least by 
Divine power. The primary conclusions from the natural 
law proximately regard man's rational nature, in those things 
that are immutable; v. g., "pay due homage to God ; " " do 
no injury," etc. There are other natural precepts which 
proximately regard an extrinsic order of actual things that are 
related to man, but which may be changed by Divine power 
without any change in the natural law itself: when Abraham 
was commanded to immolate Isaac : when the Israelites were 
ordered to take the valuable goods of the Egyptians, and the 
peculiar command was given to the prophet Osee,* there was 
in these instances, a change in the relation of exterior things 
towards man's rational action, which God can make at will, 
even unto their annihilation, or the substitution of others, 
thus constituting a different order of means to action. But 
the question of polygamy regards matter that is still farther 
removed from the one most general precept of the natural 
law, " do good; avoid evil; " and, even all mankind do not 
judge this subject to have the same relation to natural law, 
as is evinced by the fact that to day, more than half of the 
entire human race, being degenerate and imperfectly enlight- 
ened, recognize polygamy as legitimate. But that polygamy 
is against the better teachings of right reason, and opposed to 
man's superior rational instincts, is a truth that admits of no 
well-founded doubt. 

Since polyandria plainly defeats both the primary and the 
secondary ends of matrimony, it is evidently, and immedi- 
ately, against the natural law; hence, among all the races of 
mankind, polyandria was always regarded as a crime against 
nature. 

* Osee, ch. i. 



248 



ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Is tli ere a precept of the natural law binding all persons to 
marry when the time and circumstances are opportune ? 
Marriage as a natural duty of man, imposes an obligation on 
the human species collectively, but not distributively. The 
right reason of each person dictates many things that are 
necessary for his own perfection ; and such teachings of rea- 
son bind the person. But while every one can see many 
things that are necessary for the common welfare, as agricul- 
ture, navigation, the mechanical arts, etc.; yet the public need 
of these various employments places no obligation on every 
one who sees their necessity for the general good ; else every 
one should be lawyer, merchant, farmer, etc. 

It is manifest, then, that there are duties pertaining to men 
in general, which do not impose an obligation on every indi- 
vidual man in particular. It is for the public authority, when 
necessary for the common good, to use such efficacious and 
becoming means as may induce compliance with those duties 
to the community that all avoid. But there is a general provi- 
dence according to which the various tastes, necessities, inter- 
ests, etc., of different individuals, direct them to occupations 
which are suitable for them, and good for the community at 
large. As water naturally tends to its equilibrium, similarly, 
the judgments and the inclinations, which rule particular per- 
sons that are variously disposed, lead them, under this con- 
trolling providence, to the respective vacancies which they can 
advantageously fill. 

It is the natural duty of most persons, as it is also their rea- 
sonable preference, to marry ; but if there be an insuperable 
impediment to the marriage state for some individuals, they 
will rightly lead a single life; as others may justly do, who 
wish to apply their time and energy, with greater freedom, to 
superior pursuits. 

DIVORCE. 



Divorce appears to be less universally, and less prox- 
imately, opposed to the ends intended by nature for the 
conjugal state, than does polygamy. The secondary precepts 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 249 

of the natural law do not directly and per se allow any case of 
polygamy even by exception ; nor is one authorized by the 
Divine positive law, under any circumstances. The christian 
law permits divorce a vinculo, or perfect divorce with the right 
to marry another partner, whenever one party having become 
a Christian, is no longer able to live in peace with the other :* 
such person is free to separate from that infidel consort, and 
choose another partner. All grant, moreover, that for just 
reasons, there may be divorce a toro et mensa, from bed and 
board, or imperfect divorce, consisting either in temporary or 
permanent separation ; but however, without the right of 
marrying other parties, a right that exists only when there is 
divorce a vinculo. Bellarmine f remarks correctly, that if we 
consider marriage merely as a duty prescribed by nature, and 
apart from all positive Divine ordinance, the case might arise 
when no conclusive reason could be assigned why divorce 
should not then be legitimate. Hence, the only certain and 
demonstrative reason proving the divorce a vinculo or perfect 
divorce to be illicit under all circumstances, except for the 
case specified by St. Paul, is the Divine positive law; it can- 
not be demonstrated by arguments derived from natural reason 
that no other exception is allowable. 

But, on the other hand, when we consider this matter in 
general, and a priori, the legitimate union in matrimony is 
a contract which, by its very nature, is permanent. That it 
is intended by nature to be a permanent contract, may be 
inferred from the truth that the primary or principal end of 
matrimony is the rearing of offspring; and the perfect accom- 
plishment of parental duty to children imposed on them by 
nature, requires that their entire lives be dedicated to the 

* i Cor., ch. vii. vs. 12-16. 

t " Si consideremus matrimonium ut officium naturae ad propagandum 
sobolem, segre potest reddi ratio cur ob sterilitatem conjugis non liceat 
earn dimittere aut aliam ducere." De Matrim., lib I, ch. iv. If we con- 
sider matrimony merely as a duty of nature for propagating the race, it is 
not easy to assign the reason why it is not lawful to put away the sterile 
consort, or choose another. 



250 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

task.* The most important part of education is that which is 
received from the parents at home; so much so, that the loss 
of parental home instruction, can scarcely ever be supplied 
by that of any extraneous tutor; and this duty of educating 
the children rests on both parents. Even when their children 
have reached their majority, and have departed from the 
home in which they were reared, they still need counsel from 
the experienced; and their parents alone can, with well- 
founded hope of good, give those wise and acceptable moni- 
tions which benefit their children, because known by them to 
come from those that love them, are able to advise them, and 
truly wish their welfare. 

Neither can the secondary ends intended by nature for the 
conjugal state, which were mentioned when speaking of polyg- 
amy, be practically realized in marriage, unless it be an indis- 
soluble contract. If the bond of matrimony could be really 
severed on account of any reasons that ordinarily occur in 
human life, then neither party would have security against 
the other's defection : thus confidence, and therefore genuine 
love, would fail ; their union would be only a precarious one, 
and by consequence, perfect peace and happiness in the family 
would be impossible. 

Marriage is a sacred union between two persons, man and 
woman, who are thereby made, in a moral sense of the term, 
one; and the bond of that union, is love that is pure. The 
only system of laws that can certainly, generally and effica- 
ciously defend the unity, purity, and sacredness of the mar- 
riage state, are the laws of sacramental matrimony. It can- 
not be reasonably doubted that the increased facility now 
given by statutes enacted in many States of the American 
Union, for obtaining divorce under numerous pretexts, 

* "A parentibustria habemus, scilicet, esse, nutrimentum, et disciplinary " 
D. Th. cum Aristot. We have three things from our parents, namely, ex- 
istence, sustenance, and education. 

Some animals only give existence to their young ; others, give both ex- 
istence and food. It is only human parents that give to their offspring ex- 
istence, sustenance, with education in knowledge and virtue 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 251 

is an important step towards degeneracy of manners. Some 
defend this departure from the wiser and better laws in- 
herited from our forefathers, by saving that ' ; since the 
great majority of our population is non christian, the State 
cannot here regard marriage as being anything more than 
a civil contract; and the state has no power to render a civil 
contract indissoluble, by its human authority, when it is not 
so by its own nature; and marriage, if regarded only as a 
natural contract, is not per se indissoluble." 

Surely the state has no power thus to constitute any con- 
tract immutable, when it is of its own nature mutable ; and 
it is also true that the public authority has, here in the 
United States, to deal only with the civil relations of mar- 
riage; but yet, the State could continue now, as formerly, to 
recognize marriage as a sacred contract, which, by its original 
terms, as well as by its own intrinsic nature, is not a tem- 
porary bargain, but is permanent and indissoluble, at least, 
quoad vinculum. When this just and reasonable ideal of mar- 
riage was practically recognized in the laws, discontented 
couples arranged their private troubles without applying for 
divorce. Marriage being thus guarded by law as something 
sacred, was entered into with more prudence and upright- 
ness; unions that now originate and are completed in sud- 
den and capricious feeling, or in maudlin passion, were 
then prevented, or at least their number was diminished. 
Even in pagan Rome, true to the higher instincts of man's 
rational nature, there was no instance of divorce, till the 
morals of her people were corrupted by contact with the 
voluptuous nations of Asia. The increase of divorce, in any 
country, is a sure indication of declining morals.* The social 
manners and customs of the decayed Semitic races, never 
sank to their low standard, before polygamy and divorce had 
destroyed among them the purity of the conjugal state, and 
thereby debased the family. 

* When the Redeemer of mankind said to the Jews, " What God hath 
joined together, let no man put asunder; " they replied that Moses allowed 
divorce. He answered that it was permitted on account of their hardness 
of heart ; " but from the beginning it was not so." Matth. 19. 



252 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

It may be concluded, then, that it is for our wise and good 
statesmen that are sent to the halls of legislation, to oppose, 
not to follow, this downward tendency of the American fam- 
ily; and it is for them, therefore, to defend the unity, purity, 
and sacredness of the marriage state. 



ARTICLE III. 

RESPECTIVE DUTIES OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN. 

It is the natural duty of parents to provide suitable means 
of living for their children during their minority. This duty 
follows from the truth, that, ist, the parent is, under nature, 
the free efficient cause of the child's existence; 2d, the child is 
physically unable during its minority to provide for itself the 
means of living Therefore, nature manifests, under this two- 
fold respect, the duty of parents to feed and clothe their 
offspring. The like intention of nature is evident in the anal- 
agous action of irrational animals towards their young, in 
which they are impelled and guided by an instinct naturally 
implanted in them. The young of all animals are, in a greater 
or less degree, dependent for a time, on the progenitors that 
gave them life ; and of all animals, the young of the human 
species are the most incapable of providing for themselves, 
and their helpless state endures longer than that of any other 
animal species. It is, therefore, a natural and necessary duty 
of parents to support their children during minority. 

Parents are also bound to give their children suitable edu- 
cation. The duty of educating their children naturally rests 
on parents, for the same reasons that make the providing of 
food and raiment a duty naturally incumbent on them. The 
preserving, developing, and perfecting of the human species, 
both physically and morally, are thus made by nature greatly 
dependent on parents. To this work of early education, the 
government of the community may contribute indirectly ; but 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 253 

its execution is directly the duty of the parents only.* The 
duty of parents to educate their children, implies the right, 
also derived directly from the natural law, not to be unjustly 
prevented from fulfilling this obligation towards their children. 
Education has for its proper object the physical, intellectual 
and moral welfare of the children, both as regards the time 
being, and the future when they are to act for themselves. 
Hence, the health of children should be guarded ; they should 
be inured to habits of well ordered industry \ their understand- 
ing should be developed by exercise, according to their capa- 
city, and informed with the knowledge of things that ought to 
be known by them in the state of life in which they are to be 
placed. Parents are bound to teach their children, both by 
precept and by example, to practice virtue and avoid evil ; to 
know and to fulfill their duty to their Maker, to those having 
authority over them, to their equals, and their inferiors. There- 
fore, education is both of the intellect and the will or heart. 
A defective or vicious education in childhood has been styled 
" a second original sin ;" for, as by the first one, human nature 
lost many gifts that exalted it preeminently, so, the privation 
of so great a boon as good education in childhood, lowers the 
future man far beneath what naturally he ought to become. 

Parents have authority over their children, and they are 
thereby empowered by nature to govern their children during 
minority. This authority is an essential means for parents to 
discharge their duty towards their children. Its justice and 
necessity arise also from the natural inability of children 
rightly to direct their own conduct. They can coerce the 
obedience of their children; but, unlike the rulers of per- 
fect communities, they have not the power of life and death. 
In the government ot their children, prudent parents avoid 
the extremes of excessive indulgence and leniency, on the one 
hand; and of cruelty or tyranny, on the other. It cannot be 
legitimately doubted that rewards and punishments which are 
discreetly and equitably proportioned to the conduct, consti- 

* See Vattel's "Law of Nations," Book I, ch. xi. 



254 

tute the most efficacious means of ruling human beings. Ex- 
perience teaches that, by what seems to be nature's penalty, 
children reared in families, in which no proper discipline or 
order is preserved, evince, in after life, little affection for their 
parents. 

Children have some duties towards their parents which are, 
by their nature, perpetual ; they have other duties to their 
parents that are temporary. They owe unfailing love to their 
parents : filial love is a natural and instinctive principle in 
man ; but the love for parents which is a perpetual duty, is 
rational affection for them. They should reverence them as, 
under some true respect, their superiors to whom acts ot 
deference are always due. They should comfort them in the 
sufferings of declining life, and amply supply their wants, if 
they be reduced to poverty; for, children justly owe support 
to needy parents, who sustained and reared them, when 
unable to provide for themselves. Not even the follies or 
errors of parents exempt their children from the proper 
exercise of these sacred duties. 

Children, during their minority, owe obedience to their 
parents in what pertains to their education and to domestic 
discipline; provided, however, that parental authority does 
not require what is evidently evil ; in which case, obedience 
is not lawful. * 

While children have a right to inherit the goods of their 
parents ; t yet, as jurists agree, this does not exclude the right 
in parents to give a portion of their goods for other laudable 
objects ; or even to disinherit the vicious and incorrigible 

* According to the law of the Roman Empire, the majority was reached 
at the age of twenty-five years. In accordance with the laws of most 
nations at the present time the child's majority begins at the completion of 
the twenty- first year from birth. 

tin Roman law, Justinian Instit, lib. II, Tit. xviii, "De Inofficioso 
Testamento," it is provided for setting aside a will that arbitrarily or un- 
reasonably omits giving anything to the child. The Athenians before the 
time of So'on, and the ancient Germans, believed children to have a natu- 
ral right to inherit the goods of their parents. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 255 

heir. This right in children to inherit the property of their 
parents, is more generally regarded as a civil right, however, 
and not simply as a natural right; the civil rights of primo- 
geniture, and various laws regulating inheritance and testa- 
ments in different nations, may be adduced in proof of this 
assertion. (See Blackstone's Commentaries, Book II, ch. i.) 



ARTICLE IV. 

THE SERVILE STATE, OR SLAVERY; RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF 
MASTERS AND SERVANTS. 

Just as man has not, under the natural law, any arbitrary 
dominion over the life and members of his own body, but pos- 
sesses a right only to their lawful use ; so, neither can he hold 
any such dominion over the life or body of another person. 
The only dominion which one person can acquire over another 
person as his servant, is right of ownership to the lawful and 
useful service which that person is able to render. Therefore, 
the slave owner's right is limited to the legitimate and reason- 
able work commanded of the slave, and which that slave is 
both morally and physically able to perform. 

Natural law does not dictate to mankind that there should 
be slavery ; nor did it positively or directly, ever induce nations 
to originate that condition of servility.* The state of slavery 
was begun conventionally, or by human law ; but slavery is 

* "Aliquid dicitur esse de jure naturae dupliciter ; uno modo, quia natura 
ad hoc inclinat : sicut, non esse injuriam alteri faciendam. Alio modo, 

quia natura non inducit contrarium Distinctio possessionum et 

servitus non sunt inductse a natura, sed per hominum rationem ad utilita- 
tem humana? vitae." P. 1.2, qu 94, a. 5, ad 3. A thing is said to be of 
natural law, in two manners : first, because nature inclines to that ; as, in- 
jury should not be done. Secondly, because nature does not induce what 
is contrary to that thing. The distinct ownership of possessions and 
slavery, are not prescribed by nature, but they come through man's reason 
for the advantage of human life. 



256 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

not per se or of its very nature, against the natural law. The 
law of nature, then, does not in any case prescribe the state of 
slavery, as somethng good and useful; but natural law per- 
mits it, under circumstances and conditions which will be 
described; and thus the lawfulness of slavery is deduced in- 
directly from natural law. 

Prior to the rise of Christianity, slavery appears to have 
existed in all nations, and to have been authorized as legiti- 
mate by every race of mankind. The type of human civiliza- 
tion undergoes changes, whether by rising or falling in its 
standard of perfection ; and there are numerous signs that the 
nations of the earth, very soon after their original formation, 
all rapidly sank below the manners and customs, and the cor- 
recter ethical knowledge, transmitted to them from Noe. At 
the present day, more humane sentiments prevail among 
nations in regard both to instituting the state of slavery, and 
its continuance where it actually exists. This change for the 
better is mainly due, it cannot be doubted, to the gentle yet 
strong moral influence of Christianity; by which the master has 
been gradually elevated to nobler conceptions of man's natural 
dignity, and the enslaved have been progressively fitted for 
manumission, and prepared to enjoy their liberty rationally. 
During the long dark night of pagan rule over the human 
mind and civil society, the family, which comprised the child, 
the woman, and the slave, was tire property of the man; and 
he was its tyrannical master.* He alone was recognized by 
the public authority as having any rights before the law; for 
he alone was a citizen, and he alone was a unit in the body 
politic. The Chr'stian church arose, and taught that the child, 
the woman, and the slave, all have equal right with their 
human lord to redemption and heaven ; that the Christian 
laws and sacraments, are for all ranks of society equally : doc- 
trine which presented a new idea of the family. This work 
then begun, of overthrowing the old but degenerate system of 

* The fact that some Pagan nations, as the Spartans and the Persians, 
treated the child as public property of the government, is not a substantial 
exception to this statement. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 257 

the family and social life, is not yet wholly flushed, nor is it 
equally advanced among all peoples ; for, the progress of 
great truth is slow, and it is hard to eradicate prejudices and 
customs that are old and wide-spread. Since the condition of 
the child and its mother was somewhat less debased than 
was that of the slave, they were sooner disenthralled than the 
slave could be. 

Is it to be affirmed, then, that the state of slavery is per se 
unjust ? In answer, it will be proved that, 

The natural law does not simply and absolutely prohibit all 
slavery ; or, the state of slavery, is not intrinsically opposed 
to natural equity. * 

Civil society, through its supreme authority, has the right, 
in self-defence, to punish certain enormous crimes with death 
to the culprit; but the enslavement of a criminal for life is a 
milder penalty than is that of death ; therefore, for a still 
stronger reason, can society punish such criminal with slavery 
at hard labor for life. 

By similar reasoning, in all those cases in which prisoners 
taken in just war can be legitimately put to death, a fortiori, 
they can be subjected to the lighter sentence of slavery for 
life. This argument indicates the reasoning by which the 
nations of old justified the first introduction of slavery; and 
admitting, as we must, that the laws of war then in force 
legitimately authorized the slaughter of prisoners taken in just 
war, their reasoning was perfectly logical and consequent. 
The wives of the soldiers should, in such case, naturally share 
the condition of their husbands, it was agreed, and thus they 
became bondwomen. 

It must be observed, however, that the present laws and 
usages of war as agreed upon by civilized nations, forbid the 
execution of prisoners, except in case of extreme necessity; as, 
when such means is strictly required for self-preservation. 

* "Servitus ex quadam sequitate introducta est ex jure gentium." Beca- 
nus. Slavery was introduced with a species of equity by the common law 
of nations. 

22* 



258 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Also, the reducing of prisoners to slavery, is now forbidden by 
the laws of war.* It would seem to follow, then, that by the 
present law of nations, the state of slavery, which is perpetu- 
ated from parents to children cannot now originate or begin 
anew, in a nation that has no slavery. If so, under what legiti- 
mate title could people that are free be now made slaves ? It 
is now conceded that superiority in power and intelligence 
can found no right to enslave a race that is weak and unen- 
lightened. It was once admitted that persons could become 
slaves by their own free choice ; as, for example, when this 
was done by one in order to secure a permanent home and 
certain means of living. Such contract was not right nor valid, 
however, when prohibited by the laws of the nation. 

Although a right to personal liberty may be validly founded 
on prescription, yet, one person cannot acquire ownership over 
another as his slave, by right of prescription ; or, there can be 
no right of prescription against the personal liberty of any 
man that is otherwise free, t This principle, which was also a 
rule of the Roman law, seems to be a necessary deduction 
from natural equity ; for, it is not reasonable that a boon so 
sacred and precious as is personal liberty, should be forf.ited 
merely by prescription. At the best, a right of ownership 
which is purely prescriptive, is not founded on simple com- 
mutative justice; but it rests on certain respects of ex- 
pediency and general utility, which are conceived by jurists 
to supply for the deficiency of strict justice in some mat- 

* For the present laws of war generally agreed on by nations, and which 
govern the matter in question, see Vattel, "Law of Nations," Bk. 3, ch. 
viii; or, Wheaton's "Elements of International Law," Part IV, ch. i. 

t " Servitus mere personalis, quce debetur personae a persona, nullo tem- 
pore prsescribi potest. Ratio est, quia aequitas non patitur hominem libe- 
rum fieri servum ex errore opinionis ; servus tamen preescribit libertatem 
contra dominum. " Becanus, De Jure, ch. ix. qu. 9. Merely personal 
slavery, which is due from one person to another, cannot become prescrip- 
tive by any lapse of time. The reason is that equity does not suffer a free 
man to become a slave through mere error of opinion ; a slave may, how- 
ever, acquire his liberty by prescription against his master. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 239 

ters.* Against those goods which are the most sacred, 
precious, and necessary among all the goods of man, it 
is admitted that there is no prescription: v. g, there can 
be no prescription against one's life, peace of conscience, 
etc. ; and of this kind is personal liberty, which, there- 
fore, cannot be taken away, merely by right of prescrip- 
tion. Yet, on the other hand, it might happen that the cir- 
cumstances, under which a race is still detained in slavery that 
by its origin was unjust, would be such that the master him- 
self could not change their condition without causing greater 
evil ; and thus slavery might actually become, as regards the 
individual master, the less of two evils. 

It was always a rule, wherever the state of slavery was intro- 
duced, that the slave offspring inherited the condition of the 
mother; if the mother was a slave, the child was a slave, even 
if the father was a freeman ; and if the mother was free, her 
child was thereby free; hence, it was an axiom among the old 
jurists, "partus sequitur ventrem;" i. e., the condition of the 
child, as free or not free, follows that of its mother. In prac- 
tice, this is a necessary rule; for, the children of slave mothers 
could not, especially when there is a large number of such 
mothers enslaved for life, have the rights and immunities of 
freedom ; nor, vice versa, could the children of free mothers 
be, in practice, treated as slaves : and thus the condition of 
slavery was transmitted from parents to their offspring. 

To the foregoing statements it might be objected that " all 
men are naturally equal; therefore, it cannot be rightly said 
that one is born a slave." 

It is true that "all men are naturally equal," in all those 
things that are essential to man when he is considered speci- 
fically, or in the abstract. All men are naturally equal, in the 

* For example, according to the civil law, when land is acquired in good 
faith, and held in good faith during a certain period of time, no one dis- 
puting the title to it, these circumstances found prescriptive right of own- 
ership in such property, though in fact it actually belonged to another before : 
this is a right which is founded on equity, and not on strict commutative 
justice. 



260 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

sense that all have the same nature, all are destined for the 
same ultimate state or end, with the same essential means to it. 
But when we consider men as actually related to the various 
circumstances and concrete particular things around them, 
they are not all equal, in respect to those things; men differ 
in health, talent, temporal goods, inheritance, and all those 
particular things that accede to men as individuals. Hence, 
to be a slave by birth, is not against natural right, when the 
mother is legitimately a slave; anymore than it is against 
natural right for one to be born poor, of plebeian parents, ot 
feeble body or mind, etc., for, as regards these things which 
are extrinsic to man's nature, he is born to the rank, circum- 
stances, or condition of his parents. Hence, in what is essen- 
tial to human nature, all men are born equal; in what i; extrin- 
sic and accidental to human beings, men differ, and all are 
not equal as to such things. 

"All the proofs given in justification of slavery, constitute 
but a sorry argument; and since it is not demonstrated that 
slavery ought to exist, it should rather be said that slavery is 
against nature." 

It cannot be demonstrated that slavery ought to exist in 
any nation ; for, nature does not prescribe slavery ; but it is 
shown that slavery may be legitimate, under some circum- 
stances ; or, that slavery is not simply or absolutely prohibited 
by the law of nature. Its existence, then, as legitimate, is 
proximately from human law as not opposed to the natural 
law ; and it is in this sense that it was said to be derived indi- 
rectly from the law of nature. 



CHAPTER IV. 

OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 
ARTICLE I. 

NECESSITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 

The social state is natural to man ; and, by consequence, 
the civil or political state is also natural to mankind, since a 
multitude of human beings could not live in a social state, 
unless they be united into a body politic. 

In order to affix a precise meaning to the term "natural," 
as here used, observe that the word " essence " expresses all 
those invariable and immutable constituents of a being with- 
out which its existence is not possible or even conceivable. 
" Nature/' in its first and most proper sense, expresses the 
essence, as empowered to operate; for, every being, in order 
to act, must possess the requisite properties and powers that 
fit it for action : now, when a being is considered as having 
both what is necessary for its existence, and for its own 
proper or specific action, it is, under that respect, a nature* 
We may say with propriety, therefore, that action, inclination 

* "Alio modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia, vel quodlibet ens ; et 
secundum hoc, illud dicitur natura rei quod convenit ei secundum suam sub- 
stantiam, et hoc est quod per finest rei." I. 2 p., qu. io, a. I. A sub- 
stance or a being is said to be a nature in another manner ; thus, that is 
called the nature of a thing which agrees with it according to its substance, 
and this is that which is said to be per se in a thing. 

" Aliquid potest esse naturale dupliciter ; uno modo secundum naturam 
speciei, sicut naturale est homini esse risibilem; alio modo secundum natu- 
ram individui ; sicut naturale est Sorti vel Platoni esse aegrotivum vel 
sanativum secundum propriam complexionem." P. I. 2, qu. 51, a. I, in c. 
Any thing may be natural in two manners : first, according to the nature of 
the specie?, and thus it is natural to man to be risible; secondly, according 
to the nature of an individual ; thus, it is natural to Socrates or Plato to 
be sickly or healthy, according to the character of his bodily constitution. 

(261) 



262 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

to act, power to receive action, are natural to every substance. 
But a thing may be predicated as natural to a being in 
different senses, and in very different degrees of necessity; 
v. g , something may be predicated as natural to man, because 
it is an essential constituent of his substantial being; * as when 
we say, "it is natural to man that he has a soul," or "a body ; " 
in this case, we predicate what is per se necessary, by way of 
essence or part of essence. Again, we may say that t " risibi- 
lity and the faculty of rational language are natural to man ; " 
in which instances, we predicate what is per se necessary to 
man, by way of properties or attributes, which are the com- 
plements of his being, flowing from his essence, and indispen- 
sably required in order duly to fit him for action. Finally, 
we may say, "it is natural to man that he seek the 
company of other men ; that he live in society," etc. In 
this case, it is manifest that we predicate what is per se neces- 
sary for men in general or as a species; though not, as hap- 
pens with the two predicates that precede, declaring what is 
intrinsic, essential, or per se necessary, as regards every indi- 
vidual man under all circumstances and hypotheses. Since 
the social state is natural to man partly on account of his 
specific nature as a rational animal, and partly on account of 
reasons which regard men individually considered, it is not 
impossible that this or that particular man might live solitary, 
on account of reasons that are special to him. 

When it is affirmed, then, that the civil social state is neces- 
sary or natural to man, it is meant, that man's nature requires 
as necessary for him specifically, or for mankind generally, \ 

* " Praedicatum per se, idem est ac prsedicatum non contingens." The 
predicate per se is the same thing as a predicate that is not contingent. 

t "In contingentibus sicut naturalia et res humante, sufhcit talis certitudo 
ut ahquid sit verum in pluribus, licet interdum deficiat in paucioribus." P. 
I. 2, qu. 96, a. I, ad 3. In contingent matter, as are physical agents and 
human affairs, certainty is sufficient for us when anything is true in most 
cases, though it happen to fail in a few instances. 

% " Homo magis est naturaliter conjugale animal quam politicum; sed 
homo est naturaliter animal politicum et gregale." Div. Th. cum Aristot. 
Man is more inclined by his nature to conjugal life than to civil life ; but men 
are naturally civil and gregarious. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 263 

that they live in a civil or political state ; but yet, it is not 
impossible for this or that individual man, under special con- 
ditions, to exist and act naturally, even if not a member of 
the body politic. 

In order to apprehend the proofs of the thesis, " The civil 
social state is natural to man ; or, man is naturally ordained 
to live in civil or political society," as perfectly conclusive, 
attend to the force of the principle according to which all such 
truths must be demonstrated; namely, we know the nature of 
no being, except so far as the action* of that being manifests 
to us its nature. For example, we come to know what 
"magnetism" is, only by ascertaining, through experiment 
and inquiry, what its action is; we are aided also in determin- 
ing the limits of its nature, by learning some species of action 
which it has not ; which is to know indirectly what it is. Our 
knowledge of " magnetism " is then enunciated in positive and 
negative propositions, which describe or define its nature. 
Similarly, we find the proofs that man is naturally destined 
for society made evident to us, by the actions and inclinations 
which manifest his nature to us. 

The proof: Those things in which all men agree, as a spe- 
cies,! or which are substantially identical in all men, are 
natural to man ; but all men as a species agree in those things 
which render civil social life necessary for them ; therefore 
those things are natural to man. It will be seen that, by 
consequence, man being naturally social, " naturaliter animal 
gregale et politicum," is ordained by his nature for civil life. 

Man is naturally ordained, then, to live in civil or political 
society, because, first ; neither is the individual man sufficient 
for himself, nor is the family able to sustain and protect itself 

* "Modus agendi sequitur modum essendi." Manner of acting follows 
the manner of existing. 

Hence, when we know the nature of a being's action, we may conclude 
from it to the being's own nature or essence. 

t " Non enim omnes homines conveniunt, nisi in eo quod est eis natu- 
rale." P. 2. 2, qu. 57, a. 3. All men do not agree except in what is natu- 
ral to them. 



264 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

independently of other families around it : therefore, mutual 
support is necessary for human beings. Nature clothes the 
brute or irrational animal, by the operation of purely physical 
law; its senses and natural instinct direct it to the objects that 
supply all its wants, as regards food, rest, medicine, etc. 
Man's guide in such things is not any natural instinct; but it 
is reason which can learn what is best for food and raiment, 
for health, remedy of disease, etc., only through the experi- 
ence of many persons. 

Secondly, the faculty of language,* by which knowledge 
and experience are mainly acquired, diffused and transmitted, 
indicates clearly that nature intends men to live in community, 
since this gift would otherwise lose its principal end and value. 

Thirdly; man, unlike the irrational animal, is perfectible, 
not only as an individual, but the human species is also per- 
fectible, by means of increased experience and knowledge. 
This fact that the human species is perfectible because man is 
a rational animal, is itself a conclusive proof that nature in- 
tends the perfection of the human species, as an end; for, na- 
ture bestows no good gift in vain. But the human species 
cannot tend to its own perfection, except by means of that 
union which constitutes human society. It follows, then, that 
society is necessary for man, because he is perfectible, and 
he can attain his greatest perfection only when he is in society. 

Fourthly: man's strong inclination to live in society, to 
seek the companionship of his fellow men ; nature gives no 
strong inclination which has not a proper object and a com- 
mensurate end. Her,ce, man's natural love of society and 
horror of solitude, which are innate in him, furnish striking 
proof that he is naturally designed for society. 

Fifthly : man's capability of rational love and works of 
benevolence and generosity, also indicates thai he is made for 
a social state; his noblest virtues both of intellect and heart 

* Capability of using language is peculiar to rational beings; it is in this 
meaning that Homer rften repeats such expressions rs, " ysvsac 
[LZpOTZLOV dudpct)~COl> f " generations of word-dividing men. Iliad, 
lib. I, line 250. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 265 

or will, v. g., wisdom, science, art, love, and the virtues that 
spring from it, can, in the very nature of things, have their 
most perfect exercise and reach a high degree of development, 
only in the society of his fellow men. 

We may justly conclude, then, that man is intended by 
nature for the social state; and this truth derives further con- 
firmation from the fact that mankind have always lived in 
more or less perfectly organized society. 

Conceding the explanations and reasoning above given to 
be correct, a brief statement will suffice to refute the theories 
advanced by Hobbes and Rousseau, regarding the primitive 
and natural state of mankind. 

According to the doctrine of Hobbes, the natural state of 
man is that of warfare. Admitting man's natural condition 
and occupation to be that 'of war, we must, by consequence, 
grant that man naturally hates his fellow men, or that he is, 
by his nature, a misanthrope ; that, by the law of his own 
nature, he must abhor peace ; that is, he must love the things 
that are of war, or lead to war, and hate the things that 
pertain to peace. The consequences follow necessarily, 
if we assume it to be true that war or warfare is the natural 
and only congenial state of mankind. But these conse- 
quences, considered in themselves, are simply and evidently 
false in fact; man's nature and inclinations tend to peace; 
and it is only as a necessary means to peace or security, that 
war is generally admitted to be at all justifiable. 

According to the hypothesis of Rousseau, man's natural 
state is that of the wild animal in the forest ; or, he is, by his 
original nature, a wild man of the woods. In the still more 
fanciful theory of Rousseau's contemporary, Lord Monboddo, 
man's primitive original nature was that of the monkey. 
These wild and gratuitous assertions were, perhaps, sufficiently 
replied to at the time when they were first advanced, by the 
celebrated Doctor Johnson, who, in his own characteristic 
style, said to Boswell, " Sir, Rousseau knows that he is talking 
nonsense, and laughs at the world for staring at him. But 
I am afraid Monboddo does not know he is talking nonsense." 
23 



266 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Whether Rousseau was in earnest or not in proposing his 
hypothesis, it is certainly a fanciful one. All that can be said 
in its favor is, it is purely a hypothetical manner of explaining 
the primitive condition of mankind and the origin of civil 
society, for the truth of which no conclusive fact or principle 
can be alleged. It belongs to the domain of philosophy to 
argue a priori the question, " was man originally created from 
nothing?" and it can be proved demonstratively that man 
must have been created from nothing, as to his soul or spiritual 
part. But the question as to whether one man and one woman, 
or many couples were originally made, and as to what was the 
precise state of the first rational creatures, are matters which it 
is the office of history or revelation to settle, since the whole 
is an inquiry concerning contingent facts which cannot be 
determined by a priori reasoning, because they could have 
been accomplished in divers ways. We actually know, on 
testimony which founds perfect certainty, that all mankind 
are descended from one couple as first parents or progenitors; 
and the testimony of the Bible to the unity of the human race 
is corroborated for us by legitimate conclusions from ethnology 
and comparative philology. 

But abstracting from our positive knowledge of the histori- 
cal facts, and reasoning only from the nature of things, we 
must reach the conclusion that a number of human beings 
created and placed without knowledge or language in the 
forest, would possess little more ability than infants to pro- 
vide for their own wants. Under this respect, they would be 
greatly inferior to the brutes around them, which are guided 
by instincts naturally implanted in them ; and it would be 
physically impossible for them to survive, unless they were 
preserved under some special providence ; which, however, 
the theory does not suppose. The system of traditionalism, 
asserts that man can acquire no idea, and learn no truth, 
except through the ministry of oral terms; for, it holds, 
there can arise no thought in the understanding, except as 
expressed by a name in language. While this hypothesis 
affirms too much, and is therefore false ; the other extreme is 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 267 

equally untrue, that the human race, beginning as wild men 
in the woods, without any experience, and without infused 
knowledge, could continue to subsist, and could, without 
being aided, form for themselves articulate language. 

It was seen in the preceding chapter that man is a social 
being, primarily by his origin as a member of the family; 
and that his first relation to other persons is that which he has 
as a member of the family, in which he had his origin. The 
arguments adduced in the present article prove that it is 
natural and necessary for the families of mankind to live in 
society. It follows by a further inference that the social 
state which is thus necessary for mankind in general, is that 
of civil or political society. For, the end* of society, in the 
very nature of things, is the common good of all its mem- 
bers; and that common good cannot be attained, unless the 
multitude composing the society be united under the direc- 
tion and government of authority, or power of jurisdiction 
that is supreme over the entire community. 

Supreme authority of jurisdiction is that power in the per- 
son, or in the moral body, that is superior over the whole 
community, in virtue of which such head or superior is able 
to make and enforce just laws for maintaining the common 
good. It was already shown that all just law has for its 
essential end this common good; it may now be rightly said- 
that supreme authority in the civil community, or body politic, 
is also a means that is ordained to the common good, as its 
essential end. 

* Here distinguish between an end that is relatively ultimate, ana an 
end that is simply and absolutely ultimate. The end of all things, that is 
simply and absolutely ultimate, we must place in God, the first cause of all 
thai is. An end is relatively ultimate when it is ultimate in its own order, 
or is the one to which all the other ends in that series are subordinate; for 
example, in human society the end of its civil law or polity, which is 
relatively ultimate, is the welfare of the community, or the common good 
of the people. 



26S ethics, on moral philosophy. 



ARTICLE II. 

HOW GOVERNMENT BY SUPREME AUTHORITY IS NECESSARY FOR 
CIVIL SOCIETY. WHETHER THE INDIVIDUAL PERSON, OR 
THE FAMILY, IS THE UNIT OF HUMAN SOCIETY. 

The necessity of government for civil society will be more 
clearly and satisfactorily understood, if we consider the whole 
matter in the light of first principles. 

Could a nation of human beings exist, by any hypothesis, 
without authority in a visible superior ruling over them ? It 
was not intrinsically impossible for the Creator,* by choosing 
another providential dispensation from the beginning, sd to 
order and perfect man's rational nature with knowledge of the 
true and the good and with rectitude in his reason, that man 
would act with faultless wisdom and uprightness in all things 
regarding himself, his neighbor, society at large, and God. 
In other words, God could, if he so chose, make rational 
beings who would be subordinate to him through their own 
rational nature, without any intermediate ruler between them 
and Him, and they would thus tend to a common end, with- 
out the ministry of a human ruler. In such hypothesis, how- 
ever, man would not be created a perfectible being, but rather 
a perfect one : such state would rather be the ultimate term 
of his being, than that of tending to it by the acquisition of 
the intellectual and moral virtues, and thus perfecting himself 
for a final state of existence. 

Again; we may suppose man's nature to be made integral, 
as it is expressed; but that under other respects he still has 
it in his power to perfect himself: or, we may even suppose 
that he possessed the additional prerogatives constituting the 
state of innocence : would civil government and positive laws 

* For a brief, clear and accurate explanation of the different states in 
which man's nature can be conceived to have been created, or constit. 
see Becanus, Samma Theologiae Scholastics, De Auxiiio Gratise, Dis- 
put. II. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 269 

be necessary, in such conditions of human nature, for a mul- 
titude of mankind living in society ? 

Man's nature would be integral* according to the sense gen- 
erally attributed to the term, if, besides having all his mem- 
bers and powers complete, that is, his rational and organic 
powers, his stature, strength ; all the properties and qualities 
of his nature perfectly balanced and proportioned, thus fitting 
him to tend with facility towards his final state or ultimate 
end ; if, besides all those perfections, he had this in addition, 
namely, freedom from all struggle or opposition arising from 
his sensible appetites, and from all sensible inclinations that 
are against the decision and choice of the superior rational 
power. It follows, then, that, in the state of integral nature, 
all the passions would be promptly and exactly obedient to 
the will ; and that they could not, in their action, anticipate 
the choice of the will, nor even incline man to what is con- 
trary to his wishes. As thus gifted in his nature, it would, 
however, still remain for man to perfect himself as a rational 
being, capable of moral action. 

The stale of innocence, considered as something within the 
limits of nature, or apart from the supernatural order or the 
order of Grace, includes over and above the prerogatives of 
the integral state, immortality of the body ; freedom from in- 
voluntary error; the gift of impassibility, or exemption from 
pain or suffering. Whether man were in the state of integral 
nature, or in that of innocence, he would nevertheless live in 
society ; for, man is by nature a social being. It would still 
be his duty to perfect himself for his final condition of exist- 
ence, or for his ultimate beatitude ; but yet, he would have it 

* "Sicut status naturae integrge precise sumptus non dicit ordinem ad 
finem seu beatitudinem supernaturalem, ita nee status innocentiae, cum privi- 
legia omnia quibus continetur sine ordine ad hunc finem divinitus confeni 
possint." Becanus, De Auxil. Grat. Disput. I, qu. 3, Art. IV. As the 
state of integral nature precisely considered does not say reference to an 
end or beatitude that is supernatural, so neither does the state of innocence 
necessarily suppose such ultimate end, since it would not exceed God's 
power to confer the privileges peculiar to that state of innocence without 
ordaining man for a supernatural destiny. 

23* 



270 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

in his power to avert from God as his ultimate objective end ; 
for, he would not be impeccable. Man's need of direction 
and government under superior authority, in such case, would 
arise from this; ist, that he would be in the state of tending 
to his ultimate end ; 2d, he would be liable, even in those 
favored states, to fall away from duty ; 3d, in those conditions 
of his nature, he would remain a social being. 

It may be affirmed, then, that civil government would be 
necessary for mankind, even in the state of innocence, which 
includes the prerogatives or perfections peculiar to the state 
of integral nature, over and above those that are proper to 
itself. 

Mankind in such a state of existence would require govern- 
ment and law as directive, in what is necessary for the com- 
mon weal, as the proofs that are to follow will show • but law 
as coercive, could then scarcely become necessary for man,* 
owing to the perfect subjection of his passions and inclinations 
to the superior powers of his rational nature, in such a state. 

Many different persons necessarily intend many different 

* "Tunc dominatur aliquis alteri ut libero quando dirigit ipsum ad pro 
prium bonum ejus vel ad bonuoi commune. Tale dominium fuisset in statu 
innoceniise : primo, quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, unde homines 
in statu innocentiae socialiter vixissent. Socialis autem vita multorum esse 
non posset, nisi aliquis preesideret qui ad bonum commune intenderet. 
Secundo; multi per se intendunt ad multa, unu-i vero ad unum. Hii.c phil- 
osophus: quandocunque multa ordinantur ad unum, semper invenitur 
unum principale et dirigens. Tertio; quia unus homo habuisset super 
alium supereminentiam scientise et justitise, et inconveniens fuisset nisi 
hoc exequerrtur in utilitatem aliorum." 1 p., qu. 96, a. 3. One person 
governs another one as a free man when he rules for the good of the gov- 
erned, or for the common good There would be such government in a 
siate of innocence : first, because mm is naturally a social animal, and 
hence, man in a state of innocence would live socially. Put there could 
not be social life of many, unless some one were over them to intend the com- 
mon good. Secondly, many persons necessanly intend many things but one 
person intends one thing. Hence, the philosopher says, when manv things 
are coordinated to one, there is always found one thing that is principal, 
and directive of them. Thirdly, because one man WMi'd have superiority 
of knowledge and justice over another, and it would be inconsistent if this 
superiority were not employed for the advantage of the others. 



271 

things; for, just as the persons differ individually, so will the 
objects which they intend, differ among themselves. Each 
member of society, even in the state of innocence, would, by 
the law of his nature, be principally and primarily concerned 
only about those things that would pertain more or less im- 
mediately to himself, to his own welfare; and he would care 
only in a secondary and accidental manner for what regards 
the community at large. Yet, the common good far exceeds the 
good of any one person; hence, the axiom of the schools says, 
'■'boiiiim multitudinis est majus etdivinius quam bonum unius."* 
It follows, then, that if there were no supreme authority or 
director of society or the multitude, the principal and most 
necessary good, which is that of the whole community, would 
be intended only as an end that is secondary and accidental, 
even if it were intended in any manner at all. Therefore, it 
would be necessary that some person or b ?dy of persons should 
have the special duty, and the power, to intend the common 
good of the whole community and to provide for it efficaci- 
ously, as a principal end. 

Again, it is evident that the end which is ultimate for civil 
society, and which must be dominant over the entire multitude, 
is the common good ; but, in order that there should be unity 
of action in tending towards that end, there must, in the very 
nature of things, be some one ruling principle that moves and 
directs all the members of the community to that end ; and 
this can be done only by authority and law that are supreme 
over such community. Hence, society can not exist as such 
unless it have unity of action in respect to its essential end ; 
and it cannot have this unity of action and tendency, except 
through some principle that is one, and acts alike on all; and, 
finally, this principle can only be that authority which intends 
the end that is common to all the multitude, and positively 
directs all the citizens to its attainment. 

We may conclude that government and law would be ne- 
cessary for man, even if he were in the state of innocence; 

* The good of the whole multitude is something more divine than is the 
good of one person. 



272 KTIIICS. OH MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

because he is naturally a social being, who would be tendirg 
to his ultimate perfection or beatitude, from which he, not 
being impeccable, would be capable of averting his choice and 
action. A society of mankind necessarily requires govern- 
ment and law both as the bond of its union, and as the direct- 
ive norma of its action. 

For still greater reasons are supreme authority and govern- 
ment necessary for mankind, as men are now actually con- 
stituted. 

There are additional and special reasons on account of 
which mankind as now actually constituted require govern- 
ment and law. The principal cause of this greater necessity, 
is in the fact that, instead of the passions and sensible inclina- 
tions of the human compound being subordinate to reason in 
man, as he actually exists, those principles of his nature now 
anticipate the decision of reason and the choice of the will. 
It follows, then, that owing to the manner in which man's na- 
ture is now ordered, in respect to those inferior principles of 
action in him, the control of his passions is oftentimes a diffi- 
cult work for him. Since men are prone to crimes and 
disorderly action, the injustice, violence, and various vices and 
excesses of evil citizens, would destroy the peace, security, and 
well-being of the community, and render the very existence 
of human society impossible, unless there ruled over it some 
supreme authority, whose laws possessed the two-fold virtue 
of being both directive and coercive ; or, in other words, unless 
there was over it a superior power which would be fully com- 
petent to enact just laws, and to compel obedience to them. 

The question may be now appropriately asked, what is the 
unit or component of human society ? Is this unit or compo- 
nent, the family; or, is it_the individual person? In other 
words, it is now to be examined whether the individual per- 
son, or the family is the subject of law, of right and d. 

In order correctly to answer this question, it is necessary to 
distinguish different respects under which human society may 
be considered. First : we may regard the entire human race 
as one society, whose members have the same rational nature, 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 273 

and who are all subject to the natural law: since the natural 
law is published immediately to each individual reason, the 
unit of the human race as directly and immediately bound by 
the natural law, is the individual person. Secondly : we may 
consider the family,* of which the parent is the natural head ; 
it is plain that the unit of the family is the individual; since 
it consists only of individual persons. Thirdly : we may con- 
sider the body politic, or civil society; under a certain respect, 
the family is the unit of civil society; but ultimately and essen- 
tially, civil society intends the good of all its individual mem- 
bers as its end. t Supreme authority in the civil community 
governs mainly and proximately through the heads of families, 
because it is necessary, in the actual order of things, thus to 
apply most laws to the community; when we regard the laws 
as directed proximately to these heads of families, the families 
may be considered as, under that respect, the units of civil 
society. Laws that have for their proximate end the neces- 
sary rights and duties of individual persons, are not concerned 
with the family except per accidens, or indirectly; for example, 
the law is directly defensive of the minor's person against any 
unjust aggressor, even its own parent. 

It may be concluded, then, that families are under a par- 
ticular respect, the units of civil society ; but simply and ulti- 
mately, those units are the individual persons that make up 

* It is manifest that if we regard mankind only in a material sense, most 
persons are members of a family ; for, as, a fact, every one is born in the 
family ; and nearly every one remains, under some respect or other, an 
actual member of the family. We may say, then, that the material com- 
ponents of human society are families ; but we can also, with as good 
reason, say that individuals are such components. 

t " Est de ratione legis humanse quod ordinetur ad bonum commune civi- 
tatis." P. 1.2, qu. 95, a. 4. It is of the essence of human law that it be 
ordained for the common good of the State. 

The end which is essential to law is the common good of the community, 
not only as a collection, but as taken distributively ; otherwise, law would 
have for its end only an abstraction ; for, the common good, except in so 
far as it is realized in the individual members of the community, is only an 
abstraction. 
ig 



274 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

that society. Also, if the family were simply and ulttimately 
the unit of civil society, then the civil authority could directly 
reach and govern only the heads of families ; by consequence, 
these heads of families should have supreme political authority 
over their own households, whereas it was already seen that the 
parent has only economic authority over his own family. 

According to a theory followed in practice by some pagan 
nations of antiquity, only the head of the family was a citizen : 
the members of his household were his property, and he had 
over them even the power of life and death. While such sys- 
tem is false in principle and unjust in practice, it is, on the 
other hand, true that there are rights and duties of parents 
immediately and necessarily relating to the maintenance and 
education of their children, which are derived by them from 
the natural law, and which, therefore, are net derived from 
civil law, any more than they can be rightfully abrogated by 
civil law. 

The natural defender of the child's rights against the unjust 
parent by whom it is totally neglected and abandoned, or 
would be gravely injured in its rights as a member of the com- 
munity, or would be destroyed, is the civil authority ; since it 
it is for such ends that the civil authority is naturally ordained. 
By the Christian or supernatural dispensation, the Church has 
the right divinely given, of requiring that the children of her 
fold be duly educated through her ministry, in what pertains 
to faith and morals. This right of the Church is not opposed 
to the power conferred by nature on the civil government ; 
but on the contrary, it is perfective of the civil order.* 

* There is a respect under which the family may also be considered as the 
unit of the Church ; namely, in so far as she governs through the heads of 
families ; but, simply and ultimately, the individual is the unit of any 
society. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 275 



ARTICLE III. 

ORIGIN OF AUTHORITY TO GOVERN CIVIL SOCIETY. 

While the different kinds of irrational animals are united 
into herds and flocks, and are directed in their gregarious 
action, by principles which are only physical and mechanical 
in their operation; rational animals, or human beings, who 
judge and choose, must be united and directed, by a principle 
that is rational and moral in its action. It is evident that the 
principle of union must be according to the nature of the 
beings united ; in the brute, this principle is mere animal 
instinct, while in man, it originates as a dictate of reason ; 
and it is through such dictate of right reason that authority 
to direct and coerce, comes naturally and necessarily to human 
society. 

This authority may be regarded, under different respects, 
both as a formal, and a material principle in human society ; 
it is formal, as being an active constituent of society by hold- 
ing it united, and empowering it to govern its members; it is 
material, in respect to its end, which is the common good of 
the community or society, since a means is related to its end, 
as matter is related to form. * 

Authority may be considered either as it is in itself absolu- 
tely and a priori, under which respect, it, like all good things 
in their origin, is immediately from God. Or, authority may 
be considered as a moral faculty actually existing in human 
society; under this respect also it originates from God, who 
has so constituted things that it arises naturally and necessarily 
in human society, for its preservation and welfare; hence, as 
the natural law, that is implanted in man's reason, is from God, 

* " Finis comparatur ad id quod ordinatur ad finem, sicut forma ad mate- 
riam .... sic rectitudo voluntatis est quasi materia ; beatitudo perfecta 
est forma." P. I. 2, qu. 4, a. 4, in C. The end is compared to what is 
ordained for that end, as matter to form. Thus, rectitude of the will is 
quasi matter ; perfect beatitude is the form. 



276 ETHICS, OK MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

so is that authority with which human society is naturally 
endowed, also from God. Or finally, authority may be re- 
garded as it is in the person that rules over the community. 
Concerning authority as considered . under this last respect, 
supposing the government of a nation to be now first organ- 
ized by the people, and that they are left to act naturally or 
without any special Divine intervention, the question may be 
asked; from whom does the ruler proximately or immediately 
receive his supreme authority ; from the people that cho >se 
him to govern in their stead, or directly and immediately 
from God ? * 

It has commonly been taught in the schools, especially 
since the time of the great Angelic Doctor, that civil authority 
is received by human society immediately from God ; but the 
person that rules over civil society, receives his supreme 
authority to govern, immediately from the people, and medi- 
ately, or through the people, from God. This thesis enunci- 
ates the true and sound doctrine concerning the origin of civil 
authority, as will be shown. 

In order precisely to apprehend the scope of the proposi- 
tion, observe that civil authority is here spoken of as to its 
ordinary and natural origin ; or, its origin in the nature of 
things. By a special and supernatural providence, as in the 
case of Saul, authority may come to the ruler immediately 

* "Dominium et praelatio ex jure humano introducta sunt." P. 2. 2, qu. 
io, a. io, and qu. 12, a. 2. Actual and exclusive ownership of property, 
and superiorship in authority of a particular person over a multitude of per- 
sons, are from human positive law. 

" Ordinare aliquid ad bonum commune, est vel totius multitudinis, vel 
alicujus gerentis vicem totius multitudinis." P. I. 2, qu. 90, a. 3, in C. 
To ordain anything for the general good is the office either of the whole 
multitude, or of some one holding the place of the whole multitude. 

"Qui Cprinceps) non habet potestatem condendi legem, nisi in quantum 
gerit personam multitudinis." P. I. 2, qu. 97, a. 3, ad 3. He (the ruler) 
has not power of making law, except in as much as he bears the person of 
the multitude ; that is, he has power to legislate only in so far as he repre- 
sents or impersonates the community intrusting him with his authority to 
act for them. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 277 

from God, and not naturally, or by means of a transfer made 
by the multitude. 

Before advancing reasons in proof that the thesis declares 
the only manner in which civil authority naturally originates 
in human society, it will help towards a clear understanding 
of the whole matter, first to give a brief account of the oppo- 
sition made to it by different classes of thinkers, especially 
within the last three centuries. It appears that the first influ- 
ential opponent of this doctrine was Louis of Bavaria : * he 
maintained that kings receive their authority to rule immedi- 
ately from God, and not through the medium of human 
society ; at the same time engaging able scholars to defend this 
opinion with learned arguments.. His aim, it would seem, 
was to prove that the Roman Pontiff had no power to depose 
him ; he argued that what God himself directly and immedi- 
ately bestows, cannot be taken away by any earthly tribunal. 
Despite all that was said in proof that his authority, like that 
of the Pontiff to rule over the Church, was immediately from 
God, he was, nevertheless, deposed by Clement VI. James 
I, of England, more than a century later, wrote a work in 
which he maintained the " Divine and indefeasible right of 
Kings"; or, that their power comes to them immediately from 
God, not through the medium of the people ; and that " the 
Kingf can do no wrong." The learned Spanish Jesuit, Suarez, 

* " The notion of the divine right of kings had been promulgated in Eng- 
land previous to the time when Fortesque wrote. A parliamentary title to 
the throne, however, became established on more than one signal occasion. 
.... Neither did the opinion of a divine and indefeasible right in kings 
make much progress, until a comparatively late period." See " De Laudi- 
bus J.egum Anglise," by Sir John Fortesque, chancellor to Henry VI, 
ch. xv, with notes by Andrew Amos: published by Robert Clarke & Co., 
Cincinnati, 1874. 

Sir Thomas More maintained, in spite of the tyrant, Henry VIII, that 
the king held his crown by parliamentary tide. See Lives of the Chancel- 
lors, by Campbell. 

t" The right Divine of Kings to govern -zorong," is the witty and expressive 
language in which the poet, Alexander Pope, condemns as absurd this 
opinion defended by King James. 

24 



278 



ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



in his work, "Defensio Fidei Catholicae," lib. 3, answered King 
James, declaring the opinion defended by him to be novel 
and singular ; and that it appeared to have been devised in or- 
der to exaggerate the power of temporal rulers, and to lessen the 
spiritual power of the Church. This theory of King James, 
which is a consistent argument for caesarism or absolutism, 
was defended both in England and in Germany, till it was 
found by those who preferred juster notions of the common 
good, even to favor at court, that the giving of absolute and 
inamissible authority to fallible kings, not merely lessened the 
power of the Church : it also destroyed the just rights of the 
people ; and, therefore, that the theory of " the Divine and 
indefeasible right of Kings," under this respect, at least, proves 
too much. 

In France, Louis XIV propounded substantially the same 
notions concerning kingly authority ; " L' etat c'est moi ; " I 
am the state. There were not wanting at his service courtly 
philosophers of learning and ability to defend this claim of 
absolute power, as of Divine right ; and to denounce any con- 
trary opinion as unchristian. They argued that the supreme 
civil authority must come immediately or proximately from 
God to the temporal sovereign, since the opposite doctrine 
would authorize revolution at the choice of the people ; 
whereas, that which God himself gives immediately, no earthly 
power can take away, for any cause. They cited in their favor 
the text from St. Paul, Rom. xiii. 1 ; "There is no power but 
from God : " * and, had it been authoritatively and defini- 

* " On this text Cornelius a Lapide expresses what maybe regarded as the 
doctrine generally taught in the Christian schools, and he proposes it as if 
undisputed: " Potestas saecularis est a Deo mediate, quia natura et recta ratio, 
quae a Deo est, dictat et hominibus persuasit praeficere reipublicoe magis- 
tratus, a quibus regantur : potestas vero ecclesiastica est a Deo instituta — 
est immediate a Deo." Secular power is mediately from God; because 
nature and right reason, which are from God, dictate and persuade men to 
place over the commonwealth magistrates by whom they are governed ; but 
ecclesiastical power is immediately from God, by Him immediately was it 
instituted. 

Similarly Billuart, Dissert. I, a 4, De Leg., explains this text as applied 
to civil and spiritual power ; as do authors generally. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 279 

tively settled that the Apostle therein teaches a'l power to come 
immediately from God to the civil ruler, his words would have 
long since decided the dispute, at least for Christians. 

At the present time, few minds belonging to any school of 
thought, believe in the "divine and indefeasible right of 
Kings, " or that the temporal ruler derives his authority im- 
mediately from God, and not mediately or through the people. 
There are many at this day, to be sure, who strive to magnify 
the prerogatives of the civil power, and to diminish those of 
the spiritual order ; they do so, however, not by claiming that 
civil rulers derive their authorty immediately from God ; but 
rather that its origin is from the will of the people, and that 
the will of the people is the supreme and ultimate law of all 
human society. * 

Since the days of Rousseau, many writers, ignoring, or else 
positively denying, all Divine character or virtue in supreme 
civil authority, make of it merely the creation of that original 
pact by which the multitude agrees to become a body politic, 
or to live together as a civil society; net duly attending to the 
fact that authority and law, which are thus purely human in 
their first origin, and by their entire nature, can impose on the 
consciences of the people no obligation to obey. 

Opposed to all these opinions concerning the origin of civil 
authority, is the sound doctrine, affirmed by Suarezf to be 
commonly taught and certain, " sententia communis et 
certa ; " namely, that God gives authority to civil society 
immediately ; society may either retain this authority, and 

* As before said, excited and passionate minds, and also minds of limited 
ability to distinguish and generalize, are apt to dispute by asserting univer. 
sal contraries, both of which, in moral matter, are generally false. The 
theory of false liberalism, and that of csesarism or absolutism, appear to be 
opposites or contraries of the kind described. 

t " Dicendum est ergo hanc potestatem, ex sola natura rei, in nullo sin- 
guiari homine existere, sed in hominum collectione : conclusio est communis 
et certa." Suarez, De Leg., lib. 3, c. 2, No. 3; et cap. 4, No. 2. It 
must be said, therefore, that this power does not exist, from the very nature 
of things, in any particular man, but it thus exists in a collection of men. 
This conclusion is common and certain. 



280 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

govern itself democratically ; or else make it over in trust to 
a ruler chosen by the people to represent the community, and 
to provide for the common good. But not otherwise can any 
one, except by special Divine intervention, justly and validly 
acquire this authority, than through the consent of the com- 
munity, either proximately or remotely given, to the transfer 
of it from their hands. * Nor does it by any means follow 
that because the civil ruler receives his authority immediately 
from the people, and, therefore, receives it only mediately 
from God, revolution in government at the mere will of the 
people is thereby authorized; in fact, the lawfulness or un- 
lawfulness of revolution depends on a different order of rea- 
sons, as will be shown in a succeeding article. 

Observe that we attribute to God as sole and immediate 
cause, f only those effects and operations that intrinsically, or 

* In defending this manner of explaining the origin of civil authority, 
against the innovators of their time, Bellarmine (De Lai,cis, lib. 3) and 
Suarez (in his answer to King James I, of England, and in his work, Pe 
Legibus), have treated this whole matter so ably and fully, that little is here 
said, or, indeed, can be said, on either side of the question, which may 
not be found well expressed by them. 

" Sequitur ex: dictis, potestatem civilem quoties in uno homine vel prin- 
cipe reperitur legit' mo, ex ordinario jure, a populo et communitate man- 
asse, vel proxime vel remote; nee aliter posse haberi, ut justa sit." Suarez, 
De Leg , lib. 3, c. 4. It follows from what was said that whenever civil 
power is found in one man or legitimate prince, by ordinary right it came 
from the people and community, either proximately or remotely ; it cannot 
be otherwise possessed, so as to be just. 

"At jus divinum nulli homini particulari dedit hanc potestatem; ergo 
dedit muliitudhii."' Bel'.armine, De Laicis, lib. 3, c. 6, where he develops 
this conclusion. Divine right gave this power to no particular man ; it, 
therefore, gave this power to the multitude. 

t " Creatio et justificatio impii, etsi a solo Deo fiant, non tamen propria 
loquendo miracula dicuntur : quia non sunt nata fieri per alias causas, et ita 
non contingunt proeter ordinem naturae, cum hsec ad facultatem naturoe non 
pertineant." P. I, qu. 105, a 7, ad I. Though creation and justification of 
the impious are from God alone, yet they are not, properly speaking, called 
miracles ; because they are not of a nature to be done at aU by other causes, 
and thus they do not happen by exception to the order of nature, since 
these things do not pertain to the powers of nature. 

The subtle intellect of Horace saw this truth, and he accordingly lays 






SPECIAL ETHICS. 281 

at least actually, and as a fact, exceed the power of created 
nature. This rule is in accordance both with perfect pru- 
dence and sound philosophy. But it does not thence follow 
that miracles are the only immediate divine works ; for, there 
are other works which are not miracles, and which, neverthe- 
less, God alone can perform : the creation of human souls is 
not a miracle, and yet God alone can create from nothing. 
In such works, God may be said to act by way of a natural 
cause. Hence, the first cause is not to be introduced without 
necessity, or when the question is only of a principle that is 
first in an order or series of second causes. 

Agreeably to the foregoing rule, we must not conceive God 
as conferring authority on civil society, by a special act dis- 
tinct from his creation of men's rational souls, any more than 
we should conceive the natural law to be imparted to the 
human reason by any such special and distinct creative act. 
Such an act could not be known to us, except by revelation ; 
just as it can be known to us only through revelation, that 
spiritual power is communicated to the Church by a super- 
natural act;* but civil power is natural to human society, 
and, therefore, like the law of nature, its existence should be 
evident through the natural light of reason, or without the 
help of supernatural revelation. Hence, civil authority comes 
to human society, not in a miraculous or in a supernatural 
manner ; but it comes naturally ; or, like the natural law, 
through a dictate of right reason ; when it sees that God, in 
providing what is necessary for man. must have conferred this 
power upon political or civil society: "qui dat form am, et 
dat consequentia ad formam " ■ to give a nature is to give also 
the things that must necessarily belong to that nature. When 
considering this authority under different respects, we may 
conceive it either as coming to civil society by way of an 

down his rule for the plot of a drama : ei Nee Deus intersit nisi dignus vin- 
dice nodus Incident: " Do not make God take part in the work, unless he 
alone can solve the difficulty. 

* " Authority in the Church is not of natural origin ; it comes through a 
special and supernatural providence. 

21* 



282 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

essential property, or as a necessary consequence of man's 
nature, or as originating through a dictate of right reason. 

Authority is, in itself, from God. That authority is, in itself, 
from God. is proved not only by its being naturally necessary 
for human society; for God alone can give existence or being 
to a rational nature, and to that nature's laws and properties; 
but also, its power to punish crime with the death of the 
culprit; its ability to bind the conscience, show a virtue in 
supreme civil authority which it could not possess, except as 
coming from God, for no purely human power can have any 
such prerogatives. Although that union of the people by 
which they become a body politic or form a civil society sup- 
poses a voluntary agreement among them ; * yet, the authority 
which is necessary for governing them, comes, not by their 
choice, or by their pact, as Rousseau erroneously asserts ; but 
it comes in the very nature of things, and, therefore, necessa- 
rily. By consequence, authority is naturally and necessarily 
in the community, even if, by absurdity, the people willed to 
constitute themselves into a civil community, that would be 
intended by them to exist without it ; so soon as they consent 
to unite and become a community, thereupon and conse- 
quently the authority is actually and immediately in that 
community. 

We may consider a multitude of human beings under two 
respects ; first, merely as a large collection or great number of 
men who, however, are not united together by any species of 
bond : in such a multitude of men, authority does not exist, 
except radically or potentially, as an effect may be conceived 

* " Prius est tale corpus politicum constitui quam sit hominibus talis 
potestas, quia prius esse debet subjectum potestatis quam potestas ipsa, 
saltern ordine naturae. Semel autem constitute- illo corpore, statim ex vi 
rationis naturalis est in illo hsec potestas — per modum proprietatis reslilt- 
antis." Suarez, De Leg., lib. 3, c. 3, No. 6. The body pontic, or the 
community, must be actually constituted before there is in men such power; 
because the subject of the power ought to be prior to the power itself, at 
least in the order of their origin. The community being constituted, imme- 
diately, through a dictate of natural reason, this power is in it, by way of a 
resultant property. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 283 

to preexist in the cause that can produce it; secondly, we may 
consider such multitude of men as having agreed, for the sake 
of securing their common welfare, to be united into one com- 
munity; they thus become a perfect community, or a body 
politic; and it is as a community of rational beings that they are 
made capable of moral action that is regulated by law, and it is 
as such community, also that they constitute a subject that is 
susceptible of authority. By consequence of this agreement, 
and in the nature of things, they possess authority which is a 
necessary means for realising the common good ; this moral 
faculty, authority, does not begin to exist by the mere choice 
or only through the will of the people ; it originates by way of 
an essential property in the body politic, and it is published, 
like the natural law, in the dictate of right reason, and it is, 
therefore from the Author of nature. Hence, as all just law 
is derived from the natural law ; analogously, when we con- 
sider the merely natural order of things, all civil authority that 
is justly acquired, is derived from that power to govern, which 
originates naturally and necessarily with the civily community, 
and belongs to it as a necessary means for it to subsist. 

Political power or authority to govern, then, is naturally 
and originally in the whole community, and not in any par- 
ticular person, since all are equal in this regard ; and no one 
can acquire this authority, therefore, except by the agreement 
of the people.* It will be conceded that it depends on the 
free choice of the people to determine whether they will exer- 

* Same have denied that this authority can exist at all in a community; 
they affirm that since the families distributively taken can have only ■ ' econ- 
omic authority," so, when they are taken collectively, they can have no 
other authority. But this reasoning is not logical ; and besides, even if ad- 
mitted to be correct, it would prove too much; for, it would equally prove 
the impossibility of all corporate faculty or right, all common dominion, 
etc. The argument is not logically valid, since a multitude without any 
corporate unity is specifically different from one that is an organic body or 
community ; and hence, illation from one to the other is not here legiti- 
mate. This is like to the sophism, " each witness taken alone gives only 
probable testimony ; therefore, many witnesses taken collectively, give only 
a collection of probable testimony"; herein there is also conclusion from 
one specific object to another different specific object ; which is illogical. 



284 

cise this authority themselves democratically, or give over its 
exercise to one ruler, or to a union of several men who will 
thus personate the community and provide for the public 
weal. In the latter case, we must, both in propriety of lan- 
guage and truth of fact, say that the authority is thus com- 
mitted, transferred, or made over, by the community to the per- 
son charged by them with its exercise for the common good. 
Just as subordinate officers are truly and justly said to derive 
or receive their authority from the supreme ruler who com- 
mits it to them, nor is this against the nature of the moral 
faculty, which authority is ; so, it is equally consonant with 
fact, and with the nature of things, to say that the ruler de- 
rives or receives his authority immediately from the commu- 
nity. Just as the se/ii/ig, and the letting, of one's house, agree 
in this, that both are acts of dominion, for both suppose 
him to own the house; so, for the community to give its 
authority over to a ruler, and for that ruler to delegate au- 
thority to a subordinate, agree in this that both actions con- 
sist in transferring authority. Besides, to assert that it is 
repugnant to the nature of authority that it should be trans- 
ferred by the people to a ruler chosen by them, is to affirm 
too much ; since, that being true, we should cease to speak of 
rights, titles, ownership of property, etc., as being given, sold, 
made over, and the like, from man to man; for they too are 
moral faculties that come originally from God. The very ar- 
guments which are drawn from the nature of authority as 
having God for its author, to prove that a community of man- 
kind cannot give it, or transfer it, will be equally conclusive 
against the intrinsic possibility of giving, or transferring, any 
right, title, or moral faculty, no matter what be its special 
object. 

That the people forming the civil community immediately 
confer the supreme authority on the ruler whom they elect to 
exercise it in their behalf, is shown also by the fact, admitted 
by all, that the people in organizing their government, can re- 
strict the authority given to the ruler by various limitations 
and conditions ; and they can even provide for its withdrawal 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 235 

and its reversion to them; for example, if the original terms 
on which its retention was made essentially to depend, be 
violated by him ; or if his term of office was limited to a spe- 
cified .period of time, and the like provisions of law. On what 
principle, and by what right, could the people thus modify, 
add to, and take from, authority, which God himself bestows 
immediately on the ruler, and even go so far as to regulate its 
use ? 

A ruler who receives his authority immediately and abso- 
lutely from God, is not responsible to any earthly power for 
the use of that authority; since a trust is per se to be accounted 
for, only to him from whom it really comes ; but it is against 
reason for any man, who is not infallible in teaching and pre- 
scribing what is per se necessary to be known and done by the 
community, to possess absolute authority, for the use of which 
he is answerable to no power on earth. In fact, however, 
temporal rulers are responsible also to power that is on earth 
for the use made by them of their authority to govern ; and 
this is so, because they are liable to abuse it by making laws 
that are unjust, criminal, and tyrannical, on the one hand; and, 
on the other hand, because they receive their authority imme- 
diately from the people in solemn trust for the community : 
therefore, St. Thomas speaks of the- ruler, as, "gerens vicem 
totius multitudinis ; non habet potestatem condendi legem, 
nisi in quantum gerit personam multitudinis;" (p. i, 2. qu. 97, 
a. 3. ad 3. et passim) : a vicegerent of the multitude, he has 
no power of making law, except in as much as he represents 
the multitude. 

The theory teaching the "divine and indefeasible right of 
kings," or that they hold their authority immediately from 
God and not mediately or through the community, really 
exalts the mere personal interest of a ruler above the common 
good of the nation ;* but this is to place a means above the 

* " Semper enim finis excellit id quod est ad finem ; et quanto aliquid 
efficacius ordinatur ad finem, tanto melius est." P. 2. 2, qu. 152, a. 5. 
The end always excells the means to that end ; and the more efficaciously 
any thing is ordained to the end, the better it is. 



286 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

end to which that means is ordained, or it is a conversion of 
what, by its nature, is only a means, into the principal end. 
Such authority being, according to the hypothesis, indefeasible 
and inamissible, because absolutely independent of all earthly 
power, no matter how far it may be perverted from the objects 
on account of which it was divinely given ; nevertheless, the 
ruler invested with it must prevail, even if the nation perish. 
Against this false notion concerning the nature and true end 
of civil authority stands the truth that is contradicted in the 
theory of absolutism or cajsarism ; " regnum non est propter 
regem; sed rex est propter regnum;" the king is made for the 
community, not the community for the king. (De Regim. 
Princ. lib. 3, c. xi.* It is an absurdity, therefore, in those 
theorists who make the common good of a civil community 
something that is only secondary to the merely personal or 
family interests of a particular dynasty. 

Here it may be asked, cannot civil government, with its 
supreme political authority, be of patriarchal origin ? For 
example, if we suppose the father of a family, with his children 
and servants, first to occupy a region of the earth : would not 
the authority of the father be per se supreme civil power, and 
could not this authority be transmitted by hereditary right, in 
accordance with a law which he could himself enact ? 

In answer to this question we must distinguish between the 
imperfect community or family; and the perfect community, or 
the only one which is properly and really a body politic or 
civil community: these two communities differ from each other 
specifically or essentially, f as was shown in a preceding chap- 

* The same holds true of spiritual rulers: " For every high priest taken 
from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, 
that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins." St. Paul to Hebrews, 
ch. v, v. I. 

t "Sicut homo est pars domus, ita domus est pars civitatis: civitas 
autem est communitas perfecta .... unde ille qui gubernat aliquam 
familiam. potest quHem facere aliqua praecepta, vel statuta ; non tamen qux 
proprie habeant rationem legis." P. I. 2, qu. 90, a. 3, ad 3. As a man is 
part of the household, so the household is part of the State ; but the State 
is a perfect community. Hence, he that governs only a family can, indeed, 
make certain precepts or statutes, but not what properly has the nature of 
law. 






SPECIAL ETHICS. 287 

ter of this work. The father of a family, as such, and in the 
nature of things, has only "economic authority;"* or, he has, 
as head of a family, only that limited authority which suffices 
to direct and govern a household, and it does not naturally or 
per se extend beyond that household with its dependent mem- 
bers. His children who have reached their majority and have 
families of their own, are no longer subject to him, just as he 
is not subject to his father whom he has left in order to set up 
for himself. When these families inhabiting the same territory, 
but not actually subject to any civil ruler, become sufficiently 
numerous, they would naturally unite and agree among them- 
selves upon a means of preserving order, and of promoting 
their common welfare: that means could be no other than 
supreme civil authority which is competent to provide for the 
general good both by directive and coercive laws. They 
would then determine the form of their government, and elect 
their ruler : t it follows, therefore, that if the first progenitor 
become a political sovereign or supreme civil ruler over his 
descendants, it can naturally take place, only by some general 
agreement among them, either explicitly or tacitly made. The 
fact of Adam's being the first father of the human family, did 
not constitute him the political head of mankind ; indeed, as 
St. Augustine observes, (de civit. Dei, 15, c. 8), Cain was actu- 
ally the first man to exercise political authority or to rule with 
civil authority over a perfect community. \ A father has no 

*■ " Economic prudence " is denned to be that prudence which is required 
in the head of a family, in order that he be capable of rightly administering 
the affairs and governing the members of that family. " Political prud- 
ence " is necessary for the ruler of a body politic or civil community. But 
political and parental authority have prerogatives that differ specifically, as 
their objects differ specifically. 

t Whether authority is transmitted by election or by succession, yet it 
always remains true that this authority is immediately from the multitude* 
and it is mediately or through the multitude, from God; or it retains this 
relation still subsisting, even when it descends from one ruler to another by 
hereditary law. 

% " And Cain went out from the face of the Lord and dwelt as a fugitive 
on the earth, at the east side of Eden. . . . And he built a city, and called 
the name thereof by the name of his son, Henoch." Genesis iv. 



288 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

inherent right to be the civil ruler of his descendants ; nor 
could he justly become such, unless they confer on him su- 
preme political authority, either by an express or an implied 
agreement.* 

It would not be correct to say that the subject possessing 
the supreme authority, and also the form of government are 
per se determined by a preexistent fact, and they are deter- 
mined per accide7is by the consent of the multitude. The 
phrase, " preexistent fact," is vague and equivocal ; and since 
this sort of fact is indeterminate, variable, and contingent, it 
is the thing that is really accidental. To establish or originate 
a government, the consent of the multitude is, per se necessary. 
It is proper only to irrational animals to have their manner of 
life and their union into herds determined by accidental facts 
that operate physically and mechanically, t Since the principle 
of union should be according to the nature of the beings that 
are to unite, it befits man's rational nature to act intelligently 
in this matter; and, hence, it is a work of understanding, for 
a multitude of mankind to become a civil body, which they 
will do, therefore, by rational consent, and under the light and 
direction of the natural law. 

Does not the doctrine herein proposed favor the theory of 
Rousseau, who reduces civil society and its government to a 
purely human contract, freely entered into by the multitude; 
which binds, therefore, only so far as they wish to bind them- 
selves ? 

* ' ' Quia hsec potestas ex natura rei est immediate in communitate, ergo, 
ut juste incipiat esse in aliqua persona tanquam in snpremo principe, necesse 
est, ut ex consensu communitatis illi tribuatur." Suarez, De Legibus, 
lib. 3, c. 4, No. 2. Because this power, from the nature of things, is im- 
mediately in the community, therefore, in order for it justly to begin to exist 
in any person as Supreme ruler, it is necessary that it be given to him by- 
consent of the community. 

t In all such questions, the keen scholastic philosophers, with the great 
Angelic Doctor at their head, most strictly guard man's rational nature. 
They sedulously avoid aU theories whose tendency is to lower the dignity 
of reason, God's best gift to man ; or ever to explain his moral action as 
coming from any merely physical and mechanical principle ; or to make of 
moral law a mechanical rule rather than a rule of riffht reason. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 289 

Rousseau's error is not in saying that a body politic, or a 
perfect community, supposes, as proximate or remote, a pact 
or agreement; for, how could men, who are rational beings, 
and, as such, not ruled by necessary physical law, be induced 
to live united into a community, unless they somehow consent 
to do so ? But his chief error is in founding authority and 
law, for their origin and moral value, on this agreement, which 
is from man ; instead of founding that authority and law, on 
the law of nature, which is from God. The agreement to 
live together in a community is a human action ; but the 
authority which is to rule the members of that community and 
direct them to a common end, is from God ; it is not a crea- 
ture of the human will, it is superior to the human will, and 
can bind it with moral obligation. It is not even possible 
that authority and law, as possessing a moral power to bind 
the conscience, could have their first origin in the will of the 
people, or in any human will ; all such authority is, in itself, 
from God; and all just law is derived from the natural or eter- 
nal law. 

The supreme civil authority, of its essence or very nature, 
possesses all the qualities and prerogatives which are neces- 
sary to constitute it the due and sufficient means of accom- 
plishing its proper end, which is the general good of the body 
politic or civil community ; and it effects this end by means 
of just laws and precepts. It cannot be either more or less 
than this. 

The absolutists, who defend the " divine and indefeasible 
right of kings," might here object that this making of the peo- 
ple confer the authority on the ruler, whereby he receives his 
power only mediately from God, favors the wild theories of 
liberalists and revolutionists ; in as much as it weakens the 
authority of all government. 

In answer, it must be said that the doctrine objected to, 
according to which civil authority naturally comes to huma ti 
society immediately from God, and it can be acquired justly 
and validly by a particular person, as supreme ruler, only by 
the consent of the multitude, given either proximately or re- 
25 



290 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

motely;* this doctrine is the medium between the two oppo- 
site extremes, liberalism and revolutionism, on the one hand ; 
and absolutism or csesarism, on the other hand : in such 
matter, the just medium between opposite extremes is the 
rule both of truth and rectitude : " virtus est in medio." The 
theories of the liberalists and revolutionists are mischievous 
and evil, for one kind of reasons ; and absolutism or csesarism 
is mischievous and evil, for reasons of an opposite kind ; and 
thus these extremes meet, as all extremes meet. While the 
one extreme party would take from the ruler his power to 
make and enforce just laws ; the other extreme party gives to 
the ruler, the power that is independent of all earthly tribunal, 
to make and enforce unjust laws; each of these theories is 
destructive of the common good. 

It is proper also to state a truth in this place, though already 
briefly mentioned before, which cannot fail to have its influ- 
ence on the minds of most persons that will reflect on it, 
namely, that what has been herein proposed as the moderate 
and sound doctrine concerning the origin of civil authority, is 
that which was taught in all the great schools, especially from 
the time of St. Thomas. t It is true that the criterion of philo- 
sophical certainty is, not authority, but evidence of the truth 
as following necessarily from its absolute first principles ; yet, 
it is an extrinsic guaranty for truth, which is useful to those 
minds that are not prepared to judge the matter by the strict 
canons of philosophical reasoning. 

* The authority is committed by the community to the ruler proximately, 
when they choose the ruler ; it is given by the community remotely, when 
it is taken away or lost by the just penalty of war, and thus passes into 
other hands ; in this last case the consent of the people is rationally and 
justly due ; but yet, it is not immediate or proximate, since it is on account 
of an extrinsic reason. 

t The learned Bishop Ullathorne, in his answer to Mr. Gladstone's " Ex- 
postulation," bears indisputable testimony to the same fact : "According to 
the traditional teaching of Catholic divines from the days of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, the temporal power has its immediate derivation from the people." 
"The Expostulation Unveiled," p. 26. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 291 

One passage is here cited from an eminent schoolman, 
wherein he states briefly the main theory of authority and 
civ 1 government, as commonly taught by the old scholastic 
authors. " But because this governing and legislative power 
cannot be easily exercised by the entire multitude, since it 
would be difficult for all without exception to assemble at the 
same time, as often as it might be necessary to consult for the 
common good and pass laws : on this account the multitude 
usually transfers its right, or governing power, either to some 
persons selected from all ranks of the people, and this is called 
democracy ; or to a few of the best citizens, which is called 
aristocracy ; or to but one person, whether for himself alone, 
or also for his successors by hereditary right, and this is styled 
monarchy. Hence it follows that all power is from God, as 
said by the Apostle, Rom. xiii ; it is indeed immediately and 
by natural right in the community ; but it is only mediately 
and by human right in kings and other rulers, unless God 
himself should immediately confer this power on some others, 
as he conferred it on Moses over the people of Israel, or as 
Christ gives power to the sovereign pontiff over the whole 
Church."* Thus wrote Billuart, in his theology according to 
the Summa of St. Thomas, De Legibus, Dissertation I, art. iv. 

Besides this scholastic author, and other schoolmen whose 
sayings have already been given in this article, no others need 
be quoted, since it is not denied by the learned scholar that 
such was their teaching. 

* " Veriim quia hoec potestas gubernativa et legislativa non potest facile- 
exerceri a tota multitudine, dim:ile namque foret omnes et singulos simul 
convenire toties quoties providendum est de necessariis bono communi et 
de legibus ferendis; ideo solet multitudo transferre suum jus, seu potestatem 
gubernativara, vel in aliquos de populo ex omni conditione, et dicitur 
democratia; vel in p.iucos optimates, et dicitur aristocratia; vel in unum 
tantum, sive pro se solo, sive pro successoribus jure hsereditario, et dicitur 
monatchia. Ex quo sequitur omnem potestatem esse a Deo, ut dicitur 
Apost., Rom. xi ; i ; immediate quidem et jure naturae in communitate, medi- 
ate autem tantum et jure humano in regibus, et aliis rectonbus, nisi Deus 
ipse immediate aliquibus banc potestatem conferat, ut contulit Moysi in popu- 
lum Israel, et Christus summo pontifici in totam ecclesiam." Billuart, in 
Sum. Div. Th. De Legibus, Diss. I, Art. iv. 



292 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ARTICLE IV. 

DIFFERENT FORMS OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT; RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE. 

ere are three simple • forms of government, which were 
already denned ; namely, monarchy, aristocracy and demo- 
cracy. These simple forms may be combined in various pro- 
portions, as is actually done in the different kinds of mixed 
government. It is found by the experience of mankind that 
no one of the simple forms of government long works well in 
practice. Writers on po'itical ethics generally agree that, in 
the abstract or theoretically, simple monarchy is the most 
perfect form of government ; since its complete unity gives to 
the body politic the greatest strength, and constitutes it the 
exactest likeness of divine government. But, as a fact, owing 
to the imbecility, ignorance and vices of men, it seldom or 
never proves the best in actual practice.* Owing to the same 
causes, it is not best for the common welfare to invest a few 
men with unrestricted authority ; for, in practice, neither is 
pure aristocracy a good or successful form of government. 
Pure democracy, except for a small community like Attica in 
ancient Greece, is, perhaps, actually impossible in practice ; 
for, how could the vote of all the people in a great nation be 
awaited in every matter requiring an authoritative decision ? 
Pure democracy has been objected to as not even being really 
an original type of government; on the alleged ground, that 

* Aristotle makes complete happiness, or the summum bonum, consist in 
the perfect exercise of all the virtues ; he considers that community lo be 
best tilted for happiness, in which the middle class, or they who are neither 
very rich nor very poor, are the great majority, and are the princip il end 
of the laws, at the same time that they have a principal hand in shaping 
and directing civil polity. He states this objection to absolute monarchy : 
" He who bids the law to be supreme, makes God supreme ; but he who 
entrusts a man with supreme power, gives it to a wild beast, for such his 
appetites sometimes make him; passion, too, influences those who are in. 
power, even the very best of men; law is intellect free from appetite." 
Polit., bk. Ill, ch. XVI. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 293 

it is absurd to regard the community as capable of being its 
own superior. But this objection is false under a double 
respect ; for, first, superiorship is not incompatible with the 
duty of obeying the law, though the superior himself make 
the law that binds him, as already seen. Secondly, the com- 
munity as a collective and organized body, is truly superior 
to that community as distributively taken, or distributively 
bound by the laws ; and, therefore, it is not against the nature 
of things for a community to be both superior and inferior, 
under different respects. 

Which is the best form of government for a given particu- 
lar community that is now free to make a choice of one ? 

It is manifest that, since many circumstances must combine 
to make up a particular concrete fact, it would pertain to 
political prudence, or the wisdom of the multitude, in the 
event supposed, to estimate them and decide according to 
them what is best for the individual case. One legitimate 
form of government would be better or worse than another 
for this or that community, relatively to those circumstances. 
Yet, there are two truths taught by the experience of mankind 
which would give important direction in the first formation of 
a civil government. First, it is dangerous to the welfare of 
the community for any ruler to have absolute or unlimited 
power ; consequently, the power of the ruler should be clearly 
and precisely denned by prudent law which is unchangeable 
excq;>t by common consent. Secondly, government which is 
itself regulated by law, not by arbitrary will, or the mixed 
form of government, is the most perfect in practice ; in other 
words, the species of civil government, which is the best of all 
in practice, is that mixed form which duly combines the per- 
fections of all the pure or simple forms in the proportion 
which justly and fitly adapts it to the community for which it 
is designed. 

St. Thomas (P. i, 2, qu. 95, a. 1, ad 2,) calls attention to 

the fact that, in the beginning, God did not place a king over 

the Israelites ; for the reason that the Jews as a people were 

cruel and avaricious, two vices that specially lead to tyranny. 

25* 



294 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Hence God, i Kings, ch. viii. rebuked the Israelites because 
they asked to be governed by a king. To the e truths we 
may also refer the last sentence in the Book of Judges, ch. 
xxi. v. 24 : "in those days there was no king in Israel ; but 
every one did that which seemed right to himself." Simple 
monarchy, then, though, perfect in its species when considered 
abstractly, is not such relatively, or in the concrete ; and for 
this reason the great Doctor proceeds to show * how the 
three simple forms may be so combined as to constitute the 
most perfect government t in practice, each of the pure forms 
being inexpedient. 

May it not be correctly said that, in the concrete and rela- 
tively, the best among the genuine forms of government for a 
particular nation is the one which is therein actually and le- 
gitimately established ? 

If the question be meant to imply, that superiority in the 
form itself of any government arises from its being actually in 
force, together with the fact that its origin was legitimate ; 
this would be a mixing or conjoining of predicates that do not 
belong to the same subject, and the confounding of a neces- 
sary condition for the validity of a government, with the con- 
stituent principle of that government. Greater or less perfec- 
tion in the form itself of any particular government, does not 
depend on the legitimacy of its origin, except by way of con- 
dition ; indeed it arises from an entirely difierent order of 
things. The form alone is the subject considered, when the 
question is argued, " which is the most perfect, or the best 
form of civil government, the monarchy, the aristocracy, the 
democracy, or the mixed government ? " Legitimacy of 

*P. I, 2, qu. 95, a. I. 

t " Est aHquod regimen ex istis commixtum (scilicet ex formis simplici- 
bus), quod est optimum : et secundum hoc sumitur lex, quam majores natu 
simul cum plebibus sanxerunt, ut Isidorus dicit lib. 2." P. I. 2, qu. 94, 
a. 4. There is another government mixed of them (the three simple 
forms), which is the best of all; and according to this one, that is taken to 
be law which the older citizens, together with the populace, enact, as Isidore 
says. 






SPECIAL ETHICS. 295 

origin is an indispensable condition for any genuine form of 
government to be justly established or validly imposed on a 
nation ; but superiority in that form itself, no more proceeds 
from the legitimacy of its origin, than does suitableness of plan 
or shape in a dwelling house, proceed from the fact that the 
house has been duly paid for. 

The preference which a nation has for one form of govern- 
ment over another one, is not determined by mere theoretical 
abstractions, nor by the speculative opinions of philosophers 
concerning the nature of political power; but the people 
choose according to their notions of what is practically best 
for their social and temporal interests. It is certain that the 
efficiency and strength of a government depend, not only 
upon the legitimacy of its origin; but also on the rational 
love which the people at large have for it ; since the union 
which perfects the body politic, and makes it completely one 
in power and virtue, necessarily requires that there exist and 
dominate in the hearts of the people, a genuine love for their 
government as good for them, and as their own government. 
It follows, then, that any form of power which is unjustly 
forced upon a community; and whose laws are abhorrent to 
the customs and traditions of the people, can scarcely make 
of them a community that is united and happy, even if it 
should retain more than a short, precarious, and violent 
existence. 

In the mixed kinds of government, one of the simple forms 
may so prevail over the others as to impose its name on the 
form itself of that government. Thus it is that the English 
government, though constituted of all the simple forms, is 
styled a monarchy; while the United States government, is 
called a republic ; because it is a union of commonwealths in 
which the democratic form or element is predominant over 
the other constituent forms. 

The fundamental rule or type of a government, or the essen- 
tial and specific form that determines its nature and kind, 
must not be confounded with the written constitution of the 
nation, if it have one. This fundamental law or essential 



296 ethics, or moral philosophy. 

form of a government, when it is really established in a com- 
munity, is written in the hearts of the people ; it can persist 
in being, and govern their civil life, even when the laws writ- 
ten on parchment have perished. Such life and virtue are 
rightfully claimed for the form of government, and the lex ?ion 
scripla or common law, which, with only occasional and tran- 
sient interruptions, have ruled the English nation for a thou- 
sand years.* 

CONCERNING THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE. 

Suffrage, in itself, as an action, is nothing else than the ex- 
pression, in due form, of a choice or an opinion by which a 
member of the community manifests his preference for some- 
thing as good, or his opposition to something as not good, for 
the public welfare; or, it is the giving of his vote for or against 
something made subject to popular choice as thus expressed. 

Suffrage may be considered under two respects ; first, as 
the expression of that primitive and formative consent by 
which the members of the unorganized multitude agree to 
constitute themselves into a body politic or civil society under 
some special form of government; and secondly, we may 
consider what suffrage is when it exists as an ordinary legal 
right, or what that right is when it is an organic act in the 
perfected body politic. Again, we may examine whether there 
can be any right of suffrage at all, which is antecedent to pos- 
itive law ; whether or not all persons in the community 
naturally possess an equal right to suffrage, and what species of 
matter is capable of being decided by suffrage, or can be sub- 
ject to choice by vote of the community. 

Anterior to all positive law or convention, the right of suf- 
frage, as something ordinary, is not determinately and exclu- 
sively in any particular individuals of the multitude. Primarily, 
it would be determined by general agreement among an un- 
formed or unorganized multitude wishing to become a civil 
community, what species of government should be adopted ; 

*For some pertinent reflections on this subject, see Brownson's Review 
for July, 1852, p. 355, et seqq. 






SPECIAL ETHICS. 297 

and there is no reason a priori, or arising from the very nature 
of things, why any one in that multitude, capable of exercising 
rational choice, should be excluded from a share in this first 
work of organizing, since it would concern all. Such primitive 
right of suffrage, like that to dominion over the corporeal 
goods of the earth, is given by nature to the community in 
common ; its exercise is regulated by positive law. Hence, the 
individual's right of giving suffrage, like exclusive ownership of 
property, is derived by the individual person from the positive 
law, or it has a conventional origin. In simple monarchy, the 
people retain no right of suffrage. But if, instead of committing 
the whole care of the community either to one sovereign ruler, 
or to a body of persons, it was determined to decide matters 
pertaining to the common good by vote of the people, or to 
elect all rulers by suffrage ; it would then be conventionally 
fixe 1 as to what persons could most fitly and advantageously 
exercise this ordinary function of the community or body politic. 
The multitude would argue, and indeed consistently and 
truly, that in order actually to exercise the right of suffrage, a 
certain measure of prudence is necessary; since, by its very 
nature, the giving of suffrage should be a work of sane and ma- 
ture reason. Hence, both the actual right of voting, and the 
right of being voted for, are made dependent by positive law on 
certain conditions which usually restrict them to a class of the 
community. It is plain that children, and also adults that are 
mentally imbecile, are physically incapable of performing such 
action. It was never looked on as duly becoming the modesty 
and domestic habits of women, for them to exercise a right 
of political suffrage; unless, perhaps, the story of the Amazons 
be not a fiction. The laws regulating the exercise of suffrage 
are various in different nations, where this species of power is 
retained by the people in their own hands. But this right is 
not naturally and inherently in any particular members or in- 
dividuals of the community, to the exclusion of other persons 
from it ; for, it can be thus acquired by such individual mem- 
bers of the community only as a civil right ; or, they can ac- 
tually come to possess it, only through positive law. 



298 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Since suffrage by the people is only a special form or mode 
of exercising civil power, it is, in itself, capable of having for 
its legitimate object, whatever can be the legitimate object of 
civil laws; or, its subject matter maybe commensurate in 
extension with that of civil law; as would actually be the 
case in a simple democracy, in which no laws are enacted 
except by a vote of the people. But as an unjust law which 
is promulgated by a king is, in itself, no law at all ; so, an un- 
just law which is enacted by a vote of the people is, in itself, 
really no law at all. While there is some matter in regard to 
which we may say that the proverb holds true, " vox populi, 
vox Dei; " yet, that saying does not hold true, and it is even 
absurd, if the voice of the people be for an unjust law, or for 
anything else that is, in itself, morally wrong. 



ARTICLE V. 

FACULTIES OF THE SUPREME AUTHORITY \ ITS RIGHT USE J 
NECESSARY QUALITIES OF THE GOOD RULER. 

In order for supreme authority in the body politic to be a 
means capable of effecting its end, which is to advance and 
maintain the common good of the community, it must possess 
the following virtues or powers: the- legislative power, the ju- 
diciary power, and the executive power. 

It is manifest that the supreme authority cannot practically 
or efficaciously direct 'and control the community, unless it be 
able both to prescribe the rule of action for the people, and 
compel obedience to it; in other words, it must be competent 
to ordain or lay down the law, define the matter which it 
comprehends, and make it actually operative. It is of the 
legislative power to make or ordain the law; it is the function 
of the judiciary power to define its scope and meaning and 
right application to its object; and it is the office of the exec- 
utive power to enforce the law in practice. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 299 

Since absolute supreme power in the hands of one man, or 
power which is restricted by no positive principle as a safe- 
guard, is against all prudence, whether we consider man as he 
actually is in himself or the experience of nations; it is gen- 
erally inexpedient and unwise in practice for all these faculties 
of supreme authority to be combined in one individual per- 
son. Legitimate power to rule over rational beings, which is 
purely arbitrary, or authority which is of blind will or caprice, 
cannot exist in the nature of things as something rightful; and 
it is more likely that one man will be arbitrary in governing, 
than that several men will conspire to rule arbitrarily or by 
blind caprice.* It follows, then, that while the supreme civil 
authority is, in itself, necessarily one; the organs through 
which it acts on the community not only may be more than 
one, but in practice they should generally be diverse; nor, at 
the same time, is this opposed to the evident trurii that all the 
powers of government must be coordinated to the same com- 
mon end, which is the public good. 

Just and wise government is essential for perfect union, 
peace, and prosperity in the social community. The justice 
and wisdom of the government, are really the justice and wis- 
dom of the ruler, and of the laws. The proverbs of mankind 
enunciate the truth learned by general experience that the 
character of a nation, as good or bad, depends for its forma- 
tion, to a greater or less extent, on the head that rules and 
directs its citizens. + This is but natural ; for the ruler is per- 
petually exhibited to the people in the laws and decisions by 
which he is positively controlling or influencing the daily 
action of the community; and they often behold the example 
of his own conduct especially as expressed in the manners 

* See Aristotle's^Politics, Book III, especially ch. xvi. 

t "What manner of man the ruler of a city is, such also are they that 
dwell therein." Eccles. x. 2. 

" The King that judgeth the poor in truth, his throne shall be established 
forever." " When the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall mourn." 
Prov. xxix. 

" Qualis rex, talis grex." "Tel maitre, tel valet." 



300 ETHICS, Oli MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

learned at his court and made fashionable by his ministers. 
These causes are powerful in their action ; and their effect is 
not only to regulate the public demeanor of the people, but, 
in an important degree, to form their moral habits, and to 
shape all their practical judgments of what pertains to the 
affairs of social life. 

Every ruler is bound in justice both to know the duties of 
his office, and to fulfill them with equity. 

The graveness of an obligation is in proportion to the 
sacredne s and importance of the duty which founds it; also 
the sacredness and greatness of a duty depend upon the 
proper object of that duty. Now the proper object of a super- 
ior's duty, and that to which alone his office is ordained by 
virtue of lawful authority, is the welfare of the community 
over which he is appointed to preside. Hence, in so far as 
the welfare of a community is something great and sacred, 
that far forth is the obligation on the conscience of the ruler, 
also something sacred and weighty It follows, then, that 
gross and culpable ignorance of his duty in important matter; 
or any serious abuse of authority, is something criminal in a 
ruler : " corruptio optimi, pessima est perversio," the corrup- 
tion of the best, is the worst perversion. 

Experience proves the truth, and it is also conformable to 
reason, that the ruler who ordinarily follows an equitable 
medium between the opposite extremes of rigorous severity, 
and laxism in governing, exercises his authority with most 
prudence and efficacy. 

Prudence and all moral virtue, as shown in a preceding 
chapter, consist in a just or right medium between the ex- 
tremes of too much and too little ; " virtus est in medio." 
On account of the intrinsic goodness and excellency of virtue, 
this middle line of action by which the extremes, too much 
and too little, are duly avoided, is often called "the golden 
mean." The virtue that is principally required in the ruler 
who governs a civil community, is " political prudence ; " 
styled political prudence, because it concerns the welfare of 
the body politic, as its proper object. 



SPECIAL ETIUCS. 301 

Prudence is, under different respects, both an intellectual 
and a moral virtue, as already sufficiently explained. He 
alone is a good ruler who governs according to that just, true 
measure or golden medium in which the virtue, " political 
prudence," consists; and following this middle course, he will 
decline from the extreme, laxity, on the one hand; and from 
extreme rigor, on the other. 

This medium cannot be precisely defined or particularly 
described, so as to reduce it to an assignable mathematical 
f irmula which is plainly applicable to all individual cases. 
For while mathematical knowledge or scientific knowledge 
regards only necessary truth; or it regards contingent matter 
only under that respect in which it is related to necessary 
truth ; prudence, on the contrary, is concerned about the con- 
tingent only as something variable, that may happen in this 
manner, or in that manner. The particular and actual cir- 
cumstances of time, place, means and persons, which the 
prudence of a ruler must estimate, are, by their very nature, 
so numerous and variable, that they cannot be subjected to a 
given definite rule or determinate measure. On this account, 
the knowledge of what is essential to civil law; the possession 
of the cardinal virtues, especially prudence and justice, are 
necessarily required in the superior of the body politic or 
civil community, in order that he be proximately and rightly 
fitted to perform the duties of his office with well founded 
hope of success. 

As there are many contingent human things that ordinarily 
happen in the same manner, whenever their principal circum- 
stances are the same; there are certain axioms and conclu- 
sions regarding such matters derived from the experience of 
mankind, which convey wise instruction to the ruler ; as do 
also the annals of history. For instance, he may learn from 
the example of Alcibiades and that of Roboam, that counsel 
must be sought from men of experience and maturity of judg- 
ment; from the history of Csesar, Pompey, and Anthony, that 
the republic which is divided by unpatriotic and selfish leaders 
into contending factions, must fall; from the history of " Good 
26 



302 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

King Edward," that a wise and virtuous ruler, practically loves 
the people, makes a happy realm, etc. 

It can scarcely be doubted that the best and happiest com- 
munities may be well governed, by a few simple laws that are 
wise, and are faithfully observed, better than by a great mass 
of codes and statutes ; and, on the other hand, it is equally 
certain that as the morals of a nation decline, so its laws, at 
the same time, mujt increase both in number and severity. 

A sovereign who declines from that medium in which per- 
fect or consummate prudence consists, to the extreme of laxi- 
ty, is more likely to begin this species of misgovernment by 
omitting to enforce the existing laws, than by failing to decree 
new ones. The laws themselves are defective in their sub- 
stance, however, when they do not prohibit some public dis- 
orders which are seriously injurious to the community; or, 
also, when they do not command all that is necessary for the 
public good. 

While law should be so administered with truth and equity* 
that the extremes too much and too little are both avoided ; 
yet, as already seen, in certain moral things, some virtues 
may properly and legitimately favor one excess more than the 
other ; t or, they may incline rather to one of two opposite 
extremes, than to the other. The virtues of a sovereign or 
supreme ruler are more noble, and partake more of divine 
perfection, when mercy and goodness in him are predominant 
over rigorous justice that exacts the last farthing due. Coercive 
measures must needs be used by him for the refractory; but, 
as before observed, it is rather the certainty that guilt will be 
punished, than the greatness of the penalty inflicted, that makes 
punishments efficacious in preventing crimes among the citi- 

* " Mercy and truth preserve the King, and his throne is strengthened by 
clemency." Prov. xx. 28. 

"Necesse est ut multos timeat, quem multi timent." Publ. Syrus. He 
necessarily has many to fear, whom many fear. 

P. 2. 2, qu. 109, a. 4. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 303 

zens ; thus his leniency may mitigate the severity of strict 
penal justice.* 

A supreme ruler may tend to extreme rigor, in the exercise 
of his authority, either by making the laws more numerous 
and burdensome than is necessary for the general good of the 
nation; or, by being needlessly harsh and exacting in the 
execution even of laws which, in themselves, are good and 
wise. As moderation in the exercise of superior power, wins 
the hearts of the multitude ; so does undue severity provoke 
in them hatred and opposition. A numerous body of onerous 
laws, + enforced by a hard master, will, perhaps, be as much 
mechanical in their action as they will be moral ; for they will 
be obeyed, in such case, rather through animal fear and the 
compulsion of physical force, than from any rational choice 
or conviction of duty arising from respect for the ruler's 
authority, or the subject's own mental approbation of those 
laws. It becomes a government over human beings to elevate 
the people into good and orderly citizens, by an enlightened 
direction and control of their superior or rational nature : or, 
by ruling them as moral agents that are perfectible. More- 
over, when laws are excessively numerous, they must unduly 
intermeddle with various personal and private affairs, the 
direction and control of which properly pertain only to the 
individual. | For, as already seen, human law cannot regu- 
late, or even reach, all the details and particulars of the indi- 

* Mercy is an exercise of goodness, which is not required by justice ; or 
which is not due in justice. Though the medium of justice is not something 
that is variable ; yet, goodness can mitigate pure justice in what regards 
the manner, time, place, and other circumstances ; as also by wholly or 
partially remitting the debt ; and this is forgiveness. 

t " Proelati abstinere debent a multitudine praeceptorum." P. 2. 2, qu. 
105, a. I, ad 3. Superiors should abstain from a multitude of precepts. 

To this matter the expressive words of Tacitus, already cited in this 
work, are also pertinent: "In corruptissima republica, plurimse leges." 
In a very corrupt republic, laws are most numerous. 

X "De minimis non curat prsetor." The ruler does not trouble himself 
about trifles. 



304 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 






vidual's conduct; but he must be left, as regards many things, 
to his own prudence, to the guidance of his own conscience,* 
and the counsel of wise persons.! 

The idea sometimes becomes more or less prevalent in par- 
ticular communities, that men can be made good and orderly 
citizens by a multitude of searching laws rigorously enforced;, 
and even that the youth can be most successfully formed to 
virtue, by methods of discipline which will render evil physi- 
cally impossible for them. It cannot be justly doubted, how- 
ever, that this is a mistaken mode of governing human beings, 
the almost certain effect of which is to engender extreme evils, 
by arousing and irritating dangerous passions that break out 
with greater force because their extreme violence is a revul- 
sion of nature from undue restraint. In such things, one un- 
reasonable extreme tends to produce its opposite extreme. It is 
sure that all moral evil can never be made physically impos- 
sible through mere power of human laws ; and neither can all 
moral good ever be made physically necessary by a mechani- 
cal use of positive laws. 

It may be concluded, then, that too much government, and 
too little government, are both evil ; and in this case, there- 
fore, as in all others, " extremes meet." 

* " Sub lege rationis continentur omnia ea, quae ratione regulari possunt." 
P. I. 2, qu. 94, a. 2, ad 3. All those things are included under the law of 
reason, which can be regulated by reason. 

t "Ad singulos enim actus dirigendos dnntur singularia prsecepta pru- 
dentium: lex est praeceptum commune." P. 1. 2, qu. 96, a. 1, ad 2. For 
the direction of particular actions, there are particular precepts of the pru- 
dent ; law is a common precept. 

" Et ibid. a. 2, ad 3: "Lex humana non omnia potest prohibere quae 
prohibet lex naturae." Human law cannot prohibit all things which the 
law of nature prohibits. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 305 



ARTICLE VI. 

PRIVATION OF LAW AND GOVERNMENT ; OR, CONCERNING THE 
STATES OF ANARCHY AND TYRANNY IN THE BODY POLITIC. 
IS IT EVER LEGITIMATE FOR THE COMMUNITY FORCIBLY 
TO RESIST TYRANNY OF GOVERNMENT ? 

When laxism and rigorism in civil government have reached 
their uttermost extremes of abuse, they then lead directly and 
certainly to the two great social evils, called respectively 
anarchy and tyranny. 

Anarchy is a state of lawlessness, in which the multitude is 
ruled by no authority ; the public welfare is not effectually 
defended by any law ; and the worst social disorders are not 
repressed. By anarchy, therefore, the community is put into 
a state of violence, arising proximately from the crimes and 
grave wrongs committed by its own members ; but attributa- 
ble, primarily and chiefly, to the privation of necessary law 
and efficacious government. Failure to execute the laws is 
an immediate occasion of anarchy ; since law that is not 
obeyed by those for whose government it exists, is practically 
no law at all, and general disorder in a community, proceed- 
ing from the want or absence of all operative law, is that 
which constitutes the state of anarchy. Failure to enforce 
laws necessary for governing the community, may sometimes 
arise from a false conception and wrong application ot mercy, 
by which justice is not only mitigated, but its essence is 
destroyed ; it may proceed, in other cases, from weakness of 
character in the persons having either legislative, or executive 
power. But in commonwealths and free governments, a 
more ordinary and far more dangerous cause for failure of 
the law, is venality in the officers of government ; for, when 
the ministers of public authority are seduced by bribes and 
presents, and are thus made openly to circumvent the laws, 
their example will gradually but surely destroy that truth and 
justice among the people without which no form of civil 
26* 



306 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

government can long peaceably endure. Then the public 
authority will favor the rich, and oppress the poor; the laws, 
like spider webs, will hold the weak, but the strong will break 
through them. In a state of complete anarchy, if the mass 
of the people be poor and wretched, while the wealth of the 
land has accumulated in the hands of a few, they may grow 
desperate and reckless ; sometimes new and dangerous spirits 
rise up from the depths of society, becoming the leaders of 
wild and infuriated mobs that produce a condition of brutal 
violence which, while their vengeance rules supreme, consti- 
tutes what is appropriately styled, " the reign of terror." 
History attests the fact that anarchy is often succeeded by the 
despotic rule of one man ; as, on the other hand, despotism 
or tyranny is, in its turn, sometimes followed by. anarchy; for, 
indeed, one of these two opposite extremes naturally leads to 
the other. Though anarchy always has presupposed to it as 
its indirect cause, more or less weakness and incompetency in 
the supreme ruling power; yet, it may have its origin in the 
demoralized multitude, whose minds are misled by false 
teachers, and whose passions are kindled by the fiery eloquence 
of demagogues aiming to produce social disorder and con- 
fusion. Also, revolution in government is seldom exempt, at 
least, from transitional anarchy ; and it is mainly on this ac- 
count that moderate and virtuous minds generally oppose any 
radical change in established governments. 

Tyranny is also the privation of law and government;* but 
it is brought about by extreme causes, that are the opposites 
or contraries of those which give rise to anarchy. In this 
condition of civil society, the ruler ignores or practically de- 
nies the truth that the general public good is the essential and 

* "Aliud autem est regimen tyrannicum, quod est omnino corruptum ; 
unde ex hoc non sumitur aliqua lex." P. I. 2, qu. 95, a. 4. Another gov- 
ernment is that of tyranny, which is wholly corrupt ; hence, in it there 
is no law. 

The tyranny being only the corruption of government, has no law at all ; 
it is government without law, because it is government without justice. It 
is essenti il to the justice of a law that it command only what is for the com- 
mon good, and the tyrant's laws intend only his own private advantage. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 307 

only end of all human law; and he oppresses the people with 
unjust regulations which have no other aim than to advance 
his own personal interest. Tyranny, by its very nature and 
definition, is abuse of authority through unjust and oppressive 
law, that has not for its end the common good ; and, there- 
fore, tyrannical rule is a violent and iniquitous use of power to 
govern. Tyranny is the privation of law and right govern- 
ment ; because it is of the essence of law and right govern- 
ment, to have for their only end the common good of the 
community; and the ordinances of the tyrant and his exercise 
of the supreme power, have for their final aim his personal in- 
terest, to the exclusion of the general public welfare as prin- 
cipal. 

Such a despot assumes, implicitly at least, that he is the 
state, and that the community is for him ; * that his will is 
the law, and the end of the law is to gain for him the objects 
of his selfishness and his uncontrolled passions. Practically, 
he regards the people as his property, and assumes that they 
are in the relation towards him of irrational animals, which 
must be compelled physically and mechanically to obey the 
bidding of their owner and master. When the unjust laws of 
the tyrant become so numerous, and the burdens which they 
impose on the people grow so heavy, as to be unendurable, 
and to defeat and destroy the very end of civil government ; 
then, such ruler may be truly styled an intolerable tyrant, and 
his government may be rightly called unendurable tyranny. 

There may also be only partial tyranny, which is lighter, 
and which is endurable ; as when the ruler publishes some 
particular despotic laws, or he slightly abuses his authority, so 
as to prescribe what is detrimental to the public welfare, in 
some degree, but does not wholly destroy the essential end of 
government. There may be a tyranny of the majority over 
the minority in the community ; as sometimes happens in 

* " Regimen tyrranicum non est justum; quia non ordinatur ad bonum 
commune sed ad bonum privatum regentis." P. 2. 2, qu. 42, a. 2, ad 3. 
The tyrannical government is not just : because it is not directed for the 
common good, but ior the private good of the ruler. 



308 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

democratic forms of government. In the aristocracy, there 
may be tyranny of the minority over the majority. Since 
monarchy may be either simple and absolute, or limited and 
regulated by law ; so, the tyranny of a king may either violate 
the natural law alone, or it may be opposed both to the nat- 
ural law, and to human law. 

Is it ever legitimate or right for subjects to disobey, or to 
resist the tyrant ? 

I. It is plain that when any ruler or superior commands 
what is fobidden either by the natural law, or the positive law 
of God, his subjects are bound in conscience not to obey such 
command. 

II. Rebellion against lawful government, besides being in 
itself criminal, is a great social evil; since it causes anarchy 
which is more or less complete and lasting. 

III. Tyranny caused by particular acts through which 
authority is abused, but which neither injures many important 
rights of the people, nor is most heinous and grievous, is evi- 
dently not of itself a just and sufficient reason for forcibly 
resisting the tyrant; since this remedy for the evil would, in 
general, surely be worse than the evil itself. 

IV. Serious abuse of authority in governments whose 
powers and functions are denned and regulated by constitu- 
tional law, should be corrected according to juridical forms, 
and before the tribunal which is legitimately empowered to 
adjudge the matter. 

But, is forcible resistance to the supreme absolute ruler, or 
a revolution in the government, ever justifiable, even when 
there is that total privation of just law and equitable govern- 
ment which constitutes in the body politic what may be cor- 
rectly denominated intolerable or extreme tyranny ? 

Modern writers on social and political ethics do not all give 
the same answer to this question. The school of authors who 
defend absolutism, or the theory that the civil ruler's authority 
is not restricted by any condition or limitation, simply deny 
that forcible resistance to supreme civil power or revolution in 
the government can ever be a legitimate undertaking, from 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 309 

any degree or species whatever of tyranny; provided the 
supreme ruler or sovereign originally acquired his authority to 
govern by a rightful title. The reasons which they advance 
in proof of this opinion are principally the following: i. 
Revolution, with its concomitant anarchy and crimes, is a 
greater evil than any possible tyranny. 2. The sovereign or 
supreme ruler being superior over the community, cannot be 
judged by the community, it being inferior and subject. 3. To 
justify the right of revolution for any one case, is practically 
to license all revolution, since such principle would be liable 
to abuse. 4. Because all such authority to govern comes im- 
mediately from God to the ruler; not man, therefore, but 
God alone can take it away. 5. To affirm that the multitude 
can forcibly resist even the most ruinous tyranny, is to main- 
tain that civil authority is radically democratic. Wherefore, 
the defenders of this theory conclude that the only right and 
duty of the people in such event, how grievous soever may be 
the tyranny under which they suffer, are prayer and longan- 
imity.* 

The opposite extreme opinion is held by a class variously 
styled revolutionists, liberalists, socialists, etc., who maintain 
that since all law and government originate in the popular 
will, and have no other validity than that which is attributed 
to them by the popular wish, they can, therefore, be changed 
or set aside arbitrarily by dominant parties among the people; 
or, the people have a right to overthrow their existing gov- 
ernment at any time, whether with a reason, or without a 
reason. 

Both of these extreme hypotheses are false, just as all other 
extreme opinions are likely to be false, when they concern 
moral or practical matter. The arguments adduced to prove 
that the tyrant's authority is inamissible, f and that he cannot 

* "A kingdom is translated from one people to another, because of injus- 
tices, and wrongs, and injuries, and divers deceits." Eccles. x. 8. 

t He "prays amiss" who asks God himself to do a work directly and 
immediately, for the accomplishing of which God has already provided a 
natural means which the suppliant can employ. 



310 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

be rightfully resisted, even should he be a destroyer of the 
nation, are not conclusive. The first one, that, %t revolution 
is accompanied with anarchy, and it is, therefore, a worse evil 
than any possible tyranny," is, at the least, a misuse of words; 
" revolution " which is a return to the reign of law and order 
by the removal of insufferable tyranny, is not anarchy ; but it 
is a relief from anarchy, and a restoration of government by 
just law. It is true, however, that resistance, even to the 
worst tyranny, is not justifiable, when it would surely fail to 
render the state of the community any better; as St. Thomas 
says.* The second argument ; " the superior cannot be 
judged by the inferior ;" " superior est potior pars communi- 
tatis ;" seems to be nothing more than an equivocation, or a 
play on words ; these courtly sayings are fallacious, when 
applied according to the meaning attributed to them in this 
argument. 

The ruler is superior officially ; that is, in the order of 
jurisdiction or authority to govern by just law; but outside of 
that order, or personally, he is not superior ; nay, he may be 
personally inferior to all good citizens. So long as he tends 
by just means to the end for which he is invested with 
authority to rule the community, he is acting formally and 
officially as superior, and as such he is not to be judged by 
his subjects, but he is to be obeyed by them. Should he 
cease to employ his legitimate authority as a means of pro- 
moting the common welfare, and use violence and injustice in 

* "Regimen tyrannicum non est j us turn : quia non ordinatur ad bonum 
commune, sed ad bonum privatum regentis. Et ideo perturbatio hujus 
regiminis non habet rationem seditionis, nisi forte quando sic inordinate 
perturbatur tyranni regimen, quod multitudo subjecta majus detrimentum 
patitur ex perturbatione consequente, quam ex tyranni regimine. Magis 
autem tyrannus seditiosus est." P. 2. 2, qu. 42, a. 2, ad 3. Tyrannical 
government is not just; because it is not ordained for the common good, 
but for the private good of the ruler. And, therefore, the perturbation of 
such government has not the nature of sedition, unless, perchance, 
when the tyrant's government is distubed in a manner so disorderly that 
the multitude subject to him suffer more harm from the consequent confu- 
sion than from the tyrant's government. It is rather the tyrant himself 
that is seditious. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 311 

order to accomplish his own private and personal aims; he 
would not then be acting as superior, for he is not superior in 
the order of unjust law and violence against the common 
good, and all men are inferiors as regards the precepts of the 
natural law. When the superior ceases to act as officially 
such, and becomes an enemy of the public, or a dangerous 
aggressor on the community, the community not only has a 
right to judge him and forcibly resist his destructive violence; 
but, if necessary for self-preservation, it is then plainly a duty 
of the community to do so. When the superior commands 
what is in itself evil, it is the duty of every subject to judge 
that the superior orders what is evil, and that such command 
is not to be obeyed. When the superior is a destroyer of the 
common good, it is for the whole community to judge and 
decide what is necessary for its defence, and what is to be 
done in that emergency. 

Hence, in order to avoid an equivocal use of words, and 
the fallacious reasoning which it gives rise to, observe that 
God alone can be styled personally and naturally superior 
over mankind, and over all law ; superiorship in a human 
ruler, is only official ; it is not personal, but is a trust, and it 
has superior law over it, to which that human ruler must be 
subordinate and obedient in governing, in order validly to 
exercise his authority and office as superior ; under that law, 
which is supreme over all creatures,* his personal conduct, 
when he is a wicked tyrant, may be condemned ; and, if 
necessary for the public safety, his arbitrary and tyrannical 
acts may be forcibly resisted. 

* " It is unmeaning to say, they (princes) have no superior but the law 
of God; for that is to play with words. A law is no superior without 
an authority to judge and apply it." " The civil ruler is for the defence of 
the people ; but if he should make war on the people, the right of self- 
defence would justify resistance." Cardinal Manning, "Vatican Decrees," 
ch. I. 

If the people cannot judge the tyrant's abuse of power, there results the 
inconsistency of law that is really such, even when it must of right be a 
nullity; for, it is actually a nullity, if the people cannot rightfully enforce 
it in the case supposed. 



312 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Another argument urged by the absolutists to prove 
that a community has no right to defend itself with force 
against any species or degree of tyranny, is : " the authorizing 
of forcible resistance to any kind or degree of tyranny, is 
practically to license revolution under all pretexts, since such 
principle would be liable to abuse." But this is reasoning on 
a false assumption ; the conclusion here logically and cer- 
tainly follows, only provided it be granted that every thing is 
wrong and forbidden by the natural law, which is liable to be 
abused by excess ; this, however, is a false principle. Indeed, 
every moral principle requiring the exercise of prudence for 
its right application is liable to abuse. It follows, then, that 
the argument is not valid, since it proves too much. 

The argument for the duty of passive submission to extreme 
tyranny, founded on the false assumption that supreme au- 
thority comes to the civil ruler directly and immediately from 
God, is sufficiently answered in the preceding article of this 
chapter. It surely does not strengthen the moral power of 
human law in practice, to exaggerate the prerogatives of civil 
authority. 

When it is said that to admit the right in a community ot 
resisting extreme tyranny, is to affirm the doctrine that " the 
body politic is primarily democratic, and that the supreme 
authority always remains radically in the multitude;" it may 
be replied that this objection also merely raises up a difficulty 
concerning the use of words. The authority of civil rulers, 
primarily and naturally speaking, comes to them immediately 
from the people, mediately from God; if this be what is meant 
by the proposition, " government is primarily democratic," it 
is a true proposition in that sense. The expression, " author- 
ity remains radically' in the multitude," may be understood so 
as to imply either a true or false assertion : if it be made to 
imply that when the supreme authority is transferred by the 
community to the sovereign, it is not wholly and really trans- 
ferred, or that the community is always free to withdraw it 
arbitrarily, this assertion is not true. If it mean that there is 
in the community an inherent right to resume the supreme 



SPECIAL ETUICS. 313 

authority, when such a step becomes clearly essential for self- 
preservation, in this sense it is true. 

The more reasonable and true doctrine, concerning this 
subject of dispute, and, at the same time, the doctrine that is 
taught by the best and safest guides, is a medium between the 
two extreme theories; * that of the absolutists or caesarists, on 
the one side ; and that of the revolutionists, liberalists, social- 
ists, etc , on the other ; and thus again the rule holds true, 
that, in moral things, bo:h of two extreme contraries, are most 
generally false. 

It may be affirmed, then, that a civil community has the 
natural right of necessary self-defense against tyranny that is 
grievously or extremely oppressive and morally unendurable; 
and, by consequence, such community has the right to depose 
or remove the tyrant, when such ccurse of action is necessary 
for self preservation. 

All men have a natural right to defend their lives, and their 
goods necessary for living, against an unjust aggressor, even 
by taking the life of the unjust aggressor, if that be the neces- 
sary and only means of defense. That every man has this 
right of self-defense against an unjust aggressor, is universally 
admitted to be a certain and demonstrated conclusion from 
the very law of nature. That the tyrant is an unjust aggressor 
on the community, requires no proof, nor is it denied : the con- 
clusion follows necessarily, then, that a civil community has 
the right of self-defense against the destroying tyrant, t and 

* It can scarcely be doubted that exaggerated and inflammatory writings 
from these extreme partisans, whether by magnifying or lessening the pre- 
rogatives of civil authority, have much influence towards exciting the civil 
commotions from which some nations are seldom entirely free: just as ex- 
treme rigor, and extreme laxity in moral matters, both con ;uce :? irreligion 
among the people, though they produce this result in opposite manners. 

t "Si rex justam suam potestatem in tyrannidemverteret, ilia in manifes- 
tam civitatis perniciem abutendo; posset populus natural! potestate ad se 
defendenium uti : hac enim nunquam se privavit." Suarez. C e:'eri-. Fid., 
lib. 3. c. 3. If a king were to turn his just authority into 'yrar.ny, abusing 
it o the manifest destruction of the State; the people can use their natural 
right of se'f-defence ; for, of this they never deprived themselves. 

And Bellarmine, De Laicis, lib. 3, c, 6, says: "Nota, in particulari 
27 



314 ETHICS, OK MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

consequently, the people can depose or remove him, wl\cn 
that is the necessary and only means to the end. Nay more, 
it being true that every person has the natural right of self- 
defense against an unjust aggressor; a fortiori, or for a still 
stronger reason has a whole community of men the right of 
self-defense against an unjust aggressor, since the existence 
and well being of a whole community are of more importance 
than are the life and peace of an individual person ; " bonum 
multitudinis est majus et divinius, quam bonum unius." 

This reasoning is conclusive, and hence Suarez declares the 
right of self-defense to be a full justification of armed resist- 
ance to tyranny, when such means becomes necessary for the 
preservation of the community. In the same manner, and for 
the same reasons, that an individual is competent to determine 
what defense is necessary for the preservation of his life or his 
goods of life, when unjustly imperilled by such aggression ; 
so, speaking before the bar of natural reason, a community of 
mankind can judge the facts and the degree of necessity which 
authorize forcible resistance, in the analogous case of danger- 
ous tyranny. In extreme necessity, positive forms and laws 
yield to natural law; or, as the axiom expresses this truth, 
" necessity knows no law •" that is, necessity abrogates what 
is merely of human right or institution. In such exigency as 
extreme tyranny constitutes, the often misused saying, "the 
superior cannot be judged by die inferior,"* which is true in 

singulas species regfminis esse de jure gentium, non de jure naturse ; nam. 
pendet a consensu mukitndinis constituere super se regem vel consules, 
vel alios magistratus, ut patet; et si causa legitima adsit, potest multitude* 
mutare regnum in aristocratiam, aut democratiam, ut Romae factum legi- 
mus." Take notice particularly that the special forms of government come 
by human law, not by the law of nature; for it depends on the consent of 
the multitude to place over themselves a king, consuls, or other magistrates, 
as is plain: and if there be a legitimate reason, the multitude can change a 
kingdom into an aristocracy, or a democracy, or the contrary, as we read 
of having been done in Rome. 

*This saying, as here applied, and others of like import, as, " Rex est 
optima pars," " Superior est potior pars," are of mo lern origin ; they are 
true only under a particular respect, and are, therefore, equivocal. They 
are often cited in argument as if they were simply true; and they thus 
serve the purposes of false reasoning. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 315 

the sense that the inferior cannot be an ordinary and authori- 
tative tribunal before which the superior is to be judged under 
positive law, loses its application and becomes a nullity. It is 
evident, however, that no degree of necessity, and no exigency 
of human things, can change or annul the law of nature, or 
any precept thereof. 

Who could deny the right of the passengers on a ship out 
at sea, to remove from authority the desperate commander 
that would be plainly and directly striving to sink the vessel 
with all on board, if they could at all effect his removal, and 
thereby save their lives 1 Their right to use that necessary 
means of self-preservation is a plain dictate of natural reason. 
An individual person has the right of self-defence against the 
unjust aggressor; a small number of persons, and an imper- 
fect community, are admitted to possess this natural right of 
self-defence: then, by what principle of justice or truth can it 
be shown that a whole nation of human beings has no right 
to defend itself against the tyrant that would destroy it ; and 
that the only right and duty of the people, in such case, are 
to pray and to suffer the destruction, without the use of any 
human means ? And even granting the theory disproved in 
the preceding article, which makes authority originally to have 
come, not mediately, but immediately from God to the ruler 
who is now a tyrant: does not the right of self defence, or 
the right to self-preservation, also come immediately from 
God to all mankind? Is that right really possessed by every 
individual person ; and must it nevertheless be granted that it 
does not exist in a multitude or nation of persons ? The 
truth is that every community has the natural right of self- 
defence against any unjust aggressor. It is certainly not licit 
for subjects to resist lawful authority ; but for a community to 
resist extreme tyranny, is not resistance to authority ; it is 
resistance to violence. For the ruler to make a tyrannical 
law, is not act of authority ; it is an act of injustice and 
violence, which can never proceed from ths.1 sacred principle, 
authority from God to govern by just law* that bind in con- 
science. 



316 

The ruler holds his authority^/- the good of the nation ; 
he has no authority against the welfare or existence of the 
nation. The tyrant whose government is oppressive and 
ruthless, may be truly regarded as putting himself, practically 
and morally, outside of the community, and thus making him- 
self as an extraneous foe to its safety and its very existence; 
against him, therefore, thus making himself as an external 
enemy and an aggressor, the community has the natural right 
efficaciously to defend itself. Moreover, the ruler, on becom- 
ing a tyrant, thereby ceases to be officially and formally a 
ruler; and thus, to all practical intents and purposes, he leaves 
the community without any true and real government at all. 
But a community that is deprived of true and real govern- 
ment, has a right, in the very nature of things, to provide for 
the common good; and, consequently, to restore, or again 
institute genuine government. In such event, we may affirm 
with St. Thomas (p. 2. 2, qu. 42, a 2. ad 3), " Magis autem 
tyrannus seditiosus est ; " it is then rather the tyrant himself 
that is seditious. 

The end is above the means that serve it, and which exist 
only on account of that end; but the civil ruler, as such, is 
only for the community, and this is the real relation between 
the rulers and their people, in the body politic. Hence, the 
end, or the good of the community being that which is truly 
and really principal, if the means to it, which is secondary and 
is necessary only on account of that end, should entirely fail ; 
then, it is evident, another means that will be efficacious can 
be chosen by the community. It follows, therefore, that when 
a civil ruler utterly fails to accomplish the essential end of 
government, by making of himself an arbitrary and lawless 
tyrant, another can be selected ; or, the community has a nat- 
ural right to remedy the evil, by providing means for realizing 
its essential end. 

It will be useful here to remark, in regard to the chief ob « 
ject of civil government, that the ancient pagans made the 
state, as a power against other nations, that which is principal; 
and the people belonged to the state as its property. The 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 317 

absolutists or caesarists, make the supreme ruler, as a power 
against the people or his subjects, what is principal: " rex est 
pars potior et melior," The legitimists, make perpetuation of 
the dynasty, the principal end to be secured.* The socialists 
and liberalists, make license as opposed to restrictive and co- 
ercive law, and to controlling authority or ruling power, the 
principal end to be gained. The only true principal end )f 
the government, is to maintain the common good of the peo- 
ple, by means of wise and just laws equitably administered; 
and hence, the goodness of a government depends less on its 
particular form, than on the prudence, fidelity, and justice 
with which its authority is exercised, or its proper functions 
are performed. 

Since the theory of absolutism teaches that the monarch 
holds his authority immediately from God, or by " divine and 
indefeasible right;" and that his authority is absolute, that is, 
free from any condition or exception that limits it before the 
community ; it follows from the theory that such monarch has 
no law above him, but the divine law ; and that he alone has 
a right to explain and apply that divine law to himself, or to 
his own acts. It is in this sense the defenders of absolutism 
affirm, as quoted above, that "the inferior cannot judge the 
superior." As this doctrine virtually constitutes the monarch, 
"pontifex;" the theory of caesarism, "Caesar Imperator et 
Pontifex Maximus," is a logical conclusion from that of abso- 

* The following language of the illustrious Pius IX, though not an official 
utterance, has, nevertheless especial weight, as coming from such a source. 
It was spoken at an audience in 1876, the report of which, was published in 
the press at the time ; for example, see New York Tablet, January 13th, 
1877; the "Record" (Monthly), Philadelphia, March loth, 1877. After 
specifying the main duties incumbent on temporal rulers, he then speaks of 
legitimism, and, among other things, says : " How many legitimate reign- 
ing families have not lost, by dispensation of Providence, their claim to 
their thrones? — The principle of legitimacy is not at ail to be considered; 
but are we not falling into an error in imposing its vindication, under any 
circumstances, upon the Pope, especially, then, when it was forfeited by 
reason of the wrongs done by such families ; or, is it presumed that the 
functions of the bishops and priests differ in one State — whether monarchy 
or republic — from another ? " 

27* 



318 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

lutism. Hence, the two theories being identical in their prin- 
ciple, are herein mentioned together, just as if they were not 
distinct from each other. 

The opposite extreme, or the notion advocated by the liber- 
alists, socialists, and revolutionists, ultimately leads to a denial 
of all genuine government and law as necessary for the com- 
munity or as having any binding power over the consciences 
of the citizens; and on this account their theory is more 
directly and evidently false. It is only as a power that is 
stable and efficacious in maintaining order and enforcing the 
respective rights and duties of the people among themselves, 
that government affords general security, or is any certain and 
reliable means of defending the common good. The proofs 
advanced, in a preceding part of this work, to demonstrate the 
strict necessity of supreme government and law for civil society 
are, at the same time, a sufficient refutation of this extrav- 
agant doctrine. These theorists confound civil liberty with 
civil license. The people of no nation have the right, not to be 
bound by just and necessary law; and, indeed, just law can 
not be opposed to true liberty ; it is only unjust law 
that is opposed to genuine civil liberty. That nation has 
civil liberty, whose people are so required to do their duty as 
citizens, that their rights are in nowise taken away or abridged; 
and they are burdened with no laws which are unnecessary, or 
which are truly inexpedient for the general public welfare. 
This being true, the people may enjoy perfect civil liberty, 
under any legitimate form of government. But no good citi- 
zen of any nation can wish for that liberty which consists in 
the privation of necessary law and order ; for, this would not 
be liberty ; but it would be the license of crime and bad pas- 
sion, along with general disorder or anarchy. 

One who reads the treatises of many writers on ethics or 
morals, will hardly fail to observe how some of those authors 
insist on law, rather as being a principle that is directive of 
moral action ; while others insist on law, more as a power 
that can be made coercive of man's action. The former, show 
only the truth and justice of the law, as the reason for obedi- 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 319 

ence; the latter, portray the penalties of its infraction, as 
furnishing the principal motive for obedience to the law. 
This difference in their manner of apprehending law, and 
proposing it to other minds, may come, in some instances, 
from peculiar personal character, or bent of education ; but 
others thus treat the subject on theory. It is surely the 
nobler conception of law to make its dignity and excellency 
consist principally in its virtue to direct rational and moral 
action ; yet, the perfection of law is not complete or integral, 
unless it can also be made coercive of obedience. 

It may be concluded, then, that all narrow, one-sided, or 
extreme theories for explaining authority and law, and the 
respective rights and duties of rulers and subjects, are erron- 
eous; and what is false or exaggerated, can serve no good 
purp se; can produce no real or lasting benefit to any lauda- 
ble object; nor can it be of any genuine advantage, either to 
truth or virtue. 



ARTICLE VII. 

OF THE COMMON LAW OF NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. 

Proposition I. — The common law of nations, or the "jus 
gentium" as explained in the old schools, is not the same 
as the modern international law, except under a respect. 

Proposition II. — The civil government has not, of its own 
nature, any authority to prescribe rules of spiritual conduct or 
religious worship. 

The evident, necessary, and immediate conclusions from 
the natural law; or, as they are often styled, the first conclu- 
sions from the natural law, do not fall under positive legisla- 
tion ; and they are binding on the nations of mankind, as well 
as they are on the private individual conscience. Such con- 
clusions from the natural law, are not a part either of the 
common law of nations or of international law ; for, both the 



320 ETHICS, Ott MORAL PHIL030PIIT. 

common law of nations, "jus gentium," and international law, 
are positive law; whereas, these principles or conclusions per- 
tain immediately to the substance of the natural law, and they 
are, therefore, presupposed to all positive law. 

It will help towards better understanding the nature and 
proper object of positive law, to distinguish precisely and 
clearly between this common law of nations, the "jus genti- 
um " of the old schools, and what is now understood by " in- 
ternational law." 

The common law of nations, or the "jus gentium" of the 
old schools, comprised certain principles or rules of justice, 
which were recognized as laws in all, or in nearly all, nations ; 
not, however, by any compact either expressed or implied 
which they entered into. These laws were common to na- 
tions, only because their utility or necessity was evident, and 
was, therefore, seen alike by all nations of mankind. Hence, 
such laws were common, not by convention, but by coincidence 
of judgment. To this kind of law was referred the division of 
property; also, the introduction of slavery; the transferring 
of supreme authority from the multitude, to which it is primi- 
tively and naturally given, to a ruler, who, for the ends of 
government, impersonates the multitude ; the punishment of 
certain enormous crimes with death, etc. This common right 
of nations was understood to include not only general laws 
regulating internal order among the citizens of each nation ; 
but other laws also which governed the intercourse of nations 
with each other, but which had the force of law, however, 
rather because their justice and necessity were evident to all 
men,* than because they were conventionally agreed upon. 
While there were a few plain and simple principles of comity 
and justice on which ancient nations were, at least, implicitly 
agreed, yet, they had no complete code, or system of interna- 

* " Quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, et apud omnes 
gentes peraeque custoditur; vocaturque jus gentium." P. 2. 2, qu. 57, 
a. 3, in C.'j see also Suarez, De Legibus, lib. I, c. 17. The common 
law of nations : what is laid down by reason among all mankind, and 
is kept by nearly all nations. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 321 

ticnal law. Hence, international law as a special and com- 
plex department of jurisprudence, is of more recent origin. It 
is not morally possible for all nations of mankind persistently 
to approve and defend anything as true and just, which is, in 
itself, really false and unjust; for this reason, the fact of all 
nations agreeing in a rule of civil justice, was always accepted 
as conclusive proof that such rule follows by valid deduction 
from the law of nature.* While this argument from the testi- 
mony of mankind is only extrinsic proof, for, it is not drawn 
from the intrinsic nature of law and its matter; yet, the agree- 
ment among nations in seeing the same principle of justice, in 
the same manner, affords certain, though indirect proof that 
their inferences from natural law are consequent; and this is 
why the common law of nations, " jus gentium," is often spoken 
of as comprising demonstrative conclusions from the law 
of nature ; t though, in reality, they are not strictly and simply 
such. 

Since the essential principles of natural justice and moral 
rectitude bind nations of mankind in their conduct towards 
each other, as well as they bind individual persons ; it may be 
concluded that international law, and municipal or civil law, 

* "Sicutin una civitatevel provincia consuetudo introducit jus, itain uni. 
verso humano genere potuerunt j ura gentium moribus introduci. Eo vel max- 
ime quod ea quae ad hoc jus pertinent, et pauca sunt, et juri naturali valde 
propinqua, et quae faciliimam habent ab ilia deductionem, adeoque utilem, et 
consentaneam ipsi naturae, ut licet noa sit evidens deductio tanquam de se 
necessaria ad honestatem morum, sit tamen valde conveniens naturae et 
de se acceptabilis ab omnibus." Suarez, De Leg., lib. I, c. 19. As in one 
Siate or province custom introduces law; so, among all mankind, the laws 
of nations may be introduced by custom; more especially since the matter 
pertaining to such laws, which are few, and quite adjacent to natural law, 
is very easily deduced from the natural law, is so useful, and consentaneous 
to nature itself, that though it is not so evident a deduction that it is neces- 
sary for correctne.-s of morals, yet it agrees well with nature, and is of 
itself acceptable to all men. 

"Ad jus gentium pertinent ea, quae derivantur ex lege naturae sicut 
conclusiones ex principiis." P. 1.2, qu. 95, a. 4. Those things pertain 
to the common law of nations which are derived from the natural law as 
conclusions from their principles. 
21 



322 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ultimately rest on the same basis, which is justice; and, there- 
fore, the definition of the one must agree in substance with 
the definition of the other. All nations are bound, it is plain, 
by the natural law; and as there can be no positive law which 
is not derived from the natural law, it follows that there can 
be no genuine law of nations which is not derived from the 
law of nature, or which is not a dictate of right reason.* 

The definition of international law given by President Madi- 
son declares its origin, nature, and object accurately and pre- 
cisely, at least, as international law is understood by the best 
jurists of the present day: "International law, as understood 
among civilized nations, may be defined as consisting of those 
rules which reason deduces, as consonant to justice, from the 
nature of the society, existing among independent nations; 
with such definitions and modifications as may be established 
by general consent." t 

The laws that now direct and control the intercourse be- 
tween nations, in peace and in war, comprise, besides the 
necessary general principles always practically in force, a large 
body of conventional rules regulating what pertains to the 
mutual rights and duties of nations, in various and manifold 
matter. So different is the present mode of warfare from the 
ancient; so extensive is commerce; so great the increase of 
travel by land and on the high seas, for pleasure, business, 
and improvement; so changed is the whole type of civiliza- 
tion from that which marked early periods of civil history, 
that international law is now something quite distinct from 
what it was in the olden times as a part of the u jus gentium ; " 
and, as before said, it is now a comprehensive system of juris- 
prudence. 

* " Omnis lex humanitus posita in tantum habet de ratione legis, in 
quantum a lege naturae derivatur." P. I. 2, qu. 95, a. 2. Every law laid 
down by human authority has the true nature of law, just so far as it is 
derived from the law of nature. 

And qu.93, a. 3 : "Omnes leges in quantum participant de recta ratione, 
in tantum derivantur a lege aeterna." All laws participate of right reason, 
in so far as they are derived from the eternal law. 

t See Wheaton's Elements of International Law, chap. I. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 323 

Bentham* founds international law primarily on utility or 
expediency for the temporal prosperity and happiness of nations- 
Were it, at the same time, granted by him that nothing is truly 
or simply useful and expedient in respect to these ends except 
what is a just and right means; and were it granted by him 
also that no national prosperity and happiness constitute a 
good and legitimate end, unless they accord with justice, then 
we might concede his assertion to be true. But even as 
understood in that manner, still his principle would not be 
philosophical ; since the first reason for international law, is 
the end intended by it ; t not the means to that end. The law 
of nations, is on account of a common or general end to be 
gained by it, namely, the good or welfare of nations ; the law 
does not originate in the means, but in the end ; for, law, of 
its very nature, first intends a just end, and then, secondarily 
and consequently, it intends the suitable and legitimate means 
to that end. Means may be useful, and, in that sense, expedient, 
and yet be bad; it is not enough that means subserve an end 
efficaciously ; they must do it also legitimately. To the con- 
trary of what Bentham's theory seems to imply, the end does 
not justify the means. 

Since all nations are independent of each other, and equal 
before the law of nature, no one of them naturally has any 
authority over the others. Yet, on the other hand, they have 

* Bentham, "Principles of Morals and Legislation," chapter I, says: 
11 The principle of utility is the foundation of the present work; it will be 
proper, therefore, at the outset to give an explicit and determinate account 
of what is meant by it. By the principle of utility is meant that principle 
which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the 
tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of 
the party whose interest is in question ; or, what is the same thing in other 
words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action what- 
soever ; and, therefore, not only of every action of a private individual, 
but of every measure of goverment." 

t "Finis respondet principio . . . Primum autem principium in 
operativis, quarum est ratio practica, est finis ultimus." P. I. 2, qu 90, 
a. 2 ; it. qu. 2. a. 5. The end corresponds to its principle. But the first 
principle in work, which falls under practical reason, is the ultimate end. 



324 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

some common interests; they have rights and duties, in 
respect to each other, arising, from the very nature of things, 
which impose certain mutual obligations on them before the 
law of nature. Indeed, the necessity, for laws regulating the 
conduct of nations towards each other, is plainly deducible 
from this truth, that they have important common interests, 
and that they are related to each other by mutual rights and 
duties. As no nation has authority over other independent 
nations, and, in practice, power could not be committed to 
one nation to legislate for all others ; it follows that inter- 
national authority to legislate, must, ordinarily, be republican 
in the mode of its exercise. It is, perhaps, on this account 
that some authors have gone so far as to affirm that all the 
nations of mankind naturally constitute one great republic. 
But this is to affirm too much; for, international government 
is not instituted by nature, it is introduced by human conven- 
tion ; and besides, all the nations of mankind were never actu- 
ally united into such republic under any system of international 
laws. It may be conceded, however, that the nations of man- 
kind possess some natural aptitude or capability for such union 
under general or common laws agreed upon by all. For, as 
Suarez observes,* though mankind are divided into various 
nations, they possess not only a specific unity as one race 
descended from Adam, but they also possess a certain moral 
and political unity. This is indicated by the fact that they 
have, under the law of nature, certain mutual rights and duties 
common to all civil communities. 

There are some plain and essential principles of justice and 
rules of international conduct that are not subject to change, 

* " Humanum genus, quantumvis in varios populos et regna divisum, 
semper habet aliquam unitatem non solum specificam, sed etiam quasi politi- 
cam et moralem, quam indicat naturale prseceptum mutui amoris, miseri 
cordiae, quod ad oranes extenditur, etiam extraneos et cujuscumque naiio- 
nis." Suarez, De Leg., lib. I, c 19, No. 9. The human race, how much 
soever divided into various peoples and kingdoms, always retains a certain 
unity, not only a specific unity, but a kind of political and moral one, which 
is indicated by the natural precept of natural love and mercy, which ex- 
tends to all men, even to foreigners of every nation. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 325 

and which, it must be assumed a priori, no nation is rationally- 
free to disregard. The observance of them is sometimes com- 
pelled by force on a particular nation that disturbs the general 
safety by refusing to obey them. The only penal sanction 
annexed to international law, is the risk that other nations 
may combine to punish its infraction. A nation can, as a 
fact, refuse, in virtue of its sovereignty as a nation, compliance 
with any laws of the kind ; but it always does so at the risk 
of suffering vindictive justice at the hand of other powers. 

Some jurists distinguish the laws of nations into the primary 
cr necessary, and the secondary or voluntary. The primary 
are explained by them to be certain and undeniable deduc- 
tions from the law of nature; the secondary are such as are 
voluntarily or conventionally agreed on by nations. 

But these primary or necessary principles of the natural law 
that are evident to the entire mass of mankind are not properly 
styled ''laws of nations;" they are rather the law of nature as 
manifestly applying to its own matter; whereas, the laws of 
nations are human positive laws. Those first and evident con- 
clusions can be truly styled " laws of nations" only in the sense 
that all nations of mankind assent to them as dictates of natural 
justice, and thus they are common to nations by coincidence 
and through the specific identity of human reason, not by posi- 
tive convention. International law, or the law of nations, 
rightly and strictly so called, is positive human law. which is 
either explicitly or implicitly agreed to by nations ; and, there- 
fore, it has the force of law, not of its own intrinsic nature, 
like the natural law and the necessary conclusions from it ; 
but it requires as a condition for its validity as law, that it be 
voluntarily or conventionally agreed to by nations. 

It may be concluded, then, from all that has been thus far 
said, that the common law of nations, or the '-jus gentium" of 
the old schools, was not the natural law ; nor was it, except for 
a few of its principles, international law as positively agreed 
on by nations. In itselt, it mainly consisted of civil laws that 
were common to most nations ; but without having been 
adopted conventionally by them, as is generally required in 
23 



326 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

order for international law to be validly constituted. Hence, 
this "jus gentium" was said by the old writers on jurispru- 
dence, to be a medium between natural law and civil law ;* 
it is not absolutely immutable, as is the natural law ; and it is, 
on the other hand, far less mutable than is mere civil law in 
general. The distinction between these three species of law 
will be readily understood if we reflect that there are some 
perfectly evident and immutable principles of justice, and of 
moral rectitude, which nature implants in every reason, t and 
which, on that account, belong to the substance of the natural 
law itself; for example, "injustice should not be done;" " do 
good ;" " honor God," etc. There are other general princi- 
ples directive of man's social conduct, which most nations see 
alike, and recognize in practice; but yet, they are not abso- 
lutely certain and immutable truths following by necessary 
deduction from the law of nature : authors usually mention as 
instances of such principles, the introduction of slavery; the 
division of property ; the institution of the special forms of 
government, etc. Such principles are not so universal, neces- 

* "Jus gentium est veluti medium inter jus naturale et civile ; nam cum 
primo convenit aliquo modo in communitate et in universalitate et facili illa- 
tione ex principiis naturalibus ; licet non per absolutam necessitatem vel evi- 
dentiam, in quo convenit cum humano jure." Suarez, De Leg., lib. I, c. 
2o, No. 10. The com uon law of nations is a sort of medium between the 
natural law and the civil law ; for it agrees in some manner with the first, 
in its generality and universality, and its easy deduction from natural prin- 
ples, but not by its absolute necessity and evidence; and under this respect 
it agrees with the human law. 

t " Lex naturalis est quam opinio non genuit, sed naturalis evidentia, ut 
Cicero dixit ; ergo omnis lex quae non hoc modo generatur, positiva est et 
humana: tale est jus gentium, quia non per evidentiam, seel probabilitatem 
et communem sestimatonem hominum introducitur. " Suarez, De Leg., 
lib. I, c. 19, No. 4. It is not opinion, but natural evidence, that begets 
the natural law, as Cicero said; therefore, all law that is not generated in 
this manner, is positive and human : such is the law of nations which is 
introduced, not through evidence, but probability and the general estima- 
tion of men. 






SPECIAL ETHICS. 327 

sary, and absolute,* as are the demonstrated conclusions from 
natural law ; but yet they are far more so than are numerous 
and variable civil statutes regulating the details of conduct 
among citizens of this or that nation; for, civil laws of the 
kind are susceptible of frequent change. 

Some international laws now in force were introduced by 
more or less general treatise among nations; others were 
adopted successively by different nations, and thus they grad- 
ually acquired the authority of general laws. The present law 
of blockade is an example of international law coming into 
vogue by degrees. The conditions now required for the block- 
ade of an enemy's coast or seaport, are: ist, the blockade 
must be duly promulgated; 2d, it must be made actually effi- 
cacious by a sufficient naval force. According to the treaty 
of Paris, signed March 30th, 1856, by all the principal nations 
of Europe, letters of marque will not again be issued by those 
powers to privateers; but in this agreement finally to abolish 
privateering, the government of the United States did not 
concur. 

Privateering and " guerrilla warfare," in which none but the 
unarmed and defenceless are attacked, and that only for the 
sake of private booty as inducement for the lawless aggressors, 
seem not to be in themselves plainly justifiable before the bar 
of reason and natural equity, as becoming means of weaken- 
ing an enemy; especially since experience has shown that 
these practices are demoralizing : that a part of their actual 
effect is to vitiate and deprave. 

The laws of nations that now prevail may be learned from 
the following authoritative sources: ist, treaties of peace, t 

* " Sic enim jus gentium de servitute captivorum in bello justo in ecclesia 
mutatum est, et inter christianos non servatur ex antiqua ecclesise consuetu- 
dine, quae est veluti speciale jus gentis fidelis." Suarez, De Legibus, lib. I, c. 
20, No. 10. For thus the law of nations which enslaved prisoners taken m 
a just war is changed in the Church, and it is not done among Christian 
nations, by an old custom of the Church, thus making a sort of special 
common law among those Christian nations. 

t Wheaton's " Elements of International Law," chapter I. 



328 ETHICS, OK MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

alliance, and commerce, declaring, modifying, or defining pre- 
existing international laws; 2d, ordinances of particular gov- 
ernments prescribing rules of conduct for their commissioned 
cruisers and prize tribunals ; 3d, decisions of international tri- 
bunals, such as boards of arbitration and courts of prize; 4th, 
written opinions of official jurists given confidentially to their 
own governments ; the archives of the department of foreign 
affairs in every country contain a collection of such docu- 
ments. In the United States, writings of the kind are pub- 
lished, like other State papers ; but, in most nations, they are 
not made public; 6th, authors of authority showing what is 
approved by general usage of nations ; what definitions, modi- 
fications, etc., have been introduced by general consent. It 
is manifest, however, that the works of -these writers on inter- 
national jurisprudence, can have no positive value or authority 
except in so far as giving reliable testimony concerning what 
has actually been done by nations. 

Does the common law of nations, or the "jus gentium," in- 
clude within its proper object, a system of religion ? Or, in 
other words, is it the office of civil government, under the 
law of nature, to rule or to guide man in things directly re- 
lating him to God, and to his ultimate destiny ? 

It is not naturally within the jurisdiction of civil authority 
to prescribe rules of religious worship, nor to govern in purely 
religious or spiritual matters. 

Civil authority and law have for then* special and proper 
end, to regulate the conduct of the people towards one 
another, as citizens. Religious matter and laws regulating 
religious worship, or things which directly relate man to God, 
do not primarily and immediately pertain to civil government 
at all. It is the office of religion and of the divine law to 
govern man in all these things that directly pertain to God, 
and to the future life. Civil law and government, when re- 
stricted to their own intrinsic and essential end and order of 
things, ultimately terminate in the common civil good of the 
body politic, which is a temporal and earthly object. Relig- 
ion and the divine law intend, as their special object, man's 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 329 

future and final state, which will be unending. As civil gov- 
ernment has not for its own peculiar and distinctive end man's 
supernatural beatitude; so, neither would it, in a state of pure 
nature, have for its own special or proper end man's natural 
beatitude in a future life.* It must be concluded, therefore, 
that the direction of man in his duty to God, or in religious 
matter, does not naturally pertain to the specific or proper end 
of civil law and government; and, by consequence, it is not 
the office of civil authority as such to institute a system of 
religion. 

As a fact, even the ancient pagan governments practically 
recognized the principle that man's religious obligations are 
founded on divine law, and that they do not originate in hu- 
man authority. They all assumed that there was in the world a 
medium in some respect elevated above the mere civil order, 
through which the will and behests of the divinity were au- 
thoritatively manifested to the nation ; such their oracles, 
priests, conjurors, etc., were believed to be. When a nation 
and its government degenerated to such abasement that the 
civil ruler purchased his own apotheosis, he claimed,, and his 
pretension was not disputed, that his authority to govern in 
matters of religion, was superior to his power as merely a civil 

* " Potestas civilis non solum non respicit felicitatem aeternam vitse 
futurse ut finem ultimum proprium, verum etiam nee per se intendit pro- 
priam spiritualem felicitatem hominum in hac vita, et consequenter nee per 
se potest in materia spirituals disponere aut leges ferre." Suarez, De I-egi- 
bus, lib. 3, c. XI, No. 6. Civil power not only does not regard the un- 
ending happiness of the next life as its own proper ultimate end, but it 
even does not necessarily intend the spiritual well-being of men in this life, 
and consequently it cannot of itself dispose of religious matter or make 
laws for it. 

Et ibid: " Potestas civilis etiam in pura natura spectata, non habet pro 
fine intrinseco et per se intento felicitatem naturalem vitse futurse." Even 
considering only the state of pure nature, civil authority has not for the end 
intrinsic to it and necessarily intended for it, man's natural bliss in future 
life. 

*' Id quod ita pertinet ad privatam felicitatem, ut non redundet in bonum 
communitatis, ad hanc potestatem, vel legem civilem non pertinet." Ibid. 
No. 7. What so pertains to private happiness as not to redound to the pub 
lie good, does not pertain to such power, or to the civil law, 
28* 



330 ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ruler. These statements being true, though the actual induc- 
tion from history proving them to be true must be left to the 
ingenuous reader, it follows that the nations of mankind never 
regarded religious direction, or the prescribing and regulating 
of purely religious matter, as belonging to the province of 
merely civil authority ; but they believed that religion and the 
divine law pertained to a tribunal that was of a superior order, 
thus admitting the specific end of civil legislation and gov- 
ernment, and that of religion, to be entirely and essentially 
distinct* 

God has made both religion and civil government necessary 
for mankind, but in respect to different ends ; namely, for 
man's temporal good as a citizen or as belonging to the body 
politic, on the one hand; and, on the other, for his future 
good as possessing a spiritual and immortal nature. Neither 
one of these powers to rule, can exclude or destroy the other, 
without averting from the end for which it was instituted, and 
thereby sacrificing the general good for what is false and per- 
nicious. There can be no conflict between them, if neither 
order ever directly intervenes in what really pertains to the 
other. Civil government is not naturally ordained to provide 
for, and accomplish, both these ends; for, civil government is 
only an external power, and it is concerned only with the ex- 
ternal conduct of citizens. It is the function of religion inte- 
riorly to direct and rule the mind and will of the people by 
the principles of right reason and morality. Indeed, religion 
is really efficacious, only in so far as it is an internal virtue or 
force in the faculties of the soul. Religion being purely a 
moral power, or having not the faculties of civil or municipal 
authority, it is not naturally ordained to control affairs of the 
community that are merely civil. On the other hand, how- 
ever, civil government cannot make a community truly virtu- 
ous and happy, nor keep it such, without the aid of genuine 

* It is a fact, however, that the civil government in past times always 
exercised a certain control over the external practices of religious worship, 
and also over all matters mixed with both religious and civil relations ; ex- 
cept in those Christian nations which recognized the authority of the Church 
as supreme in all that pertains to religion. 



SPECIAL ETHICS. 331 

religion, since there is no real basis for moral rectitude apart 
from religion as relating man to God. 

The merely civil virtues do not suffice to make the indivi- 
dual morally good. Moral goodness is founded on complete 
rectitude of reason, by which the person tends, in all his de- 
liberate action, only to what is dictated by right reason. 
Hence, since moral goodness comes from internal uprightness, 
and is essentially dependent on acts as internal, it is matter 
which, of its very nature, cannot belong to the specific or 
proper object of civil legislation, which is something public or 
external. The civil law is concerned with the individual's 
internal acts, only as made external, and thereby affecting 
other citizens. It may be concluded, therefore, that it is the 
office of civil law to regulate men's conduct towards each other 
as citizens ; it is that of religion to regulate the conduct of 
men as owing duty to God. Since man's duty to God is, in 
the very nature of things, above the duty which he owes to 
men,* it follows that religion necessarily transcends the purely 
civil order, and is superior to it both in dignity, and in the 
species of its authority. While it is not competent for religious 
authority to intervene in purely civil matter; on the other 
hand, civil laws that directly regard spiritual or religious mat- 
ter, have, in themselves, no validity or force. Such legislation 
can come only through a power that is divinely and specially 
authorized to direct man's internal moral acts. 

In Christian nations there are laws which, under some re- 
spect, give religious direction ; in as much as they regulate the 
conduct of the citizen in certain public matters pertaining to 
religious worship; as, for example, when they require a sus- 

* " Lex Divina principaliter instituitur ad ordinandum homines ad Deum; 
lex autem humana principaliter ad ordinandum homines ad invicem : et 
ideo leges humanse non curaverunt aliquid instituere de cultu divino, nisi 
in ordine ad bonum commune hominum." P. I. 2, qu. 99, a. 3; also, 
Suarez, De Legibus, lib. 3, c. II, No. 8. The divine law was instituted 
principally for directing man to God ; human law, principally for regulat- 
ing men's conduct among themselves ; and, therefore, human laws are not 
concerned about anything belonging to divine worship, except in so far as 
it is related to the public good. 



332 ETHICS, OK MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

pension of ordinary daily employments on the Sunday. But 
such laws derive their efficacy, as imposing any obligation on 
the individual conscience, really from the authority which is 
in the Christian Church to direct the religious conduct and 
worship of the people composing such body politic or civil 
community. Civil government has no such authority natural 
and intrinsic to itself; it can exercise such power only in 
virtue of an authority that is extrinsic to it, and is superior to 
it, in that order of matter. The natural rule of religious action 
for man, is the upright individual conscience as informed with 
the law of nature. For the Christian, the guide in religious 
action, is that same conscience as also furthermore informed 
with truth supernaturally revealed, and duly proposed. 

Civil authority, if considered precisely in itself, is not greater 
in a Christian nation than it is in a non Christian nation, nor 
is it of different species in these two nations.* That the civil 
government in a Christian nation can exercise any right or 
power over religious ma ter, is from a faculty communicated 
to it by supernatural religious authority ; which is extrinsic to 
the civil order, and is superior to the civil order, in all that 
pertains to man's duty towards God. 

* " Haec potestas, ut nunc est in principibus christianis, in se non est 
major nee alterius naturae, quam merit in principibus ethnicis ; ergo ex se 
non habet alium finem, nee aliam materiam." Suarez, De Leg., lib. 3, c. 
XI, No. 9. This power as it now is in Christian princes, is not in itself 
either greater than it was in Pagan princes, nor is it of a different nature ; 
therefore, of itself, it has neither a different end, nor different matter. 

Ibid. No. 4 : " Potestas civilis non per intrinsecam habitudinem, sed per 
relationem et imperium extrinsecum, ordinatur ad finem aeternum superna- 
turalem." Civil power is not ordained ior supernatural beatitude by its 
own intrinsic habitude for it, or relation to it, but by extrinsic relation and 
command. 



SPECIAL ETUICS. 333 



CONCLUSION 



The task proposed to himself by the author is now finished, 
though the subjects of ethics have not all been even touched 
upon. It was not herein aimed to describe the various theo- 
ries of social science, nor to devise and build up a theory of 
the kind ; but merely to explain and prove some important 
elementary truths which must be understood in order to rea- 
son correctly on the moral conduct of men, whether they be 
considered as individual persons, as members of the family, 
or as making up civil society. Truths of this kind are not 
partisan, are not changed with change of climate ; nor do 
they vary with race or nationality. Indeed, no one can theo- 
rize on morality, or on man's social nature, with any real 
advantage, who adopts mere hypotheses for principles that 
are certain ; because this would be to substitute fanciful no- 
tions and opinions in place of the genuine truth proved by its 
reasons. 

In conclusion, the great fundamental principle of ethics 
regarded as a practical science, with which this treatise began, 
maybe here repeated as summing up all its precepts; "in 
omnibus operibus tuis, respice finem " ; but the true and only 
end of our being, to which all legitimate society on earth 
must, by its nature, be subordinate, is that final and permanent 
beatitude or state of happiness, which consists in union with 
God. 

The End. 



ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 



PAGE. 

Absolutism in Government, Doctrine of -.277, 290, 309, 316 

Absolutism Reduces to Caesarism 317 

Acts as Elicited, and Imperate 43 

Act of Law 153 

Action, Human 17, 41, 66 

Action, Voluntary 42, 45 

Actions Manifest the Nature of Agent 263 

Actions, why some give Pleasure 72 

Acts, Imputability of 47 

Adoration, Supreme 196 

Anarchy 305 

Aristotle, on Government by one Man {note) 292 

Art, Arts, the Liberal 87 

Authority, Supreme Civil, Necessary 268 

Authority, Origin of 275 

Authority, End of 328 

Authority, how Proximately and Remotely from the 

People {note) 290 

Authority, Chief Faculties or Prerogatives of 298 

Authority, Right Use of 299 

Authority, Civil, under Different Respects, both Formal 

and Material Principle 275 

Beatitude, as Formal and Objective 19, 31 

Beatitutde as an End 17 

Beatitude, its Object 2>2> 

Beatitude, what Action 20, 29 

Beatitude, Perfect, whether Same for all Persons 37 

Beatitude, whether Attainable in this Life 39 

335 



336 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 

PAGE. 

Bentham, Utilitarian Doctrine of 56, 117, 323 

Body, Human, how Subject to the Soul 203 

Body Politic, Distinct from Family 128 

Body, Resurrection of 44 

Brute Animal does not Formally Apprehend an End ... 16 

Csesarism, what it is 317 

Cardinal Virtues 94 

Cause may have two Effects, one alone being intended.. 207 

Chief Good, Summuvi Bonum 17, 117 

Children, Duties of .* 252 

Children, Education of 252, 304 

Children, their Right to Inherit : 254 

Circumstances Affect Moral Action 62 

Civil Society Necessary 261 

Collection of Persons, how Bound by Law 248 

Common Good the End of all Positive Law 127, 129, 273 

Common Law of Nations, Jus Gentium 319 

Common Law, or Lex 11011 Scripia 135 

Common Sense 61, i6y 

Community as Perfect, and as Imperfect 128 

Communism 233 

Concupiscence, whether Opposed to Will's Liberty 50 

Conscience 60, 146, 165 

Conscience as Erroneous, Right, Doubtful 170, 1 73 

Conscience, Nature and Definition of Explained.. . . 165, 168 

Conscience, what is Liberty of 178 

Conscience, Proximate Rule of Morality j 69 

Courts, Government by 335 

Demerit and Merit 65 

De Necessitate Medii 177 

Determination of Matter as made by Law 142 

Divine and Indefeasible Right of Kings 277 

Divorce 244, 248 

Dominion in Goods, how it Originates 222 

Duels 208 



ALPHABETICAL INDEX- 337 

PAGE. 

Duty Founded by Right 183 

Duty and Right as Related to Law 191 

Effect, may be Known, and not be Intended 207 

Elicited and Imperate Acts 43 

Eminent Domain 226 

End, as a Cause 15, 16, 62, 63 

End, the Ultimate 15 

End, as Good to which the Will Naturally Tends, not 

Subject to Choice 18, 35 

End, Tendency to must Cease 16 

End, as Ultimate ; how Men cannot Tend to two such 

Ends ' 24 

End, as Absolutely Ultimate, and as Relatively such 

{note) 267 

End, Ultimate its Object 33 

Equal, in what sense Men are Born such 259 

Extreme Opinions 313, 3T9 

Faculty of First Principles 60, 85 

Fame, Glory, Riches, Power, not Object of Beatitude... 39 

Family , 240 

Family, Unity of 243 

Family, whether Unit of Civil Society 273 

Fancy, not Capable of Virtue 88 

Fear, how it Affects the Will , 51 

Fellow Men, Duty to 212 

Fortitude 97 

God, our Natural Knowledge of 21 

God, Man's Duty to 195 

God, Duty to not Directly Founded on Dependence .. . 194 

God, Merit Before 67 

God, External and Internal Homage to 197 

Government, Civil, why Necessary 26S 

Government, whether Patriarchal in Origin 286 

Government, Scholastic Theory of 291 

29 



338 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 

PAGE. 

Government, Different Forms of. 292 

Government, Privation of by Anarchy and Tyranny 305 

Government, Best Form of 293 

Government, Civil and Religious, how Related 328, 330 

Hobbes 265 

Heart, Secrets of Naturally Known only to God 216 

Ignorance 48 

Imputability 47 

Indifferent Action 69 

Infinite, Meanings of 162 

Insanity, Distinctive Symptoms of 52, 82 

Instinct 58 

Intellect, as Speculative and Practical 20 

Intellect, Human, Commensurate Object of 22 

Intellect, Acts with Physical Necessity (note) 42 

Intelligence, as Faculty of First Principles 60, 85 

Intending, Different Manners of 70 

Intuition (note) 23 

James I of England, on Origin of Civil Authority 277 

Judges, Government by 134 

Jus Gentium, or Common Law of Nations 319 

Jus Gentium, a Medium between Civil and Natural Law 326 

Justice 96 

Justice, as Conditional, Founds Right 67 

Justinian Code 137 

Justice Essential to Law 145 

Just Law Binds in Conscience 145 

Kings, Divine and Indefeasible Right of 277 

Language, or Faculty of Rational Speech 126, 216, 264 

Law, Kinds of 125, 130 

Law, Act of 153 

Law, Effect of 154 

Law, the Eternal 104 






ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 339 

PAGE. 

Law, is a Work of Reason 106, 127 

Law, End of 127, 129 

Law, the Natural 108, m 

Law, Natural, End of as Primary and Secondary 244 

Law, Natural, is Immutable 119 

Law, Natural, most General Precept of 114, 116 

Law, Natural, its Matter {note) 139, 304 

Law, Natural, Unity of 121 

Law, Natural, its General Precepts 123, 152 

Law, Natural, Sanction of 156 

Law, Natural, how it Binds the Human Species Collect- 
ively , 248 

Law, Natural, whether Obscured by Vice 123 

Law, as Positive, 124 ; Defined 125 

Law, Human, End of 127, 129 

Law, Positive, Necessity of ' 133 

Law, Promulgation of 131 

Law, Human, does not Regard all Good and all Evil .. 139 

Law, the Common, or Lex non Scripta 135 

Law, the Roman, or Civil 137 

Law, Human, not the Natural Applied 141 

Law, Positive, Derived from the Natural Law 145 

Law, as Directive and Coercive 149, 318 

Law, Sanction of. 154 

Laws, should not be too Numerous 303, 304 

Law, International 320 

Law, International, Primary and Secondary Principles of 325 

Laxism 179 

Legitimism (note) 317 

Liberty, Civil 3^ 

Liberty of Conscience , 178 

Liberalists, Revolutionists, Socialists 309, 318 

Liberal Arts, The 87 

Love, as Founding Duty to Others 213 

Lie, The, is Evil 215 

Magnanimity, or Virtue as Heroic 99 



340 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 

PAGE. 

Man, Conceivable States in which he might have been 

Created 268 

Man, Naturally Social 240, 263 

Man, does not Tend to God Necessarily 23 

Man, Tends to Good Necessarily 23 

Man, Duty to Self. 200 

Man, Duty to Fellow Men 212 

Men, how Naturally Equal 259 

Manning, Cardinal, cited (note) 311 

Merit and Demerit 65 

Merit before God, whether Possible 67 

Mill, John Stuart, on the Will 82 

Metaphysical Exactness not in Practical things 122, 123 

Moderamen Inculpatae Tutelae 207 

Morality 45, 54, 62 

Moral Sense, whether Possible 60 

Moral Goodness, on what Dependent 331 



Nature, whether to be Followed 118 

Natural, Different Meanings of 261 

Necessary Perfection, Opposed to Derived no 

Necessity, per se y Kinds or Degrees of 262 

Obediential Power, what it is (note) 36 

Object, in Moral Action 62 

Ownership of Material Goods 222 

Parents, Duties of 252 

Participated Perfection, what it is no 

Per se 262 

Passion ; 73 

Passion, when Imputable 80 

Passion, not Evil, in se . . 79 

Passion, may be Excited by Fancy 76, 82 

Passions, Classified 77 

Pius IX, on Legitimism (note) 317 

Pleasure of Body not Beatitude 28 



ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 341 

PAGE. 

Polygamy 244 

Precept, what it is {note) 118 

Privilege 128 

Prescription Y 258 

Prudence, as a Virtue 86, 95 

Prudence, as Economic and Political 287 

Prudence, in Ruler 301 

Punishment, how Intended by the Law 149, 155 

Punishment, whether it can be Endless 159, 162 

Reason, its Empire over Objects 41 

Reason, it needs Help for its First Operation 112 

Religion, not a Civil Institution 328 

Religion, and Civil Government Necessary 330 

Revelation, how it is Necessary 199 

Rights and Duties, their Origin 183 

Rights and Duties, as Related to Law 191 

Right, whether any before God 68, 183 

Rigorism 179, 302, 303 

Rousseau 265, 288 

Ruler, Duties of 299, 300, 316 

Ruler, is such on account of Ruled 286 

Ruler in what Sense Superior 310, 311 

Ruler, Will of when Law 126 

Ruler, how Bound by his own Law 145 

Sanction of Law 154 

Scientific Knowledge 85 

Self Defense, Right of 206 

Secrets of Hearts, how Known ?. . 216 

Sense, not subject of Virtue 58, 88, 89 

Sin, is Malice of Infinite 161, 162, 163 

Slavery 255 

Society, Civil 261, 272 

Soul, how it Rules the Body 203 

Souls, whether all are Substantially Equal 37 

Species, how Bound Collectively, and Distributively 248 



342 ALPHABETICAL LtfDEX. 

PAGE. 

Stoic s 75, "9> 2 °5 

Suffrage 296 

Suicide 204 

Superior, Superiorship, human, is Official, not personal 310, 311 

Synteresis 60, 166 

Temperance 101 

Tyrant, Tyranny 306 308 

Unity of Society 272 

Utility, Utilitarian 56, 117, 323 

Ullathorne Bishop, cited (note) 288 

Virtues , 84 

Virtue, Moral Defined 88 

Virtue in the Middle, virtus est in medio 90 

Virtues Intellectual, whether more perfect than moral. . . 92 

Virtues, the Cardinal 94 

Virtues, Aristotle, Rules for Acquiring 202 

Virtue may Incline more to one Extreme 242 

Virtues, the Civil, not sufficient 331 

Virtue, Principle of the Soul's Life in Beatitude 161 

Voluntary Directly 46 

Vox Populi Vox Dei 57, 298 

Wife, in what Manner Subordinate to Husband 241 

Will, the, its Perfection 25, 42 

Will, cannot be Forced to Elicit action 47 

Will, the Inferior and the Superior 76 

Will, the, its object not Immediate from Fancy 82 

Will, the, not Determined in Choosing by motive 82 

Will, its Rule is the reason 171 

Wisdom 85 



July, 1878 

STANDARD SCHOOL BOOKS, 

Published byMURPHY&CO., Baltimore. 

tfg'A. liberal discount to Booksellers. Schools, Teachers, &c, when purchased in quantities. 

Fredet's Ancient and Modern Histories. 

New Revised and Enlarged Editions, Continued up to 1867. 
A.ncient History ; from the Dispersion of the Sons of Noe, to the 
Battle of Actium, and the Change of the Roman Republic into an 
Empire. By Peter Fredet, D. D , Professor of History, in St. 
Mary's College, Bait. 32d revised edition. 12o„ half arab. 1 50 
M.odem History ; from the Coming of Christ, and the Change of 
the Roman Republic into an Empire, to the Year of our Lord, 1867. 
By Peter Fredet, D. D , Professor of History in St. Mary's Col- 
lege, Bait. 34th revised and enlarged edition. 12o., half arab. 1 50 
Introduced into many of the principal Literary Institutions of the United 
States, adopted as Text Books in the Irish University, Dublin, and many Insti- 
tutions in England and the Provinces, Fredet's Histories have acquired a wide- 
spread reputation, and their excellence is too well established, at this day, to be 
dwelt upon. The publishers have the pleasure of announcing, that, in order to 
make the Modern History more complete and deserving of the liberal patronage 
hitherto extended to it, they have, with the valuable assistance of the late Dr. 
Fredet's reverend collaborators, added several Chapters embracing the Histori- 
cal Events tiat have taken place in this and other countries from 1854 to 1867. 

The Modern History has been thoroughly revised and considerably enlarged. 
The additional matter, carefully prepared, will be found worthy of the distin- 
guished Historian's original work. The history of the Recent Civil War in the 
United States, particularly, has been compiled with a truthful impartiality which 
makes it the best Synopsis of this Memorable Event yet published for the use 
of Educational Institutions. It is a correct record of facts, faithfully told with- 
out political comment. 

The student will therefore find in Dr. Fredet's two books, the "Ancient" and 
"Modern" Histories, the most Complete, Authentic, and reliable History of the 
World, fr,om its Creation to the Year of our Lord, 1867. 

JtSfFrom a large number of Commendatory Notices of Professor Fredet's Ancient and 
Modern Histories, we select the following, as embodying the spirit of all. 

College of William & Mart, Williamsburg, Va., October, 1867. 

Gentlemen: — The demand for Fredet's Ancient and Modern Histories and Kerney's Com- 
pendium of History, shows that these most excellent books are appreciated as they ought to be. 
The improvements and additions to the editions of 1867 just issued from your press, make them 
all that could be reasonably desired. Immediately alter the reopening of the College of Willi-m 
and Alary, in 1865, Frtdet's Histories were, after a careful examination of the Text Books of the 
day., adopted in the Institution. A more intimate acquaintance soon justified the wisdom of the 
selection. They evidently were written in a conscientious and Christian spirit, with a manifest 
intent 10 teach historical truths. They constitute an honorable monument to the memory of the 
late Reverend Author, 

Kerney's Compendium was subsequently introduced into the College Grammar School, and 
gave entire satisfaction. In style and system and the interest it excites, it is admirably adapted 
to beginners and junior students, while it may be read and consulted with profit by the more ad- 
vanced. Trusting that your public spirit and enterprise in putting surh standard works within 
reach may meet with a liberal encouragement. I remain yours, very respectfully, 

Messrs. J. Murphy & Co. k Eenj. S. Ewell, President, College W. & Mary. 

The Metropolitan says:— "The style is veritably charming by its simplicity, and by the quiet 
love of his subject which the author displays. It is the language of a talented and successful 
teacher, who relates to his class the great events of time, succinctly but graphically, yet in a 
lively and picturesque manner. It is thus that history should be written for youth." 

The London Standard says:— "These two excellent manuals of History have a wide and in- 
creasing circulation in America, and are everywhere held in the highe>t esteem. The compiler, 
Dr Fredet, has achieved a task of no ordinary difficulty, in compressing so much recondite mat- 
ter into so small a spa^e; in leaving untold nothing that was of note of the immense and varied 
annals of the world. No college, school, or library ought to be without these excellent works." 

The Dublin Telegraph says:— " Fredet's Histories have been adopted, as a class book, by the 
Irish University; and we entertain no doubt, that they will supersede, even in other establish- 
ments, those miserable compilations which wilful perverters of truth have long palmed upon the 
public as histories and abridgments of histories." 

The Dublin Tablet says:— "These two volumes are plain, copious, and useful summaries of 
history, and the number of editions through which they have passed attest their popularity." 

The Philadelphia Instructor says : — " We hope these histories will find their way into literary 
Institutions in order that the young may learn the past from pure and uncorrupted sources." 

Murphy & Co., Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore. ** 
1 ' 



School Edition Lingard's England. 

TAngird?s History of England. By John Lingaed, D. D. 

"With a Continuation from 1G88, to the reitrn of Queen Victoria. 
Abridged by James Burke, Esq , A. B. With an Appendix to 
1873. By the Editor of the First Class Book of History. To which 
are added, Marginal Notes and Questions, adapted the use of 
Schools. 17th Edition 1 CO 

The Student will find that the ipsissima verba of the great Historian 
of England has been religiously preserved in the Abridgment. 
The Continuation has been witten by an author who has been long and 

favorably known in literature. 

NOTICES OF THE PRESS. 

The Metropolitan, in noticing this work, says: — "We are glad to see this excellent abridgment 
adapted to the use of schools. It will do much to remove those many false impressions, which 
English historians have hitherto made upon the readers of history by their word-painting of 
imaginary events. In no nation perhaps was history more ' a conspiracy apainst troth,' than in 
that of England, and in none did the mind of American youth need a more particular antidote to 
jta poisoning influence. It was a good thought then to give a sound, reliable first book to the 
youthful student, and we are happy to find that Mr. Burke and his able American collaborator, 
have succeeded in producing a text-book which we can with the utmost confidence commend to 
the favorable consideration of the instructors of youth. 

The Cambridge (Mass.) Chronicle says:— " We have often called the attention of our readers 
to the great value of Lingard's History. The learning, ability, and general impartiality of the 
author are well known An abridgment of the work was very desirable, and it appears to havo 
been very well done by the present editor. No person can be said to be thoroughly acquainted 
with English History who is not familiar with Lingard. The volume is well printed, in a clear 
type, and convenient form, and furnishes a valuable contribution to the historical literature of 
the country 

The London Critic says: — " The author has carefully and successfully produced a volume that 
must be very acceptable to those for whose use it was designed." 

The Dublin Review says:— "Mr. Burke's Abridgment is completely successful. We do not 
hesitate to pronounce the work, as a whole, one of the most valuable additions to our scanty 
school literature which we have met with for many years.' 

The London edition of Brownson's Review says: -"Mr. Burke appears to have entered on his 
task with an enthusiasm equal to the ability which he has displayed in executing it. He has 
formed a Manual of British History, not merely the best for the object aimed at— the instruction 
of }outh— but a volume of safe reference to those of riper years." 

The Dublin Freeman's Journal says: — "Mr. Burke has performed his laborious task well, 
compressing into a comparatively small space the substance of such a large work in the author's 
own language, adding a clear and rapid abstract of the national history down to the present 
year." 

A. History of the Catholic Church, from the Commencement 

of the Christian Era to the Ecumenical Council of the Vatican. Compiled and 
Translated from the best Authors. By Rev. Theodore Noethen. With Ques- 
tions, adapted to the use of Schools. ..4th Edition ...Recently Published, 1.25 

The utility and importance of a Compendium of Church Ilistory for the use 
of Colleges, Academies and Schools, are so great and so evident, that the Com- 
piler of the present volume deems it unnecessary to make more than a passing 
allusion to this subject. The knowledge of the History of the Catholic Church 
is essentia] to every Catholic. As the age we iive in demands the greatest watch- 
fulness on the part of parents, teachers and pastors, in regard to the moral and 
religious culture of youth, we have omitted nothing that can make this History 
a most complete and perfect text-book lor students, trusting thereby to effect a 
great and lasting good for the present and future time. In order to facilitate the 
use of this work for both teachers and scholars, Questions have been added at 
the end of the book. 

Opinions of the Press. 

"This Compendium has long been needed. We call the attention of all instructors to the 
work, and recommend its introduction into the Catholic schools. Besides bei: g a good text-book 
for the class, it will be found to conta'.n very instructing reading for the family circle. The facts 
are recorded succinctly, and the few reflections made are to the point." Ave Maria. 

"The. book is very praiseworthy."— Calh. World. " Just the book we wanted."— JV. Y. Tablet. 

Murphy & Co., Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore. 



KEHNBY'S COMPENDIUM OF HISTOEY. 

A Compendium of Aneient and Modem History f from 

the Creation to the year 18G7, with Questions adapted to the use of Schools; 
also an Appendix, containing the Declaration of Independence, the Constitu- 
tion of the U. S., a Biographical Sketch of Eminent Personages, with a Chro- 
nological Table of Remarkable Events. Discoveries, Improvements, etc. By 
M. J. Kersey, A. M. 46th Revised and Enlarged Edition, continued up to 1867. 

12o., half arabesque. 1.25 
In presenting a Revised and Enlarged Edition of this Popular History to the 
public, the publishers deem it unnecessary to dwell upon its merits. Exten- 
sively introduced into the Schools of this Country, and in many Institutions of 
Learning in England and Ireland, and even in the East Indies, it has met every- 
where with the greatest favor, and thirty-one editions rapidly exhausted are 
evidence of the liberal patronage extended to this sterling work. 

The Compendium has been brought down to the Present Time, and this Edi- 
tion comprises all the Important Events that have transpired in Europe since 
the Crimean War, including the Recent War between Austria and Prussia; the 
History of the Ephemeral limpire of Mexico; and a Graphic Sketch of the Ame- 
rican Civil War, written without partiality or bias. The data for this Last and 
Important Chapter have been carefully compiled from the most authentic 
sources, and from the best Narrative of the Principal Events of the War, that can 
be put in the hands of the young. 

These additions have been carefully prepared, and written in conformity with 
the spirit of impartiality which has made Mr. Kerney's books so popular. 

Recommendations, Notices, &c. 

This Boole, has been Introduced into the Female High Schools of Baltimore, 

by the following Resolutions, January 10, 1871. 

Resolved, That the Committee oa Female High Schools be authorized to purchase for, and in- 
troduce into said Schools as a Text-book on general History, Kerney's Compendium of History. 

Resolved, That from and after this the use of all other Histories as Text-books in said Female 
High Schools shall be forbidden and the book adopted under the authority of the foregoing reso- 
lutions shall be substituted in the place of those now used and taught in said Schools. 

Baltimore City College, Baltimore, May 3lst, 1871. 

Messrs Murphy & Co. In accordance with your request, I have carefully examined Ker- 
ney's Compendium of History. As the result of this examination, I can unhesitatingly affirm 
that the work is uniformly pervaded by a clear, candid, and discriminating narration of leading 
historical events, which admirably adapts it to the purposes of Instruct on in our Schools and 
Academies. A second and a more diligent perusal of the book, has only served to confirm my 
first impressions of its excellence, and I commend it to all who are interested in elevating the 
standard of instruction in this most important department of our educational system. 

Henry E. Shepherd, Prof. History and Literature, 
Eastern Female High School, Baltimore, June 20, 1871. 

Gentlemen : I have r.o cause to change the fa orable opinion I expressed of " K'einey'j Com- 
pendium of Aneient and Modern History" on its introduction into this School. In the hand of 
the true educator it has, I think, no superior. Nath. H. Thayer. 

Kerney's Co i pendium has been introduced into the College Grammar School, and gives entire 
satisfaction. In style and system, and the interest it excites, it is admirably adapted to begin- 
ners and junior students, while it may he read and consulted with profit by the more advanced. 

Benj. S. Ewell, President. 

Williamsburg, Va., October, 1867. College William and Mary. 

The Compendium of History, by M. J. Kerney, has been in my possession several months, and 
after a careful reading, I believe it to be a very useful book in the department of study to which 
it belongs. I take pleasure in recommending it to teachers. 

J. N. M'Jilton, Chairman Central High School of Bait. 

"We have looked through it w'th some attention, and must confess that we have been favora- 
bly impressed with its merits. In the History, more especially, where it is impossible to avoid 
the relation of f ic:s touching various religious creeds, the compiler seems to have scrupulously 
refrain d from any remark that could arouse sectarian prejudice— a fault in which too many of 
those who have given their labors to the compilation of school histories have been prone to in- 
dulge." National Intelligencer. 
_ " As an elementary treatise, this work will, we should suppose be, and deservedly so, afavorite 
m o.ir sc .ools. Tiie appendix of biographical notices of prominent individuals, is an original 
and desiraole addition to ihe book." Lutheran Observer. 

"It is a work containing much useful information, and, as a school book, and for general his- 
torical reference, it will be found invaluable." Baltimore America*- 

Murphy & Co., Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore. 
3 



Upwards of 80,000 Copies liave been Sold. 

Jxerney's First Class Booh of History, Designed for Pupils 

commencing the Study of History, with Questions, adapted to the use of 
Schools. By M. J. Kersey, A. M., Author of Compendium of History, <fcc, Ac. 

Revised and Enlarged Edition. {8ol.h Thousand.) 60 

J$5"It is Clear, Comprehensive, Truthful and Impartial, and can he recommended •with confi- 
dence, as the best and most reliable School History Published. 

The appearance of thirty-two large editions of Kerney's First Class Book of 
History within twenty years, is a sufficient evidence of its popularity as an ele- 
mentary class book. As a book for study, and a book for reading, in place of the 
disjointed matter found in ordinary " Readers," the publishers have endeavored 
to make it every way worthy of continued patronage. 

The importance of the particular changes introduced in this edition, renders 
it desirable to call the attention of teachers and parents to its e lhanced value. 
Errors and inaccuracies of whatever kind have been carefully rectified, If any 
have found in it heretofore defects worthy of notice, it is to be hoped that the 
emendations supplied, — suggested as they have been, by teachers of experi- 
ence, — will recommend this new edition to their hearty approval. 

In order to make this book correspond in character with the Author's larger 
work, the "Compendium of Ancient and Modsrn History," the last edition was 
enlarged by the introduction of a short synopsis of Sacred and Ancient History. 
In Modern History, several chapters were added, embracing the most important 
recent events that had transpired in the civilized countries of the world, includ- 
ing the late " American Civil War." 

The form of " Questions " at the foot of each page has been improved. Super- 
fluities have been retrenched, and facts equally as important to be known as' 
those already stated, introduced. "Where the narrative embraces events, which, 
from their religious or political bearing, gives rise to a diversity of opinion' 
among men, eare has been taken to avoid a method of statement likely to prove 
offensive to either extreme. Truth is the object aimed at, not partisanship : in 
the interests of which it is notorious that the most of what is called History, is 
written. The publishers trust that this little book will now find its way into a 
still wider circle of institutions, than those in which it has been heretofore 
known and appreciated. 

No pains have been spared in the revision and preparation of this Edition, 
with the hope of rendering it worthy, in every respect, of the high commenda- 
tion and liberal patronage enjoyed by Mr. Kerney's Popular Class Books. 

From a large number of Recommendations, toe select the following : 

From- Professor Joyxes, of Washington and Lee University ,Va. 
Messrs. JOHN Murphy & Co., Dear Sirs: — T have used Kerney's First Lessons in History tor 
some time past, in teaching my own children, and have had occasion at the same time to compare 
it with other boobs for the first study of History. I consider Kerney's much the best book for this 
purpose that I have seen. It is the most comprehensive, and at the same time the simplest in its 
style— while it is fu'.I of fads, it is :.ls» sufficiently enlivened by anecdote and incident, to keep 
up the interest of children. It seems moreo . er to be just and truthful, and contains nothing 
that cou'd be offensive to any portion of our people— a quality that in these days, when school 
books seem to be regarded as proper instruments for political teaching, should commend it es- 
pecially to the peo; le of the South. I trust it may have a wide circulation in our Southern 
Schools. Very truly. EDWARD S. JOYXES. 

Eastern Female High School, Baltimore, June 26, 1871. 
Gentlemen-: — The true province of the Historian i3 to give facts without comment. This is a 
distinguishing quality of Kerney's "First Book of History," which renders it not only a model 
for all compilers, but an unobjeetional work for all schools. Nath aniel. H. Thayer. 

Board School Commissioners of Talbot Co., Easton, April 29, 1878. 
J. Mttrpht & CO., Sirs:— We find no books so well adapted to the wants of our Public School* 
as "Kerney's First Class Book of History" and "Kerney's Compendium of History." The 
School Board of Talbot county adopted these books unanimously. A. Chaplain, Sec'y. 

Murphy & Co., Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore. 
4 



ONDERDONK'S HISTORY OF MARYLAND, 

From its Settlement, to 1 8 77. With the Constitution of the State, for the Use of Schools. 

Fifth Revised and Enlarged Edition, with Fine Engravings, 376 pages, 75 cts. 

Adopted as a Text-Book in the Public Schools of Baltimore, 
and several Counties op the State. 

From the Preface. — The former editions of this History having met with such 
favor from the public that a new edition is demanded, opportunity has been 
given to make further additions. Biographical sketches of some of Maryland's 
prominent men have been added. New illustrations have been made, and it 
has been more thoroughly adapted to the use of the class room. The portion 
that relates to the period of the civil war has been re-written, and care has been 
taken to make it a History of the State during that war. No attempt has been 
made, and it would be out of place if it were made, to give a history of the war; 
tlvat belongs to the History of the United States. ( 

i The History of the Proprietary government, under which Maryland was es- 
tablished and grew, is full, for it is in that government that we find the germs 
of those principles of popular liberty that resulted in the Revolution; and it is 
in the free institutions founded under it that we recognize the school in which 
our fathers learned both the true objects of government, and their own rights 
as individuals. 

There is perhaps no stimulus to worthy deeds, or at least to the preservation 
of self-respect, equal to that which is furnished in the legacy of a good name. 
That our youth should know how rich the History of Maryland is in all that can 
inspire noble emulation, is not only desirable in itself, but is the surest pledge 
that they will be animated to deeds worthy of their sires, and that, by "imitat- 
ing the virtue, the valor, and the liberality of their forefathers," they will hand 
down the State to posterity with untarnished lustre. 

In the former editions, the hope was expressed that this little book might be 
instrumental in promoting this knowledge among the rising generation of the 
State. The adoption of this History as a text-book by the Public Schools of the city of 
Baltimore, and the subsequent adoption by the State Board of Education, and their 
recommendation of its use by all the Schools of the Stale, justify the hope expressed, 
and give assurance that it supplies the want so long felt. 

With the view of meeting the requirements of the School Law of 1872, the Constitution 
of the State has been added. The importance of making this a subject of study 
in the common schools cannot be over estimated. As it is the duty of every 
man to take a part in the political movements ot the day, we trust, that our 
youth, will be thoroughly instructed therein, so that when they come to act 
their part on the stage of life, they may be amply prepared to discharge the 
high and holy duties that necessarily devolve upon every freeman. 

The authorities consulted in this work are MeMahon, McSherry, Irving, Ban- 
croft, Bozman, and papers of Maryland Historical Society. 

College St. James, Sept. 1877. HENRY ONDERDONK. 

Office Superintendent of Public Instruction, 

Baltimore, April 30th, 1877. 
This is to certify that the Third Revised Edition of Onderdonk's History of Maryland, pub- 
lished by John Murphy & Co., Baltimore, was on the 24th of April, in accordance with a unani- 
mous resolution of the Committee on Books, adopted by the Board of School Commissioners of 
Baltimore, for use in the Grammar Schools. HENRY E. SHEPHERD, 

Superintendent of Public Schools, 

Jg®" At a meeting of the State Board of Education, held on the 29th of May, 1872, Onder- 
donk's School History f Maryland, with the Constitution of the State Appended, was unani- 
mousty recommended for adoption in all the Public Schools of the State. 

Murphy & Co. Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore. 
5 



Kerney's Arithmetics. 

The Columbian Arithmetic, designed for the Use of Acade- 
mies and Schools. By M. J. Kerney, A. M „ 26th Edition. 50 

The aim has been, in the compilation and arrangement of this -work, to make it a book of 
practical instruction; one in which the science of figures is thoroughly explained and clearly 
elucidaied. The examples for practice are generally such as the pupil will meet in the various 
businesi transactions of life. The arrangement is progressive, all questions being solved by 
rules previously explained. This new edition has been carefully revised and enlarged. Several 
useful tables on the subject of Interest have been introduced, and numerous miscellaneous 
ex-imples adJ<>d. The e improvements render the work still more deserving of the extensive 
paiiuiiuge it has heretofore enjoyed. 

Key to Kerney's Columbian Arithmetic, containing the 

Solution of the principal Questions 40 

Introduction to the Columbian Arithmetic, for the Use of 

•^Schools. By M. J. Kerney, A. M 30th Revised Edition. 20 

This little work is designed as an introduction to the former, and is intended for children 
about to commence the study of Arithmetic. The first principles of the science are familiarly 
explained in the form of question and answer, and the pupils are conducted in the study as far 
as the end of compound numbers. It is replete with practical examples, adapted to the capacity 
of that class of learners for which it is designed, and it also contains all the Tables. 

Mr. Kerney's Arithmetics have already acquired a wide-spread popularity, as attested oy the 
Bale of large'editions in a few years. They are books of practical instruction, arranged by a 
practical teacher of many years' experience. The present editions have been carefully revised, 
and nei:her pains nor expense will be spared to render them at all times worthy the high 
reputation already acquired. 

The Publishers have the pleasure of announcing that this Series of Arithmetics havp under- 
gone a ca-eful and thorough revision, by a Brother of the Society of the Holy Cross, an 
experienced practical teacher and arithmetician. 

Kerney's Murray' s Grammar, — An Abridgment of Murray's 
Grammar and Exercises, designed for the Use of Academies and Schools; with 
an Appendix, containing Rules for Writing with Perspicuity and Accuracy; 
also a Treatise on Epistolary Composition . By M. J. Kerney, A. M. 

46th Edition. 18o. half bound, 25 
This Grammar is used in the Public Schools of Baltimore; in the Schools of the Christian 
Brothers; and in many of the principal Schools and Academies throughout the country. 

In point of arrangement, this work is superior to any other Abridgment of Murray's Gram- 
mar that has yet appeared before the public. It combines the Grammar and Exercise, by adapt- 
ing Exercises to every chapter and section throughout the work, so that the pupil may have, at 
every stage of his progress, a practical illustration of the portion under his immediate s'.udy. 
The present e lition has been carefully revised by the author, and many valuable improvements 
made in the work. A Treatise on Epistolary Composition has b-en added, containing direc- 
tions for writing Letters, Notes, Cards, &c, with a variety of examples of the same. 

A Catechism of Scripture History, compiled by the Sisters 

of Mercy for the children attending their schools. Revised by M. J. Kerney, 

A. M 31st Edition. 75 

"This excellent work is extensively used in nearly aU Catholic Institutions throughout 
England, Ireland, Canada, and the United States. 

" The object of the Catechism, ' is to render children early acquainted with the truthful and 
interesting events recorded in the Sacred Scriptures; to familiarize them with the prophecies 
relating to the coming of the Messiah, and lead them to regaid the Old Testament as a figure 
and a forshadowing of the New.' 

"The present edition has been much improved, Hie questions to the answers being made 
more concise, so as to admit of their being easily committed to memory. An Appendix has also 
been add- d, containing extracts from the Prophets, Scripture texts, and 6hort sketches of the 
lives of the Apostles and Evangelists. The Chronological Table, which has been carefully re- 
vised and considerably enlarged, fixes the dates cf the most remarkable events recorded in the 
Sacred Writings." 

Catechism of Ecclesiastical History. Abridged for the Use 
of Schools. By a Friend of Youth. Enlarged Edition. 16o. flexible cloth, 30 
This little work has been carefully revised and enlarged, the text being brought down to the 
present time. These improvements it is hoped will render it still more popular with the in- 
structors of youth. 

Mun ay f s English Grammar, adapted to the different classes 

ol learners; with an Appendix, containing rules and observations for assisting 
the more advanced students to write with perspicuity and accuracy, by 

Lindley Murray- 12o. 40 

In presenting a new edition of Murray's Grammar, which is universally considered the best 
extant, we deem it sufficient to state, that the present edition is printed from an entirely new 
set of plates, and that it has been carefully revised, and free from many of the inaccuracies and 
blemishes which are to be found in other editions, printed from old stereotype plates. This^ 
together with the very low price affixed to it, are the only claims urged in favor of this edition. 

Murray's English Reader 18o. 35 

Murphy & Co. Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore 
6 



HILL'S PHILOSOPHY. 
HILL'S PHILOSOPHY,- Comprising Ethics and 
Moral Philosophy. By Kev. Walter H. Hill, S. J., Pro- 

fessorof Philosophy in the St. Louis University , Mo. Just Published, 
in 1 vol. 12o. 342 pages, half arabesque $1 50 

We have the pleasure of announcing the second volume of Hill's Philosophy, 
comprising the very important subject of Ethics, or Moral Philosophy. The 
Author has taken time to perfect his work by reflection, revision and frequent 
correction, so that his Readers will be repaid for their long waiting by the ex- 
cellence of the work. 

Ethics is a subject on which we have thus far had no safe text-book in our 
language; and yet its importance is such, that no other subject, besides those 
intimately connected with faith and religion, needs more wise and discrimi- 
nating treatment. 

§ In a country like ours, where every citizen wields power for the weal or woe 
of his fellow-citizens and his country, what can be of more vital consequence 
than that every citizen should have true and sound notions and principles 
about the great questions of which Moral Philosophy treats, such as the nature 
and origin of authority, dominion and government; the relation of man to 
himself, to society and to his Maker; the family, education, &c? 

The volume here presented is one in which all may read with profit, and whose 
doctrine they can safely adopt and follow in practice. To the student and pro- 
fessional man it is simply indispensable. It advances nothing that is not war- 
ranted by the greatest and wisest of the men of past ages, St. Thomas, St. 
Augustine, Suarez, Becanus, &c , whose authority is quoted on every page. The 
Author's own long experience in teaching this branch of science, in one of the 
principal colleges of the Society of Jesus in this country, is another motive for 
confidence in the fruit of the patient labor he has bestowed on his work. 

-We send it forth on its mission, in the assured hope that it will be received 
with at least as much favor as was shown to the volume on Logic and General 
Metaphysics from the same pen. 

ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY, Comprising Logic 

and General Principles of Metaphysics. By Rev. Walter H. Hill, S.J., 
Professor of Philosophy in the St. Louis University, Mo. hth Revised Edition, $1 50 
From the Publishers' Preface to the Second Revised Edition. — It is not yet 
one month since we issued the First Edition of Hill's Philosophy, and such 
has been the demand for the work, that a second Editon is required. Very 
favorable notices have already been given of the work by several periodicals, 
and able judges, whose verdict we know to be of the highest authority, have pro- 
nounced the book a true and trusty guide through the intricacies of philosophy. 
«a " We rejoice at this success, because it ensures the completion of the whole 
work, including Ethics, and gives us every reason to believe that we shall soon 
have, in our language, a Manual of Philosophy, for students and for the general 
reader, equal to the admirable Latin works, which have hitherto been almost 
the only pure sources of Philosophical knowledge.'' 

"The Author has taken advantage of the opportunity offered by the prepara- 
tion of this Edition, to revise his work and thus render it more acceptable to 
the student." 

This Work is from the pen of one who has devoted many years to the study 
and teaching of philosophy. That it is sound in principle, is guaranteed by the 
well known character of the studies in the Society to which the author belongs, 
whilst his experience as a Teacher leaves no room for doubt that his book has 
been written in clear and correct language. It is elementary and must be con- 
cise; yet it treats the important points of philosophy so clearly, and contains so 
many principles of wide application, that it cannot fail to be especially useful in 
a Country where sound philosophical doctrine is perhaps more needed than 
in any other. 

4®*Specimen copies of either Work, will be sent by Mail prepaid, to Teachers 
and others, with a view to Introduction, only on receipt of one-half the retail 
price, J&B=> These two volumes are special. 

Murphy A Co., Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore. 
7 



Sestini's Mathematical Works. 

Elementary Algebra. By B. Sbstini, S J., Author of Analyti- 
cal Geometry, &c, &c. Professor of Natural Philosophy and 
Astronomy in Georgetown College. 12o. half arabesque, 75 

Tlie main object of this treatise is to render the scienpe of Algehra intelligi- 
ble to pupils vrho'-e minds are yet unaccustomed to such studies. The beginner 
will here be furni-hed with sm h proofs as are suited to his capacity ; examples 
will afford new light to what might be otherwise obscured with regaid to the 
operations founded on higher principles; he will, for the present, content him- 
self with merely practical rules, exemplified in the same manner. With a mind 
thus gradually led on to strict mathematical discussion, he may then resume 
his course with profit, by the aid of a treatise now in preparation, which is in- 
tendvd as a sequel to this, and, by more exact and thorough investigation, com- 
plete his fctudy of Algebra. 

A Treatise on Algebra. By B. Sestixi, S. J., Author of 
11 Elementary Algebra," "Analytical Geometry, &c. 12o. 1 00 
The treatise i* divided into two ptrts, the first of which contains Algebraical 
operations, with several questions and doctrines connected with therm so that 
each section may prove complete in its own subject, and the inconvenience of 
turning elsewhere to speak of matter left unfinished betore, may be avoided. . . . 
The second contains the most indispensable theories of equations, proportions, 
and progressions, logarithms, and some few principles on the series. The doc- 
trine of equations has been treated more copiously than the others, not so much 
on account of its importance as because it is well adapted to give an idea of 
algebraic analysis, and thus prepare the mind of the student, who would after- 
wards apply himself to higher studies. It is as clear and concise as the nature 
of such works permits, and seems to embrace everything necessary to a lull 
knowledge of Algebra. 

Elements of Geometry and Trigonometry, by B. Sestint, 

S.J., Author of "Analytical Geometry," " Elementary Algebra," &c. 8o. half cl. 82 
"The author has succeeded in combining two qua'ities rarely united,— great 
perspicuity and extreme conciseness. It has evidently been the result of great 
thought and long experience in teaching. The student passes gradually from 
the simpler to the more complex truths of the science. The work caunot be too 
warmly commended as an admirable introduction to the science it professes to 
teach, and we would advise teachers and parents not to select a text-book until 
they have given this volume a careful and candid examination." — Metropolitan. 

Manual of Geometrical and Infinitesimal Analysis, by 

.. B. Sestixi, S. J. 8o., half roan (Eecently Published,) 1 50 

Extract fror.i the Preface. — "This manual, prepared with the view of its serving 
as an introduction to the study of Physical fecience, was onlv intended for a 
class of studenis intrusted to the care of the compiler. The suggestion of 
friends that the work might prove advantageous to others induces him to offer 
it to the public. 

"Works of analysis — some of them voluminous — are not wanting; nor does 
our little book pretend to give a complete development of its subject. For this 
reason we ca.l it a manual, which excludes all discussions the results of which 
are seldom or never called into use in the applications. It is hoped, however, 
thrt it will sufficiently serve the purpose intended." 

The North American Spelling Booh. Designed for 
Elementary Introduction in Schools. A New Enlarged Edition. 
Being an improvement upon all others 20 

The aim in this compilation has been to present a gradation of lessons necessary to 
impart a knowledge of the spelling, division, pronunciation, and accentuation of the 
Tarious sounds and syllables that compose the English language. In pronouncing 
and accenting words, good usage and the best lexicographers have been followed 
The rules laid down are few, but 6imple and concise; and the progress from what is 
easy to what is difficult, is gentle and gradual. It is universally conceded to be on# 
of the **8T, aa it is unquestionably the Ctieapest Spelling Book published. 

Murphy & Co. Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore. 



THE BEST AND CHEAPEST 

"Wilson's [Progressive Speller. 

Wilson's Progressive Speller, containing upwards of Twelve 
Thousand Words, with Reading and Dictation Exercises annexed to each Les- 
son, arranged so as to be best adapted to Aid the Memory, and obviate the 
difficulties in this Branch of Elementary Education. Compiled by William J. 

Wilson, of North Carolina Fifth Revised Edition, 190 pages, 12o. 25 

This boo£ has been prepared with great care by a gentleman eminently quali- 
fied, both by education and experience. Its characteristic is the simplicity of 
its arrangement. Being strictly a Spelling Book, no attempt is made to combine 
with it subjects of study coming, properly, after the child has learned to spell 
and read. Each lesson is accompanied by a Reading and Dictation Exercise, 
designed to cultivate the eye. the eir, and the hand. The object of a Speller 
being to teach the mechanica 1 structure and pronunciation of words, the lessons 
and exercise- are arranged primarily and solely to this end. The orthography 
and orthoepy are according to the standards recognized as highest authorities in 
this country. Especial care has been taken to keep it free from provincialisms, 
and it is, therefore, recommended as a Text-Book suitable alike for all sections 
of the country. The completeness of its vocabulary may be known from th$ 
fact of it3 containing upwards of twelve Thousand English words. 

Recommendations, Notices, &c. 
State of North Carolina, Office Scferixtendext of Public Instebctioh, 

Raleigh, May 20th, 1871- 
Messrs. Johx Mcrphy k Co., Gents— I have the honor to inform you tnat, hy vhtue of a vota 
passed by the Board of Education of this State, on the 25th of March last, " Wilson's Progres- 
sive Speller" is recommended for use in the Public Schools of thi3 State. 

Yours truly S. S. ASHLEY, Sec'y of Board. 

From Rev.C. EWilet, Superintendent of Common Schools of N. Carolina. 
Mr.W. J. Wilsox: Dear Sir— I have examined with care your.Spelling Book, and regard it aa 
a book of decided merit. You have manifested in its preparation taste, j udgmect and learning, 
and I consider it worthy of introduction into our schools. I am truly yours, C. H. WILEY. 

From Rev. B. Craven, D. D., President of Trinity College, N. C. 
Mr. Wilson* : Dear Sir — I have examined your Spelling Book, and believe it in many respects 
superior to any with which I am acquainted. It is full of important improvements. I should be 
glad to see it introduced into all our schools. B. CRAVEN. 

From Rev. Dr. D e e m s, of N. Carolina. 

Dear Sir — The pressure of my engagements has not allowed time for a very careful examina- 
tion of the MS of your Spelling Book, the many good points of which have made themselves ap- 
parent to the Rev. Dr Craven and the Rev. Mr. Wiley, whose judgment of such a work I am free 
to endorse. I hope it will meet with deserved success. Very respectfully yours, 

W. J. Wilson, Esq. CHARLES F. DEEMS. 

From Professor Joyxes, of Washington and Lee University, Va. 

Messrs. Johx Murphy & Co., Dear Sirs— I regard Wilson's Progressive Speller, published by 
yon, as the best Spelling Book that I have ever seen. In simplicity, in fullness, in well dis- 
tributed and well graded classification, and in practical convenience for use, I think it superior 
toother books. The Dic'.a'ion Exercises that accompany the spelling lessons, afford a usefnl 
praxis for the pupil. I like the book most of all on account of its simplicity and easy progres- 
eiveness. It recognizes the old truth — almost forgotten now-a-days— that spelling is something 
not only worth learning, but very hard to learn, and therefore needed to be taught by systematic, 
constant, and well-graded practice; "nd of this, it furnishes more, and furnishes it more judi- 
ciously, than any other book that I have seen. I wish it may obtain a very wide use. 

EDWARD S. JOYNES. 

" The work is systematic, d ;void of provincialism?, arranged with strict regard to gradation 
with a uniformity of all the leading vowel sounds in all the words of each lesson. The classifi- 
cation is admirable, and we believe the work will be approved by teachers everywhere." 

Memphis Public Ledger. 

Murphy & Co., Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore. 



July, 1S7S. 

To Catholic Educational Institutions. 

In soliciting attention to the following, the Publishers have the 
pleasure of announcing that most of these Works have been intro- 
duced, and are extensively used in many of the leading Colleges, 
Academies, and Schools in the U. S., Canada, See. 

From a large number of Recommendations, &c, we select the folloiving : 
Professor John O Kane Murray, B. S., of Brooklyn, N. Y., in his Literary Correspond- 
ence to the Toronto Tribune, under the head of ''American Literary Rotes," says: 
A. History of the Catholic Church — "how many who think themselves 
very intelligent, never read one, in fact, never saw any such work? Without 
wishing to press the point too closely, how many, even of our Catholic College 
graduates, know quite as much about the history of Mohametanism as they do 
about the history of Catholicity— perhaps more? And is this something to be 
proud of— something concerning which every one who is not a college president, 
or a Cardinal, should be silent? But why write a catechism? The plain, blunt 
truth is, this is a matter of shame in many of our higher institutions. Algebra, 
mythology — the tag-ends of nearly every 'ology' and 'ometry,' are freely 
thrown to students, while they are left to hunger for even a glance at any book 
containing the history of what is dearest to us on earth — our sublime Old 
Church! Who hears of a student's getting a prize for excellence in Church 
History? Frankly, I have not. We talk about religious instruction; with clarion 
voice, we urge the necessity of making our Catholic youth familiar with the 
Church and her doctrines. This is well. But let every Catholic College hang 
its head in shame, 'as a traitor to its high mission,' if it neglects placing 
Church History on its programme of necessary studies. 

"On this subject we have now some excellent text-books, about one of the 
very best of which, I desire to make a few remarks. The ' History of the Catho- 
lic Church,' by Rev. Father Noethen, is a handsomely bound volume of 650 
pages. It is published at a very low price by the enterprising house of John 
Murphy & Co., Baltimore. As a well written and meritorious text-book on 
Church History, it has no rival in our language. 'Full without overflowing,' 
it strikes the golden mean between too much and too little. The arrangement, 
the skillful presentation of salient points, the omission of trivialities commands 
hearty praise— in short, the whole book bears the impress of a master hand. 
This is just the volume for our students— not to be ignorant of, but to master. 
It would be interesting to know how many of our Catholic Colleges in the 
United States and the Dominion of Canada, use a text-book on Church History. 
Now, I desire it to be well understood, that this is written with all due respect 
to everybody, by one who does not wish to be numbered with the croakers, and 
who is neither indifferent to the good name of our Catholic Colleges, nor ignor- 
ant of the grand work they are doing for the sound education, true progress, 
and civilization in America." 

Isingard's England, by Burke, (720 pages,) is a most felicitous and success- 
ful attempt at giving the world an abridgment of the greatest history of Eng- 
land ever written. The fifteenth revised and enlarged edition lies before me. 
It brings the story of England, down to 1873. As an excellent treatise for the 
student or general reader, it is unequalled in beauty of style, treatment of sub- 
ject, Catholic tone, and richness of illustration. The "make up" of the book 
is also highly creditable to the publishers. 

"The rapid progress made by American Catholic literature, during the last 
few years, is a subject not by any means as well known as it should be. This 
is especially noticeable in the line of sound, suitable text-books for Catholic 
schools and colleges. Among the enterprising publishing houses that have 

Murphy & Co., Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore. 
10 



Recommendations, &c. — Continued. 

been conspicuous in bringing about this laudable improvement, stands the well 
known firm of John Murphy & Co., of Baltimore. In the department of general 
history they publish the best text-books in the English language. This may 
sound like hyperbole; but it is not said at random, nor without knowing that 
•whereof we speak.' 

Fredet's A.ncicnt and Modern, History, in two volumes, are used in the 
best Catholic Colleges in the United States, Canada, Great Britain and Ireland. 
As an excellent general history in one volume, Zerne^s Compendium, of 
Ancient and Modem History stands alone, while his * 

First Class Boole of History is an inimitable little volume to familiarize 
youth with the great story of the past. 

Besides the foregoing, the following are a few of the excellent text-books 
which can be warmly commended to Catholic educators and Catholic parents. 
They are published by Messrs. Murphy & Co., to whose courtesy we are in- 
debted for copies of the latest revised editions : 

Hill's Philosophy. — The Elements of Philosophy, by Father Hill, S. J., is 
another new work, which will prove of rare value to our Catholic students. It 
is a well bound volume of some 234 pages, and contains a thorough discussion 
of Logic and General Metaphysics. Iu our language, we know of but one other 
such work, (Louage's) written from a Catholic stand point, and of the two we 
much prefer Father Hill's book. Sound in doctrine, and written in a clear, terse 
stylo, this is a much needed and truly welcome text-book. 
A glance at another work, and w<^ must finish. 

Wettenhall's Greek, Grammar.— Rudiments of the Greek Lanr/vage,* by a 
learned Jesuit Father, is an admirable little grammar of that ciass-io tongue 
which was immortalized by Homer, Pindar and Sophocles. In 112 pages are 
condensed, simplified and arranged with a masterhand, the principal points of 
Greek grammar. For accuracy, clearness, brevity and neatness, we have seen 
nothing to surpass this small volume." 



School and Classical Books, Paper, Stationery, &c. 

Their stock of School Books embraces, in addition to their own, 
nearly all the Publications of the leading Publishers in the United 
States, comprising every variety of Primers, Spellers, Headers, 
Grammars, Arithmetics, Geographies, Histories, Dictionaries, etc.; 
also, Works on Elocution, Algebra, Geometry, Trigonometry, As- 
tronomy, Botany, Chemistry, Geology, and Mineralogy, Philoso- 
phy, Ehetoric, and Logic, Book-Keeping, Penmanship, etc., etc., 
together with all the leading Text- Books in Latin, Greek, French, 
Spanish and German — nearly all of which they are prepared to 
supply at Publishers' wholesale prices. 

Their Stock of Paper, Stationery, and School Requisites generally, 
comprises every variety, all of which they are prepared to sell at the 
lowest current rates 

j|^°Orders, which will receive the same careful and prompt atten- 
tion, as if selected in person, are respectfully solicited. 

J^lg^The various Railroad, Transportation, Express and Steamship 
Companies running from our city, afford every facility for trans- 
portation at the Lowest Rates, to all parts of the country — North 
and South, East and West. 

Murphy & Co., Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore. 
11 



Jenkins' English Literature. 

Just Published, in a handsome volume of 56U pages, 12o. price in cloth, $2. 
Library style, half morocco, $3. 

The Student's Handbook of British and American Literature, 

Containing Sketches Biographical and Critical of the Most 
Distinguished English Authors, from the Earliest Times to the 
Present Dag, with Selections from their Writings, and Questions 
adapted to the Use of Schools. By Rev. O. L. Jenkins, A. M., 
Late President of St. Charles, and formerly President of St. Mary 1 a 
College, Baltimore. (Special.) 

This is an Elementary History of the English Language and Literature, espe- 
cially intended for Schools, Academies and Colleges. 'J he period which it 
embraces, d>ites back as early as the time when the Saxons under Hengist and 
Horsa landed in Britain, and reaches to our own day through the following 
stages: the Anglo-Saxon Period, 549-1065; the Semi-Saxon Period, lUo5-125<>; the 
Old English Period, 1250-1350; the Middle English Period, 1350-1580; and the Modem 
Period, from 1580 to our time. Each of these periods is a point of departure in 
the history of English Literature, and each constitutes in it^eif a well-defined 
epoch in the growth of the language. In the fifth, or last period, falls the Liter- 
ary HrsTORY of America. This is divided into three parts; the Colonial Era, 
the Revolutionary Period, and the Present Century. 

The extracts have been carefully selected, with a view to serve not only as 
fair specimens of the slyle of the writers, but also as an illustrative history in 
themselves of Engdsh Literature. Various Tables, chronological and linguistic, 
as well as a copious Index, accompany the work In fine, Questions have been 
introduced, for the special convenience of teachers and students. 

Brief Extracts from Notices of the Press,&c. 

Brooklyn, N. Y., March 6, 1876. 
John Mukpuy, Esq., Publisher, Baltimore, 

Dear Sir : — " I beg of you to excuse my delay 
in giving what you so kindly ask — my humble 
opinion of Rev. Father Jenkins' text-book on 
our language and literature. I have given it a 
few hours examination, and my impressions 
are: The plan is good, the execution is excel- 
lent. The learned author handles his subject 
with ability, clearness, wisdom, and a calm 
impartially, as rare as it is admirable. The 
critical remarks, both original aud borrowed, 
arc happy and to the point. Much good tas^j 
and sound, cultivated. judgment are exhibited 
in the selection of the specimens. As a whole, 
the work has so many merits, that it will — it 
must take its place as the text-book in English 
literature in all our high Carbolic instit tions 
of learning." J. O'KANE MURRAY. 

Baltimore, July nth, 1876. 
Mr. John Murphy-, 

Dear Sir : — Be pleased to accept my grateful 
acknowledgments for a copy of Dr. Jenkms" 
Handbook of British and A nerican Literature. 
I read the work with great interest and plea- 
sure. It impressed me as a sound and scholarly 
book, carefully constructed, and containing 
much valuable information in regard to many 
authors, whose works and whose history, are 
little known to the American public. I trust 
that its success may be commensurate with its 
merits. I am, dear sir, yours very truly, 
HENRY E. SIIEPnERD, 
Sup't Public Instruction, Baltimore. 

"ThATTiatory of the English language i* well 
and usefully illustrated in the Work before us 
by numerous extracts from Saxon and Anglo- 
Saxon writers of various periods, accompanied 
hy translations into modern English. The 
study of this book alone would go far towards 
enabling any one to understand and enjoy the 
Anglo Saxon writers." London Tablet. 

"It is without exception, the best student's 
handbook we have yet had under perusal." 
Newark Daily Journal. 



"The author shows himself thoroughly versed 
in his subject. He writes with elegance, occa- 
sionally with force, as in tne remarks on the 
influence of the Protestant Reformation on lit- 
erature. His taste is true and his judgment 
sound." Catholic World. 

"Wo find much in it to praise; the biographi- 
cal sketches are ex ellent, and the selections 
have been made wuh good taste. We like the 
arrangement of the work, which is clear and 
methodical." Ave Maria. 

"It embraces specimens of the styles of 
writers, from the Anglo-Saxon period to the 
present time. These extracts are preceded by 
ample biographical and critical sketches of 
their authors, with interesting historical de- 
tails relative to the progress of letters during 
the different periods. Various tables, chronolo- 
gical and linguistic, as well as a copious index, 
accompany the work." Publishers' Weekly. 

" The work is well written, and to Catholio 
students of English literature, we cordially 
recommend it. The style is excellent; it is 
the safest and most appreciative text-book 
that ha3 so far appeared in America." 

The Salesianum. 

"The present volume is very full, compre- 
hensive and complete, omiting no literary name 
of any note." St. Louis Globe Democrat. 

"We think that it cannot be excelled, and 
cmnot fail to become one of the most aco-p- 
table text-books that, has yet been presented to 
our educational institutions." — PitUburg Calh. 

"This book is not only adapted to literary 
classes in schools, but well adapted to home 
reading by all who wish to be posted on the 
growth and cultivators of our vernacular." 
Nebraska Watchman. 

"No student or professional man should bo 
without this excellent work, as to many it will 
prove exceedingly useful, and to all a most in- 
structive and interesting acquisition. It is a 
condensed library, and is worth ten times its 
price." Baltimore Sunday Nnot. 



Murphy & Co. Publishers and Booksellers, Baltimore. 



LBS' 






12 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Dec. 2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVAT.ON 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724)779-2111 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




013 544 425 A 







I 



^H 






■ 



.-..;?. 






